perf/callchain: Force USER_DS when invoking perf_callchain_user()

[ Upstream commit 88b0193d9418c00340e45e0a913a0813bc6c8c96 ]

Perf can generate and record a user callchain in response to a synchronous
request, such as a tracepoint firing. If this happens under set_fs(KERNEL_DS),
then we can end up walking the user stack (and dereferencing/saving whatever we
find there) without the protections usually afforded by checks such as
access_ok.

Rather than play whack-a-mole with each architecture's stack unwinding
implementation, fix the root of the problem by ensuring that we force USER_DS
when invoking perf_callchain_user from the perf core.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/kernel/events/callchain.c b/kernel/events/callchain.c
index e9fdb5203de5c0b99bfb992640e89ffe9d4a8160..411226b26bcaa2be897885f343dd68d14f66a6ab 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/events/callchain.c
+++ b/kernel/events/callchain.c
@@ -227,12 +227,18 @@ get_perf_callchain(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 init_nr, bool kernel, bool user,
                }
 
                if (regs) {
+                       mm_segment_t fs;
+
                        if (crosstask)
                                goto exit_put;
 
                        if (add_mark)
                                perf_callchain_store_context(&ctx, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
+
+                       fs = get_fs();
+                       set_fs(USER_DS);
                        perf_callchain_user(&ctx, regs);
+                       set_fs(fs);
                }
        }