openssl: Fix CVE-2014-0160 aka Heartbleed.

diff --git a/openssl/openssl.nm b/openssl/openssl.nm
index b52e8c7927df5e4442ebe1bdc12094fa5aff6517..5a7e24ebac21393d1099d0755e6cb6e7d4765626 100644 (file)
--- a/openssl/openssl.nm
+++ b/openssl/openssl.nm
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 name       = openssl
 version    = 1.0.1e
-release    = 1
+release    = 2
 
 maintainer = Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
 groups     = System/Libraries

diff --git a/openssl/patches/openssl.git-96db902.patch b/openssl/patches/openssl.git-96db902.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..6fed32a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/patches/openssl.git-96db902.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Sat, 5 Apr 2014 23:51:06 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
+X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_1g~3
+X-Git-Url: http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=96db902
+
+Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
+
+A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+server.
+
+Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 7a5596a..2e8cf68 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+       unsigned int payload;
+       unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-      /* Read type and payload length first */
+-      hbtype = *p++;
+-      n2s(p, payload);
+-      pl = p;
+-
+       if (s->msg_callback)
+               s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                       &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++      /* Read type and payload length first */
++      if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++              return 0; /* silently discard */
++      hbtype = *p++;
++      n2s(p, payload);
++      if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++              return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++      pl = p;
++
+       if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+               {
+               unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
++              unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
++                                          2 /* heartbeat length */ +
++                                          payload + padding;
+               int r;
+ 
++              if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
++                      return 0;
++
+               /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
+                * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+                * payload, plus padding
+                */
+-              buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
++              buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+               bp = buffer;
+ 
+               /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+               /* Random padding */
+               RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+ 
+-              r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
++              r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+ 
+               if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+                       s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+-                              buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
++                              buffer, write_length,
+                               s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
+               OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index b82fada..bddffd9 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+       unsigned int payload;
+       unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-      /* Read type and payload length first */
+-      hbtype = *p++;
+-      n2s(p, payload);
+-      pl = p;
+-
+       if (s->msg_callback)
+               s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+                       &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++      /* Read type and payload length first */
++      if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++              return 0; /* silently discard */
++      hbtype = *p++;
++      n2s(p, payload);
++      if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++              return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++      pl = p;
++
+       if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+               {
+               unsigned char *buffer, *bp;