2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2019, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "common/ocv.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
19 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
20 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
22 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
23 #include "crypto/sha384.h"
24 #include "crypto/random.h"
25 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
26 #include "drivers/driver.h"
27 #include "ap_config.h"
28 #include "ieee802_11.h"
30 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
31 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
32 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
34 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
35 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
36 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
39 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
40 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
41 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
42 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
44 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
45 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
46 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
47 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
);
48 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
49 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
50 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
53 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
54 struct wpa_group
*group
);
55 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
56 struct wpa_group
*group
);
57 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
58 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
60 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
61 struct wpa_group
*group
);
62 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
63 struct wpa_group
*group
);
64 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
65 struct wpa_group
*group
);
66 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
68 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
69 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
70 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
71 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans
= 4000; /* ms */
73 /* TODO: make these configurable */
74 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
75 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
76 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
79 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
80 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
82 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
83 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
88 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
89 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
91 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
92 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
96 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
97 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
100 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
101 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
105 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
106 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
108 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
110 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
114 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
116 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
117 const u8
*prev_psk
, size_t *psk_len
,
120 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
122 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
123 prev_psk
, psk_len
, vlan_id
);
127 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
128 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
130 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
132 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
136 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
138 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
139 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
141 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
143 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
148 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
149 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
151 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
153 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
158 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
159 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
161 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
163 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
169 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
172 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
174 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
176 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
179 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
180 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
183 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
185 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
189 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
190 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
193 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
195 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
199 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
200 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
202 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
204 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
208 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
209 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
215 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
218 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
219 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
224 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
227 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
233 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
234 const u8
*addr
, u16 reason
)
236 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
238 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
" (reason %u)",
239 MAC2STR(addr
), reason
);
240 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, reason
);
245 static int wpa_channel_info(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
246 struct wpa_channel_info
*ci
)
248 if (!wpa_auth
->cb
->channel_info
)
250 return wpa_auth
->cb
->channel_info(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, ci
);
252 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
255 static int wpa_auth_update_vlan(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
256 const u8
*addr
, int vlan_id
)
258 if (!wpa_auth
->cb
->update_vlan
)
260 return wpa_auth
->cb
->update_vlan(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, vlan_id
);
264 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
266 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
268 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
269 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
272 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
273 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
274 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
277 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
278 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
279 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
284 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
286 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
287 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
289 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
290 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
292 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
294 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
296 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
297 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
298 } while (group
->changed
);
301 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
305 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
306 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
307 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
312 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
314 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
315 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
317 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
318 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
323 void wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
325 if (sm
&& sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
326 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start PTK rekeying timer for "
327 MACSTR
" (%d seconds)", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
),
328 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
);
329 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
330 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0,
331 wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
336 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
338 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
344 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
347 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
348 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
352 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
353 struct wpa_group
*group
)
355 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
359 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
361 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
364 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
365 * Local MAC Address || Time)
367 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
368 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
369 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
370 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
372 os_memset(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
, 0xab, 8);
373 os_memset(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, 0xcd, sizeof(ptr
));
374 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
375 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
378 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
379 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
381 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
382 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
388 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
389 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
391 struct wpa_group
*group
;
393 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
397 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
398 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
399 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
401 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
402 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
403 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
404 "the first station connects");
408 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
409 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
410 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
411 * on embedded devices.
413 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
414 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
422 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
423 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
424 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
426 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
427 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
428 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
436 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
437 * @addr: Authenticator address
438 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
439 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
440 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
442 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
443 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
444 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
447 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
449 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
450 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
452 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
453 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
455 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
457 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
458 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
463 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
464 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
465 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
470 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
472 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
473 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
474 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
475 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
480 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
481 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
482 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
483 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
484 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
485 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
486 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
490 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
492 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
493 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
494 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
497 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
498 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
499 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
503 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
504 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
505 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
509 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
511 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
517 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
519 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
521 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
523 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
524 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
525 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
526 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
533 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
534 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
536 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
538 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
540 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
541 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
543 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
545 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
546 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
547 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
548 wpa_ft_deinit(wpa_auth
);
549 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
552 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
553 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
556 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
558 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
570 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
571 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
572 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
574 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
575 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
577 struct wpa_group
*group
;
578 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
581 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
582 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
583 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
588 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
591 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
592 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
594 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
595 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
596 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
602 struct wpa_state_machine
*
603 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
604 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
606 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
608 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
611 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
614 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
616 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
618 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
619 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
620 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
626 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
627 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
629 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
632 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
633 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
634 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
635 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
636 "start 4-way handshake");
637 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
638 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
642 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
645 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
646 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
647 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
648 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
649 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
653 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
656 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
657 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
658 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
661 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
662 "start authentication");
666 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
667 return 1; /* should not really happen */
669 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
670 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
674 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
676 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
677 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
678 * STA has not yet been removed. */
682 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
686 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
689 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
691 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
692 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
693 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
694 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
696 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
697 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
698 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
700 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
701 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
702 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
703 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
705 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
706 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
707 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
708 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
709 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
711 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
713 wpabuf_clear_free(sm
->dpp_z
);
714 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
715 bin_clear_free(sm
, sizeof(*sm
));
719 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
724 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
725 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
726 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
728 if (eloop_deplete_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
,
729 sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
) == -1)
730 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
734 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
735 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
736 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
737 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
738 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
739 wpa_ft_sta_deinit(sm
);
740 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
741 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
742 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
743 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
744 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
745 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
746 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
752 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
757 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
762 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
763 const u8
*replay_counter
)
766 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
769 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
770 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
777 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
778 const u8
*replay_counter
)
781 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
783 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
784 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
785 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
786 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
791 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
792 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
793 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
794 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
796 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
797 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
799 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
800 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
801 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
802 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
806 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
807 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
808 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
810 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
811 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
812 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
816 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
817 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
818 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
819 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
820 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
824 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
825 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
826 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
827 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
828 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
829 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
830 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
831 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
832 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
838 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
841 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
842 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
844 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
845 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
846 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
847 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
850 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
851 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
852 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
853 "group cipher is not TKIP");
854 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
855 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
856 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
857 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
859 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
860 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
861 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
862 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
866 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
867 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
869 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
874 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
879 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
883 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
885 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
886 !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
887 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
888 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
, &pmk_len
,
892 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
893 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
894 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
895 sm
->xxkey_len
= pmk_len
;
897 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
900 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
903 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
906 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
907 data
, data_len
) == 0) {
908 if (sm
->PMK
!= pmk
) {
909 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
910 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
916 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
917 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
922 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
923 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
928 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
929 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
931 if (vlan_id
&& wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
932 wpa_auth_update_vlan(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, vlan_id
) < 0)
935 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
936 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
937 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
943 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
944 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
945 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
947 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
948 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
949 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
950 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
} msg
;
952 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
954 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
957 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
959 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
961 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
962 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
964 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
965 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
969 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
970 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
971 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
972 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
973 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
974 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
975 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
976 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
977 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
978 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
979 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
980 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
982 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
984 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
985 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
986 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
988 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
993 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
994 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
996 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
997 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
999 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
1000 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
1001 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
1002 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
1003 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
1008 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
1009 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
1010 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
1016 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
1018 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
1019 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1021 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
1024 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
1025 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore SMK message");
1029 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1032 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
1034 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
1035 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
1036 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
1037 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
1039 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
1042 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1045 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1047 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1048 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1049 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1050 if (wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1051 !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1052 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1053 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1055 "advertised support for "
1056 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1061 if (!wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1062 !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1063 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1064 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1066 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1072 if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1073 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1074 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1075 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1080 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1081 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1082 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1083 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1084 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1085 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1086 "replayed counter");
1091 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1092 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1095 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1096 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1097 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1098 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1099 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1102 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1103 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1104 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1105 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1106 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1108 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1109 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1110 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1112 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1113 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1114 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1115 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1116 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1117 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1118 goto continue_processing
;
1121 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1122 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1123 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1124 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1126 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1127 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1128 * different SNonce values.
1130 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1131 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1132 goto continue_processing
;
1135 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1136 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1137 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1138 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1139 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1140 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1141 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1143 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1144 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1145 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1147 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1148 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1150 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1151 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1152 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1154 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1155 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1159 continue_processing
:
1161 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1162 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1163 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1164 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1167 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1171 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1172 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1173 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1174 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1175 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1176 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1177 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1181 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1182 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1184 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1185 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1186 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1187 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1188 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1189 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1192 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1193 "collect more entropy for random number "
1195 random_mark_pool_ready();
1196 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1197 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
1202 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1204 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1205 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1206 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1212 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1213 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1214 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1215 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1216 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1217 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1225 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1226 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1228 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1229 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1230 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1234 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1235 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1236 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1237 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1242 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1243 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1244 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1245 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1248 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1250 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1251 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1253 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
, &sm
->PTK
,
1255 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1256 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1257 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1258 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1260 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
,
1261 "TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
1263 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1268 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1269 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1270 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1271 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1273 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
,
1274 "TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
1276 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1279 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1282 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1283 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1284 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1285 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1288 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1289 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1290 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1291 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1292 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1294 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1295 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1301 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1302 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1303 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1305 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1306 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1308 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1309 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1310 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1311 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1312 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1314 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1315 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1316 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1320 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1321 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1323 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1324 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1327 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1328 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1329 key
->replay_counter
);
1331 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1333 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1334 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1335 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1336 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1337 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1339 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1340 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1342 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1343 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1347 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1348 * do not get copied again.
1350 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1353 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1354 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_memdup(data
, data_len
);
1355 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1357 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1359 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1360 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1361 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1362 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1363 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1368 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1369 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1371 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN
];
1375 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1376 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1377 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1378 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1379 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1382 os_memset(data
, 0, sizeof(data
));
1383 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1384 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1385 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1386 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1388 os_memset(pos
, 0xef, 8);
1389 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1391 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, gtk_len
) < 0)
1394 #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
1395 if (sha384_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1398 #else /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
1399 #ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
1400 if (sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1403 #else /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
1404 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1407 #endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
1408 #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
1414 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1416 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1417 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1419 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1420 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1421 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1426 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1427 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1428 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1429 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1430 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1432 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1433 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1434 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1436 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1438 int version
, pairwise
;
1440 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1442 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
1443 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1445 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1448 version
= force_version
;
1449 else if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1450 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1451 else if (wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1452 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1453 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1454 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1456 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1458 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1460 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1461 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1464 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1465 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1466 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1467 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1468 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1470 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1472 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1473 wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1474 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1475 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1477 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1478 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1481 len
+= key_data_len
;
1482 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1483 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1485 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1488 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1489 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1490 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1491 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1492 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1493 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1495 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1496 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1497 key_info
|= version
;
1498 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1499 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1500 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1501 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1502 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1504 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1505 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& !pairwise
)
1506 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1508 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1510 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1511 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1512 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1513 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1514 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1516 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1517 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1518 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1519 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1520 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1521 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1524 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1527 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1530 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1531 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1533 } else if (!mic_len
&& kde
) {
1537 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1538 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1541 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1542 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1543 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1544 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1545 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1546 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1547 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1548 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1549 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1553 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1554 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1555 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1556 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1557 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1563 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1569 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1571 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1572 wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1573 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1574 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1575 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using AES-WRAP (KEK length %u)",
1576 (unsigned int) sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1577 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1578 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1583 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1584 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1585 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1588 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1589 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
1590 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1591 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1592 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1593 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1594 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1595 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1596 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1597 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1598 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1607 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1608 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1609 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1610 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1616 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1617 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1618 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
) < 0) {
1622 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1624 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1626 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1627 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1628 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1631 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1634 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1636 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1642 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1643 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1644 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1645 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1646 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1649 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1655 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1658 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1659 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1660 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1661 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1663 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1664 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
1665 (!pairwise
|| (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)))
1666 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans
;
1667 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1668 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1671 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1672 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1673 "counter %u)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1674 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1675 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1679 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
1680 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1682 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1683 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1686 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1687 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
, pmk_len
);
1689 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1692 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1693 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1694 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1695 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1696 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1697 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1698 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1699 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1700 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1701 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1703 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1708 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1710 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1711 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1712 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1714 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1715 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1716 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1717 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1721 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1728 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1729 "event %d notification", event
);
1734 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1735 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1740 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1745 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1746 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1747 os_memset(sm
->PMK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PMK
));
1749 os_memset(sm
->xxkey
, 0, sizeof(sm
->xxkey
));
1751 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1754 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1757 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1758 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1759 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1760 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1761 * properly at this point.
1763 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1764 "started - initialize now");
1767 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1768 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1770 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1773 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1775 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1776 * update for this STA.
1778 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1779 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1780 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1782 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1785 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1786 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1787 "after association");
1788 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1790 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1791 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1792 wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm
);
1794 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1796 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1797 case WPA_ASSOC_FILS
:
1799 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1800 "FILS: TK configuration after association");
1802 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
1804 #else /* CONFIG_FILS */
1806 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1807 case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
:
1808 sm
->tk_already_set
= FALSE
;
1812 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1813 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1814 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1816 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1817 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1819 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1821 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1822 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1824 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1827 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1828 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1830 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1834 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1836 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1837 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1842 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1846 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1848 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1850 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1851 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1852 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1856 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1857 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1858 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1859 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1860 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1861 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1862 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1865 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1867 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1869 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1870 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1871 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
1872 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1873 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1878 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1880 u16 reason
= sm
->disconnect_reason
;
1882 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1883 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1884 sm
->disconnect_reason
= 0;
1886 reason
= WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
;
1887 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, reason
);
1891 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1893 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1894 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1898 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1900 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1901 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1902 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1903 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1905 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1906 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1910 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1911 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1913 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1916 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1917 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1918 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1919 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1920 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1922 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1924 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1925 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1926 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1927 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1929 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1930 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1933 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1934 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1935 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1936 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1937 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1938 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1943 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1945 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1947 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1948 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1951 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1952 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1953 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1954 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1955 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1956 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1957 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1959 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1960 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1962 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1965 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1967 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1968 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1969 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1975 static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1977 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1978 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
1979 "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
1980 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1983 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1990 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1992 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1993 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1995 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1996 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1998 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2000 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
2001 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2002 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2004 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
) {
2005 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2006 "DPP: No PMKSA cache entry for STA - reject connection");
2007 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2008 sm
->disconnect_reason
= WLAN_REASON_INVALID_PMKID
;
2010 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
2011 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
2012 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2014 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2015 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
2018 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
2019 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
2021 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
2022 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2023 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
2024 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
2025 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2028 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
2029 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
2030 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2031 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
2032 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2033 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
, SHA384_MAC_LEN
);
2034 sm
->xxkey_len
= SHA384_MAC_LEN
;
2036 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
2037 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2040 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2042 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
2043 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
2044 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2047 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
2049 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2050 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
2051 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
2052 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
2053 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
2054 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
2055 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
2056 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
2057 * be good workaround for this issue. */
2058 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
2062 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
2067 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
2068 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
,
2071 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, psk_len
);
2072 sm
->pmk_len
= psk_len
;
2073 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2074 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
2075 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2076 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2079 if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
2080 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "SAE: PMK from PMKSA cache");
2081 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2082 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2083 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2084 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2085 sm
->xxkey_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2086 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2088 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
2089 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2093 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
2095 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
2096 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
2098 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
2099 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
2100 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2101 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
2104 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2105 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2106 * immediately following this. */
2110 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2111 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2113 * For infrastructure BSS cases, it is better for the AP not to include
2114 * the PMKID KDE in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 since it could be used to initiate
2115 * offline search for the passphrase/PSK without having to be able to
2116 * capture a 4-way handshake from a STA that has access to the network.
2118 * For IBSS cases, addition of PMKID KDE could be considered even with
2119 * WPA2-PSK cases that use multiple PSKs, but only if there is a single
2120 * possible PSK for this STA. However, this should not be done unless
2121 * there is support for using that information on the supplicant side.
2122 * The concern about exposing PMKID unnecessarily in infrastructure BSS
2123 * cases would also apply here, but at least in the IBSS case, this
2124 * would cover a potential real use case.
2126 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2127 (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2128 (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
&& sm
->pmksa
) ||
2129 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) &&
2130 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2132 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2133 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2134 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2135 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2137 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2138 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from PMKSA entry",
2139 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2140 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2141 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2142 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2143 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2144 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2145 "RSN: No KCK available to derive PMKID for message 1/4");
2148 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2149 if (sm
->pmkid_set
) {
2150 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2151 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from FILS/ERP",
2152 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2153 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2154 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2156 /* No PMKID available */
2157 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2158 "RSN: No FILS/ERP PMKID available for message 1/4");
2161 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2163 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2164 if (sm
->pmkid_set
) {
2165 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2166 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from SAE",
2167 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2168 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2169 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2171 /* No PMKID available */
2172 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2173 "RSN: No SAE PMKID available for message 1/4");
2176 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
2179 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2180 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2182 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2183 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2185 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2186 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID derived from PMK",
2187 &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
], PMKID_LEN
);
2190 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2191 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2192 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2196 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2197 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2198 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2203 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2204 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2205 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, ptk
);
2206 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2209 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&& sm
->dpp_z
) {
2210 z
= wpabuf_head(sm
->dpp_z
);
2211 z_len
= wpabuf_len(sm
->dpp_z
);
2213 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
2215 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2216 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2217 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
, z
, z_len
);
2223 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2224 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
,
2225 const u8
*dhss
, size_t dhss_len
,
2226 struct wpabuf
*g_sta
, struct wpabuf
*g_ap
)
2228 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2231 u8 fils_ft
[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN
];
2232 size_t fils_ft_len
= 0;
2234 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2235 snonce
, anonce
, dhss
, dhss_len
,
2236 &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2237 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
,
2238 fils_ft
, &fils_ft_len
);
2241 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2242 sm
->tk_already_set
= FALSE
;
2244 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2246 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2247 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
2248 u8 pmk_r0
[PMK_LEN_MAX
], pmk_r0_name
[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
];
2249 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2250 size_t pmk_r0_len
= use_sha384
? SHA384_MAC_LEN
: PMK_LEN
;
2252 if (wpa_derive_pmk_r0(fils_ft
, fils_ft_len
,
2253 conf
->ssid
, conf
->ssid_len
,
2254 conf
->mobility_domain
,
2255 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2256 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2257 sm
->addr
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
,
2261 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMK-R0",
2262 pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_len
);
2263 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMKR0Name",
2264 pmk_r0_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2265 wpa_ft_store_pmk_fils(sm
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
);
2266 os_memset(fils_ft
, 0, sizeof(fils_ft
));
2268 res
= wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name
, conf
->r1_key_holder
,
2269 sm
->addr
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2271 os_memset(pmk_r0
, 0, PMK_LEN_MAX
);
2274 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMKR1Name", sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2276 sm
->pmk_r1_name_valid
= 1;
2278 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2280 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2281 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2282 g_sta
? wpabuf_head(g_sta
) : NULL
,
2283 g_sta
? wpabuf_len(g_sta
) : 0,
2284 g_ap
? wpabuf_head(g_ap
) : NULL
,
2285 g_ap
? wpabuf_len(g_ap
) : 0,
2286 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2287 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2288 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2289 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2291 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2292 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2293 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2299 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2300 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2302 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2303 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2310 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2311 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2312 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2313 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2314 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2315 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2316 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2317 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2320 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2322 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2326 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2327 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2329 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2330 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2331 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2332 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2333 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2334 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2338 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2339 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2340 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2343 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2344 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2345 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2346 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2347 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2349 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2354 const u8
* wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2355 const u8
*ies
, size_t ies_len
,
2356 const u8
*fils_session
)
2359 const u8
*session
= NULL
;
2361 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2362 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2363 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2367 /* Verify Session element */
2369 end
= ((const u8
*) ie
) + ies_len
;
2370 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2371 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2373 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2374 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2375 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2383 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2384 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in Assoc Req - reject",
2389 if (!fils_session
) {
2390 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2391 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in STA entry - reject",
2396 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2397 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2398 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2399 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2400 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2401 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2408 int wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*ies
,
2411 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2413 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(ies
, ies_len
, &elems
, 1) == ParseFailed
) {
2414 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2415 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2419 if (!elems
.fils_session
) {
2420 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Session element");
2424 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2425 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2429 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2430 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2431 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2432 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2433 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2437 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2438 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2439 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2440 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2441 elems
.fils_key_confirm
, elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2442 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2443 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2451 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2452 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2453 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2456 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2460 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2461 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2462 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2466 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2467 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2468 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2472 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2473 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2474 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2475 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2476 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2478 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2482 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2485 session
= wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(sm
, ie
, end
- ie
,
2488 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session validation failed");
2492 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2494 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2495 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2496 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2500 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2502 /* The STA's MAC address */
2504 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2505 /* The AP's BSSID */
2507 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2508 /* The STA's nonce */
2509 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2510 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2511 /* The AP's nonce */
2512 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2513 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2515 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2516 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2518 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2519 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2521 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2522 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2523 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2524 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2527 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2528 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2530 if (wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(sm
, pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) < 0) {
2531 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key Confirm validation failed");
2535 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2539 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2540 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2541 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2543 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2544 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2545 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2546 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2550 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2553 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2554 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2557 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2559 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2561 /* The AP's BSSID */
2563 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2564 /* The STA's MAC address */
2566 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2567 /* The AP's nonce */
2568 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2569 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2570 /* The STA's nonce */
2571 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2572 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2574 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2575 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2576 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2578 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2579 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2581 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2582 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2584 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2588 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2589 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2590 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2595 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2598 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2599 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2600 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2605 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2606 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2607 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2608 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2611 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2617 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2618 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2620 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2621 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2623 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2625 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2627 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2631 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2633 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2634 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2635 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2636 /* Element ID Extension */
2637 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2638 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2640 /* FILS HLP Container */
2642 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2644 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2648 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2649 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2650 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2651 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2652 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2654 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2655 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2656 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
2657 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2659 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2660 * of GTK in the BSS.
2662 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2668 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2670 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2671 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2673 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2676 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2677 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2678 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2680 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2683 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
)) {
2684 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
2687 if (wpa_channel_info(sm
->wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
2688 wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING
,
2689 "FILS: Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
2694 pos
= wpabuf_put(plain
, OCV_OCI_EXTENDED_LEN
);
2695 if (ocv_insert_extended_oci(&ci
, pos
) < 0) {
2700 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
2706 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2711 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2712 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No valid PTK available to set TK");
2715 if (sm
->tk_already_set
) {
2716 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: TK already set to the driver");
2720 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2721 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2723 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2724 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2725 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2726 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2729 sm
->tk_already_set
= TRUE
;
2735 u8
* hostapd_eid_assoc_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2736 const u8
*fils_session
, struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2738 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2742 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
; /* Element ID */
2743 *pos
++ = 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
; /* Length */
2744 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
; /* Element ID Extension */
2745 os_memcpy(pos
, fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2746 pos
+= FILS_SESSION_LEN
;
2748 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2750 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2754 os_memcpy(pos
, wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
));
2755 pos
+= wpabuf_len(plain
);
2757 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "%s: plain buf_len: %u", __func__
,
2758 (unsigned int) wpabuf_len(plain
));
2760 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2764 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2768 int get_sta_tx_parameters(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ap_max_chanwidth
,
2769 int ap_seg1_idx
, int *bandwidth
, int *seg1_idx
)
2771 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2773 if (!wpa_auth
->cb
->get_sta_tx_params
)
2775 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_sta_tx_params(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, sm
->addr
,
2776 ap_max_chanwidth
, ap_seg1_idx
,
2777 bandwidth
, seg1_idx
);
2779 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
2782 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2784 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2786 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2787 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2790 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2791 u16 key_data_length
;
2792 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2793 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2794 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2795 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2798 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2799 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2800 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2801 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2803 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
2805 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2806 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2809 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2810 !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2811 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2812 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
, &pmk_len
,
2817 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2818 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2819 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
2820 sm
->xxkey_len
= pmk_len
;
2822 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2825 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2828 if ((!pmk
|| !pmk_len
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
2829 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use PMK from PMKSA cache");
2830 pmk
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk
;
2831 pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2834 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
2838 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
2839 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2840 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2841 if (sm
->PMK
!= pmk
) {
2842 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
2843 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
2851 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2852 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2856 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2858 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2859 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2864 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2865 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2867 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2872 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2875 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2876 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2877 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2878 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2879 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2880 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2881 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2884 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2885 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2886 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2890 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2891 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2892 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2893 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2894 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2896 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2897 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2899 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2900 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2901 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2902 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2903 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2904 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2906 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2907 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2909 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2910 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2911 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2912 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2913 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2917 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
)) {
2918 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
2922 if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
2923 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2924 "Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key 2/4");
2928 if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm
,
2929 channel_width_to_int(ci
.chanwidth
),
2930 ci
.seg1_idx
, &tx_chanwidth
,
2934 if (ocv_verify_tx_params(kde
.oci
, kde
.oci_len
, &ci
,
2935 tx_chanwidth
, tx_seg1_idx
) != 0) {
2936 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2941 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
2942 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2943 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2944 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2945 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2948 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2950 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2951 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2953 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2954 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2955 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2957 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2958 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2959 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2960 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2961 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2962 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2963 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2967 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2969 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2970 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2972 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2973 * with the value we derived.
2975 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2976 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2977 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2978 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2980 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2982 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2983 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2984 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2988 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2990 if (vlan_id
&& wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2991 wpa_auth_update_vlan(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, vlan_id
) < 0) {
2992 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2993 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2997 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2998 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
3000 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3001 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
3002 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
3004 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3005 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
3008 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
3010 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
3011 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
3015 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
3017 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
3022 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3024 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3026 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
3028 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3029 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
3036 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3038 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
3039 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3040 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3041 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3043 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
3046 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
3048 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
3049 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
3050 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
3052 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
3053 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3054 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3055 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3057 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
3060 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
3063 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
3064 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
3070 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3072 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3078 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3083 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3086 static int ocv_oci_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3089 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
))
3090 return OCV_OCI_KDE_LEN
;
3091 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3095 static int ocv_oci_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
**argpos
)
3098 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
3100 if (!wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
))
3103 if (wpa_channel_info(sm
->wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
3104 wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING
,
3105 "Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
3109 return ocv_insert_oci_kde(&ci
, argpos
);
3110 #else /* CONFIG_OCV */
3112 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3116 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
3118 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3119 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
3120 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3122 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
3124 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
3125 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3128 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3129 sm
->TimeoutCtr
> 1) {
3130 /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
3133 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3134 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3135 * immediately following this. */
3139 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
3140 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
3142 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3143 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3144 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
3145 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3146 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3147 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
3148 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
3149 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
3150 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
3151 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
3152 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
3153 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
3154 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
3156 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3157 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
3158 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3159 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
3161 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3162 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3163 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3164 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3166 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3167 * of GTK in the BSS.
3169 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
3177 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
3183 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
3185 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
3186 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
3187 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
3188 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
3189 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
3190 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
3192 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3193 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
3194 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
3199 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
3201 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
3202 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3203 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3204 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
3205 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
3207 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3209 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
3210 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
3211 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3212 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3217 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
3219 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3220 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3225 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
3227 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
3228 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
3235 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3238 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
3240 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3243 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3244 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
3249 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3250 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3252 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
3254 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
3255 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
3256 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
3257 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
3258 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
3259 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
3261 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3263 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
,
3264 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
3265 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
3267 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
3271 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
3272 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
3278 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
3279 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3281 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
3282 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
3285 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
3286 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3288 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
3289 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
);
3292 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3294 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
3296 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3297 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
3298 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
3299 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
3300 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
3302 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3304 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3305 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
3306 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3307 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3308 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
3309 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
3310 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
3315 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
3317 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
3318 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3320 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
3321 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
3322 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
3323 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
3324 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3325 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
3328 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3329 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
3331 wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm
);
3333 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3334 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
3335 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
3336 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3337 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
3341 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
3343 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
3344 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3345 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
3348 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
3351 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
3352 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
3353 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3354 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
3357 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3358 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
3359 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3361 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3362 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
3363 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3369 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
3372 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3373 else if (sm
->Disconnect
3374 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
3375 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3376 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
3377 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3379 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
3380 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3381 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
3382 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
3383 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
3384 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3385 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
) {
3386 if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm
) < 0)
3387 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3389 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3390 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
3391 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
3393 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
3394 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3396 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
3397 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3399 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
3400 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3402 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
3403 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
3404 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3405 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
3406 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3407 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3408 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
3409 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
3410 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
3411 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
)
3412 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3414 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
3415 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3416 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0) {
3417 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3419 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&& sm
->pmksa
) {
3420 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3421 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
3423 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3424 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3425 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
3426 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3429 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
3430 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
3431 NULL
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
3432 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3434 } else if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
3435 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3436 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
3438 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3439 "no PSK configured for the STA");
3440 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3441 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3444 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
3445 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3446 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3447 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3448 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3449 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3450 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3452 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3453 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
3454 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3455 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3456 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3457 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3459 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
3460 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
3461 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
3462 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3463 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3464 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3465 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3466 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3468 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3469 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3471 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3472 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3473 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3474 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3475 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3476 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3477 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3478 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
||
3479 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3480 sm
->TimeoutCtr
> 1)) {
3481 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3483 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3484 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
3485 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3486 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3487 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3488 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3490 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3496 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3498 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3500 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3501 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3502 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3504 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3508 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3510 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3511 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3513 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3515 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3517 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3520 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3521 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> 1) {
3522 /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
3525 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
) {
3526 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3527 * immediately following this. */
3531 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3532 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3533 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3534 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3535 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3536 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3537 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3538 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3539 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3541 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3542 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3543 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3545 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3546 * of GTK in the BSS.
3548 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3552 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3553 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3554 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
3555 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3556 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3559 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3560 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3562 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3564 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3565 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
3569 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3572 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3575 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3576 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3577 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3578 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3580 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3581 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3587 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3590 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
3591 const u8
*key_data
, *mic
;
3592 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
3593 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
3594 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
3596 u16 key_data_length
;
3597 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3599 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3600 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3603 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
3606 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
3609 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
3610 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
3611 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
3612 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
3613 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
3614 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
3615 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
3618 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
3619 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3620 "received EAPOL-Key group msg 2/2 with invalid Key Data contents");
3624 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
)) {
3625 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
3629 if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
3630 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3631 "Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key group 1/2");
3635 if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm
,
3636 channel_width_to_int(ci
.chanwidth
),
3637 ci
.seg1_idx
, &tx_chanwidth
,
3641 if (ocv_verify_tx_params(kde
.oci
, kde
.oci_len
, &ci
,
3642 tx_chanwidth
, tx_seg1_idx
) != 0) {
3643 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3648 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3650 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3651 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3652 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3653 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3654 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3655 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3656 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3657 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3662 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3664 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3665 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3666 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3667 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3668 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3669 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3670 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
3671 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN",
3672 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
);
3676 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3678 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3679 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3680 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3681 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3682 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3683 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3684 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3685 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3687 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3688 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3689 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3690 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3691 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3692 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
||
3693 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3694 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> 1))
3695 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3696 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3697 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3699 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3700 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3702 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3703 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3709 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3710 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3714 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3715 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3716 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3717 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3718 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3720 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3721 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3723 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3724 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3726 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3727 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3728 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3729 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3730 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3731 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3733 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3734 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3736 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3742 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3743 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3745 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3746 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3747 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3748 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3751 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3754 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3757 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3758 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3759 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3763 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3765 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3768 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3769 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3770 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3771 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3774 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3776 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3777 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3778 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3780 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3781 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3782 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3785 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3786 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3789 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3790 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3797 #ifdef CONFIG_WNM_AP
3798 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3799 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3801 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3804 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3808 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3811 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3815 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3817 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3822 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3825 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3826 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3827 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3828 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3830 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3831 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3834 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3835 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3837 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3839 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3840 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3846 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3847 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3849 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3851 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3855 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3857 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3858 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3859 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3861 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3865 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3868 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3870 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3871 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3875 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3876 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM_AP */
3879 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3880 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3884 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3885 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3886 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3887 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3888 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3890 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3892 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3893 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3894 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3895 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3896 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3897 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3898 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3899 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3900 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3902 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3903 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3904 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3905 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3906 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3908 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3909 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3910 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3914 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3915 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3919 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3920 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3921 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3922 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3925 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3926 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3930 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3931 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3934 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3935 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3936 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3939 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3945 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3947 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3948 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3949 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3951 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3958 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3959 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3961 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3962 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3963 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3964 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3968 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3969 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3971 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3972 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3973 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3974 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3976 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3977 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3985 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3986 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3989 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3990 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3991 /* Do not allow group operations */
3992 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3993 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3994 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3995 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3997 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3998 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3999 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
4000 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
4001 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
4002 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4007 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4012 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
4013 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
4014 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
4015 * recursive call. */
4016 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
4020 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
4022 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
4025 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
4026 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
4028 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
4029 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
4031 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
4032 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
4034 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4035 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
4036 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
4038 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
4039 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
4040 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
4041 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
4048 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
4050 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
4055 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4059 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
4063 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4066 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4068 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4071 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4073 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
4075 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
4077 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4078 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
4079 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
4080 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
4081 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4082 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
4083 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4088 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
4090 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
4094 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
4095 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
4096 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
4098 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
4101 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
4102 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
4103 const int preauth
= 1;
4104 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
4105 const int preauth
= 0;
4106 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
4108 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4111 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4112 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
4113 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
4114 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
4115 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
4116 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
4117 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
4118 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
4119 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4123 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
4124 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
4127 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4128 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
4129 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
4130 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
4131 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
4132 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
4133 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
4134 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
4135 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
4136 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
4137 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
4138 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
4139 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
4140 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
4141 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
4142 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4143 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4144 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4145 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
4146 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4147 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4148 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4149 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
4150 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
4151 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
4153 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
4154 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
,
4155 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
,
4156 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
4157 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
4158 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
4159 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
4160 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
4161 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
4162 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
4164 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
4165 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
4166 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
4167 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
4168 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
4169 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4173 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
4174 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
4177 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
4178 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
4179 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4187 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
4195 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
4197 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
4199 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
4200 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
4206 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4207 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
4208 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
4209 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
4210 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4211 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
4212 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
4213 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
4214 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
4215 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
4216 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
4218 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
4219 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
4220 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
4221 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4226 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4227 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
4228 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
4230 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
4231 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4239 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4242 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
4246 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4248 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
4252 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4254 return sm
->pairwise
;
4258 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_pmk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int *len
)
4267 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4271 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
4275 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4283 int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4285 if (!sm
|| !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4287 return sm
->tk_already_set
;
4291 int wpa_auth_sta_fils_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4293 if (!sm
|| !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4295 return sm
->tk_already_set
;
4299 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4300 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
4302 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
4309 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4310 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4312 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
4316 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4319 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
4323 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
4325 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4327 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
4328 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
4332 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
4333 unsigned int pmk_len
,
4334 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
4336 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
4337 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4340 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4341 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
4342 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
4343 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
4347 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
4348 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
4349 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
4350 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4357 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4358 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4359 int session_timeout
,
4360 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
4362 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4365 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
4368 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
4369 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
4376 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4377 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4379 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4382 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
4384 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
4392 void wpa_auth_add_sae_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4394 os_memcpy(sm
->pmkid
, pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4399 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add2(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4400 const u8
*pmk
, size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*pmkid
,
4401 int session_timeout
, int akmp
)
4403 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4406 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, pmkid
,
4407 NULL
, 0, wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, session_timeout
,
4415 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4418 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4420 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
4422 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
4424 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
4425 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
4426 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
4431 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
4434 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4436 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
4440 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4442 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4443 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
4447 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
4450 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4451 char *buf
, size_t len
)
4453 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4456 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
4460 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4461 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
4462 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
4464 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
4465 struct os_reltime now
;
4467 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
4468 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
4472 os_get_reltime(&now
);
4473 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
4478 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4479 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
4483 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4486 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
4488 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4489 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
4490 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
4495 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
4496 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
4499 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4500 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4503 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4505 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
4509 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
4510 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4511 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4518 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
4519 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4520 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4525 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
4526 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
4529 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4530 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4532 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4534 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4538 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
4539 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
4540 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
4550 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
4551 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4552 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4554 /* Skip the special first group */
4555 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4558 group
->references
++;
4562 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
4563 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4564 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4566 /* Skip the special first group */
4567 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4570 group
->references
--;
4571 if (group
->references
)
4573 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
4578 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
4579 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
4581 static struct wpa_group
*
4582 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4584 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4586 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4589 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4591 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4595 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4596 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4603 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4604 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4605 * even if a negative value is returned.
4606 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4608 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4610 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4612 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4615 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4617 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4619 group
= group
->next
;
4622 if (group
== NULL
) {
4623 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4628 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4629 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4632 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4633 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4635 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4643 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4644 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4645 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4648 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4650 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4653 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4656 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4658 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4660 group
= group
->next
;
4666 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4667 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4670 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4671 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4672 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4676 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4678 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4681 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4682 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4683 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4688 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4694 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4696 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4698 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4701 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4703 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4705 group
= group
->next
;
4708 if (group
== NULL
) {
4709 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4714 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4717 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4720 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4721 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4723 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4724 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4731 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4732 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4734 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4736 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4737 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4738 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4740 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4741 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4742 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4743 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4744 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4745 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4746 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4747 * the station has received the frame.
4749 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4750 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4751 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4753 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4754 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4755 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4756 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4759 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
4760 if (sm
->eapol_status_cb
) {
4761 sm
->eapol_status_cb(sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx1
,
4762 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx2
);
4763 sm
->eapol_status_cb
= NULL
;
4765 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
4769 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4773 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4777 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4781 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4786 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4788 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4790 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4793 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4796 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4797 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4799 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4803 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4805 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4809 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4810 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4816 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
{
4817 struct wpa_authenticator
*auth
;
4819 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4825 static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
)
4827 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
*data
= ctx
;
4829 if (a
== data
->auth
|| !a
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
||
4830 os_memcmp(a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
, data
->cache_id
,
4831 FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN
) != 0)
4833 data
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(a
->pmksa
, data
->spa
, data
->pmkid
);
4834 return data
->pmksa
!= NULL
;
4838 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4839 wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4840 const u8
*sta_addr
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4842 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata
;
4844 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
)
4846 idata
.auth
= wpa_auth
;
4847 idata
.cache_id
= wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id
;
4849 idata
.spa
= sta_addr
;
4850 idata
.pmkid
= pmkid
;
4851 wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_fils_iter
, &idata
);
4856 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4857 int wpa_auth_write_fte(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int use_sha384
,
4858 u8
*buf
, size_t len
)
4860 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
4862 return wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
4863 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
4864 NULL
, NULL
, buf
, len
, NULL
, 0);
4866 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4869 void wpa_auth_get_fils_aead_params(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4870 u8
*fils_anonce
, u8
*fils_snonce
,
4871 u8
*fils_kek
, size_t *fils_kek_len
)
4873 os_memcpy(fils_anonce
, sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4874 os_memcpy(fils_snonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4875 os_memcpy(fils_kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN
);
4876 *fils_kek_len
= sm
->PTK
.kek_len
;
4880 void wpa_auth_add_fils_pmk_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
4881 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4883 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
4884 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
4885 os_memcpy(sm
->pmkid
, pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4889 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
4892 void wpa_auth_set_auth_alg(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u16 auth_alg
)
4895 sm
->auth_alg
= auth_alg
;
4900 void wpa_auth_set_dpp_z(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const struct wpabuf
*z
)
4903 wpabuf_clear_free(sm
->dpp_z
);
4904 sm
->dpp_z
= z
? wpabuf_dup(z
) : NULL
;
4907 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
4910 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
4912 int wpa_auth_resend_m1(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int change_anonce
,
4913 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4914 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4916 const u8
*anonce
= sm
->ANonce
;
4917 u8 anonce_buf
[WPA_NONCE_LEN
];
4919 if (change_anonce
) {
4920 if (random_get_bytes(anonce_buf
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
))
4922 anonce
= anonce_buf
;
4925 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4926 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
4927 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
4928 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
4929 anonce
, NULL
, 0, 0, 0);
4934 int wpa_auth_resend_m3(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4935 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4936 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4938 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
;
4939 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4941 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4942 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
4943 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
4945 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
4947 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
4948 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
4952 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
4953 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
4954 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
4955 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
4956 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
4957 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
4958 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
4959 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
4960 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
4961 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
4962 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
4963 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
4965 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4966 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
4967 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
4968 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
4970 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
4971 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
4976 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
4982 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
4984 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
4985 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
4986 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
4987 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
4988 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
4989 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
4991 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4992 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
4993 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
4998 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
5000 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
5001 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
5002 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
5003 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
5004 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
5006 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
5007 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
5012 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
5014 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
5015 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
5020 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
5022 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
5023 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
5030 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
5033 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
5035 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
5038 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
5040 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
5041 if (pos
- opos
>= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
) {
5042 /* skip KDE header and keyid */
5043 opos
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2;
5044 os_memset(opos
, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
5046 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
5047 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
5052 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
5053 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
5055 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
5057 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
5058 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
5059 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
5060 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
5061 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
5062 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
5064 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
5066 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
,
5067 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
5068 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
5070 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
5074 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
5075 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
5081 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
5082 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
5084 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
5085 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
5088 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
5089 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
5091 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
5092 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
);
5095 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
5097 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
5098 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
5099 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
5100 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
5101 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
5102 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
5103 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
5109 int wpa_auth_resend_group_m1(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
5110 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
5111 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
5113 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
5114 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
5116 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
5117 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
5119 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
5123 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
5124 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
5126 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
5127 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake (TESTING)");
5129 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
5130 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
5131 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
5132 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
5133 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
5134 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
5137 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
5138 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
5140 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
5142 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
5144 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
5146 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
) {
5147 /* skip KDE header and keyid */
5148 opos
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2;
5149 os_memset(opos
, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
5151 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
5152 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
5156 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
5159 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
5162 sm
->eapol_status_cb
= cb
;
5163 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx1
= ctx1
;
5164 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx2
= ctx2
;
5166 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
5167 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
5168 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
5169 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
5171 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
5172 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
5179 int wpa_auth_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
5183 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
5184 return eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
5187 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */