-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/bn_int.h"
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#ifndef RSA_NULL
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+#include "rsa_local.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa);
static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = {
- "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA (from Eric Young)",
+ "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA",
rsa_ossl_public_encrypt,
rsa_ossl_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
rsa_ossl_private_encrypt, /* signing */
NULL,
0, /* rsa_sign */
0, /* rsa_verify */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
+ NULL, /* rsa_keygen */
+ NULL /* rsa_multi_prime_keygen */
};
+static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
+
+void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ default_RSA_meth = meth;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void)
+{
+ return default_RSA_meth;
+}
+
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
{
return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
}
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+ rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
goto err;
/*
- * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
- * modulus
+ * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+ * the length of the modulus.
*/
- j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
- i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
- for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
- to[k] = 0;
-
- r = num;
+ r = BN_bn2binpad(ret, to, num);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
+ return r;
}
static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BN_BLINDING *ret;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa->lock);
if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
}
ret = rsa->blinding;
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) {
+ if (BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(ret)) {
/* rsa->blinding is ours! */
*local = 1;
*local = 0;
if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
- if (!got_write_lock) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
- }
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
}
ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
}
err:
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa->lock);
return ret;
}
static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (unblind == NULL)
+ if (unblind == NULL) {
/*
* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
*/
return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else {
+ } else {
/*
* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
*/
int ret;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+
+ BN_BLINDING_lock(b);
ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ BN_BLINDING_unlock(b);
+
return ret;
}
}
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
- int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+ rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL) {
}
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
- BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_d = d = BN_new();
- if (d == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- d = rsa->d;
+ BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (rsa->d == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ BN_free(d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
+ BN_free(d);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_d before any further use of rsa->d */
- BN_free(local_d);
+ /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+ BN_free(d);
}
if (blinding)
goto err;
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
+ if (!BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret))
+ goto err;
if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
res = f;
else
res = ret;
- } else
+ } else {
res = ret;
+ }
/*
- * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
- * modulus
+ * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than
+ * the length of the modulus.
*/
- j = BN_num_bytes(res);
- i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
- for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
- to[k] = 0;
-
- r = num;
+ r = BN_bn2binpad(res, to, num);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
+ return r;
}
static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* do the decrypt */
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
goto err;
} else {
- BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_d = d = BN_new();
- if (d == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- d = rsa->d;
+ BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
+ if (rsa->d == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ BN_free(d);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+ rsa->n, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(d);
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
+ BN_free(d);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_d before any further use of rsa->d */
- BN_free(local_d);
+ /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+ BN_free(d);
}
if (blinding)
if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
- p = buf;
- j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+ j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+ if (j < 0)
+ goto err;
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+ err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & ~constant_time_msb(r));
err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
+ return r;
}
/* signature verification */
{
BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int i, num = 0, r = -1;
- unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+ if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+ rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
goto err;
- p = buf;
- i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+ i = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err;
switch (padding) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ memcpy(to, buf, (r = i));
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
- return (r);
+ return r;
}
static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
- int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy, *r2, *m[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM - 2];
+ int ret = 0, i, ex_primes = 0, smooth = 0;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (vrfy == NULL)
+ goto err;
- {
- BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+ if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI
+ && ((ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0
+ || ex_primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM - 2))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
+ BIGNUM *factor = BN_new();
+
+ if (factor == NULL)
+ goto err;
/*
- * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
- * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
+ * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
*/
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_p = p = BN_new();
- if (p == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- local_q = q = BN_new();
- if (q == NULL) {
- BN_free(local_p);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- p = rsa->p;
- q = rsa->q;
+ if (!(BN_with_flags(factor, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME),
+ BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, rsa->lock,
+ factor, ctx))
+ || !(BN_with_flags(factor, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME),
+ BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, rsa->lock,
+ factor, ctx))) {
+ BN_free(factor);
+ goto err;
}
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)
- || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_p);
- BN_free(local_q);
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ BN_with_flags(factor, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&pinfo->m, rsa->lock, factor, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(factor);
goto err;
}
}
/*
- * We MUST free local_p and local_q before any further use of rsa->p and
- * rsa->q
+ * We MUST free |factor| before any further use of the prime factors
*/
- BN_free(local_p);
- BN_free(local_q);
+ BN_free(factor);
+
+ smooth = (ex_primes == 0)
+ && (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont)
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->q) == BN_num_bits(rsa->p));
}
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
- (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock,
+ rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
+ if (smooth) {
+ /*
+ * Conversion from Montgomery domain, a.k.a. Montgomery reduction,
+ * accepts values in [0-m*2^w) range. w is m's bit width rounded up
+ * to limb width. So that at the very least if |I| is fully reduced,
+ * i.e. less than p*q, we can count on from-to round to perform
+ * below modulo operations on |I|. Unlike BN_mod it's constant time.
+ */
+ if (/* m1 = I moq q */
+ !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(m1, I, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+ || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(m1, m1, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx)
+ /* m1 = m1^dmq1 mod q */
+ || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, m1, rsa->dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_q)
+ /* r1 = I mod p */
+ || !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(r1, I, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+ || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+ /* r1 = r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r1, r1, rsa->dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_p)
+ /* r1 = (r1 - m1) mod p */
+ /*
+ * bn_mod_sub_fixed_top is not regular modular subtraction,
+ * it can tolerate subtrahend to be larger than modulus, but
+ * not bit-wise wider. This makes up for uncommon q>p case,
+ * when |m1| can be larger than |rsa->p|.
+ */
+ || !bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(r1, r1, m1, rsa->p)
+
+ /* r1 = r1 * iqmp mod p */
+ || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx)
+ || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->iqmp, rsa->_method_mod_p,
+ ctx)
+ /* r0 = r1 * q + m1 */
+ || !bn_mul_fixed_top(r0, r1, rsa->q, ctx)
+ || !bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r0, r0, m1, rsa->n))
+ goto err;
+
+ goto tail;
+ }
+
/* compute I mod q */
{
- BIGNUM *local_c = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *c;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_c = BN_new();
- if (local_c == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(local_c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- c = local_c;
- } else {
- c = I;
- }
+ BIGNUM *c = BN_new();
+ if (c == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_c);
+ BN_free(c);
goto err;
}
{
- BIGNUM *local_dmq1 = NULL, *dmq1;
- /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- dmq1 = local_dmq1 = BN_new();
- if (local_dmq1 == NULL) {
- BN_free(local_c);
- goto err;
- }
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+ BIGNUM *dmq1 = BN_new();
+ if (dmq1 == NULL) {
+ BN_free(c);
+ goto err;
}
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_q)) {
- BN_free(local_c);
- BN_free(local_dmq1);
+ rsa->_method_mod_q)) {
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(dmq1);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */
- BN_free(local_dmq1);
+ /* We MUST free dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */
+ BN_free(dmq1);
}
/* compute I mod p */
if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_c);
+ BN_free(c);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_c before any further use of I */
- BN_free(local_c);
+ /* We MUST free c before any further use of I */
+ BN_free(c);
}
{
- BIGNUM *local_dmp1 = NULL, *dmp1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1 = BN_new();
+ if (dmp1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- dmp1 = local_dmp1 = BN_new();
- if (local_dmp1 == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
- }
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_p)) {
- BN_free(local_dmp1);
+ BN_free(dmp1);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */
- BN_free(local_dmp1);
+ /* We MUST free dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */
+ BN_free(dmp1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * calculate m_i in multi-prime case
+ *
+ * TODO:
+ * 1. squash the following two loops and calculate |m_i| there.
+ * 2. remove cc and reuse |c|.
+ * 3. remove |dmq1| and |dmp1| in previous block and use |di|.
+ *
+ * If these things are done, the code will be more readable.
+ */
+ if (ex_primes > 0) {
+ BIGNUM *di = BN_new(), *cc = BN_new();
+
+ if (cc == NULL || di == NULL) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ /* prepare m_i */
+ if ((m[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+
+ /* prepare c and d_i */
+ BN_with_flags(cc, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(di, pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, cc, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* compute r1 ^ d_i mod r_i */
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m[i], r1, di, pinfo->r, ctx, pinfo->m)) {
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BN_free(cc);
+ BN_free(di);
}
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
goto err;
{
- BIGNUM *local_r1 = NULL, *pr1;
- /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- pr1 = local_r1 = BN_new();
- if (local_r1 == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- pr1 = r1;
- }
+ BIGNUM *pr1 = BN_new();
+ if (pr1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
- BN_free(local_r1);
+ BN_free(pr1);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_r1 before any further use of r1 */
- BN_free(local_r1);
+ /* We MUST free pr1 before any further use of r1 */
+ BN_free(pr1);
}
/*
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
goto err;
- if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ /* add m_i to m in multi-prime case */
+ if (ex_primes > 0) {
+ BIGNUM *pr2 = BN_new();
+
+ if (pr2 == NULL)
goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, m[i], r0)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(r2, r1, pinfo->t, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_with_flags(pr2, r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, pr2, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_negative(r1))
+ if (!BN_add(r1, r1, pinfo->r)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r1, pinfo->pp, ctx)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, r1)) {
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(pr2);
+ }
+
+ tail:
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+ if (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont) {
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ bn_correct_top(r0);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
* be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
*/
if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
goto err;
+ if (BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+ bn_correct_top(r0);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err; /* not actually error */
+ }
if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
goto err;
if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
* return that instead.
*/
- BIGNUM *local_d = NULL;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
+ if (d == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- local_d = d = BN_new();
- if (d == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- d = rsa->d;
- }
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
- BN_free(local_d);
+ BN_free(d);
goto err;
}
- /* We MUST free local_d before any further use of rsa->d */
- BN_free(local_d);
+ /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
+ BN_free(d);
}
}
+ /*
+ * It's unfortunate that we have to bn_correct_top(r0). What hopefully
+ * saves the day is that correction is highly unlike, and private key
+ * operations are customarily performed on blinded message. Which means
+ * that attacker won't observe correlation with chosen plaintext.
+ * Secondly, remaining code would still handle it in same computational
+ * time and even conceal memory access pattern around corrected top.
+ */
+ bn_correct_top(r0);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa)
{
rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
+ int i;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
- return (1);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(pinfo->m);
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-
-#endif