/*
- * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
-#include "e_os.h"
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
-#include "../crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/rand/rand_local.h"
+#include "../include/crypto/rand.h"
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/wait.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif
#include "testutil.h"
#include "drbgtest.h"
unsigned int flags;
/* KAT data for no PR */
- const unsigned char *ent;
- size_t entlen;
+ const unsigned char *entropy;
+ size_t entropylen;
const unsigned char *nonce;
size_t noncelen;
const unsigned char *pers;
size_t perslen;
const unsigned char *adin;
size_t adinlen;
- const unsigned char *entreseed;
- size_t entreseedlen;
+ const unsigned char *entropyreseed;
+ size_t entropyreseedlen;
const unsigned char *adinreseed;
size_t adinreseedlen;
const unsigned char *adin2;
size_t kat2len;
/* KAT data for PR */
- const unsigned char *ent_pr;
- size_t entlen_pr;
+ const unsigned char *entropy_pr;
+ size_t entropylen_pr;
const unsigned char *nonce_pr;
size_t noncelen_pr;
const unsigned char *pers_pr;
size_t perslen_pr;
const unsigned char *adin_pr;
size_t adinlen_pr;
- const unsigned char *entpr_pr;
- size_t entprlen_pr;
+ const unsigned char *entropypr_pr;
+ size_t entropyprlen_pr;
const unsigned char *ading_pr;
size_t adinglen_pr;
- const unsigned char *entg_pr;
- size_t entglen_pr;
+ const unsigned char *entropyg_pr;
+ size_t entropyglen_pr;
const unsigned char *kat_pr;
size_t katlen_pr;
const unsigned char *kat2_pr;
pr##_pr_returnedbits, sizeof(pr##_pr_returnedbits) \
}
-#define make_drbg_test_data_df(nid, pr, p) \
- make_drbg_test_data(nid, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF, pr, p)
+#define make_drbg_test_data_use_df(nid, pr, p) \
+ make_drbg_test_data(nid, 0, pr, p)
+
+#define make_drbg_test_data_no_df(nid, pr, p) \
+ make_drbg_test_data(nid, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF, pr, p)
+
+#define make_drbg_test_data_hash(nid, pr, p) \
+ make_drbg_test_data(nid, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC, hmac_##pr, p), \
+ make_drbg_test_data(nid, 0, pr, p)
static DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA drbg_test[] = {
- make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_128_ctr, 0, aes_128_no_df, 0),
- make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_192_ctr, 0, aes_192_no_df, 0),
- make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_256_ctr, 0, aes_256_no_df, 1),
- make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_use_df, 0),
- make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_use_df, 0),
- make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_use_df, 1),
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ /* FIPS mode doesn't support CTR DRBG without a derivation function */
+ make_drbg_test_data_no_df (NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_no_df, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_no_df (NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_no_df, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_no_df (NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_no_df, 1),
+#endif
+ make_drbg_test_data_use_df(NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_use_df, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_use_df(NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_use_df, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_use_df(NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_use_df, 1),
+ make_drbg_test_data_hash(NID_sha1, sha1, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_hash(NID_sha224, sha224, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_hash(NID_sha256, sha256, 1),
+ make_drbg_test_data_hash(NID_sha384, sha384, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_hash(NID_sha512, sha512, 0),
};
-static int app_data_index;
-
/*
* Test context data, attached as EXDATA to the RAND_DRBG
*/
typedef struct test_ctx_st {
- const unsigned char *ent;
- size_t entlen;
- int entcnt;
+ const unsigned char *entropy;
+ size_t entropylen;
+ int entropycnt;
const unsigned char *nonce;
size_t noncelen;
int noncecnt;
} TEST_CTX;
static size_t kat_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ int prediction_resistance)
{
- TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
+ TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(drbg);
- t->entcnt++;
- *pout = (unsigned char *)t->ent;
- return t->entlen;
+ t->entropycnt++;
+ *pout = (unsigned char *)t->entropy;
+ return t->entropylen;
}
static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
- TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
+ TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(drbg);
t->noncecnt++;
*pout = (unsigned char *)t->nonce;
return t->noncelen;
}
+ /*
+ * Disable CRNG testing if it is enabled.
+ * If the DRBG is ready or in an error state, this means an instantiate cycle
+ * for which the default personalisation string is used.
+ */
+static int disable_crngt(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ static const char pers[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
+ const int instantiate = drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
+
+ if (drbg->get_entropy != rand_crngt_get_entropy)
+ return 1;
+
+ if ((instantiate && !RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_drbg_get_entropy,
+ &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
+ &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
+ &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce))
+ || (instantiate
+ && !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, (const unsigned char *)pers,
+ sizeof(pers) - 1)))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
- kat_nonce, NULL))) {
+ kat_nonce, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(drbg, &t))
+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg))) {
failures++;
goto err;
}
memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
- t.ent = td->ent;
- t.entlen = td->entlen;
+ t.entropy = td->entropy;
+ t.entropylen = td->entropylen;
t.nonce = td->nonce;
t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
- RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
failures++;
/* Reseed DRBG with test entropy and additional input */
- t.ent = td->entreseed;
- t.entlen = td->entreseedlen;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen)
+ t.entropy = td->entropyreseed;
+ t.entropylen = td->entropyreseedlen;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen, 0)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len, 0,
td->adin2, td->adin2len))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2, td->kat2len, buff, td->kat2len)))
*/
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, td->nid, td->flags))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
- kat_nonce, NULL)))
+ kat_nonce, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(drbg, &t)))
failures++;
- RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
- t.ent = td->ent_pr;
- t.entlen = td->entlen_pr;
+ t.entropy = td->entropy_pr;
+ t.entropylen = td->entropylen_pr;
t.nonce = td->nonce_pr;
t.noncelen = td->noncelen_pr;
- t.entcnt = 0;
+ t.entropycnt = 0;
t.noncecnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers_pr, td->perslen_pr)))
failures++;
* Now generate with PR: we need to supply entropy as this will
* perform a reseed operation.
*/
- t.ent = td->entpr_pr;
- t.entlen = td->entprlen_pr;
+ t.entropy = td->entropypr_pr;
+ t.entropylen = td->entropyprlen_pr;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->katlen_pr, 1,
td->adin_pr, td->adinlen_pr))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat_pr, td->katlen_pr, buff, td->katlen_pr))
/*
* Now generate again with PR: supply new entropy again.
*/
- t.ent = td->entg_pr;
- t.entlen = td->entglen_pr;
+ t.entropy = td->entropyg_pr;
+ t.entropylen = td->entropyglen_pr;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len_pr, 1,
td->ading_pr, td->adinglen_pr))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL)))
return 0;
- RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, t);
- t->ent = td->ent;
- t->entlen = td->entlen;
+ RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(drbg, t);
+ t->entropy = td->entropy;
+ t->entropylen = td->entropylen;
t->nonce = td->nonce;
t->noncelen = td->noncelen;
- t->entcnt = 0;
+ t->entropycnt = 0;
t->noncecnt = 0;
return 1;
}
unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp;
int ret = 0;
- if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg)))
goto err;
/*
* Personalisation string tests
*/
- /* Test detection of too large personlisation string */
+ /* Test detection of too large personalisation string */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_pers + 1) > 0)
+ || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_perslen + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/*
* Entropy source tests
*/
- /* Test entropy source failure detecion: i.e. returns no data */
- t.entlen = 0;
+ /* Test entropy source failure detection: i.e. returns no data */
+ t.entropylen = 0;
if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen), 0))
goto err;
goto err;
/* Test insufficient entropy */
- t.entlen = drbg->min_entropy - 1;
+ t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test too much entropy */
- t.entlen = drbg->max_entropy + 1;
+ t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
*/
/* Test too small nonce */
- if (drbg->min_nonce) {
- t.noncelen = drbg->min_nonce - 1;
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen) {
+ t.noncelen = drbg->min_noncelen - 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
}
/* Test too large nonce */
- if (drbg->max_nonce) {
- t.noncelen = drbg->max_nonce + 1;
+ if (drbg->max_noncelen) {
+ t.noncelen = drbg->max_noncelen + 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
/* Try too large additional input */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
- td->adin, drbg->max_adin + 1)))
+ td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1)))
goto err;
/*
* Check prediction resistance request fails if entropy source
* failure.
*/
- t.entlen = 0;
+ t.entropylen = 0;
if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
/* Instantiate again with valid data */
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_counter;
- drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
+ reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_gen_counter;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
- t.entcnt = 0;
+ t.entropycnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
- || !TEST_int_eq(t.entcnt, 1)
- || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(t.entropycnt, 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_gen_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
* Check prediction resistance request fails if entropy source
* failure.
*/
- t.entlen = 0;
+ t.entropylen = 0;
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
/* Test reseed counter works */
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_counter;
- drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
+ reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_gen_counter;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
- t.entcnt = 0;
+ t.entropycnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
- || !TEST_int_eq(t.entcnt, 1)
- || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(t.entropycnt, 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_gen_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
*/
/* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */
- if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adin + 1) > 0)
+ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1, 0) > 0)
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */
- t.entlen = 0;
- if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
+ t.entropylen = 0;
+ if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too much entropy */
- if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
+ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- t.entlen = drbg->max_entropy + 1;
- if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
+ t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1;
+ if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too little entropy */
- if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
+ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- t.entlen = drbg->min_entropy - 1;
- if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
+ t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1;
+ if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Standard says we have to check uninstantiate really zeroes */
- if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->ctr), &drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr)))
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->data), &drbg->data, sizeof(drbg->data)))
goto err;
ret = 1;
return rv;
}
-#define RAND_ADD_SIZE 500
+/*
+ * Hook context data, attached as EXDATA to the RAND_DRBG
+ */
+typedef struct hook_ctx_st {
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ /*
+ * Currently, all DRBGs use the same get_entropy() callback.
+ * The tests however, don't assume this and store
+ * the original callback for every DRBG separately.
+ */
+ RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy;
+ /* forces a failure of the get_entropy() call if nonzero */
+ int fail;
+ /* counts successful reseeds */
+ int reseed_count;
+} HOOK_CTX;
+
+static HOOK_CTX master_ctx, public_ctx, private_ctx;
+
+static HOOK_CTX *get_hook_ctx(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ return (HOOK_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(drbg);
+}
+
+/* Intercepts and counts calls to the get_entropy() callback */
+static size_t get_entropy_hook(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ int prediction_resistance)
+{
+ size_t ret;
+ HOOK_CTX *ctx = get_hook_ctx(drbg);
+
+ if (ctx->fail != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = ctx->get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
+ prediction_resistance);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ ctx->reseed_count++;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Installs a hook for the get_entropy() callback of the given drbg */
+static void hook_drbg(RAND_DRBG *drbg, HOOK_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ ctx->drbg = drbg;
+ ctx->get_entropy = drbg->get_entropy;
+
+ /*
+ * We can't use the public API here, since it prohibits modifying
+ * the callbacks or the callback data of chained DRBGs.
+ */
+ drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy_hook;
+ drbg->callback_data = ctx;
+}
+
+/* Installs the hook for the get_entropy() callback of the given drbg */
+static void unhook_drbg(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ HOOK_CTX *ctx = drbg->callback_data;
+
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ drbg->get_entropy = ctx->get_entropy;
+}
+
+/* Resets the given hook context */
+static void reset_hook_ctx(HOOK_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->fail = 0;
+ ctx->reseed_count = 0;
+}
+
+/* Resets all drbg hook contexts */
+static void reset_drbg_hook_ctx(void)
+{
+ reset_hook_ctx(&master_ctx);
+ reset_hook_ctx(&public_ctx);
+ reset_hook_ctx(&private_ctx);
+}
-static int test_rand_add()
+/*
+ * Generates random output using RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes()
+ * and checks whether the three shared DRBGs were reseeded as
+ * expected.
+ *
+ * |expect_success|: expected outcome (as reported by RAND_status())
+ * |master|, |public|, |private|: pointers to the three shared DRBGs
+ * |expect_xxx_reseed| =
+ * 1: it is expected that the specified DRBG is reseeded
+ * 0: it is expected that the specified DRBG is not reseeded
+ * -1: don't check whether the specified DRBG was reseeded or not
+ * |reseed_time|: if nonzero, used instead of time(NULL) to set the
+ * |before_reseed| time.
+ */
+static int test_drbg_reseed(int expect_success,
+ RAND_DRBG *master,
+ RAND_DRBG *public,
+ RAND_DRBG *private,
+ int expect_master_reseed,
+ int expect_public_reseed,
+ int expect_private_reseed,
+ time_t reseed_time
+ )
{
- char *p;
+ unsigned char buf[32];
+ time_t before_reseed, after_reseed;
+ int expected_state = (expect_success ? DRBG_READY : DRBG_ERROR);
+
+ /*
+ * step 1: check preconditions
+ */
+
+ /* Test whether seed propagation is enabled */
+ if (!TEST_int_ne(master->reseed_prop_counter, 0)
+ || !TEST_int_ne(public->reseed_prop_counter, 0)
+ || !TEST_int_ne(private->reseed_prop_counter, 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check whether the master DRBG's reseed counter is the largest one */
+ if (!TEST_int_le(public->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter)
+ || !TEST_int_le(private->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * step 2: generate random output
+ */
+
+ if (reseed_time == 0)
+ reseed_time = time(NULL);
- if (!TEST_ptr(p = malloc(RAND_ADD_SIZE)))
+ /* Generate random output from the public and private DRBG */
+ before_reseed = expect_master_reseed == 1 ? reseed_time : 0;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)), expect_success)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(RAND_priv_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)), expect_success))
return 0;
- RAND_add(p, RAND_ADD_SIZE, RAND_ADD_SIZE);
- free(p);
+ after_reseed = time(NULL);
+
+
+ /*
+ * step 3: check postconditions
+ */
+
+ /* Test whether reseeding succeeded as expected */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(master->state, expected_state)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(public->state, expected_state)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(private->state, expected_state))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (expect_master_reseed >= 0) {
+ /* Test whether master DRBG was reseeded as expected */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(master_ctx.reseed_count, expect_master_reseed))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (expect_public_reseed >= 0) {
+ /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(public_ctx.reseed_count, expect_public_reseed))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (expect_private_reseed >= 0) {
+ /* Test whether public DRBG was reseeded as expected */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(private_ctx.reseed_count, expect_private_reseed))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (expect_success == 1) {
+ /* Test whether all three reseed counters are synchronized */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(public->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(private->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Test whether reseed time of master DRBG is set correctly */
+ if (!TEST_time_t_le(before_reseed, master->reseed_time)
+ || !TEST_time_t_le(master->reseed_time, after_reseed))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Test whether reseed times of child DRBGs are synchronized with master */
+ if (!TEST_time_t_ge(public->reseed_time, master->reseed_time)
+ || !TEST_time_t_ge(private->reseed_time, master->reseed_time))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+
return 1;
}
-int setup_tests(void)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+/*
+ * Test whether master, public and private DRBG are reseeded after
+ * forking the process.
+ */
+static int test_drbg_reseed_after_fork(RAND_DRBG *master,
+ RAND_DRBG *public,
+ RAND_DRBG *private)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status=0;
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (!TEST_int_ge(pid, 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pid > 0) {
+ /* I'm the parent; wait for the child and check its exit code */
+ return TEST_int_eq(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid) && TEST_int_eq(status, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* I'm the child; check whether all three DRBGs reseed. */
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 1, 1, 1, 0)))
+ status = 1;
+
+ /* Remove hooks */
+ unhook_drbg(master);
+ unhook_drbg(public);
+ unhook_drbg(private);
+ exit(status);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Test whether the default rand_method (RAND_OpenSSL()) is
+ * setup correctly, in particular whether reseeding works
+ * as designed.
+ */
+static int test_rand_drbg_reseed(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *master, *public, *private;
+ unsigned char rand_add_buf[256];
+ int rv=0;
+ time_t before_reseed;
+
+ /* Check whether RAND_OpenSSL() is the default method */
+ if (!TEST_ptr_eq(RAND_get_rand_method(), RAND_OpenSSL()))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* All three DRBGs should be non-null */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())
+ || !TEST_ptr(public = RAND_DRBG_get0_public())
+ || !TEST_ptr(private = RAND_DRBG_get0_private()))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* There should be three distinct DRBGs, two of them chained to master */
+ if (!TEST_ptr_ne(public, private)
+ || !TEST_ptr_ne(public, master)
+ || !TEST_ptr_ne(private, master)
+ || !TEST_ptr_eq(public->parent, master)
+ || !TEST_ptr_eq(private->parent, master))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Disable CRNG testing for the master DRBG */
+ if (!TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* uninstantiate the three global DRBGs */
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private);
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public);
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(master);
+
+
+ /* Install hooks for the following tests */
+ hook_drbg(master, &master_ctx);
+ hook_drbg(public, &public_ctx);
+ hook_drbg(private, &private_ctx);
+
+
+ /*
+ * Test initial seeding of shared DRBGs
+ */
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 1, 1, 1, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+
+
+ /*
+ * Test initial state of shared DRBGs
+ */
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 0, 0, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+
+ /*
+ * Test whether the public and private DRBG are both reseeded when their
+ * reseed counters differ from the master's reseed counter.
+ */
+ master->reseed_prop_counter++;
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 1, 1, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+
+ /*
+ * Test whether the public DRBG is reseeded when its reseed counter differs
+ * from the master's reseed counter.
+ */
+ master->reseed_prop_counter++;
+ private->reseed_prop_counter++;
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 1, 0, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+
+ /*
+ * Test whether the private DRBG is reseeded when its reseed counter differs
+ * from the master's reseed counter.
+ */
+ master->reseed_prop_counter++;
+ public->reseed_prop_counter++;
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 0, 1, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed_after_fork(master, public, private)))
+ goto error;
+#endif
+
+ /* fill 'randomness' buffer with some arbitrary data */
+ memset(rand_add_buf, 'r', sizeof(rand_add_buf));
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ /*
+ * Test whether all three DRBGs are reseeded by RAND_add().
+ * The before_reseed time has to be measured here and passed into the
+ * test_drbg_reseed() test, because the master DRBG gets already reseeded
+ * in RAND_add(), whence the check for the condition
+ * before_reseed <= master->reseed_time will fail if the time value happens
+ * to increase between the RAND_add() and the test_drbg_reseed() call.
+ */
+ before_reseed = time(NULL);
+ RAND_add(rand_add_buf, sizeof(rand_add_buf), sizeof(rand_add_buf));
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 1, 1, 1,
+ before_reseed)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+
+
+ /*
+ * Test whether none of the DRBGs is reseed if the master fails to reseed
+ */
+ master_ctx.fail = 1;
+ master->reseed_prop_counter++;
+ RAND_add(rand_add_buf, sizeof(rand_add_buf), sizeof(rand_add_buf));
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(0, master, public, private, 0, 0, 0, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+#else /* FIPS_MODE */
+ /*
+ * In FIPS mode, random data provided by the application via RAND_add()
+ * is not considered a trusted entropy source. It is only treated as
+ * additional_data and no reseeding is forced. This test assures that
+ * no reseeding occurs.
+ */
+ before_reseed = time(NULL);
+ RAND_add(rand_add_buf, sizeof(rand_add_buf), sizeof(rand_add_buf));
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 0, 0,
+ before_reseed)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+#endif
+
+ rv = 1;
+
+error:
+ /* Remove hooks */
+ unhook_drbg(master);
+ unhook_drbg(public);
+ unhook_drbg(private);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
+static int multi_thread_rand_bytes_succeeded = 1;
+static int multi_thread_rand_priv_bytes_succeeded = 1;
+
+static void run_multi_thread_test(void)
{
- app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ unsigned char buf[256];
+ time_t start = time(NULL);
+ RAND_DRBG *public = NULL, *private = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(public = RAND_DRBG_get0_public())
+ || !TEST_ptr(private = RAND_DRBG_get0_private())) {
+ multi_thread_rand_bytes_succeeded = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(private, 1);
+ RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(public, 1);
+
+ do {
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0)
+ multi_thread_rand_bytes_succeeded = 0;
+ if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0)
+ multi_thread_rand_priv_bytes_succeeded = 0;
+ }
+ while(time(NULL) - start < 5);
+}
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+typedef HANDLE thread_t;
+
+static DWORD WINAPI thread_run(LPVOID arg)
+{
+ run_multi_thread_test();
+ /*
+ * Because we're linking with a static library, we must stop each
+ * thread explicitly, or so says OPENSSL_thread_stop(3)
+ */
+ OPENSSL_thread_stop();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int run_thread(thread_t *t)
+{
+ *t = CreateThread(NULL, 0, thread_run, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ return *t != NULL;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread)
+{
+ return WaitForSingleObject(thread, INFINITE) == 0;
+}
+
+# else
+
+typedef pthread_t thread_t;
+
+static void *thread_run(void *arg)
+{
+ run_multi_thread_test();
+ /*
+ * Because we're linking with a static library, we must stop each
+ * thread explicitly, or so says OPENSSL_thread_stop(3)
+ */
+ OPENSSL_thread_stop();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int run_thread(thread_t *t)
+{
+ return pthread_create(t, NULL, thread_run, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread)
+{
+ return pthread_join(thread, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * The main thread will also run the test, so we'll have THREADS+1 parallel
+ * tests running
+ */
+# define THREADS 3
+
+static int test_multi_thread(void)
+{
+ thread_t t[THREADS];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < THREADS; i++)
+ run_thread(&t[i]);
+ run_multi_thread_test();
+ for (i = 0; i < THREADS; i++)
+ wait_for_thread(t[i]);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(multi_thread_rand_bytes_succeeded))
+ return 0;
+ if (!TEST_true(multi_thread_rand_priv_bytes_succeeded))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Test that instantiation with RAND_seed() works as expected
+ *
+ * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
+ * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length is at least
+ * rand_drbg_seedlen(master) bytes.
+ *
+ * If an os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
+ * is expected to succeed always.
+ */
+static int test_rand_seed(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *master = NULL;
+ unsigned char rand_buf[256];
+ size_t rand_buflen;
+ size_t required_seed_buflen = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())
+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
+ required_seed_buflen = rand_drbg_seedlen(master);
+#endif
+
+ memset(rand_buf, 0xCD, sizeof(rand_buf));
+
+ for ( rand_buflen = 256 ; rand_buflen > 0 ; --rand_buflen ) {
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(master);
+ RAND_seed(rand_buf, rand_buflen);
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_status(),
+ (rand_buflen >= required_seed_buflen)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that adding additional data with RAND_add() works as expected
+ * when the master DRBG is instantiated (and below its reseed limit).
+ *
+ * This should succeed regardless of whether an os entropy source is
+ * available or not.
+ */
+static int test_rand_add(void)
+{
+ unsigned char rand_buf[256];
+ size_t rand_buflen;
+
+ memset(rand_buf, 0xCD, sizeof(rand_buf));
+
+ /* make sure it's instantiated */
+ RAND_seed(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf));
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_status()))
+ return 0;
+
+ for ( rand_buflen = 256 ; rand_buflen > 0 ; --rand_buflen ) {
+ RAND_add(rand_buf, rand_buflen, 0.0);
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_status()))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_rand_drbg_prediction_resistance(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *m = NULL, *i = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ unsigned char buf1[51], buf2[sizeof(buf1)];
+ int ret = 0, mreseed, ireseed, sreseed;
+
+ /* Initialise a three long DRBG chain */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(m = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(m))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(m, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(i = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, m))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(i, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(s = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, i))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(s, NULL, 0)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* During a normal reseed, only the slave DRBG should be reseed */
+ mreseed = ++m->reseed_prop_counter;
+ ireseed = ++i->reseed_prop_counter;
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(s, NULL, 0, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * When prediction resistance is requested, the request should be
+ * propagated to the master, so that the entire DRBG chain reseeds.
+ */
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(s, NULL, 0, 1))
+ || !TEST_int_gt(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* During a normal generate, only the slave DRBG should be reseed */
+ mreseed = ++m->reseed_prop_counter;
+ ireseed = ++i->reseed_prop_counter;
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(s, buf1, sizeof(buf1), 0, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * When a prediction resistant generate is requested, the request
+ * should be propagated to the master, reseeding the entire DRBG chain.
+ */
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(s, buf2, sizeof(buf2), 1, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_gt(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed)
+ || !TEST_mem_ne(buf1, sizeof(buf1), buf2, sizeof(buf2)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Verify that a normal reseed still only reseeds the slave DRBG */
+ mreseed = ++m->reseed_prop_counter;
+ ireseed = ++i->reseed_prop_counter;
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(s, NULL, 0, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ RAND_DRBG_free(s);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(i);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(m);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_multi_set(void)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
+
+ /* init drbg with default CTR initializer */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg)))
+ goto err;
+ /* change it to use hmac */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, NID_sha1, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)))
+ goto err;
+ /* use same type */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, NID_sha1, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)))
+ goto err;
+ /* change it to use hash */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, NID_sha256, 0)))
+ goto err;
+ /* use same type */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, NID_sha256, 0)))
+ goto err;
+ /* change it to use ctr */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, NID_aes_192_ctr, 0)))
+ goto err;
+ /* use same type */
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, NID_aes_192_ctr, 0)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0), 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ rv = 1;
+err:
+ uninstantiate(drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int test_set_defaults(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *master = NULL, *public = NULL, *private = NULL;
+
+ /* Check the default type and flags for master, public and private */
+ return TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())
+ && TEST_ptr(public = RAND_DRBG_get0_public())
+ && TEST_ptr(private = RAND_DRBG_get0_private())
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->type, RAND_DRBG_TYPE)
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->type, RAND_DRBG_TYPE)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->type, RAND_DRBG_TYPE)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
+
+ /* change master DRBG and check again */
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(NID_sha256,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(master))
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->type, NID_sha256)
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->flags, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->type, RAND_DRBG_TYPE)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->type, RAND_DRBG_TYPE)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
+ /* change private DRBG and check again */
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(NID_sha256,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE|RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private))
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->type, NID_sha256)
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->flags, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->type, RAND_DRBG_TYPE)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->type, NID_sha256)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
+ /* change public DRBG and check again */
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(NID_sha1,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC
+ | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public))
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->type, NID_sha256)
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->flags, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->type, NID_sha1)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->type, NID_sha256)
+ && TEST_int_eq(private->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
+ /* Change DRBG defaults and change public and check again */
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(NID_sha256, 0))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public))
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->type, NID_sha256)
+ && TEST_int_eq(public->flags, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+
+ /* FIPS mode doesn't support CTR DRBG without a derivation function */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ /* Change DRBG defaults and change master and check again */
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(NID_aes_256_ctr,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(master))
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->type, NID_aes_256_ctr)
+ && TEST_int_eq(master->flags,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER|RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF)
+#endif
+ /* Reset back to the standard defaults */
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(RAND_DRBG_TYPE,
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS
+ | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER
+ | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC
+ | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(master))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public))
+ && TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private));
+}
+
+/*
+ * A list of the FIPS DRGB types.
+ * Because of the way HMAC DRGBs are implemented, both the NID and flags
+ * are required.
+ */
+static const struct s_drgb_types {
+ int nid;
+ int flags;
+} drgb_types[] = {
+ { NID_aes_128_ctr, 0 },
+ { NID_aes_192_ctr, 0 },
+ { NID_aes_256_ctr, 0 },
+ { NID_sha1, 0 },
+ { NID_sha224, 0 },
+ { NID_sha256, 0 },
+ { NID_sha384, 0 },
+ { NID_sha512, 0 },
+ { NID_sha512_224, 0 },
+ { NID_sha512_256, 0 },
+ { NID_sha3_224, 0 },
+ { NID_sha3_256, 0 },
+ { NID_sha3_384, 0 },
+ { NID_sha3_512, 0 },
+ { NID_sha1, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha224, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha256, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha384, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha512, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha512_224, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha512_256, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha3_224, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha3_256, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha3_384, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+ { NID_sha3_512, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC },
+};
+
+/* Six cases for each covers seed sizes up to 32 bytes */
+static const size_t crngt_num_cases = 6;
+
+static size_t crngt_case, crngt_idx;
+
+static int crngt_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
+ unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
+ unsigned int *md_size)
+{
+ size_t i, z;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_lt(crngt_idx, crngt_num_cases))
+ return 0;
+ /* Generate a block of unique data unless this is the duplication point */
+ z = crngt_idx++;
+ if (z > 0 && crngt_case == z)
+ z--;
+ for (i = 0; i < CRNGT_BUFSIZ; i++)
+ buf[i] = (unsigned char)(i + 'A' + z);
+ return EVP_Digest(buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+}
+
+static int test_crngt(int n)
+{
+ const struct s_drgb_types *dt = drgb_types + n / crngt_num_cases;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
+ unsigned char buff[100];
+ size_t ent;
+ int res = 0;
+ int expect;
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_CTX_new();
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx))
+ return 0;
+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new_ex(ctx, dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL)))
+ goto err;
+ ent = (drbg->min_entropylen + CRNGT_BUFSIZ - 1) / CRNGT_BUFSIZ;
+ crngt_case = n % crngt_num_cases;
+ crngt_idx = 0;
+ crngt_get_entropy = &crngt_entropy_cb;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_crngt_get_entropy,
+ &rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy,
+ &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
+ &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce)))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > ent;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0), expect))
+ goto err;
+ if (!expect)
+ goto fin;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
+ goto err;
+
+ expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > 2 * ent;
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0), expect))
+ goto err;
+ if (!expect)
+ goto fin;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
+ goto err;
+
+fin:
+ res = 1;
+err:
+ if (!res)
+ TEST_note("DRBG %zd case %zd block %zd", n / crngt_num_cases,
+ crngt_case, crngt_idx);
+ uninstantiate(drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+ crngt_get_entropy = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
+ OPENSSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return res;
+}
+
+int setup_tests(void)
+{
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_kats, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_error_checks, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test));
+ ADD_TEST(test_rand_drbg_reseed);
+ ADD_TEST(test_rand_seed);
ADD_TEST(test_rand_add);
+ ADD_TEST(test_rand_drbg_prediction_resistance);
+ ADD_TEST(test_multi_set);
+ ADD_TEST(test_set_defaults);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
+ ADD_TEST(test_multi_thread);
+#endif
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_crngt, crngt_num_cases * OSSL_NELEM(drgb_types));
return 1;
}