--- /dev/null
+Git v2.14.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release addresses the security issues CVE-2019-1348,
+CVE-2019-1349, CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352,
+CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387.
+
+Fixes since v2.14.5
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2019-1348:
+ The --export-marks option of git fast-import is exposed also via
+ the in-stream command feature export-marks=... and it allows
+ overwriting arbitrary paths.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1349:
+ When submodules are cloned recursively, under certain circumstances
+ Git could be fooled into using the same Git directory twice. We now
+ require the directory to be empty.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1350:
+ Incorrect quoting of command-line arguments allowed remote code
+ execution during a recursive clone in conjunction with SSH URLs.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1351:
+ While the only permitted drive letters for physical drives on
+ Windows are letters of the US-English alphabet, this restriction
+ does not apply to virtual drives assigned via subst <letter>:
+ <path>. Git mistook such paths for relative paths, allowing writing
+ outside of the worktree while cloning.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1352:
+ Git was unaware of NTFS Alternate Data Streams, allowing files
+ inside the .git/ directory to be overwritten during a clone.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1353:
+ When running Git in the Windows Subsystem for Linux (also known as
+ "WSL") while accessing a working directory on a regular Windows
+ drive, none of the NTFS protections were active.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1354:
+ Filenames on Linux/Unix can contain backslashes. On Windows,
+ backslashes are directory separators. Git did not use to refuse to
+ write out tracked files with such filenames.
+
+ * CVE-2019-1387:
+ Recursive clones are currently affected by a vulnerability that is
+ caused by too-lax validation of submodule names, allowing very
+ targeted attacks via remote code execution in recursive clones.
+
+Credit for finding these vulnerabilities goes to Microsoft Security
+Response Center, in particular to Nicolas Joly. The `fast-import`
+fixes were provided by Jeff King, the other fixes by Johannes
+Schindelin with help from Garima Singh.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.15.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6 to address
+the security issues CVE-2019-1348, CVE-2019-1349, CVE-2019-1350,
+CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352, CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1354, and
+CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes for that version for details.
+
+In conjunction with a vulnerability that was fixed in v2.20.2,
+`.gitmodules` is no longer allowed to contain entries of the form
+`submodule.<name>.update=!command`.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.16.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6 and in
+v2.15.4 addressing the security issues CVE-2019-1348, CVE-2019-1349,
+CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352, CVE-2019-1353,
+CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes for those
+versions for details.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.17.3 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6 and in
+v2.15.4 addressing the security issues CVE-2019-1348, CVE-2019-1349,
+CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352, CVE-2019-1353,
+CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes for those
+versions for details.
+
+In addition, `git fsck` was taught to identify `.gitmodules` entries
+of the form `submodule.<name>.update=!command`, which have been
+disallowed in v2.15.4.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.18.2 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6, v2.15.4
+and in v2.17.3, addressing the security issues CVE-2019-1348,
+CVE-2019-1349, CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352,
+CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes
+for those versions for details.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.19.3 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.14.6, v2.15.4
+and in v2.17.3, addressing the security issues CVE-2019-1348,
+CVE-2019-1349, CVE-2019-1350, CVE-2019-1351, CVE-2019-1352,
+CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1354, and CVE-2019-1387; see the release notes
+for those versions for details.
memory used by fast-import during this run. Showing this output
is currently the default, but can be disabled with --quiet.
+--allow-unsafe-features::
+ Many command-line options can be provided as part of the
+ fast-import stream itself by using the `feature` or `option`
+ commands. However, some of these options are unsafe (e.g.,
+ allowing fast-import to access the filesystem outside of the
+ repository). These options are disabled by default, but can be
+ allowed by providing this option on the command line. This
+ currently impacts only the `export-marks`, `import-marks`, and
+ `import-marks-if-exists` feature commands.
++
+ Only enable this option if you trust the program generating the
+ fast-import stream! This option is enabled automatically for
+ remote-helpers that use the `import` capability, as they are
+ already trusted to run their own code.
+
Options for Frontends
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
submodule init` to initialize the configuration variable of
the same name. Allowed values here are 'checkout', 'rebase',
'merge' or 'none'. See description of 'update' command in
- linkgit:git-submodule[1] for their meaning. Note that the
- '!command' form is intentionally ignored here for security
- reasons.
+ linkgit:git-submodule[1] for their meaning. For security
+ reasons, the '!command' form is not accepted here.
submodule.<name>.branch::
A remote branch name for tracking updates in the upstream submodule.
if (!err && (option_recurse_submodules.nr > 0)) {
struct argv_array args = ARGV_ARRAY_INIT;
- argv_array_pushl(&args, "submodule", "update", "--init", "--recursive", NULL);
+ argv_array_pushl(&args, "submodule", "update", "--require-init", "--recursive", NULL);
if (option_shallow_submodules == 1)
argv_array_push(&args, "--depth=1");
#include "diffcore.h"
#include "diff.h"
#include "object-store.h"
+#include "dir.h"
#define OPT_QUIET (1 << 0)
#define OPT_CACHED (1 << 1)
char *p, *path = NULL, *sm_gitdir;
struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
struct string_list reference = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP;
- int dissociate = 0;
+ int dissociate = 0, require_init = 0;
char *sm_alternate = NULL, *error_strategy = NULL;
struct option module_clone_options[] = {
OPT__QUIET(&quiet, "Suppress output for cloning a submodule"),
OPT_BOOL(0, "progress", &progress,
N_("force cloning progress")),
+ OPT_BOOL(0, "require-init", &require_init,
+ N_("disallow cloning into non-empty directory")),
OPT_END()
};
} else
path = xstrdup(path);
+ if (validate_submodule_git_dir(sm_gitdir, name) < 0)
+ die(_("refusing to create/use '%s' in another submodule's "
+ "git dir"), sm_gitdir);
+
if (!file_exists(sm_gitdir)) {
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(sm_gitdir) < 0)
die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), sm_gitdir);
die(_("clone of '%s' into submodule path '%s' failed"),
url, path);
} else {
+ if (require_init && !access(path, X_OK) && !is_empty_dir(path))
+ die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), path);
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(path) < 0)
die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), path);
strbuf_addf(&sb, "%s/index", sm_gitdir);
int recommend_shallow;
struct string_list references;
int dissociate;
+ unsigned require_init;
const char *depth;
const char *recursive_prefix;
const char *prefix;
int max_jobs;
};
#define SUBMODULE_UPDATE_CLONE_INIT {0, MODULE_LIST_INIT, 0, \
- SUBMODULE_UPDATE_STRATEGY_INIT, 0, 0, -1, STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, 0, \
+ SUBMODULE_UPDATE_STRATEGY_INIT, 0, 0, -1, STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, 0, 0, \
NULL, NULL, NULL, \
NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0}
argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--prefix", suc->prefix, NULL);
if (suc->recommend_shallow && sub->recommend_shallow == 1)
argv_array_push(&child->args, "--depth=1");
+ if (suc->require_init)
+ argv_array_push(&child->args, "--require-init");
argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--path", sub->path, NULL);
argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--name", sub->name, NULL);
argv_array_pushl(&child->args, "--url", url, NULL);
OPT__QUIET(&suc.quiet, N_("don't print cloning progress")),
OPT_BOOL(0, "progress", &suc.progress,
N_("force cloning progress")),
+ OPT_BOOL(0, "require-init", &suc.require_init,
+ N_("disallow cloning into non-empty directory")),
OPT_END()
};
{
int ret;
wchar_t wpath[MAX_PATH];
+
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(path)) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (xutftowcs_path(wpath, path) < 0)
return -1;
ret = _wmkdir(wpath);
typedef int (*open_fn_t)(wchar_t const *wfilename, int oflags, ...);
va_list args;
unsigned mode;
- int fd;
+ int fd, create = (oflags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL);
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
open_fn_t open_fn;
mode = va_arg(args, int);
va_end(args);
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+ errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
filename = "nul";
int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
FILE *file;
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+ int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
+ errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
filename = "nul";
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
FILE *file;
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+ int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
+ errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
filename = "nul";
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
p++;
len++;
}
- if (*p == '"')
+ if (*p == '"' || !*p)
n += count*2 + 1;
continue;
}
count++;
*d++ = *arg++;
}
- if (*arg == '"') {
+ if (*arg == '"' || !*arg) {
while (count-- > 0)
*d++ = '\\';
+ /* don't escape the surrounding end quote */
+ if (!*arg)
+ break;
*d++ = '\\';
}
}
*d++ = *arg++;
}
*d++ = '"';
- *d++ = 0;
+ *d++ = '\0';
return q;
}
return -1;
}
+int mingw_has_dos_drive_prefix(const char *path)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Does it start with an ASCII letter (i.e. highest bit not set),
+ * followed by a colon?
+ */
+ if (!(0x80 & (unsigned char)*path))
+ return *path && path[1] == ':' ? 2 : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * While drive letters must be letters of the English alphabet, it is
+ * possible to assign virtually _any_ Unicode character via `subst` as
+ * a drive letter to "virtual drives". Even `1`, or `ä`. Or fun stuff
+ * like this:
+ *
+ * subst ֍: %USERPROFILE%\Desktop
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i < 4 && (0x80 & (unsigned char)path[i]); i++)
+ ; /* skip first UTF-8 character */
+ return path[i] == ':' ? i + 1 : 0;
+}
+
int mingw_skip_dos_drive_prefix(char **path)
{
int ret = has_dos_drive_prefix(*path);
setenv("TERM", "cygwin", 1);
}
+int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path)
+{
+ int preceding_space_or_period = 0, i = 0, periods = 0;
+
+ if (!protect_ntfs)
+ return 1;
+
+ skip_dos_drive_prefix((char **)&path);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ char c = *(path++);
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\0':
+ case '/': case '\\':
+ /* cannot end in ` ` or `.`, except for `.` and `..` */
+ if (preceding_space_or_period &&
+ (i != periods || periods > 2))
+ return 0;
+ if (!c)
+ return 1;
+
+ i = periods = preceding_space_or_period = 0;
+ continue;
+ case '.':
+ periods++;
+ /* fallthru */
+ case ' ':
+ preceding_space_or_period = 1;
+ i++;
+ continue;
+ case ':': /* DOS drive prefix was already skipped */
+ case '<': case '>': case '"': case '|': case '?': case '*':
+ /* illegal character */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ if (c > '\0' && c < '\x20')
+ /* illegal character */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ preceding_space_or_period = 0;
+ i++;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Disable MSVCRT command line wildcard expansion (__getmainargs called from
* mingw startup code, see init.c in mingw runtime).
* git specific compatibility
*/
-#define has_dos_drive_prefix(path) \
- (isalpha(*(path)) && (path)[1] == ':' ? 2 : 0)
+int mingw_has_dos_drive_prefix(const char *path);
+#define has_dos_drive_prefix mingw_has_dos_drive_prefix
int mingw_skip_dos_drive_prefix(char **path);
#define skip_dos_drive_prefix mingw_skip_dos_drive_prefix
static inline int mingw_is_dir_sep(int c)
#include <inttypes.h>
#endif
+/**
+ * Verifies that the given path is a valid one on Windows.
+ *
+ * In particular, path segments are disallowed which
+ *
+ * - end in a period or a space (except the special directories `.` and `..`).
+ *
+ * - contain any of the reserved characters, e.g. `:`, `;`, `*`, etc
+ *
+ * Returns 1 upon success, otherwise 0.
+ */
+int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path);
+#define is_valid_path(path) is_valid_win32_path(path)
+
/**
* Converts UTF-8 encoded string to UTF-16LE.
*
EXTLIBS = user32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib wininet.lib ws2_32.lib invalidcontinue.obj
PTHREAD_LIBS =
lib =
- BASIC_CFLAGS += -DPROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT=1
ifndef DEBUG
BASIC_CFLAGS += -GL -Os -MD
BASIC_LDFLAGS += -LTCG
COMPAT_OBJS += compat/mingw.o compat/winansi.o \
compat/win32/pthread.o compat/win32/syslog.o \
compat/win32/dirent.o
- BASIC_CFLAGS += -DWIN32 -DPROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT=1
+ BASIC_CFLAGS += -DWIN32
EXTLIBS += -lws2_32
GITLIBS += git.res
PTHREAD_LIBS =
const char *colon = strchr(url, ':');
const char *slash = strchr(url, '/');
return !colon || (slash && slash < colon) ||
- has_dos_drive_prefix(url);
+ (has_dos_drive_prefix(url) && is_valid_path(url));
}
static const char *prot_name(enum protocol protocol)
int protect_hfs = PROTECT_HFS_DEFAULT;
#ifndef PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT
-#define PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT 0
+#define PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT 1
#endif
int protect_ntfs = PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT;
const char *core_fsmonitor;
static struct strbuf new_data = STRBUF_INIT;
static int seen_data_command;
static int require_explicit_termination;
+static int allow_unsafe_features;
/* Signal handling */
static volatile sig_atomic_t checkpoint_requested;
if (!export_marks_file || (import_marks_file && !import_marks_file_done))
return;
+ if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(export_marks_file)) {
+ failure |= error_errno("unable to create leading directories of %s",
+ export_marks_file);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (hold_lock_file_for_update(&mark_lock, export_marks_file, 0) < 0) {
failure |= error_errno("Unable to write marks file %s",
export_marks_file);
}
import_marks_file = make_fast_import_path(marks);
- safe_create_leading_directories_const(import_marks_file);
import_marks_file_from_stream = from_stream;
import_marks_file_ignore_missing = ignore_missing;
}
static void option_export_marks(const char *marks)
{
export_marks_file = make_fast_import_path(marks);
- safe_create_leading_directories_const(export_marks_file);
}
static void option_cat_blob_fd(const char *fd)
option_active_branches(option);
} else if (skip_prefix(option, "export-pack-edges=", &option)) {
option_export_pack_edges(option);
- } else if (starts_with(option, "quiet")) {
+ } else if (!strcmp(option, "quiet")) {
show_stats = 0;
- } else if (starts_with(option, "stats")) {
+ } else if (!strcmp(option, "stats")) {
show_stats = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(option, "allow-unsafe-features")) {
+ ; /* already handled during early option parsing */
} else {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
+static void check_unsafe_feature(const char *feature, int from_stream)
+{
+ if (from_stream && !allow_unsafe_features)
+ die(_("feature '%s' forbidden in input without --allow-unsafe-features"),
+ feature);
+}
+
static int parse_one_feature(const char *feature, int from_stream)
{
const char *arg;
if (skip_prefix(feature, "date-format=", &arg)) {
option_date_format(arg);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "import-marks=", &arg)) {
+ check_unsafe_feature("import-marks", from_stream);
option_import_marks(arg, from_stream, 0);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "import-marks-if-exists=", &arg)) {
+ check_unsafe_feature("import-marks-if-exists", from_stream);
option_import_marks(arg, from_stream, 1);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "export-marks=", &arg)) {
+ check_unsafe_feature(feature, from_stream);
option_export_marks(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "get-mark")) {
; /* Don't die - this feature is supported */
avail_tree_table = xcalloc(avail_tree_table_sz, sizeof(struct avail_tree_content*));
marks = mem_pool_calloc(&fi_mem_pool, 1, sizeof(struct mark_set));
+ /*
+ * We don't parse most options until after we've seen the set of
+ * "feature" lines at the start of the stream (which allows the command
+ * line to override stream data). But we must do an early parse of any
+ * command-line options that impact how we interpret the feature lines.
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
+ const char *arg = argv[i];
+ if (*arg != '-' || !strcmp(arg, "--"))
+ break;
+ if (!strcmp(arg, "--allow-unsafe-features"))
+ allow_unsafe_features = 1;
+ }
+
global_argc = argc;
global_argv = argv;
FUNC(GITMODULES_SYMLINK, ERROR) \
FUNC(GITMODULES_URL, ERROR) \
FUNC(GITMODULES_PATH, ERROR) \
+ FUNC(GITMODULES_UPDATE, ERROR) \
/* warnings */ \
FUNC(BAD_FILEMODE, WARN) \
FUNC(EMPTY_NAME, WARN) \
while (desc.size) {
unsigned mode;
- const char *name;
+ const char *name, *backslash;
const struct object_id *oid;
oid = tree_entry_extract(&desc, &name, &mode);
".gitmodules is a symbolic link");
}
+ if ((backslash = strchr(name, '\\'))) {
+ while (backslash) {
+ backslash++;
+ has_dotgit |= is_ntfs_dotgit(backslash);
+ if (is_ntfs_dotgitmodules(backslash)) {
+ if (!S_ISLNK(mode))
+ oidset_insert(&gitmodules_found, oid);
+ else
+ retval += report(options, &item->object,
+ FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_SYMLINK,
+ ".gitmodules is a symbolic link");
+ }
+ backslash = strchr(backslash, '\\');
+ }
+ }
+
if (update_tree_entry_gently(&desc)) {
retval += report(options, &item->object, FSCK_MSG_BAD_TREE, "cannot be parsed as a tree");
break;
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_PATH,
"disallowed submodule path: %s",
value);
+ if (!strcmp(key, "update") && value &&
+ parse_submodule_update_type(value) == SM_UPDATE_COMMAND)
+ data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
+ FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_UPDATE,
+ "disallowed submodule update setting: %s",
+ value);
free(name);
return 0;
#define offset_1st_component git_offset_1st_component
#endif
+#ifndef is_valid_path
+#define is_valid_path(path) 1
+#endif
+
#ifndef find_last_dir_sep
static inline char *git_find_last_dir_sep(const char *path)
{
cached=
recursive=
init=
+require_init=
files=
remote=
nofetch=
-i|--init)
init=1
;;
+ --require-init)
+ init=1
+ require_init=1
+ ;;
--remote)
remote=1
;;
${reference:+"$reference"} \
${dissociate:+"--dissociate"} \
${depth:+--depth "$depth"} \
+ ${require_init:+--require-init} \
$recommend_shallow \
$jobs \
"$@" || echo "#unmatched" $?
}
}
-static int only_spaces_and_periods(const char *path, size_t len, size_t skip)
+/*
+ * On NTFS, we need to be careful to disallow certain synonyms of the `.git/`
+ * directory:
+ *
+ * - For historical reasons, file names that end in spaces or periods are
+ * automatically trimmed. Therefore, `.git . . ./` is a valid way to refer
+ * to `.git/`.
+ *
+ * - For other historical reasons, file names that do not conform to the 8.3
+ * format (up to eight characters for the basename, three for the file
+ * extension, certain characters not allowed such as `+`, etc) are associated
+ * with a so-called "short name", at least on the `C:` drive by default.
+ * Which means that `git~1/` is a valid way to refer to `.git/`.
+ *
+ * Note: Technically, `.git/` could receive the short name `git~2` if the
+ * short name `git~1` were already used. In Git, however, we guarantee that
+ * `.git` is the first item in a directory, therefore it will be associated
+ * with the short name `git~1` (unless short names are disabled).
+ *
+ * - For yet other historical reasons, NTFS supports so-called "Alternate Data
+ * Streams", i.e. metadata associated with a given file, referred to via
+ * `<filename>:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`. There exists a default stream
+ * type for directories, allowing `.git/` to be accessed via
+ * `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/`.
+ *
+ * When this function returns 1, it indicates that the specified file/directory
+ * name refers to a `.git` file or directory, or to any of these synonyms, and
+ * Git should therefore not track it.
+ *
+ * For performance reasons, _all_ Alternate Data Streams of `.git/` are
+ * forbidden, not just `::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`.
+ *
+ * This function is intended to be used by `git fsck` even on platforms where
+ * the backslash is a regular filename character, therefore it needs to handle
+ * backlash characters in the provided `name` specially: they are interpreted
+ * as directory separators.
+ */
+int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name)
{
- if (len < skip)
+ char c;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that when we don't find `.git` or `git~1` we end up with `name`
+ * advanced partway through the string. That's okay, though, as we
+ * return immediately in those cases, without looking at `name` any
+ * further.
+ */
+ c = *(name++);
+ if (c == '.') {
+ /* .git */
+ if (((c = *(name++)) != 'g' && c != 'G') ||
+ ((c = *(name++)) != 'i' && c != 'I') ||
+ ((c = *(name++)) != 't' && c != 'T'))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (c == 'g' || c == 'G') {
+ /* git ~1 */
+ if (((c = *(name++)) != 'i' && c != 'I') ||
+ ((c = *(name++)) != 't' && c != 'T') ||
+ *(name++) != '~' ||
+ *(name++) != '1')
+ return 0;
+ } else
return 0;
- len -= skip;
- path += skip;
- while (len-- > 0) {
- char c = *(path++);
- if (c != ' ' && c != '.')
+
+ for (;;) {
+ c = *(name++);
+ if (!c || c == '\\' || c == '/' || c == ':')
+ return 1;
+ if (c != '.' && c != ' ')
return 0;
}
- return 1;
-}
-
-int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name)
-{
- size_t len;
-
- for (len = 0; ; len++)
- if (!name[len] || name[len] == '\\' || is_dir_sep(name[len])) {
- if (only_spaces_and_periods(name, len, 4) &&
- !strncasecmp(name, ".git", 4))
- return 1;
- if (only_spaces_and_periods(name, len, 5) &&
- !strncasecmp(name, "git~1", 5))
- return 1;
- if (name[len] != '\\')
- return 0;
- name += len + 1;
- len = -1;
- }
}
static int is_ntfs_dot_generic(const char *name,
only_spaces_and_periods:
for (;;) {
char c = name[i++];
- if (!c)
+ if (!c || c == ':')
return 1;
if (c != ' ' && c != '.')
return 0;
if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
return 0;
+ if (!is_valid_path(path))
+ return 0;
+
goto inside;
for (;;) {
if (!c)
if ((c == '.' && !verify_dotfile(path, mode)) ||
is_dir_sep(c) || c == '\0')
return 0;
+ } else if (c == '\\' && protect_ntfs) {
+ if (is_ntfs_dotgit(path))
+ return 0;
+ if (S_ISLNK(mode)) {
+ if (is_ntfs_dotgitmodules(path))
+ return 0;
+ }
}
+
c = *path++;
}
}
int overwrite;
};
+/*
+ * Parse a config item from .gitmodules.
+ *
+ * This does not handle submodule-related configuration from the main
+ * config store (.git/config, etc). Callers are responsible for
+ * checking for overrides in the main config store when appropriate.
+ */
static int parse_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *data)
{
struct parse_config_parameter *me = data;
warn_multiple_config(me->treeish_name, submodule->name,
"update");
else if (parse_submodule_update_strategy(value,
- &submodule->update_strategy) < 0)
- die(_("invalid value for %s"), var);
+ &submodule->update_strategy) < 0 ||
+ submodule->update_strategy.type == SM_UPDATE_COMMAND)
+ die(_("invalid value for %s"), var);
} else if (!strcmp(item.buf, "shallow")) {
if (!me->overwrite && submodule->recommend_shallow != -1)
warn_multiple_config(me->treeish_name, submodule->name,
return ret;
}
+int validate_submodule_git_dir(char *git_dir, const char *submodule_name)
+{
+ size_t len = strlen(git_dir), suffix_len = strlen(submodule_name);
+ char *p;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (len <= suffix_len || (p = git_dir + len - suffix_len)[-1] != '/' ||
+ strcmp(p, submodule_name))
+ BUG("submodule name '%s' not a suffix of git dir '%s'",
+ submodule_name, git_dir);
+
+ /*
+ * We prevent the contents of sibling submodules' git directories to
+ * clash.
+ *
+ * Example: having a submodule named `hippo` and another one named
+ * `hippo/hooks` would result in the git directories
+ * `.git/modules/hippo/` and `.git/modules/hippo/hooks/`, respectively,
+ * but the latter directory is already designated to contain the hooks
+ * of the former.
+ */
+ for (; *p; p++) {
+ if (is_dir_sep(*p)) {
+ char c = *p;
+
+ *p = '\0';
+ if (is_git_directory(git_dir))
+ ret = -1;
+ *p = c;
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return error(_("submodule git dir '%s' is "
+ "inside git dir '%.*s'"),
+ git_dir,
+ (int)(p - git_dir), git_dir);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Embeds a single submodules git directory into the superprojects git dir,
* non recursively.
const char *path)
{
char *old_git_dir = NULL, *real_old_git_dir = NULL, *real_new_git_dir = NULL;
- const char *new_git_dir;
+ char *new_git_dir;
const struct submodule *sub;
if (submodule_uses_worktrees(path))
if (!sub)
die(_("could not lookup name for submodule '%s'"), path);
- new_git_dir = git_path("modules/%s", sub->name);
+ new_git_dir = git_pathdup("modules/%s", sub->name);
+ if (validate_submodule_git_dir(new_git_dir, sub->name) < 0)
+ die(_("refusing to move '%s' into an existing git dir"),
+ real_old_git_dir);
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(new_git_dir) < 0)
die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), new_git_dir);
real_new_git_dir = real_pathdup(new_git_dir, 1);
+ free(new_git_dir);
fprintf(stderr, _("Migrating git directory of '%s%s' from\n'%s' to\n'%s'\n"),
get_super_prefix_or_empty(), path,
*/
int submodule_to_gitdir(struct strbuf *buf, const char *submodule);
+/*
+ * Make sure that no submodule's git dir is nested in a sibling submodule's.
+ */
+int validate_submodule_git_dir(char *git_dir, const char *submodule_name);
+
#define SUBMODULE_MOVE_HEAD_DRY_RUN (1<<0)
#define SUBMODULE_MOVE_HEAD_FORCE (1<<1)
int submodule_move_head(const char *path,
{
char Buffer[MAX_PATH];
DWORD dwRet;
- char szVolumeAccessPath[] = "\\\\.\\X:";
+ char szVolumeAccessPath[] = "\\\\.\\XXXX:";
HANDLE hVolWrite;
- int success = 0;
+ int success = 0, dos_drive_prefix;
dwRet = GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, Buffer);
if ((0 == dwRet) || (dwRet > MAX_PATH))
return error("Error getting current directory");
- if (!has_dos_drive_prefix(Buffer))
+ dos_drive_prefix = has_dos_drive_prefix(Buffer);
+ if (!dos_drive_prefix)
return error("'%s': invalid drive letter", Buffer);
- szVolumeAccessPath[4] = Buffer[0];
+ memcpy(szVolumeAccessPath, Buffer, dos_drive_prefix);
+ szVolumeAccessPath[dos_drive_prefix] = '\0';
+
hVolWrite = CreateFile(szVolumeAccessPath, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hVolWrite)
return is_hfs_dotgitmodules(path) || is_ntfs_dotgitmodules(path);
}
+/*
+ * A very simple, reproducible pseudo-random generator. Copied from
+ * `test-genrandom.c`.
+ */
+static uint64_t my_random_value = 1234;
+
+static uint64_t my_random(void)
+{
+ my_random_value = my_random_value * 1103515245 + 12345;
+ return my_random_value;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A fast approximation of the square root, without requiring math.h.
+ *
+ * It uses Newton's method to approximate the solution of 0 = x^2 - value.
+ */
+static double my_sqrt(double value)
+{
+ const double epsilon = 1e-6;
+ double x = value;
+
+ if (value == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ double delta = (value / x - x) / 2;
+ if (delta < epsilon && delta > -epsilon)
+ return x + delta;
+ x += delta;
+ }
+}
+
+static int protect_ntfs_hfs_benchmark(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ size_t i, j, nr, min_len = 3, max_len = 20;
+ char **names;
+ int repetitions = 15, file_mode = 0100644;
+ uint64_t begin, end;
+ double m[3][2], v[3][2];
+ uint64_t cumul;
+ double cumul2;
+
+ if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "--with-symlink-mode")) {
+ file_mode = 0120000;
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ nr = argc > 1 ? strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0) : 1000000;
+ ALLOC_ARRAY(names, nr);
+
+ if (argc > 2) {
+ min_len = strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
+ if (argc > 3)
+ max_len = strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0);
+ if (min_len > max_len)
+ die("min_len > max_len");
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
+ size_t len = min_len + (my_random() % (max_len + 1 - min_len));
+
+ names[i] = xmallocz(len);
+ while (len > 0)
+ names[i][--len] = (char)(' ' + (my_random() % ('\x7f' - ' ')));
+ }
+
+ for (protect_ntfs = 0; protect_ntfs < 2; protect_ntfs++)
+ for (protect_hfs = 0; protect_hfs < 2; protect_hfs++) {
+ cumul = 0;
+ cumul2 = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < repetitions; i++) {
+ begin = getnanotime();
+ for (j = 0; j < nr; j++)
+ verify_path(names[j], file_mode);
+ end = getnanotime();
+ printf("protect_ntfs = %d, protect_hfs = %d: %lfms\n", protect_ntfs, protect_hfs, (end-begin) / (double)1e6);
+ cumul += end - begin;
+ cumul2 += (end - begin) * (end - begin);
+ }
+ m[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs] = cumul / (double)repetitions;
+ v[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs] = my_sqrt(cumul2 / (double)repetitions - m[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs] * m[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs]);
+ printf("mean: %lfms, stddev: %lfms\n", m[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs] / (double)1e6, v[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs] / (double)1e6);
+ }
+
+ for (protect_ntfs = 0; protect_ntfs < 2; protect_ntfs++)
+ for (protect_hfs = 0; protect_hfs < 2; protect_hfs++)
+ printf("ntfs=%d/hfs=%d: %lf%% slower\n", protect_ntfs, protect_hfs, (m[protect_ntfs][protect_hfs] - m[0][0]) * 100 / m[0][0]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cmd__path_utils(int argc, const char **argv)
{
if (argc == 3 && !strcmp(argv[1], "normalize_path_copy")) {
return !!res;
}
+ if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "protect_ntfs_hfs"))
+ return !!protect_ntfs_hfs_benchmark(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+
+ if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "is_valid_path")) {
+ int res = 0, expect = 1, i;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < argc; i++)
+ if (!strcmp("--not", argv[i]))
+ expect = 0;
+ else if (expect != is_valid_path(argv[i]))
+ res = error("'%s' is%s a valid path",
+ argv[i], expect ? " not" : "");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "'%s' is%s a valid path\n",
+ argv[i], expect ? "" : " not");
+
+ return !!res;
+ }
+
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown function name: %s\n", argv[0],
argv[1] ? argv[1] : "(there was none)");
return 1;
#include "run-command.h"
#include "argv-array.h"
#include "strbuf.h"
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
+#include "gettext.h"
+#include "parse-options.h"
static int number_callbacks;
static int parallel_next(struct child_process *cp,
return 1;
}
+static uint64_t my_random_next = 1234;
+
+static uint64_t my_random(void)
+{
+ uint64_t res = my_random_next;
+ my_random_next = my_random_next * 1103515245 + 12345;
+ return res;
+}
+
+static int quote_stress_test(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ /*
+ * We are running a quote-stress test.
+ * spawn a subprocess that runs quote-stress with a
+ * special option that echoes back the arguments that
+ * were passed in.
+ */
+ char special[] = ".?*\\^_\"'`{}()[]<>@~&+:;$%"; // \t\r\n\a";
+ int i, j, k, trials = 100, skip = 0, msys2 = 0;
+ struct strbuf out = STRBUF_INIT;
+ struct argv_array args = ARGV_ARRAY_INIT;
+ struct option options[] = {
+ OPT_INTEGER('n', "trials", &trials, "Number of trials"),
+ OPT_INTEGER('s', "skip", &skip, "Skip <n> trials"),
+ OPT_BOOL('m', "msys2", &msys2, "Test quoting for MSYS2's sh"),
+ OPT_END()
+ };
+ const char * const usage[] = {
+ "test-tool run-command quote-stress-test <options>",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ argc = parse_options(argc, argv, NULL, options, usage, 0);
+
+ setenv("MSYS_NO_PATHCONV", "1", 0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < trials; i++) {
+ struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+ size_t arg_count, arg_offset;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ argv_array_clear(&args);
+ if (msys2)
+ argv_array_pushl(&args, "sh", "-c",
+ "printf %s\\\\0 \"$@\"", "skip", NULL);
+ else
+ argv_array_pushl(&args, "test-tool", "run-command",
+ "quote-echo", NULL);
+ arg_offset = args.argc;
+
+ if (argc > 0) {
+ trials = 1;
+ arg_count = argc;
+ for (j = 0; j < arg_count; j++)
+ argv_array_push(&args, argv[j]);
+ } else {
+ arg_count = 1 + (my_random() % 5);
+ for (j = 0; j < arg_count; j++) {
+ char buf[20];
+ size_t min_len = 1;
+ size_t arg_len = min_len +
+ (my_random() % (ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - min_len));
+
+ for (k = 0; k < arg_len; k++)
+ buf[k] = special[my_random() %
+ ARRAY_SIZE(special)];
+ buf[arg_len] = '\0';
+
+ argv_array_push(&args, buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (i < skip)
+ continue;
+
+ cp.argv = args.argv;
+ strbuf_reset(&out);
+ if (pipe_command(&cp, NULL, 0, &out, 0, NULL, 0) < 0)
+ return error("Failed to spawn child process");
+
+ for (j = 0, k = 0; j < arg_count; j++) {
+ const char *arg = args.argv[j + arg_offset];
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, out.buf + k))
+ ret = error("incorrectly quoted arg: '%s', "
+ "echoed back as '%s'",
+ arg, out.buf + k);
+ k += strlen(out.buf + k) + 1;
+ }
+
+ if (k != out.len)
+ ret = error("got %d bytes, but consumed only %d",
+ (int)out.len, (int)k);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Trial #%d failed. Arguments:\n", i);
+ for (j = 0; j < arg_count; j++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "arg #%d: '%s'\n",
+ (int)j, args.argv[j + arg_offset]);
+
+ strbuf_release(&out);
+ argv_array_clear(&args);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (i && (i % 100) == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Trials completed: %d\n", (int)i);
+ }
+
+ strbuf_release(&out);
+ argv_array_clear(&args);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int quote_echo(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ while (argc > 1) {
+ fwrite(argv[1], strlen(argv[1]), 1, stdout);
+ fputc('\0', stdout);
+ argv++;
+ argc--;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cmd__run_command(int argc, const char **argv)
{
struct child_process proc = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
int jobs;
+ if (argc >= 2 && !strcmp(argv[1], "quote-stress-test"))
+ return !!quote_stress_test(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+
+ if (argc >= 2 && !strcmp(argv[1], "quote-echo"))
+ return !!quote_echo(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+
if (argc < 3)
return 1;
while (!strcmp(argv[1], "env")) {
test_must_fail test-tool path-utils absolute_path ""
'
+test_expect_success MINGW '<drive-letter>:\\abc is an absolute path' '
+ for letter in : \" C Z 1 ä
+ do
+ path=$letter:\\abc &&
+ absolute="$(test-tool path-utils absolute_path "$path")" &&
+ test "$path" = "$absolute" || return 1
+ done
+'
+
test_expect_success 'real path rejects the empty string' '
test_must_fail test-tool path-utils real_path ""
'
~1000000 \
~9999999 \
\
+ .gitmodules:\$DATA \
+ "gitmod~4 . :\$DATA" \
+ \
--not \
".gitmodules x" \
".gitmodules .x" \
\
GI7EB~1 \
GI7EB~01 \
- GI7EB~1X
+ GI7EB~1X \
+ \
+ .gitmodules,:\$DATA
+'
+
+test_expect_success MINGW 'is_valid_path() on Windows' '
+ test-tool path-utils is_valid_path \
+ win32 \
+ "win32 x" \
+ ../hello.txt \
+ C:\\git \
+ \
+ --not \
+ "win32 " \
+ "win32 /x " \
+ "win32." \
+ "win32 . ." \
+ .../hello.txt \
+ colon:test
'
test_done
.git.SPACE .git.{space}
.\\\\.GIT\\\\foobar backslashes
.git\\\\foobar backslashes2
+.git...:alternate-stream
EOF
test_expect_success 'utf-8 paths allowed with core.protectHFS off' '
(
git init $name-$type &&
cd $name-$type &&
+ git config core.protectNTFS false &&
echo content >file &&
git add file &&
git commit -m base &&
# the name "f*" in the worktree, because it is not allowed
# on Windows (the tests below do not depend on the presence
# of the file in the worktree)
+ git config core.protectNTFS false &&
git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644 "$(git rev-parse HEAD:foo)" "f*" &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m star &&
)
'
-test_expect_success 'submodule update - command in .gitmodules is ignored' '
+test_expect_success 'submodule update - command in .gitmodules is rejected' '
test_when_finished "git -C super reset --hard HEAD^" &&
git -C super config -f .gitmodules submodule.submodule.update "!false" &&
git -C super commit -a -m "add command to .gitmodules file" &&
git -C super/submodule reset --hard $submodulesha1^ &&
- git -C super submodule update submodule
+ test_must_fail git -C super submodule update submodule
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'fsck detects command in .gitmodules' '
+ git init command-in-gitmodules &&
+ (
+ cd command-in-gitmodules &&
+ git submodule add ../submodule submodule &&
+ test_commit adding-submodule &&
+
+ git config -f .gitmodules submodule.submodule.update "!false" &&
+ git add .gitmodules &&
+ test_commit configuring-update &&
+ test_must_fail git fsck
+ )
'
cat << EOF >expect
'
test_expect_success 'submodule init does not copy command into .git/config' '
+ test_when_finished "git -C super update-index --force-remove submodule1" &&
+ test_when_finished git config -f super/.gitmodules \
+ --remove-section submodule.submodule1 &&
(cd super &&
git ls-files -s submodule >out &&
H=$(cut -d" " -f2 out) &&
git config -f .gitmodules submodule.submodule1.path submodule1 &&
git config -f .gitmodules submodule.submodule1.url ../submodule &&
git config -f .gitmodules submodule.submodule1.update !false &&
- git submodule init submodule1 &&
- echo "none" >expect &&
- git config submodule.submodule1.update >actual &&
- test_cmp expect actual
+ test_must_fail git submodule init submodule1 &&
+ test_expect_code 1 git config submodule.submodule1.update >actual &&
+ test_must_be_empty actual
)
'
)
'
+test_expect_success MINGW 'prevent git~1 squatting on Windows' '
+ git init squatting &&
+ (
+ cd squatting &&
+ mkdir a &&
+ touch a/..git &&
+ git add a/..git &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m initial &&
+
+ modules="$(test_write_lines \
+ "[submodule \"b.\"]" "url = ." "path = c" \
+ "[submodule \"b\"]" "url = ." "path = d\\\\a" |
+ git hash-object -w --stdin)" &&
+ rev="$(git rev-parse --verify HEAD)" &&
+ hash="$(echo x | git hash-object -w --stdin)" &&
+ git -c core.protectNTFS=false update-index --add \
+ --cacheinfo 100644,$modules,.gitmodules \
+ --cacheinfo 160000,$rev,c \
+ --cacheinfo 160000,$rev,d\\a \
+ --cacheinfo 100644,$hash,d./a/x \
+ --cacheinfo 100644,$hash,d./a/..git &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git -c core.protectNTFS=false commit -m "module" &&
+ test_must_fail git show HEAD: 2>err &&
+ test_i18ngrep backslash err
+ ) &&
+ test_must_fail git -c core.protectNTFS=false \
+ clone --recurse-submodules squatting squatting-clone 2>err &&
+ test_i18ngrep -e "directory not empty" -e "not an empty directory" err &&
+ ! grep gitdir squatting-clone/d/a/git~2
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'git dirs of sibling submodules must not be nested' '
+ git init nested &&
+ test_commit -C nested nested &&
+ (
+ cd nested &&
+ cat >.gitmodules <<-EOF &&
+ [submodule "hippo"]
+ url = .
+ path = thing1
+ [submodule "hippo/hooks"]
+ url = .
+ path = thing2
+ EOF
+ git clone . thing1 &&
+ git clone . thing2 &&
+ git add .gitmodules thing1 thing2 &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m nested
+ ) &&
+ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules nested clone 2>err &&
+ test_i18ngrep "is inside git dir" err
+'
+
test_done
grep gitmodulesUrl err
'
+test_expect_success 'trailing backslash is handled correctly' '
+ git init testmodule &&
+ test_commit -C testmodule c &&
+ git submodule add ./testmodule &&
+ : ensure that the name ends in a double backslash &&
+ sed -e "s|\\(submodule \"testmodule\\)\"|\\1\\\\\\\\\"|" \
+ -e "s|url = .*|url = \" --should-not-be-an-option\"|" \
+ <.gitmodules >.new &&
+ mv .new .gitmodules &&
+ git commit -am "Add testmodule" &&
+ test_must_fail git clone --verbose --recurse-submodules . dolly 2>err &&
+ test_i18ngrep ! "unknown option" err
+'
+
test_done
grep gitmodulesPath err
'
+test_expect_success MINGW 'submodule paths disallows trailing spaces' '
+ git init super &&
+ test_must_fail git -C super submodule add ../upstream "sub " &&
+
+ : add "sub", then rename "sub" to "sub ", the hard way &&
+ git -C super submodule add ../upstream sub &&
+ tree=$(git -C super write-tree) &&
+ git -C super ls-tree $tree >tree &&
+ sed "s/sub/sub /" <tree >tree.new &&
+ tree=$(git -C super mktree <tree.new) &&
+ commit=$(echo with space | git -C super commit-tree $tree) &&
+ git -C super update-ref refs/heads/master $commit &&
+
+ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules super dst 2>err &&
+ test_i18ngrep "sub " err
+'
+
test_done
test_must_fail git fast-import <input
'
+test_expect_success 'R: import-marks features forbidden by default' '
+ >git.marks &&
+ echo "feature import-marks=git.marks" >input &&
+ test_must_fail git fast-import <input &&
+ echo "feature import-marks-if-exists=git.marks" >input &&
+ test_must_fail git fast-import <input
+'
+
test_expect_success 'R: only one import-marks feature allowed per stream' '
+ >git.marks &&
+ >git2.marks &&
cat >input <<-EOF &&
feature import-marks=git.marks
feature import-marks=git2.marks
EOF
+ test_must_fail git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features <input
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'R: export-marks feature forbidden by default' '
+ echo "feature export-marks=git.marks" >input &&
test_must_fail git fast-import <input
'
EOF
- cat input | git fast-import &&
+ git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features <input &&
grep :1 git.marks
'
test_expect_success 'R: export-marks options can be overridden by commandline options' '
- cat input | git fast-import --export-marks=other.marks &&
- grep :1 other.marks
+ cat >input <<-\EOF &&
+ feature export-marks=feature-sub/git.marks
+ blob
+ mark :1
+ data 3
+ hi
+
+ EOF
+ git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features \
+ --export-marks=cmdline-sub/other.marks <input &&
+ grep :1 cmdline-sub/other.marks &&
+ test_path_is_missing feature-sub
'
test_expect_success 'R: catch typo in marks file name' '
test_must_fail git fast-import --import-marks=nonexistent.marks </dev/null &&
echo "feature import-marks=nonexistent.marks" |
- test_must_fail git fast-import
+ test_must_fail git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features
'
test_expect_success 'R: import and output marks can be the same file' '
test_expect_success 'R: feature import-marks-if-exists' '
rm -f io.marks &&
- git fast-import --export-marks=io.marks <<-\EOF &&
+ git fast-import --export-marks=io.marks \
+ --allow-unsafe-features <<-\EOF &&
feature import-marks-if-exists=not_io.marks
EOF
test_must_be_empty io.marks &&
echo ":1 $blob" >expect &&
echo ":2 $blob" >>expect &&
- git fast-import --export-marks=io.marks <<-\EOF &&
+ git fast-import --export-marks=io.marks \
+ --allow-unsafe-features <<-\EOF &&
feature import-marks-if-exists=io.marks
blob
mark :2
echo ":3 $blob" >>expect &&
git fast-import --import-marks=io.marks \
- --export-marks=io.marks <<-\EOF &&
+ --export-marks=io.marks \
+ --allow-unsafe-features <<-\EOF &&
feature import-marks-if-exists=not_io.marks
blob
mark :3
test_cmp expect io.marks &&
git fast-import --import-marks-if-exists=not_io.marks \
- --export-marks=io.marks <<-\EOF &&
+ --export-marks=io.marks \
+ --allow-unsafe-features <<-\EOF &&
feature import-marks-if-exists=io.marks
EOF
test_must_be_empty io.marks
feature export-marks=marks.new
EOF
- cat input | git fast-import &&
+ git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features <input &&
test_cmp marks.out marks.new
'
feature export-marks=marks.new
EOF
- cat input | git fast-import --import-marks=marks.out &&
+ git fast-import --import-marks=marks.out --allow-unsafe-features <input &&
test_cmp marks.out marks.new
'
head -n2 marks.out > one.marks &&
tail -n +3 marks.out > two.marks &&
- git fast-import --import-marks=one.marks --import-marks=two.marks <input &&
+ git fast-import --import-marks=one.marks --import-marks=two.marks \
+ --allow-unsafe-features <input &&
test_cmp marks.out combined.marks
'
mkdir -p .git/info/fast-import/ &&
cp marks.new .git/info/fast-import/relative.in &&
- git fast-import <input &&
+ git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features <input &&
test_cmp marks.new .git/info/fast-import/relative.out
'
feature export-marks=non-relative.out
EOF
- git fast-import <input &&
+ git fast-import --allow-unsafe-features <input &&
test_cmp marks.new non-relative.out
'
EOF
- cat input | git fast-import 2> output &&
+ git fast-import 2>output <input &&
test_must_be_empty output
'
test_expect_success 'fast-export quotes pathnames' '
git init crazy-paths &&
+ test_config -C crazy-paths core.protectNTFS false &&
(cd crazy-paths &&
blob=$(echo foo | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
- git update-index --add \
+ git -c core.protectNTFS=false update-index --add \
--cacheinfo 100644 $blob "$(printf "path with\\nnewline")" \
--cacheinfo 100644 $blob "path with \"quote\"" \
--cacheinfo 100644 $blob "path with \\backslash" \
child_process_init(fastimport);
fastimport->in = helper->out;
argv_array_push(&fastimport->args, "fast-import");
+ argv_array_push(&fastimport->args, "--allow-unsafe-features");
argv_array_push(&fastimport->args, debug ? "--stats" : "--quiet");
if (data->bidi_import) {
strbuf_addstr(err, _("empty filename in tree entry"));
return -1;
}
+#ifdef GIT_WINDOWS_NATIVE
+ if (protect_ntfs && strchr(path, '\\')) {
+ strbuf_addf(err, _("filename in tree entry contains backslash: '%s'"), path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
len = strlen(path) + 1;
/* Initialize the descriptor entry */
invalidate_ce_path(old, o);
}
- do_add_entry(o, merge, update, CE_STAGEMASK);
+ if (do_add_entry(o, merge, update, CE_STAGEMASK) < 0)
+ return -1;
return 1;
}
projects / thirdparty / git.git / commitdiff
