samba: remove SO_xxxBUF size definitions from default config

[ipfire-2.x.git] / src / patches / samba / CVE-2016-2118-v3-6.patch

From 9519f8f5123be055a4e845f87badef8b80ab2ee4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:49:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3: rpcclient: change the default auth
 level from DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY

ncacn_ip_tcp:server should get the same protection as ncacn_np:server
if authentication and smb signing is used.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

(cherry picked from commit dab41dee8a4fb27dbf3913b0e44a4cc726e3ac98)
---
 source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
index 949e14c..81c5f42 100644
--- a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
+++ b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
@@ -1062,10 +1062,9 @@ out_free:
 		}
 	}
 	if (pipe_default_auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
-		/* If neither Integrity or Privacy are requested then
-		 * Use just Connect level */
+		/* If nothing is requested then default to integrity */
 		if (pipe_default_auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE) {
-			pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT;
+			pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY;
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 0e00f6da40e6f76d9bd56187e74841c85ea86c55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2016 16:02:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] CVE-2016-2118: s4:librpc: use integrity by default for
 authenticated binds

ncacn_ip_tcp:server should get the same protection as ncacn_np:server
if authentication and smb signing is used.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7847ee85d278adb9ce4fc7da7cf171917227c93f)
---
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
index 2cd9499..a6d0df5 100644
--- a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+++ b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
@@ -593,15 +593,15 @@ struct composite_context *dcerpc_pipe_auth_send(struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
 
 	/* Perform an authenticated DCE-RPC bind
 	 */
-	if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_SIGN|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
+	if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_CONNECT|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
 		/*
 		  we are doing an authenticated connection,
-		  but not using sign or seal. We must force
-		  the CONNECT dcerpc auth type as a NONE auth
-		  type doesn't allow authentication
-		  information to be passed.
+		  which needs to use [connect], [sign] or [seal].
+		  If nothing is specified, we default to [sign] now.
+		  This give roughly the same protection as
+		  ncacn_np with smb signing.
 		*/
-		conn->flags |= DCERPC_CONNECT;
+		conn->flags |= DCERPC_SIGN;
 	}
 
 	if (s->binding->flags & DCERPC_AUTH_SPNEGO) {
-- 
2.8.1


From 8d53761dbcbea6439f4bfaef86ff79f42b682b22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 17:03:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 03/10] CVE-2016-2118: docs-xml: add "allow dcerpc auth level
 connect" defaulting to "yes"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

We sadly need to allow this for now by default.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(backported from commit 56baca8619ba9ae1734c3d77524fc705ebcbd8d2)
---
 .../security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml       | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml

diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5552112
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+<samba:parameter name="allow dcerpc auth level connect"
+                 context="G"
+                 type="boolean"
+                 xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+	<para>This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to
+	be used with DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication,
+	but no per message integrity nor privacy protection.</para>
+
+	<para>The behavior can be controlled per interface name (e.g. lsarpc, netlogon, samr, srvsvc,
+	winreg, wkssvc ...) by using 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = no' as option.</para>
+
+	<para>This option yields precedence to the implentation specific restrictions.
+	E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
+	While others like samr and lsarpc have a hardcoded default of <constant>no</constant>.
+	</para>
+
+	<para>Note the default will very likely change to <constant>no</constant> for Samba 4.5.</para>
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">yes</value>
+<value type="example">no</value>
+
+</samba:parameter>
-- 
2.8.1


From 9a0e8182314c631681f2dd47da5d790168066279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 08:45:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 04/10] CVE-2016-2118: param: add "allow dcerpc auth level
 connect" defaulting to "yes"

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(backported from commit 6e3ada2c36f527077d77a8278bd41bbc030f48cd)

(cherry picked from commit 74172d061597c96f0e733c11daee6cb15f3277dc)
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
---
 source3/include/proto.h  |  1 +
 source3/param/loadparm.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/include/proto.h b/source3/include/proto.h
index ac1540f..2ed6547 100644
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
@@ -1821,6 +1821,7 @@ char* lp_perfcount_module(void);
 void lp_set_passdb_backend(const char *backend);
 void widelinks_warning(int snum);
 char *lp_ncalrpc_dir(void);
+bool lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect(void);
 
 /* The following definitions come from param/loadparm_server_role.c  */
 
diff --git a/source3/param/loadparm.c b/source3/param/loadparm.c
index fdc9407..87d33c5 100644
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ struct global {
 	bool bUseMmap;
 	bool bHostnameLookups;
 	bool bUnixExtensions;
+	bool bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect;
 	bool bDisableNetbios;
 	char * szDedicatedKeytabFile;
 	int  iKerberosMethod;
@@ -2303,6 +2304,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] = {
 		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
 	},
 	{
+		.label		= "allow dcerpc auth level connect",
+		.type		= P_BOOL,
+		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
+		.ptr		= &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect,
+		.special	= NULL,
+		.enum_list	= NULL,
+		.flags		= FLAG_ADVANCED,
+	},
+	{
 		.label		= "use spnego",
 		.type		= P_BOOL,
 		.p_class	= P_GLOBAL,
@@ -5371,6 +5381,8 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_globals)
 	Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
 	/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
 
+	Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect = true; /* we need to allow this for now by default */
+
 	Globals.map_to_guest = 0;	/* By Default, "Never" */
 	Globals.oplock_break_wait_time = 0;	/* By Default, 0 msecs. */
 	Globals.enhanced_browsing = true;
@@ -5745,6 +5757,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_username_map_cache_time, &Globals.iUsernameMapCacheTime)
 
 FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_check_password_script, &Globals.szCheckPasswordScript)
 
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect, &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect)
 FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_wins_hook, &Globals.szWINSHook)
 FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_homedir, &Globals.szTemplateHomedir)
 FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_shell, &Globals.szTemplateShell)
-- 
2.8.1


From 82a245ff842ea33c050a8fbe415a531497232d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 04:40:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 05/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server: make use of "allow dcerpc
 auth level connect"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

With this option turned off we only allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_{NONE,INTEGRITY,PRIVACY},
this means the reject any request with AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT with ACCESS_DENIED.

We sadly need to keep this enabled by default for now.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Pair-Programmed-With: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1fa0bad3da921fca1d34971062522b4cc3e6db2c)
(cherry picked from commit 46744bbe5e3616613b2dbee7cf6fdf0d8d5caab3)
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
---
 source3/include/ntdomain.h    |  4 ++++
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source3/include/ntdomain.h b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
index 2fbeabc..650f1d0 100644
--- a/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+++ b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ typedef struct pipe_rpc_fns {
 	uint32 context_id;
 	struct ndr_syntax_id syntax;
 
+	/*
+	 * shall we allow "connect" auth level for this interface ?
+	 */
+	bool allow_connect;
 } PIPE_RPC_FNS;
 
 /*
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index d659705..c462dcf 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 			   uint32 context_id)
 {
 	struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns;
+	const char *interface_name = NULL;
 
 	DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
 		 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
@@ -355,12 +356,29 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		return False;
 	}
 
+	interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+						   abstract);
+
+	SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
+
 	context_fns->next = context_fns->prev = NULL;
 	context_fns->n_cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_num_cmds(abstract);
 	context_fns->cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_cmds(abstract);
 	context_fns->context_id = context_id;
 	context_fns->syntax = *abstract;
 
+	context_fns->allow_connect = lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect();
+	/*
+	 * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
+	 * using a parametric option like:
+	 * allow dcerpc auth level connect:<interface>
+	 * e.g.
+	 * allow dcerpc auth level connect:samr = yes
+	 */
+	context_fns->allow_connect = lp_parm_bool(-1,
+		"allow dcerpc auth level connect",
+		interface_name, context_fns->allow_connect);
+
 	/* add to the list of open contexts */
 
 	DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns );
@@ -1592,6 +1610,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
 	bool ret = False;
 	PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns;
+	const char *interface_name = NULL;
 
 	if (!p->pipe_bound) {
 		DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not bound!\n"));
@@ -1613,8 +1632,36 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+						   &pipe_fns->syntax);
+
+	SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
+
 	DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n",
-		  get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &pipe_fns->syntax)));
+		  interface_name));
+
+	switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
+	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
+	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
+	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (!pipe_fns->allow_connect) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("%s: restrict auth_level_connect access "
+				  "to [%s] with auth[type=0x%x,level=0x%x] "
+				  "on [%s] from [%s]\n",
+				  __func__, interface_name,
+				  p->auth.auth_type,
+				  p->auth.auth_level,
+				  derpc_transport_string_by_transport(p->transport),
+				  p->client_id->name));
+
+			setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED));
+			TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+			return true;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
 
 	if (!srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer(p, pkt, pipe_fns)) {
 		DEBUG(1, ("srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer: failed\n"));
-- 
2.8.1


From b68b204307e0b24bc2879ea667a706e11925166d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 09:50:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server/{samr,lsa,netlogon}:
 reject DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This prevents man in the middle downgrade attacks.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Pair-Programmed-With: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 51dd08951eb4ab9d297678f96cde61f508937721)
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>

Conflicts:
	selftest/knownfail
	source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c

selftest/knownfail is ignored in 3.6
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 source3/selftest/knownfail    |  1 +
 source3/selftest/tests.py     |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index c462dcf..3086b9e 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
 #include "ntdomain.h"
 #include "rpc_server/srv_pipe.h"
 #include "../librpc/ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
 
 #undef DBGC_CLASS
 #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
@@ -336,6 +339,7 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 {
 	struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns;
 	const char *interface_name = NULL;
+	bool ok;
 
 	DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
 		 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
@@ -369,6 +373,22 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	context_fns->allow_connect = lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect();
 	/*
+	 * for the samr and the lsarpc interfaces we don't allow "connect"
+	 * auth_level by default.
+	 */
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+	}
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+	}
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
+	}
+	/*
 	 * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
 	 * using a parametric option like:
 	 * allow dcerpc auth level connect:<interface>
diff --git a/source3/selftest/knownfail b/source3/selftest/knownfail
index bda1fe0..8717a4d 100644
--- a/source3/selftest/knownfail
+++ b/source3/selftest/knownfail
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ samba3.posix_s3.nbt.dgram.*netlogon2
 samba3.*rap.sam.*.useradd # Not provided by Samba 3
 samba3.*rap.sam.*.userdelete # Not provided by Samba 3
 samba3.*rap.basic.*.netsessiongetinfo # Not provided by Samba 3
+samba3.blackbox.rpcclient.over.ncacn_np.with.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
diff --git a/source3/selftest/tests.py b/source3/selftest/tests.py
index a733f14..8dfbf1e 100755
--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ if sub.returncode == 0:
             plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
         elif t == "raw.samba3posixtimedlock":
             plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD --option=torture:localdir=$SELFTEST_PREFIX/dc/share')
+        elif t == "rpc.samr.passwords.validate":
+            plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", 'ncacn_np:$SERVER_IP[seal] -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_np ')
         else:
             plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 720b9f861322c5fe804c53eb74e7d2d6a4d8b876 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 09:54:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3:selftest: The lsa tests which use
 connect need to fail

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
---
 source3/selftest/knownfail | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/source3/selftest/knownfail b/source3/selftest/knownfail
index 8717a4d..7d9275e 100644
--- a/source3/selftest/knownfail
+++ b/source3/selftest/knownfail
@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ samba3.*rap.sam.*.useradd # Not provided by Samba 3
 samba3.*rap.sam.*.userdelete # Not provided by Samba 3
 samba3.*rap.basic.*.netsessiongetinfo # Not provided by Samba 3
 samba3.blackbox.rpcclient.over.ncacn_np.with.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
+samba3.posix_s3.rpc.lsa.lookupsids.*ncacn_ip_tcp.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
-- 
2.8.1


From 9b2b563a1f8247f5ec7efde52d70efc666e30f56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2016 08:47:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server/{epmapper,echo}: allow
 DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 98f1a85f23d3d2a4f1c665746588688574261d90)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 3086b9e..964b843 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
 #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
 #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
 #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_epmapper.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_echo.h"
 
 #undef DBGC_CLASS
 #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
@@ -389,6 +391,18 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		context_fns->allow_connect = false;
 	}
 	/*
+	 * for the epmapper and echo interfaces we allow "connect"
+	 * auth_level by default.
+	 */
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_epmapper.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+	}
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_rpcecho.syntax_id);
+	if (ok) {
+		context_fns->allow_connect = true;
+	}
+	/*
 	 * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
 	 * using a parametric option like:
 	 * allow dcerpc auth level connect:<interface>
-- 
2.8.1


From 21453f6887569b162be44faaf43e1b9a81423210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 17:03:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/10] CVE-2016-2118: docs-xml/param: default "allow dcerpc
 auth level connect" to "no"

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(backported from commit 6469e21af32a2a405dd4f43e7d96a2f87c4a9902)

Conflicts:
	lib/param/loadparm.c
	source3/param/loadparm.c
---
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml | 6 ++----
 source3/param/loadparm.c                                     | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
index 5552112..c8e9d18 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
@@ -14,11 +14,9 @@
 	E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
 	While others like samr and lsarpc have a hardcoded default of <constant>no</constant>.
 	</para>
-
-	<para>Note the default will very likely change to <constant>no</constant> for Samba 4.5.</para>
 </description>
 
-<value type="default">yes</value>
-<value type="example">no</value>
+<value type="default">no</value>
+<value type="example">yes</value>
 
 </samba:parameter>
diff --git a/source3/param/loadparm.c b/source3/param/loadparm.c
index 87d33c5..a514727 100644
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
@@ -5381,7 +5381,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_globals)
 	Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
 	/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
 
-	Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect = true; /* we need to allow this for now by default */
+	Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect = false; /* we don't allow this by default */
 
 	Globals.map_to_guest = 0;	/* By Default, "Never" */
 	Globals.oplock_break_wait_time = 0;	/* By Default, 0 msecs. */
-- 
2.8.1


From a5aebec4ff2f1d3b824dfcc05091da712639220d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2016 22:48:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server/samr: allow
 _samr_ValidatePassword only with PRIVACY...
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This requires transport encryption.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d7c2f1e12544ee0f80438dcc1586e2d30c23b54a)
---
 source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
index 0984984..37e2e4f 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
@@ -6628,6 +6628,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ValidatePassword(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	struct samr_GetDomPwInfo pw;
 	struct samr_PwInfo dom_pw_info;
 
+	if (p->auth.auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+		p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
 	if (r->in.level < 1 || r->in.level > 3) {
 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
 	}
-- 
2.8.1