References:
- C99 draft: https://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1124.pdf
section "6.5.6 Additive operators", paragraph 9
- object size restriction in GCC:
https://gcc.gnu.org/legacy-ml/gcc/2011-08/msg00221.html
- glibc malloc restricts object size to <=PTRDIFF_MAX in
checked_request2size() since glibc v2.30 (released in 2019, as pointed
out by Jakub Wilk):
https://sourceware.org/cgit/glibc/commit/?id=
9bf8e29ca136094f
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Message-ID: <
20250429164359.
2699330-1-jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
.I length
must both be a multiple of the underlying huge page size.
.\"
+.SH CAVEATS
+Unlike typical
+.BR malloc (3)
+implementations,
+.BR mmap ()
+does not prevent creating objects larger than
+.BR PTRDIFF_MAX .
+Objects that are larger than
+.B PTRDIFF_MAX
+only work in limited ways in C
+(in particular,
+pointer subtraction results in undefined behavior
+if the result would be bigger than
+.BR PTRDIFF_MAX ).
+On top of that,
+GCC also assumes that no object is bigger than
+.BR PTRDIFF_MAX .
+.B PTRDIFF_MAX
+is usually half of the address space size;
+so for 32-bit processes,
+it is usually
+.B 0x7fffffff
+(almost 2 GiB).
+.\"
.SH BUGS
On Linux, there are no guarantees like those suggested above under
.BR MAP_NORESERVE .