/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
-#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
+typedef struct {
+ ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
+ ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
+} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+ ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
/*
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
* cert.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
+ if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
return 0;
}
- SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
*/
static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
- && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+ && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
+ && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
+ if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
/* Try to read from the client instead */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
- if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- }
- /* Fall through */
-
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
* Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
* been configured for.
*/
- if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
/* We've written enough tickets out. */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
}
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
} else {
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+ if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
+ && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
/*
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
* Calls SSLfatal as required.
*/
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
- } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ }
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
break;
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
+ } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
- && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+ && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
+static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
+{
+ switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
+#if defined(EPIPE)
+ case EPIPE:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(ECONNRESET)
+ case ECONNRESET:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
+ case WSAECONNRESET:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* server to the client.
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
- * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
- * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
- * something clever in the record layer for this.
- */
+
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
+ /*
+ * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
+ * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
+ * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
+ */
+ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
break;
}
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
+ size_t dummy;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
- &s->session->master_key_length)
+ &dummy)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
/* SSLfatal() already called */
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
+ if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+ && conn_is_closed()) {
+ /*
+ * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
+ * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
+ * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
+ * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
+ * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ break;
+ }
+
return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
break;
}
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
return 0;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
int ret;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+ if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
/*
* login name
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
- SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
return -1;
} else {
- ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
+ ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
- SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
+ SSLfatal(s, al,
al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
: SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&cookie_leni) == 0 ||
- cookie_leni > 255) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+ cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+ s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
ext_len);
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
+ ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
+ && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
/* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
- || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
+ if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
+ || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
&& (s->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
if (clienthello == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
|| s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
* in the first place
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
|| !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
&clienthello->session_id_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
&clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
+ if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
}
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
&clienthello->compressions_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return -1;
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
default:
- SSLfatal(s, al,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
}
/* Set up the client_random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Choose the version */
* This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
* support it.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
/* SSLv3/TLS */
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
goto err;
}
/* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
goto err;
}
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto err;
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
} else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
|| memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
if (protverr != 0) {
s->version = s->client_version;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
goto err;
}
}
goto err;
}
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
/* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
if (scsvs != NULL) {
- for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
if (s->renegotiate) {
/* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
} else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
/*
* an insecure downgrade.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
/*
* A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
* just selected. Something must have changed.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
}
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
/*
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
- * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
+ * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
-#endif
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ }
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
-#endif
+ if (trc_out != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
* to reuse it
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
+ OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
}
for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
/* no compress */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
- pos = s->s3->server_random;
+ pos = s->s3.server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
- pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+ pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
- s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
- s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
}
}
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
*/
if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
}
if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto err;
}
break;
}
if (done)
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
#endif
/*
- * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+ * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
+ s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
int ret;
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
/*
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
* et al can pick it up.
*/
- s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
/* something bad happened */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
default:
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return 0;
}
}
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
- if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed,
+ (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+ s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
#endif
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
} else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable =
s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
+ ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
}
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
/*-
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
+ * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/*
*/
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
+ ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
compm = 0;
#else
- if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
compm = 0;
else
- compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+ compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
- || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
- || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- s->hello_retry_request
- == SSL_HRR_PENDING
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
- : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
- NULL, 0)) {
+ || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
+ NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
-#endif
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
int i;
unsigned long type;
- const BIGNUM *r[4];
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
+ int freer = 0, ret = 0;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
CERT *cert = s->cert;
-
EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
- DH *dh;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
- DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
- pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
- DH_free(dhp);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
+ if (pkdh == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
pkdhp = pkdh;
} else {
pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
+ pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024));
if (pkdh == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pkdhp = pkdh;
}
+#endif
if (pkdhp == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
- EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
-
- dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- if (dh == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
pkdh = NULL;
- DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
- DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
+ freer = 1;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
+ &r[0])
+ || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
+ &r[1])
+ || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
+ /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
+ s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
- encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
- &encodedPoint);
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
+ &encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
r[2] = NULL;
r[3] = NULL;
} else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
goto err;
}
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
} else
#endif
{
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
- || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
+ if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
+ || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
lu = NULL;
} else if (lu == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
if (!res) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*-
* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
if (len > 0) {
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memset(binval, 0, len);
}
}
-#endif
+
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
/*
* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
}
-#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (lu != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
- size_t siglen, tbslen;
- int rv;
+ size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
- if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+ if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
/* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
- * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
- * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
- * afterwards.
- */
- siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
+ md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
+ s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
+ NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
- OPENSSL_free(tbs);
- if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
- || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+ || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
+ || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- return 1;
+ ret = 1;
err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- return 0;
+ if (freer) {
+ BN_free(r[0]);
+ BN_free(r[1]);
+ BN_free(r[2]);
+ BN_free(r[3]);
+ }
+ return ret;
}
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
s->pha_context_len = 32;
- if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
- || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
+ s->pha_context_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
+ s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
+ s->pha_context_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
}
} else {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
done:
s->certreqs_sent++;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
return 1;
}
PACKET psk_identity;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
- if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int decrypt_len;
- unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
- size_t j, padding_len;
+ size_t outlen;
PACKET enc_premaster;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
+ rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
}
- /*
- * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
- * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
- * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
- * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
- */
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
- * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
- * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
- * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
- */
-
- if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
- * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
- * the timing-sensitive code below.
+ * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
+ * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
+ * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
+ * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
+ * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
+ * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
- PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
- rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (decrypt_len < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->version);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- /*
- * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
- * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
- * PS is at least 8 bytes.
- */
- if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
+ || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
- constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
- for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
- decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
- }
- decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
-
- /*
- * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
- * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
- * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
- * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
- */
- version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
- version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
-
/*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
+ * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
+ * we double check anyway.
*/
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
- unsigned char workaround_good;
- workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
- workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
- version_good |= workaround_good;
- }
-
- /*
- * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
- * remain non-zero (0xff).
- */
- decrypt_good &= version_good;
-
- /*
- * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
- * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
- * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
- constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
- rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
+ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
-#else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- DH *cdh;
unsigned int i;
- BIGNUM *pub_key;
const unsigned char *data;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
- skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
/* We already checked we have enough data */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
- pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
- if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- if (pub_key != NULL)
- BN_free(pub_key);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
-#else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
} else {
unsigned int i;
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
}
+
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
-#else
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
- unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
+ GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *ptr;
int ret = 0;
- PACKET encdata;
/* Get our certificate private key */
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
/*
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
- /* Decrypt session key */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
- || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
- || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
+
+ ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
+ /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
+ * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
+ pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
+ if (pKX == NULL
+ || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
+ || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (asn1len == 0x81) {
- /*
- * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
- * isn't supported.
- * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
- */
- if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
- /*
- * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
- * support it
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
- } /* else short form length */
+ }
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
- start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
+
+ inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
+ start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
inlen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/* Generate master secret */
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+ const unsigned char *start = NULL;
+ size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
+
+ if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key */
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
+ s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
+ s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+ start = PACKET_data(pkt);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
{
unsigned long alg_k;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
+ if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
} else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
- if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
size_t chainidx;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
+ /*
+ * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
+ * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
+ * TLSv1.3
+ */
+ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
|| (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
|| (s->pha_context != NULL &&
!PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
+ x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
PACKET extensions;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto err;
}
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
goto err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- if (i > 1) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
- goto err;
- }
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
*/
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- int m = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
-
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (m & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) {
- /*
- * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
- */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
- }
-
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+ sk = NULL;
/*
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
- sk = NULL;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
if (cpk == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
* for the server Certificate message
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
+ * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
+ * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
+ * timeout.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
+ (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ? 0 : (uint32_t)s->session->timeout)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned int hlen;
+ size_t hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len;
- unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
+ int iv_len, ok = 0;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
- union {
- unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
- uint32_t age_add;
- } age_add_u;
-
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- size_t i, hashlen;
- uint64_t nonce;
- static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
- /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
- if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- if (cb != NULL) {
- /*
- * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
- * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
- * callback.
- */
- if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
- }
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- }
- /*
- * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket then we need to take a copy
- * of it and create a new session from it.
- */
- if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
- SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
-
- if (new_sess == NULL) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
- goto err;
- }
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = new_sess;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
-
- nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
- for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
- tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
- nonce >>= 8;
- }
-
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
- nonce_label,
- sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
- tick_nonce,
- TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
- s->session->master_key,
- hashlen)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
-
- s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
- OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
- if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
- }
- s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
- }
-
- if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
- tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
- goto err;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
/* shouldn't ever happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
- /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
- hctx, 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+#else
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+#endif
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+ ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
+ 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
+#endif
if (ret == 0) {
/* Put timeout and length */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ s->ctx->propq);
+
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
- iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
- if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
+ if (iv_len < 0
+ || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
- || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
- EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ "SHA256")) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
- /*
- * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
- * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
- * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
- * timeout.
- */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
- (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
- ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce,
- TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)))
- /* Now the actual ticket data */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
+ if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
/* Output key name */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
/* output IV */
|| encdata1 + len != encdata2
|| len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
- || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
- macendoffset - macoffset)
+ || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
+ (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
+ macendoffset - macoffset)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
- || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
+ || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
- || macdata1 != macdata2
+ || macdata1 != macdata2) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+ if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
+ s->session->session_id_length)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+ unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
+ union {
+ unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ uint32_t age_add;
+ } age_add_u;
+
+ age_add_u.age_add = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ size_t i, hashlen;
+ uint64_t nonce;
+ static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ /*
+ * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
+ * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
+ * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
+ */
+ if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
+
+ if (new_sess == NULL) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
+ sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+
+ nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
+ for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
+ tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
+ nonce >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
+ tick_nonce,
+ TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
+
+ s->session->time = time(NULL);
+ ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+ tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
+ * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
+ * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
+ || (s->max_early_data > 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
+ if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
+ tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
/*
* Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
* gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
- * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
+ * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
+ * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
*/
s->sent_tickets++;
s->next_ticket_nonce++;
+ if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
+ s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
return 1;
err:
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
* a record boundary.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
- SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}