* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48]={
0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c };
-
-static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx,
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p);
-
static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
{
EVP_MD_CTX m5;
EVP_MD_CTX s1;
unsigned char buf[16],smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char c='A';
- int i,j,k;
+ unsigned int i,j,k;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = os_toascii[c]; /*'A' in ASCII */
#endif
k=0;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
- for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
k++;
if (k > sizeof buf)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if ((i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
+ if ((int)(i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
{
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,smd,NULL);
memcpy(km,smd,(num-i));
km+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
- memset(smd,0,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m5);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s1);
return 1;
int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
- unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
COMP_METHOD *comp;
+#endif
const EVP_MD *m;
EVP_MD_CTX md;
- int exp,n,i,j,k,cl;
+ int is_exp,n,i,j,k,cl;
int reuse_dd = 0;
- exp=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ is_exp=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
+ OPENSSL_assert(m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
comp=NULL;
else
comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
- key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+#endif
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
{
reuse_dd = 1;
else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
- s->read_hash=m;
+
+ ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* COMPRESS */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
goto err;
}
+#endif
memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
}
reuse_dd = 1;
else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash=m;
+ ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* COMPRESS */
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
goto err2;
}
}
+#endif
memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
}
if (reuse_dd)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(dd);
p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
i=EVP_MD_size(m);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err2;
cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j=exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ j=is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ /* Was j=(is_exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
- if (exp)
+ if (is_exp)
{
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
- memset(&(exp_key[0]),0,sizeof(exp_key));
- memset(&(exp_iv[0]),0,sizeof(exp_iv));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ {
+
+ int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ?
+ TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ;
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
+ mac_secret, EVP_MD_size(m),
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (c->key_len)
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
+ key, c->key_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (k)
+ {
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV,
+ iv, k, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_key[0]),sizeof(exp_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_iv[0]),sizeof(exp_iv));
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);
return(1);
err:
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return(1);
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp))
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,NULL,NULL,&comp))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return(0);
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#else
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+#endif
+
+ num=EVP_MD_size(hash);
+ if (num < 0)
+ return 0;
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+num+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num*=2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s,p,num);
- /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
- * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ {
+ /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
+ * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- if ((s->session->cipher != NULL) && ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4))
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
+ }
+ }
return ret;
{
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL)
{
- memset(s->s3->tmp.key_block,0,
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3->tmp.key_block,
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
s->s3->tmp.key_block=NULL;
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
}
+/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ * occurred.
+ */
int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
- int bs,i;
+ int bs,i,mac_size=0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
if (send)
/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
l+=i;
+ /* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten
+ * with the padding length. */
+ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
rec->length+=i;
rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
}
if (!send)
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
return 0;
- }
+ /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
}
EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- {
- i=rec->data[l-1]+1;
- /* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size;
- * padding bytes (except that last) are arbitrary */
- if (i > bs)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- return -1;
- }
- rec->length-=i;
- }
+ return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
}
return(1);
}
void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
{
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),s->ctx->md5, NULL);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer,BIO_CLOSE);
}
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_dgst) return;
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst=NULL;
+ }
+
+
+
void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),buf,len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),buf,len);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE))
+ {
+ BIO_write (s->s3->handshake_buffer,(void *)buf,len);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i=0;i< SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]!= NULL)
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],buf,len);
+ }
+ }
}
-int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *p)
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
{
- return(ssl3_handshake_mac(s,ctx,NULL,0,p));
+ int i;
+ long mask;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ long hdatalen;
+ void *hdata;
+
+ /* Allocate handshake_dgst array */
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst = OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst,0,SSL_MAX_DIGEST *sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,&hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
+ for (i=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(i,&mask,&md); i++)
+ {
+ if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md)
+ {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (EVP_MD_nid(md) == NID_md5)
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ }
+#endif
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],md,NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],hdata,hdatalen);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE))
+ {
+ /* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
-int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx1, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx2,
+int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ return(ssl3_handshake_mac(s,md_nid,NULL,0,p));
+ }
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
{
int ret;
-
- ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,ctx1,sender,len,p);
+ ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
p+=ret;
- ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,ctx2,sender,len,p);
+ ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
return(ret);
}
-
-static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx,
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
{
unsigned int ret;
int npad,n;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx,*d=NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in_ctx);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+ /* Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst
+ * array*/
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
+ {
+ d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
- npad=(48/n)*n;
+ if (n < 0)
+ return 0;
+ npad=(48/n)*n;
if (sender != NULL)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,sender,len);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
return((int)ret);
}
-int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
+ const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
unsigned char *p,rec_char;
- unsigned int md_size;
- int npad,i;
+ size_t md_size;
+ int npad;
+ int t;
if (send)
{
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
- md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ if (t < 0)
+ return -1;
+ md_size=t;
npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
- /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
- rec_char=rec->type;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
- p=md;
- s2n(rec->length,p);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex( &md_ctx,hash, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
+ {
+ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+ * timing-oracle. */
+
+ /* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+ * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+ *
+ * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+ * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+ * total size. */
+ unsigned char header[75];
+ unsigned j = 0;
+ memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
+ j += md_size;
+ memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+ j += npad;
+ memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
+ j += 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->type;
+ header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+ hash,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+ mac_sec, md_size,
+ 1 /* is SSLv3 */);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned int md_size_u;
+ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
+ rec_char=rec->type;
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
+ p=md;
+ s2n(rec->length,p);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u);
+ md_size = md_size_u;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ }
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+ return(md_size);
+ }
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
+ {
+ int i;
for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
{
++seq[i];
if (seq[i] != 0) break;
}
-
- return(md_size);
}
int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
int i,ret=0;
unsigned int n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ unsigned char *tmpout = out;
+#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
for (i=0; i<3; i++)
ret+=n;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ {
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
+ p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
+ tmpout, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+#endif
return(ret);
}
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(-1); /* Don't send it :-) */
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
default: return(-1);
}
}