/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
-#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+
+#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
+
+typedef struct {
+ ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
+ ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
+} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
-static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
-static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
-static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
- PACKET *cipher_suites,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
- **skp, int sslv2format,
- int *al);
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+ ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt);
/*
* ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
-static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
default:
break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
- return 1;
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
}
- break;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
+ && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
}
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
break;
case TLS_ST_OK:
+ /*
+ * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
+ * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
+ */
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
+ break;
+
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
+ && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
return 1;
}
/* No valid transition found */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
-int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
goto err;
return 1;
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
* not going to accept it because we require a client
* cert.
*/
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
+ if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
err:
/* No valid transition found */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
+ * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
+ */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Used to determine if we shoud send a CompressedCertificate message
+ *
+ * Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
+ */
+static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ int *alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer;
+
+ if (sc->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
+ return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
+
+ for (; *alg != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; alg++) {
+ if (sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[*alg] != NULL)
+ return *alg;
+ }
+#endif
+ return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
+}
+
/*
* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
*
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
if (
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
+ /*
+ * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
+ * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
+ */
+ && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
+ || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
+ * a second time:
*/
- && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
+ && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
- && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+ && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
+ && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
* move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
* client.
*/
-static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
+static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
/* Try to read from the client instead */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (s->hello_retry_request)
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
- else
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+ else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
else if (send_certificate_request(s))
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ else if (get_compressed_certificate_alg(s) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ } else if (get_compressed_certificate_alg(s) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ }
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
/*
* Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
- * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
+ * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
* immediately.
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
- * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
- * session ticket?
*/
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
- if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
+ } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+ /*
+ * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
+ * handshake at this point.
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
- /* Fall through */
+ if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
- case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
+ * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
+ * been configured for.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
+ /* We've written enough tickets out. */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ }
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
* ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
* to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
*/
-WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
* to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
}
/* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
+ && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
- else
+ } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ }
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
} else {
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+ if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the server to the client.
*/
-WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
- * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
+ * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+ }
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
+ && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
/*
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
* the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
+ *
+ * Calls SSLfatal as required.
*/
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
- } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
+ }
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
+ break;
+ /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
+ } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
+ && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ /* Fall through */
+
case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
+static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
+{
+ switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
+#if defined(EPIPE)
+ case EPIPE:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(ECONNRESET)
+ case ECONNRESET:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
+ case WSAECONNRESET:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* server to the client.
*/
-WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
s->init_num = 0;
/* No post work to be done */
break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- break;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
return WORK_MORE_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
+ && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
- * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
- * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
- * something clever in the record layer for this.
- */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
- return WORK_ERROR;
- }
- break;
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+ && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
+ break;
+ /* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ if (!statem_flush(s))
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
+ || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
+ && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
+ * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
+ * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
+ */
+ if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
+ s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
+ break;
+ }
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
+ size_t dummy;
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
- &s->session->master_key_length)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ &dummy)
+ || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ } else {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
+ s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ if (!s->hit && !send_certificate_request(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
+ s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
+ }
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
- if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
+ if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
+ if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+ && conn_is_closed()) {
+ /*
+ * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
+ * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
+ * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
+ * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
+ * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ break;
+ }
+
return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
break;
}
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
-int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
return 0;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
*confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
else
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+#endif
+
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
+ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ *confunc = NULL;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
*confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
*mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
break;
- case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
- *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
- *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
- break;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
*confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
*mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
-size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
/*
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
*/
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
+ case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
+
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
+ return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
+#endif
+
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the client
*/
-WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
-
- case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
- BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
- /* Are we renegotiating? */
- && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_A;
- } else {
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
- }
-#endif
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
+/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ int ret;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+ if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
/*
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
* login name
*/
- ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ return -1;
} else {
- ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
+ ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, al,
+ al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
+ ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
+ : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
}
- return ret;
+ return 1;
}
#endif
return 1;
}
-int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned int cookie_leni;
- if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
- s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
- &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
- cookie_leni > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
+ || sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
+ &cookie_leni) == 0
+ || cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
+ * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
- ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
- sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
+ ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
+ sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+ s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
ext_len);
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+#define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
+ ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
+ && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- unsigned int j;
- size_t loop;
- unsigned long id;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-#endif
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- int protverr;
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
- CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
/* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
+ || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
+ && (s->options
+ & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
- /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
- s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+ clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
+ if (clienthello == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
- memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
- clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
+ clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
- if (clienthello.isv2) {
+ if (clienthello->isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
- if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
+ || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
}
/*-
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
* in the first place
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
- if (clienthello.isv2) {
+ if (clienthello->isv2) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
ciphersuite_len)
- || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
+ clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
/* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
+ * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
* for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
- * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
+ * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
*/
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
- memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
- clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+ clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
- PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
+ PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
- || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
+ || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
- &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
+ if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
- &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
* So check cookie length...
*/
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
- return 1;
+ if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
}
}
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
/* Could be empty. */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
- PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
+ PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
}
}
- if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
+ if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
- &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
/* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
- extensions = clienthello.extensions;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al,
- &clienthello.pre_proc_exts_len)) {
- /* SSLerr already been called */
- goto f_err;
+ extensions = clienthello->extensions;
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
+ &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already been called */
+ goto err;
}
+ s->clienthello = clienthello;
- /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- /* Set up the client_random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ err:
+ if (clienthello != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
- /* Choose the version */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
- if (clienthello.isv2) {
- if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
- || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
- != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
- /*
- * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
- * support it.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- /* SSLv3/TLS */
- s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
- }
- /*
- * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
- * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
- } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
- DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
+static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ unsigned int j;
+ int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int protverr;
+ size_t loop;
+ unsigned long id;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+#endif
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
+ DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
+ /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
+ if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
+ /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
+ switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ssl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
+ case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
+ break;
+ case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
+ return -1;
+ case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
+ default:
+ SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Set up the client_random */
+ memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ /* Choose the version */
+
+ if (clienthello->isv2) {
+ if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
+ || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
+ != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
+ /*
+ * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
+ * support it.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* SSLv3/TLS */
+ s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
+ * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
+ } else if (ssl->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+ DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
} else {
protverr = 0;
}
if (protverr) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
- s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
+ s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ goto err;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
- clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
+ clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
- } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
- || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
+ || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
}
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
+ if (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
if (protverr != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
+ goto err;
}
}
}
s->hit = 0;
+ if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
+ clienthello->isv2) ||
+ !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
+ &scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
+ /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
+ if (scsvs != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
+ if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
+ } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
+ !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
+ /*
+ * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
+ * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
+ * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
+ * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
+ * an insecure downgrade.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
+
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
+ /*
+ * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
+ * just selected. Something must have changed.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ }
+
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
/*
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
- * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
+ * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
- if (clienthello.isv2 ||
+ if (clienthello->isv2 ||
(s->new_session &&
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
} else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello, &al);
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
} else {
/* i == 0 */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
}
}
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
- clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
+ s->clienthello->session_id_len);
+ s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
}
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
+ * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
-#endif
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ }
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
-#endif
+ if (trc_out != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
}
+ OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
}
- for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
- if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
+ for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
+ if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
break;
}
- if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
+ if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
/* no compress */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
/* TLS extensions */
- if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
/*
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
- pos = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
- goto f_err;
+ pos = s->s3.server_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
}
- if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
+ if (!s->hit
+ && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+ && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
- pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+ pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
- s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
- s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
}
}
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
+ * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
+ * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
+ */
+ if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
- for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
- if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
+ for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
+ if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
- if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+ goto err;
}
- } else if (s->hit)
+ } else if (s->hit) {
comp = NULL;
- else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+ } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, v, done = 0;
unsigned int o;
- nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
- if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
+ for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
+ if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
break;
}
if (done)
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto err;
}
#endif
/*
- * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+ * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
+ if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
+ s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
+ if (ciphers == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ciphers = NULL;
+ }
+
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
+ s->clienthello = NULL;
+ return 1;
err:
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
-
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
+ s->clienthello = NULL;
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
- * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0.
*/
-static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
+static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
/*
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
* influence which certificate is sent
*/
- if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
- && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
+ && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
int ret;
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
/*
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
* et al can pick it up.
*/
- s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
- ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
+ s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
+ ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ sctx->ext.status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
/* something bad happened */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
default:
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0.
+ */
+int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
+ unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ &selected, &selected_len,
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed,
+ (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
+ sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
+
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+ s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
+ || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
+ || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
+ selected_len) != 0) {
+ /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
+ * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
+ * selected ALPN.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
+ selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
+ SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
+ return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
+ * present.
+ */
+ }
+
+ /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
}
return 1;
}
-WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
- int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
- if (!s->hit) {
+ int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() was already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_A;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
- cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ cipher =
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
+
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session->not_resumable =
+ s->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl,
+ ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
+ & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
+ if (s->session->not_resumable)
+ /* do not send a session ticket */
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
- if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
- goto f_err;
- /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
- if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session->not_resumable =
- s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
- & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
- != 0));
- if (s->session->not_resumable)
- /* do not send a session ticket */
- s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
/*-
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
+ * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/*
* Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
* certificate callbacks etc above.
*/
- if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
+ * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
+ * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
+ * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
- wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ wst = WORK_MORE_C;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
int ret;
- if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
+ if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
/*
* callback indicates further work to be done
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_B;
+ return WORK_MORE_C;
}
- if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
- /*
- * This is not really an error but the only means to for
- * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
- */
- if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- else
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- goto f_err;
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
}
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ err:
return WORK_ERROR;
}
-int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int compm;
size_t sl, len;
int version;
+ unsigned char *session_id;
+ int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
- version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
+ version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello()
*/
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
+ s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/*-
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
+ * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
+ * regardless
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (s->session->not_resumable ||
- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
- sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (usetls13) {
+ sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
+ session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
+ } else {
+ sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ session_id = s->session->session_id;
+ }
+
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* set up the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
compm = 0;
#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
compm = 0;
else
- compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+ compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
- if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
- || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
- || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
- NULL, 0, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
+ || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
+ pkt, &len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
- && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
+ NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- return 1;
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
+ * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
+ */
+ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+ && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */;
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
-int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
-int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
-#endif
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
+ int i;
unsigned long type;
- const BIGNUM *r[4];
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
+ int freer = 0;
+ CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
- type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
CERT *cert = s->cert;
-
EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
- DH *dh;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
- DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
- pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
- DH_free(dhp);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
+ if (pkdh == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
- EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
pkdhp = pkdh;
} else {
pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
+ pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ 0, 1024));
if (pkdh == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
pkdhp = pkdh;
}
+#endif
if (pkdhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
- EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
+ EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
-
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
pkdh = NULL;
- DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
- DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- int nid;
+ /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
+ freer = 1;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
+ &r[0])
+ || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
+ &r[1])
+ || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
- curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
+ curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
if (curve_id == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
+ /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
+ s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
- encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
- &encodedPoint);
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
+ &encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
r[2] = NULL;
r[3] = NULL;
} else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
goto err;
}
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
} else
#endif
{
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
}
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
- || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
+ if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
+ || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
lu = NULL;
} else if (lu == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
}
#endif
res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
if (!res) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*-
* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
if (len > 0) {
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
memset(binval, 0, len);
}
}
-#endif
+
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
/*
* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
}
-#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (lu != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
- unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
- size_t siglen;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
+ size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
- if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
+ if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
/* Should never happen */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
- /*
- * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
- * points to the space at the end.
- */
-
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
/* send signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
- return 0;
- /*
- * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
- * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
- * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
- * afterwards.
- */
- siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
+ md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
+ sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
+ NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
}
- if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
- s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
- paramlen) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
- || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
+ s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
+ paramlen);
+ if (tbslen == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+ || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
+ || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- return 1;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- return 0;
+ if (freer) {
+ BN_free(r[0]);
+ BN_free(r[1]);
+ BN_free(r[2]);
+ BN_free(r[3]);
+ }
+ return ret;
}
-int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
+ s->pha_context_len = 32;
+ if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
+ s->pha_context_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
+ s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
+ s->pha_context_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
+ if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
+ 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
- || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- unsigned char *namebytes;
- X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- int namelen;
-
- if (name == NULL
- || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
- &namebytes)
- || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
- /* else no CA names */
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
-
- return 1;
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ done:
+ s->certreqs_sent++;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
-static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
PACKET psk_identity;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+ psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ s->session->psk_identity,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
- *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
- if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int decrypt_len;
- unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
- size_t j, padding_len;
+ size_t outlen;
PACKET enc_premaster;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
+ rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
if (rsa == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
}
- /*
- * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
- * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
- * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
- * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
- */
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+ if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
- rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
- if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
- * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
- * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+ * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
+ * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
+ * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
+ * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
+ * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
+ * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
-
- if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
- * the timing-sensitive code below.
- */
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
- PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
- rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (decrypt_len < 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
-
- /*
- * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
- * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
- * PS is at least 8 bytes.
- */
- if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
- constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
- for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
- decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
- }
- decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->version);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- /*
- * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
- * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
- * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
- * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
- */
- version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
- version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
-
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
- unsigned char workaround_good;
- workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
- workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
- version_good |= workaround_good;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
+ || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
/*
- * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
- * remain non-zero (0xff).
+ * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
+ * we double check anyway.
*/
- decrypt_good &= version_good;
-
- /*
- * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
- * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
- * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
- constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
- rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
+ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
-#else
- /* Should never happen */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
-static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- DH *cdh;
unsigned int i;
- BIGNUM *pub_key;
const unsigned char *data;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
- skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
if (skey == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
/* We already checked we have enough data */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
- pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
- if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- if (pub_key != NULL)
- BN_free(pub_key);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
-#else
- /* Should never happen */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
-static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
} else {
unsigned int i;
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
-#else
- /* Should never happen */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
-static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
unsigned int i;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
- int Ttag, Tclass;
- long Tlen;
- size_t sess_key_len;
- const unsigned char *data;
+ GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *ptr;
int ret = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Get our certificate private key */
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
/*
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
- /* Decrypt session key */
- sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
+ /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
+ * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
+ pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
+ if (pKX == NULL
+ || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
+ || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
- &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
- || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- start = data;
- inlen = Tlen;
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
- (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+
+ inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
+ start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
+ inlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/* Generate master secret */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
+ NULL) > 0)
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+ const unsigned char *start = NULL;
+ size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key */
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
+ s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
+ s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+ start = PACKET_data(pkt);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al = -1;
unsigned long alg_k;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
- if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
+ if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
+ if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
+ if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
+ if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
+ if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
+ if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
} else {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
- if (al != -1)
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
#endif
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WORK_STATE wst)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+ labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+ labellen += 1;
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ labellen, NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
- wst = WORK_MORE_B;
- }
-
- if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
- /* Is this SCTP? */
- && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
- /* Are we renegotiating? */
- && s->renegotiate
- /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
- && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
- && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
- return WORK_MORE_B;
- } else {
- ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
}
#endif
* the handshake_buffer
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
- if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ int i;
+ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l, llen;
+ unsigned long l;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt, context;
size_t chainidx;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ /*
+ * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
+ * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
+ */
+ if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
+ s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
- if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
+ || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
+ || (s->pha_context != NULL
+ && !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
+ s->pha_context_len)))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
+ x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
+ if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
PACKET extensions;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- &rawexts, &al, NULL)
- || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
+ NULL, chainidx == 0)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ rawexts, x, chainidx,
+ PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
- goto f_err;
+ goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ goto err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- goto f_err;
+ if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
} else {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (i > 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
- al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
}
}
+ /*
+ * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
+ * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
+ * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
+ * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
+ * session may have already gone into the session cache.
+ */
+
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->peer = sk_X509_num(sk) == 0 ? NULL: sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+ sk = NULL;
/*
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
* message
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
- sk = NULL;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
- sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
- &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+ &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Resend session tickets */
+ s->sent_tickets = 0;
}
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- goto done;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- done:
+ err:
X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
return ret;
}
-int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ PACKET tmppkt;
+ BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+
+ if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
+ ret = tls_process_client_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
if (cpk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
* for the server Certificate message
*/
- if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
- || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int alg = get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc);
+ OSSL_COMP_CERT *cc = sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[alg];
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(cc != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Server can't compress on-demand
+ * Use pre-compressed certificate
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, cc->orig_len)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cc->data, cc->len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
+ return 0;
+ sc->s3.tmp.cert->cert_comp_used++;
return 1;
}
+#endif
-int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+ uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s->session->timeout);
+
+ /*
+ * Ticket lifetime hint:
+ * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
+ * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
+ * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
+ * resumed session (for simplicity).
+ */
+#define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (ossl_time_compare(s->session->timeout,
+ ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC)) > 0)
+ timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
+ } else if (s->hit)
+ timeout = 0;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static CON_FUNC_RETURN construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt,
+ uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned int hlen;
+ size_t hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int iv_len;
+ CON_FUNC_RETURN ok = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
- union {
- unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
- uint32_t age_add;
- } age_add_u;
-
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
- goto err;
- s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
- }
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
+ if (hctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
/*
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
*/
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
- if (sess == NULL)
+ if (sess == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
- sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+ }
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
- if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
+ if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
+ /* shouldn't ever happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
- /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
- hctx, 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+#else
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+#endif
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+ ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
+ 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
+#endif
if (ret == 0) {
-
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
+ * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
+ * ticket
+ */
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ ok = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Put timeout and length */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- return 1;
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (ret < 0)
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
+ if (iv_len < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
- iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ }
} else {
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ sctx->propq);
- iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
- if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
- tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
- EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+ }
+
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
+ if (iv_len < 0
+ || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
+ || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
+ tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
+ || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ "SHA256")) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
- /*
- * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
- * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
- * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
- */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
- /* Now the actual ticket data */
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
+ if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
/* Output key name */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
/* output IV */
|| encdata1 + len != encdata2
|| len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
- || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
- macendoffset - macoffset)
+ || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
+ (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
+ macendoffset - macoffset)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
- || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
+ || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
- || macdata1 != macdata2
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
- EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- NULL, 0, &al))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ || macdata1 != macdata2) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return 1;
+ /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ok = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ uint32_t age_add,
+ unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+ if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
+ s->session->session_id_length)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ /*
+ * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
+ * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
+ * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
+ * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
+ */
+ s->sent_tickets++;
+ s->next_ticket_nonce++;
+ if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
+ s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
+}
+
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+ unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
+ union {
+ unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ uint32_t age_add;
+ } age_add_u;
+ CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+
+ age_add_u.age_add = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ size_t i, hashlen;
+ uint64_t nonce;
+ static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ /*
+ * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
+ * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
+ * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
+ */
+ if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
+
+ if (new_sess == NULL) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
+ age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+
+ nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
+ for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
+ tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
+ nonce >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
+ tick_nonce,
+ TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
+
+ s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
+ ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+ }
+
+ if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+ tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
+ * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
+ * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
+ */
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
+ || (s->max_early_data > 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
+ if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret;
+
+ tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
+ tick_nonce);
+ if (tmpret != CON_FUNC_SUCCESS) {
+ if (tmpret == CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND) {
+ /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
+ ret = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
+ /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
+ tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
+ }
+ /* else SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+ }
+
+ ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
+ err:
+ return ret;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
* create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
* tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
*/
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET next_proto, padding;
size_t next_proto_len;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- err:
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#endif
-static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
- int al;
-
- if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- NULL, 0, &al)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ NULL, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
-#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
- PACKET *cipher_suites,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
- int sslv2format, int *al)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- int n;
- /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
- unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
-
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
-
- n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return NULL;
- }
-
- sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
- if (sk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return NULL;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
- s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
-
- if (sslv2format) {
- size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
- PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
- unsigned int leadbyte;
- unsigned char *raw;
-
- /*
- * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
- * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
- * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
- * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
- * problem.
- */
- raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
- s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
- if (raw == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
- PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
- raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
- || (leadbyte == 0
- && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
- TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
- || (leadbyte != 0
- && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
- s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- if (leadbyte == 0)
- s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
- }
- } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
- &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
- /*
- * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
- * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
- * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
- */
- if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
- continue;
-
- /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
- if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
- /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
- if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
- /*
- * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
- * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
- * downgrade.
- */
- if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
- goto err;
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher, 0);
- if (c != NULL) {
- if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- *skp = sk;
- return sk;
- err:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
/*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
- * (should be s->version)
+ * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
+ * a record boundary.
*/
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
- || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- NULL, 0, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = NULL;
- s->hit = 0;
+ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
- return 1;
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
}
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blobdiff