/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include <assert.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "record_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "record_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
/*-
- * tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
+ * tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
+ * internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
-int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send)
+int tls13_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ size_t ivlen, taglen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
unsigned char *staticiv;
unsigned char *seq;
int lenu, lenf;
SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
uint32_t alg_enc;
+ WPACKET wpkt;
if (n_recs != 1) {
/* Should not happen */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
staticiv = s->write_iv;
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
- if (ctx == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
+ * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
+ * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
+ * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
+ */
+ if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
rec->input = rec->data;
return 1;
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
- /*
- * To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
- * be NULL
- */
- assert(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL);
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
- return -1;
- alg_enc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
+ || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
+ if (s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0) {
+ alg_enc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
+ && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ alg_enc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
+ * be NULL
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ alg_enc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ }
if (alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) {
if (alg_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- if (send && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
- NULL) <= 0)
+ if (sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
+ NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
+ }
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_AESGCM) {
taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else if (alg_enc & SSL_CHACHA20) {
taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
} else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
- if (!send) {
+ if (!sending) {
/*
* Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
* well as the tag
/* Set up IV */
if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
/* Should not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
}
/* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, send) <= 0
- || (!send && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
+ || (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen,
- rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)
+ rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Set up the AAD */
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + taglen)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
+ || hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
+ * any AAD.
+ */
+ if (((alg_enc & SSL_AESCCM) != 0
+ && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
+ (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
+ || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
+ sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
|| (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
return -1;
}
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
/* Add the tag */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen,
- rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)
+ rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
+ }
rec->length += taglen;
}