Matthew Leeds [Fri, 7 Feb 2020 00:30:25 +0000 (16:30 -0800)]
hwdb: Fix touchpad toggle on WeiHeng P325J
On the WeiHeng P325J laptop, Fn+F2 sends LeftWindow (0xe0 0x5b) +
LeftCtrl (0x1d) + F24 (0x76). Add a quirk to remap the 0x76 to F21 which
toggles the touchpad. The Ctrl + Win part is handled in userspace, e.g
by gnome-settings-daemon here:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-settings-daemon/commit/f545950fe
This is analogous to what was done for the T-bao hardware here:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/d4a5df521d
Anita Zhang [Thu, 6 Feb 2020 23:34:17 +0000 (15:34 -0800)]
core: sync SeccompParseFlags between dbus-execute and load-fragment
9e486265716963439fb0fd7f2a97abf109f24f75 added some new syscalls to the
filter lists. However, on systems that do not yet support the new calls,
running systemd-run with the filter set results in error:
```
$ sudo systemd-run -t -r -p "SystemCallFilter=~@mount" /bin/true
Failed to start transient service unit: Invalid argument
```
Having the same properties in a unit file will start the service
without issue. This is because the load-fragment code will parse the
syscall filters in permissive mode:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/src/core/load-fragment.c#L2909
whereas the dbus-execute equivalent of the code does not.
Since the permissive mode appears to be the right setting to support
older kernels/libseccomp, this will update the dbus-execute parsing
to also be permissive.
core/selinux-access: use _cleanup_ and improve logging
Instead of setting the bus error structure and then freeing it, let's only set
it if used. If we will ignore the selinux denial, say ", ignore" to make this
clear. Also, use _cleanup_ to avoid gotos.
../src/core/selinux-access.c: In function ‘mac_selinux_generic_access_check’:
../src/basic/log.h:223:27: error: ‘%s’ directive argument is null [-Werror=format-overflow=]
../src/core/selinux-access.c:235:85: note: format string is defined here
235 | log_warning_errno(errno, "SELinux getcon_raw failed (tclass=%s perm=%s): %m", tclass, permission);
| ^~
I wonder why nobody ever noticed this.
Fixes #14691 (other issues listed in that ticket have already been fixed).
shared/ask-password-api: show "(press TAB for no echo)"
For #8495: it is arguably useful to not show the length of the password
in public spaces. It is possible to press TAB or BS to cancel the asterisks,
but this is not very discoverable. Let's make it discoverable by showing
a message (in gray). The message is "erased" after the first character
is entered.
shared/ask-password-api: return "error" when dialogue is cancelled
test-ask-password-api would crash if ^D was pressed.
If think the callers generally expect a non-empty strv as reply. Let's
return an error if we have nothing to return.
core: do not prepare a SELinux context for dummy files for devicenode bind-mounting
Let systemd create the dummy file where a device node will be mounted on with the default label for the parent directory (e.g. /tmp/namespace-dev-yTMwAe/dev/).
See c80a9a33d04fb4381327a69ce929c94a9f1d0e6c, target units can't fail.
I guess we need to figure out some replacement functionality, but at least
let's avoid the warning from systemd for now.
Chris Down [Wed, 5 Feb 2020 12:12:52 +0000 (12:12 +0000)]
cgroup: systemctl: Don't display NULL if protection was set to max
Inside format_bytes, we return NULL if the value is UINT64_MAX. This
makes some kind of sense where this has some other semantic meaning than
being a value, but in this case the value is both a.) not the default
(so we definitely want to display it), and b.) means "infinity" (or
"max" in cgroup terminology).
This patch adds a small wrapper around format_bytes that can be used for
these cases, to avoid the following situation:
[root@tangsanjiao ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/workload.slice/memory.low
max
[root@tangsanjiao ~]# systemctl show workload.slice -p MemoryLow
MemoryLow=infinity
[root@tangsanjiao ~]# systemctl status workload.slice | grep low:
Memory: 14.9G (low: (null))
Since libcap v2.29 the format of cap_to_text() has been changed which
makes certain `test-execute` subtest fail. Let's remove the offending
part of the output (dropped capabilities) to make it compatible with
both the old and the new libcap.
polkit: when authorizing via PK let's re-resolve callback/userdata instead of caching it
Previously, when doing an async PK query we'd store the original
callback/userdata pair and call it again after the PK request is
complete. This is problematic, since PK queries might be slow and in the
meantime the userdata might be released and re-acquired. Let's avoid
this by always traversing through the message handlers so that we always
re-resolve the callback and userdata pair and thus can be sure it's
up-to-date and properly valid.
sd-bus: introduce API for re-enqueuing incoming messages
When authorizing via PolicyKit we want to process incoming method calls
twice: once to process and figure out that we need PK authentication,
and a second time after we aquired PK authentication to actually execute
the operation. With this new call sd_bus_enqueue_for_read() we have a
way to put an incoming message back into the read queue for this
purpose.
This might have other uses too, for example debugging.
polkit: on async pk requests, re-validate action/details
When we do an async pk request, let's store which action/details we used
for the original request, and when we are called for the second time,
let's compare. If the action/details changed, let's not allow the access
to go through.
selinux-access: log warning on context acquisition failure
Relevant when testing in permissive mode, where the function does not return a failure to the client.
This helps to configure a system in permissive mode, without getting surprising failures when switching to enforced mode.
`log_enforcing()` and `log_enforcing_errno()` are only used for important messages, which describe failures in enforced mode.
They are guarded either by `!mac_selinux_use()` or `!label_hnd` checks, where the latter is itself guarded by the former.
Only SELinux enabled systems print these logs.
This helps to configure a system in permissive mode, without getting surprising failures when switching to enforced mode.
This never made into a release, so we can change the name with impunity.
Suggested by Davide Pesavento.
I opted to add the "ing" ending. "Fair queuing" is the name of the general
concept and algorithm, and "Fair queue" is mostly used for the implementation
name.
In particular, let's just say "is" and "must" instead of "may be" and
"should". The weaker forms are obviously correct, but the text is easier to
understand if non-conditional forms are used.
meson: update efi path detection to gnu-efi-3.0.11
Fixes systemd build in Fedora rawhide.
The old ldsdir option is not useful, because both the directory and the
file name changed. Let's remove the option and try to autodetect the file
name. If this turns out to be not enough, a new option to simply specify
the full path to the file can be added.
F31:
efi arch: x86_64
EFI machine type: x64
EFI CC ccache cc
EFI lds: /usr/lib64/gnuefi/elf_x64_efi.lds
EFI crt0: /usr/lib64/gnuefi/crt0-efi-x64.o
EFI include directory: /usr/include/efi
F32:
efi arch: x86_64
EFI machine type: x64
EFI CC ccache cc
EFI lds: /usr/lib/gnuefi/x64/efi.lds
EFI crt0: /usr/lib/gnuefi/x64/crt0.o
EFI include directory: /usr/include/efi
network,udev: refuse .link and .network settings with no matches
Two releases ago we started warning about this, and I think it is now to turn
this into a hard error. People get bitten by this every once in a while, and
there doesn't see to be any legitimate use case where the same .link or
.network files should be applied to _all_ interfaces, since in particular that
configuration would apply both to lo and any other interfaces. And if for
whatever reason that is actually desired, OriginalName=* or Name=* can be
easily added to silence the warning and achieve the effect.
(The case described in #12098 is particularly nasty: 'echo -n >foo.network'
creates a mask file, 'echo >foo.network' creates a "match all" file.)
Officially we default to a "enable *", even though pretty much everybody
overrides this with "disable *". We have a bunch of targets and services which
should not be enabled by default. In case the default policy is not overriden,
our passive units would be enabled by presets, which is generally not useful at
all. So let's explicitly mark them as disabled.
Note that this effectively changes very little. E.g. on Fedora, all the units
listed in this patch were "disabled" already.
This solution is a bit busy, but we close the race without setting *.all.*, so
it is still possible to set a different setting for particular interfaces.
Setting just "default" is not very useful because any interfaces present before
systemd-sysctl is invoked are not affected. Setting "all" is too harsh, because
the kernel takes the stronger of the device-specific setting and the "all" value,
so effectively having a weaker setting for specific interfaces is not possible.
This is intended for net.*.conf.*.foo files. Setting just "default" is not very
useful because any interfaces present before systemd-sysctl is invoked are not
affected. Setting "all" is too harsh, because the kernel takes the stronger of
the device-specific setting and the "all" value, so effectively having a weaker
setting for specific interfaces is not possible. Let's add a way in which can
set "default" first and then all the others without "all".
Yu Watanabe [Mon, 3 Feb 2020 11:18:02 +0000 (20:18 +0900)]
core: call dynamic_user_acquire() only when 'group' is non-null
When unit is reloaded, and the reloaded unit has bad-setting, then
unit_patch_contexts() is not called and exec_context::user and group
may not be configured.
A minimum reproducer for the case is:
- step 1.
$ sudo systemctl edit --full hoge.service
[Service]
oneshot
ExecStart=sleep 1h
David Michael [Thu, 30 Jan 2020 19:04:14 +0000 (14:04 -0500)]
sysusers: support creating users with a specific primary group
This extends the "uid:gid" syntax for "u" lines so that a group
name can be given instead of a GID. This requires that the group
is either queued for creation by sysusers, or it is already defined
on the system.
Frantisek Sumsal [Fri, 31 Jan 2020 10:51:05 +0000 (11:51 +0100)]
test: don't install /etc/securetty
Having /etc/securetty in test containers prevents root from logging into
them:
```
Jan 31 10:15:11 systemd-testsuite login[69]: pam_securetty(login:auth): access denied: tty 'pts/0' is not secure !
Jan 31 10:15:11 systemd-testsuite login[69]: FAILED LOGIN 1 FROM pts/0 FOR root, Authentication failure
```
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / log
