.SS Network flags
These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process
to a set of network actions.
-This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4.
+.P
+This is supported since Landlock ABI version 4.
.P
The following access rights apply to TCP port numbers:
.TP
.B LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
Connect an active TCP socket to a remote port.
.\"
+.SS Scope flags
+These flags enable isolating a sandboxed process from a set of IPC actions.
+Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain
+to forbid connections to resources outside the domain.
+.P
+This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6.
+.P
+The following scopes exist:
+.TP
+.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
+Restrict a sandboxed process from connecting to an abstract UNIX socket
+created by a process outside the related Landlock domain
+(e.g., a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process).
+.TP
+.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
+Restrict a sandboxed process from sending a signal
+to another process outside the domain.
+.\"
.SS Layers of file path access rights
Each time a thread enforces a ruleset on itself,
it updates its Landlock domain with a new layer of policy.
a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
.\"
+.SS IPC scoping
+Similar to the implicit
+.BR "Ptrace restrictions" ,
+we may want to further restrict interactions between sandboxes.
+Therefore, at ruleset creation time,
+each Landlock domain can restrict the scope for certain operations,
+so that these operations can only reach out to processes
+within the same Landlock domain or in a nested Landlock domain (the "scope").
+.P
+The operations which can be scoped are:
+.TP
+.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
+This limits the sending of signals to target processes
+which run within the same or a nested Landlock domain.
+.TP
+.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
+This limits the set of abstract
+.BR unix (7)
+sockets to which we can
+.BR connect (2)
+to socket addresses which were created
+by a process in the same or a nested Landlock domain.
+.IP
+A
+.BR sendto (2)
+on a non-connected datagram socket is treated as if it were doing an implicit
+.BR connect (2)
+and will be blocked if the remote end does not stem
+from the same or a nested Landlock domain.
+.IP
+A
+.BR sendto (2)
+on a socket which was previously connected will not be restricted.
+This works for both datagram and stream sockets.
+.P
+IPC scoping does not support exceptions via
+.BR landlock_add_rule (2).
+If an operation is scoped within a domain,
+no rules can be added to allow access to
+resources or processes outside of the scope.
+.\"
.SS Truncating files
The operations covered by
.B LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE
\^ \^ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
_ _ _
5 6.10 LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
+_ _ _
+6 6.12 LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
+\^ \^ LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
.TE
.P
Users should use the Landlock ABI version rather than the kernel version