2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
15 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
16 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "crypto/random.h"
20 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
21 #include "ap_config.h"
22 #include "ieee802_11.h"
24 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
25 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
28 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
33 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
34 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
35 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
36 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
38 struct wpa_group
*group
);
39 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
40 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
41 struct wpa_group
*group
);
42 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
43 struct wpa_group
*group
);
45 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
46 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
47 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
48 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
49 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
51 /* TODO: make these configurable */
52 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
53 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
54 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
57 static inline void wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
58 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
60 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
61 wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
65 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
66 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
69 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
70 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
74 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
75 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
77 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
79 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
83 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
84 const u8
*addr
, const u8
*prev_psk
)
86 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
88 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, prev_psk
);
92 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
93 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
95 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
97 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
101 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
103 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
104 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
106 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
108 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
113 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
114 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
116 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
118 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
123 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
124 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
126 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
128 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
133 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
134 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
137 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
139 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
143 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
144 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
147 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
149 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
153 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
154 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
156 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
158 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
162 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
163 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
169 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
172 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
173 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
178 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
181 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
187 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
190 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
192 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
193 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
194 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
198 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
201 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
202 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
204 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
205 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
206 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
208 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
213 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
215 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
217 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
218 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
221 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
222 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
223 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
226 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
227 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
228 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
233 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
235 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
236 struct wpa_group
*group
;
238 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
239 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
) {
240 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
242 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
243 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
244 } while (group
->changed
);
247 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
248 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
249 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
254 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
256 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
257 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
259 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
260 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
265 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
267 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
273 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
276 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
277 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
281 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
282 struct wpa_group
*group
)
284 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(group
)];
287 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
289 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
292 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
293 * Local MAC Address || Time)
295 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
296 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
297 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &group
, sizeof(group
));
298 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
301 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
302 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
304 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
305 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
311 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
312 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
314 struct wpa_group
*group
;
316 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
320 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
321 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
322 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
324 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
325 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
326 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
327 "the first station connects");
331 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
332 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
333 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
334 * on embedded devices.
336 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
337 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
345 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
346 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
347 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
349 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
350 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
351 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
359 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
360 * @addr: Authenticator address
361 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
362 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
363 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
365 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
366 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
367 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
369 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
371 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
372 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
374 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
375 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
376 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
378 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
379 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
384 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
385 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
386 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
391 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
393 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
394 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
395 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
400 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
401 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
402 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
403 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
404 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
405 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
409 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
411 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
412 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
413 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
416 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
417 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
418 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
425 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
427 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
429 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
431 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
432 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
433 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
439 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
440 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
442 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
444 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
446 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
447 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
449 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
450 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
451 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
452 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
454 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
456 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
457 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
458 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
459 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
461 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
463 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
475 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
476 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
477 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
479 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
480 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
482 struct wpa_group
*group
;
483 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
486 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
487 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
488 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
493 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
496 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
497 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
499 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
500 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
501 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
507 struct wpa_state_machine
*
508 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
510 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
512 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
515 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
517 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
518 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
524 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
525 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
527 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
530 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
531 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
532 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
533 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
534 "start 4-way handshake");
537 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
540 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
541 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
542 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
545 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
546 "start authentication");
550 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
551 return 1; /* should not really happen */
553 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
554 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
558 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
560 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
561 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
562 * STA has not yet been removed. */
566 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
570 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
572 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
573 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
574 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
576 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
577 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
578 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
579 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
585 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
590 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
591 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
592 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
594 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
595 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
599 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
600 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
601 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
602 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
603 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
604 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
605 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
606 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
607 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
608 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
614 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
619 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
624 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
625 const u8
*replay_counter
)
628 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
631 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
632 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
639 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
640 const u8
*replay_counter
)
643 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
645 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
646 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
647 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
648 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
653 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
654 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
655 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
656 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
658 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
659 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
661 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
662 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
663 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
664 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
668 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
669 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
670 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
672 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
673 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
674 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
678 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
679 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
680 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
681 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
682 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
686 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
687 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
688 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
689 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
690 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
691 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
692 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
693 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
694 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
700 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
703 static void wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
704 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
706 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
707 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
708 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
709 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
712 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
713 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
714 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
715 "group cipher is not TKIP");
716 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
717 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
718 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
719 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
721 wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
722 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
723 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
727 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
728 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
730 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
734 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
735 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
736 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
738 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
739 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
740 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
741 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
742 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
744 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
746 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
;
747 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
;
749 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
752 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
755 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
756 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
757 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
758 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_data_length
);
759 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
760 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
761 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
, key_data_length
);
762 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
)) {
763 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
764 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
766 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
771 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
772 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
774 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
775 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
777 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
778 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
779 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
780 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
781 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
786 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
787 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
788 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
794 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
796 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
797 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
799 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
802 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
803 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
804 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
806 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
811 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
814 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
817 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
819 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
820 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
822 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
825 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
828 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
829 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
831 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
832 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
833 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
834 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
835 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
836 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
838 "advertised support for "
839 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
844 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
845 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
846 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
848 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
855 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
856 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
857 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
858 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
859 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
860 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
866 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
867 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
870 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
871 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
872 key
->replay_counter
) &&
873 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
874 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
877 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
878 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
879 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
880 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
881 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
883 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
884 "Process SNonce update from STA "
885 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
887 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
888 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
889 key
->replay_counter
);
890 goto continue_processing
;
893 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
894 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
895 key
->replay_counter
) &&
896 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
897 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
898 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
899 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
901 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
902 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
903 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
905 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
906 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
908 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
909 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
910 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
912 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
913 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
920 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
921 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
922 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
923 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
924 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
925 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
926 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
930 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
931 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
933 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
934 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
935 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
936 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
937 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
938 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
941 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
942 "collect more entropy for random number "
944 random_mark_pool_ready();
945 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
948 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_length
,
950 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
951 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
952 "invalid Key Data contents");
956 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
957 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
959 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
960 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
962 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
963 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
964 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
965 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
966 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
967 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
968 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
969 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
970 "match with msg 2/4");
972 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
973 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
975 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
976 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
977 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
978 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
981 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
982 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
983 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
986 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
989 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
991 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
992 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
993 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
999 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1000 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1001 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1002 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1003 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1004 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1008 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1012 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1013 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1014 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1017 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1018 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1019 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1020 "invalid state - dropped");
1024 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1028 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1029 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1034 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1035 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1037 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1038 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1039 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1043 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1044 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1045 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1049 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1050 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1051 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
)) {
1052 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1053 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1056 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1057 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1058 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1061 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1062 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1063 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1064 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1065 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1067 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1068 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1074 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1075 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1076 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1078 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1079 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1080 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1081 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1083 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1084 wpa_receive_error_report(
1086 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
));
1087 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1088 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1089 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1091 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1092 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1093 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1094 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1095 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1096 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1097 wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8
*) (key
+ 1),
1098 key_data_length
, &kde
) == 0 &&
1101 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1102 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1104 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1105 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1108 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1109 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1110 key
->replay_counter
);
1112 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1114 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1115 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1116 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1117 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1118 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1120 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1121 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1123 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1124 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1128 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1129 * do not get copied again.
1131 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1134 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1135 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1136 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1139 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1141 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1142 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1143 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1145 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1146 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1148 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1149 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1150 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1151 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1152 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1157 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1158 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1160 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1164 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1165 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1166 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1167 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1168 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1171 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1172 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1173 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1174 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1176 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1179 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1180 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1181 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1182 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1185 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1191 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1193 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1194 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1196 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1197 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1198 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1203 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1204 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1205 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1206 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1207 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1209 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1210 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1213 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1215 int version
, pairwise
;
1218 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key
);
1221 version
= force_version
;
1222 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1223 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1224 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1225 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1227 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1229 pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1231 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1232 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1235 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1236 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1237 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1238 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1239 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1241 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1243 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1244 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1245 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1247 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1248 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1251 len
+= key_data_len
;
1253 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1256 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1257 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1258 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1259 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1261 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1262 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1263 key_info
|= version
;
1264 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1265 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1266 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1267 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1268 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1270 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1271 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1272 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1273 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1275 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1276 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1277 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1278 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1279 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1280 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1282 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1283 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1284 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1285 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1288 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1291 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1294 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, kde
, kde_len
);
1295 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, kde_len
);
1296 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1297 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1303 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1309 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1311 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1312 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1313 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
,
1314 (u8
*) (key
+ 1))) {
1319 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1322 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1323 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1324 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1325 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1326 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, 16);
1327 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, buf
, key_data_len
);
1328 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, (u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_len
);
1329 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1334 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1335 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1336 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1337 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1342 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, version
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1346 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1348 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1354 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1355 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1356 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1357 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1358 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1361 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1367 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1370 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1371 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1372 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1373 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1375 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1376 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1377 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1378 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1379 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1380 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1381 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1385 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1387 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1388 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1393 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1396 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1397 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1398 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1399 os_memcpy(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16);
1400 os_memset(key
->key_mic
, 0, 16);
1401 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1402 data
, data_len
, key
->key_mic
) ||
1403 os_memcmp(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16) != 0)
1405 os_memcpy(key
->key_mic
, mic
, 16);
1410 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1412 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1413 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1414 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1415 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1416 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1420 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, wpa_event event
)
1427 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1428 "event %d notification", event
);
1436 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1439 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1442 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1443 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1444 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1445 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1446 * properly at this point.
1448 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1449 "started - initialize now");
1452 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1453 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1455 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1458 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1460 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1461 * update for this STA.
1463 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1464 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1465 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1467 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1470 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1471 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1472 "after association");
1473 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1475 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1476 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1478 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1480 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1483 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1484 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1485 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1487 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1488 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1490 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1493 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1494 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1496 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1500 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1504 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1506 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1508 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1509 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1510 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1514 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1515 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1516 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1517 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1518 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1519 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1520 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1523 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1525 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1527 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1528 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1529 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1534 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1536 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1537 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1538 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1542 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1544 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1545 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1549 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1551 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1552 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1553 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1554 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1556 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1557 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1561 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1562 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1564 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1567 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1568 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1569 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1570 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1571 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1573 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1575 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1576 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1577 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1578 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1580 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1581 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1584 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
);
1585 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
1586 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
1590 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1592 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1594 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1597 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1598 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1599 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1600 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1601 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1602 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1603 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1605 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1606 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1608 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1611 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1613 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1614 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1615 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1616 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1622 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1624 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1625 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1627 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1628 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1630 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1632 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1633 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1634 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1635 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1636 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len
);
1637 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, PMK_LEN
);
1638 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1639 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1640 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1641 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1643 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1645 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
1648 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1649 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1650 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1651 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1652 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1653 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1654 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1655 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1656 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1657 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1661 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1664 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1665 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, NULL
);
1667 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1668 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1669 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1670 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1671 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1673 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1677 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1679 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1680 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1682 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1683 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1684 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1687 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1688 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1689 * immediately following this. */
1693 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1694 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1696 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1697 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1699 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1700 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1702 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1703 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1704 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1705 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1707 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1708 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1711 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1712 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1714 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, PMK_LEN
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
1715 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1716 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1719 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
1720 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
1721 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
1725 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
1726 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
1728 size_t ptk_len
= sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
? 48 : 64;
1729 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1730 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1731 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
, ptk_len
);
1732 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1734 wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, "Pairwise key expansion",
1735 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, sm
->SNonce
,
1736 (u8
*) ptk
, ptk_len
,
1737 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1743 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
1747 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
1749 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1750 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
1751 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
1753 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1754 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1757 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1758 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, pmk
);
1764 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, pmk
, &PTK
);
1766 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
1767 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
1772 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1777 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1778 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
1782 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1783 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1785 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
1786 * with the value we derived.
1788 if (os_memcmp(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
1789 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
1790 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1791 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
1793 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
1795 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1796 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
1797 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1801 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1803 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1804 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1806 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1807 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
1808 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
1810 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1813 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1815 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
1816 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
1820 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
1822 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
1827 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1829 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1831 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
1832 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde
);
1839 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1841 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
1842 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1844 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
1847 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
1849 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
1850 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, igtk
.pn
) < 0)
1851 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
1852 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
1853 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1855 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
1858 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
) < 0)
1861 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
1862 (const u8
*) &igtk
, sizeof(igtk
), NULL
, 0);
1867 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1869 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1875 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1880 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1883 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
1885 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
1886 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
1887 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1889 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
1891 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1892 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1895 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1896 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1897 * immediately following this. */
1901 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
1902 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
1904 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1905 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
1906 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
1907 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
1908 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
1909 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
1910 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
1911 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
1912 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
1913 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1914 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1916 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1917 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1918 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
1919 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
1921 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
1922 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
1923 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1925 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
1926 * of GTK in the BSS.
1928 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
1936 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
1942 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
1944 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
1945 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
1946 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
1947 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
1948 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
1949 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
1951 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1952 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
1953 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
1958 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
1960 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
1961 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1962 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1963 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
1964 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
1966 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1967 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
1972 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
1974 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1975 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1976 int res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, pos
- kde
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
1978 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
1979 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
1985 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1988 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
1990 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
1993 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
1995 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1996 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1998 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2000 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2001 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2002 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2003 NULL
, NULL
, pos
, kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2006 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2007 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2013 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2014 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2016 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2017 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2020 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2021 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2023 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2024 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2027 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2029 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2030 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2031 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2032 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2033 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2038 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2040 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2041 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2043 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2044 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2045 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2046 sm
->PTK
.tk1
, klen
)) {
2047 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2050 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2051 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2053 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2054 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2055 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2056 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2060 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2061 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2062 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2066 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2068 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2069 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2070 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2073 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2076 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2077 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2078 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2079 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2082 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2083 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2084 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2086 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2087 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2088 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2094 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2097 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2098 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2099 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2100 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2101 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2102 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2104 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2105 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2106 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2107 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2108 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2109 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2110 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2111 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2112 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2113 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2115 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2116 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2118 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2119 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2121 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2122 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2124 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2125 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2126 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2127 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2128 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2129 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2130 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2131 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2133 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2134 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2135 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2136 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2138 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2139 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2140 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2141 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2144 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2145 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, NULL
))
2146 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2148 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2149 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2150 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2151 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2154 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2155 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2156 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2157 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2158 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2159 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2160 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2161 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2162 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2163 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2164 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2165 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2166 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2168 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2169 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2170 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2171 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2172 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2173 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2174 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2175 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2177 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2178 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2180 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2181 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2182 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2183 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2184 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2185 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2186 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2187 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2188 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2189 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2190 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2192 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2193 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2194 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2195 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2197 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2203 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2205 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2207 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2208 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2209 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2211 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2215 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2217 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2218 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2219 u8
*kde
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2221 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2223 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2226 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2227 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2228 * immediately following this. */
2232 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2233 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2234 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2235 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2236 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2237 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2238 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2239 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2240 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2242 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2243 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2245 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2246 * of GTK in the BSS.
2248 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2252 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2253 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2254 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2255 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2260 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2262 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2264 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2267 pos
= kde
+ gsm
->GTK_len
;
2270 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2271 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2273 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2274 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2275 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
2280 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2282 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2283 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2284 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2285 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2286 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2287 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2288 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2289 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2290 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2291 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2296 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2298 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2299 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2300 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2301 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2302 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2306 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2308 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2309 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2310 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2311 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2312 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2313 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2314 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2315 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2317 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2318 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2319 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2320 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2321 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2322 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2323 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2324 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2325 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2327 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2328 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2330 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2331 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2337 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2338 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2342 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2343 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2344 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2345 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2346 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2348 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2349 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2351 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2352 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2353 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2354 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2355 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2356 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2357 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2360 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2361 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2363 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2369 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2370 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2372 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2373 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2374 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2375 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2378 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2381 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2384 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2385 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2386 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2390 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2392 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
2395 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2396 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2397 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2398 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2401 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2403 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2404 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2405 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2407 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2408 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2409 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2412 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211V
2413 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in wnmsleep */
2414 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2416 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211V */
2418 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2419 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2426 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211V
2427 /* update GTK when exiting wnmsleep mode */
2428 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2430 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2433 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2437 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2439 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2443 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2446 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2447 size_t subelem_len
, pad_len
;
2452 /* GTK subslement */
2453 key_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2454 if (key_len
> sizeof(keybuf
))
2458 * Pad key for AES Key Wrap if it is not multiple of 8 bytes or is less
2461 pad_len
= key_len
% 8;
2463 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
2464 if (key_len
+ pad_len
< 16)
2467 os_memcpy(keybuf
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], key_len
);
2468 os_memset(keybuf
+ key_len
, 0, pad_len
);
2469 keybuf
[key_len
] = 0xdd;
2473 key
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2476 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2477 * Key[5..32] | 8 padding.
2479 subelem_len
= 13 + key_len
+ 8;
2480 subelem
= os_zalloc(subelem_len
);
2481 if (subelem
== NULL
)
2484 subelem
[0] = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2485 subelem
[1] = 11 + key_len
+ 8;
2486 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2487 WPA_PUT_LE16(&subelem
[2], gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2488 subelem
[4] = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2489 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, subelem
+ 5) != 0)
2494 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, key_len
/ 8, key
, subelem
+ 13)) {
2499 os_memcpy(pos
, subelem
, subelem_len
);
2501 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext GTK",
2502 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2509 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2510 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2513 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2517 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] |
2518 * Key[16] | 8 padding */
2519 subelem_len
= 1 + 1 + 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN
+ 8;
2520 subelem
= os_zalloc(subelem_len
);
2521 if (subelem
== NULL
)
2525 *ptr
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2526 *ptr
++ = subelem_len
- 2;
2527 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2529 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, ptr
) != 0) {
2534 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
/ 8,
2535 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], ptr
)) {
2540 os_memcpy(pos
, subelem
, subelem_len
);
2542 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext IGTK",
2543 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2548 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2549 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211V */
2552 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2553 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2557 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2558 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2559 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2560 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2561 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2563 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2565 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2566 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2567 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2568 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2569 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2570 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2571 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2572 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2573 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2575 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2576 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2577 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2578 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2579 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2581 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
2582 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2583 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2587 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2588 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2592 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2593 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2594 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2595 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2598 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2599 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
&&
2600 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, WPA_ALG_IGTK
,
2601 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2602 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2605 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2611 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2612 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2614 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2615 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2616 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2617 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2619 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0)
2626 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2627 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2630 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2631 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2632 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2633 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2634 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2636 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2637 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2638 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2639 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2640 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2641 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2646 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2651 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2652 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2653 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2654 * recursive call. */
2655 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2659 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2661 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2664 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2665 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2667 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2668 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2670 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2671 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2673 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
2674 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
2675 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
2677 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
2678 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2679 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
2680 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
2687 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
2689 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
2694 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2698 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
2702 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2705 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2707 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2710 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
2712 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
2714 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2716 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2717 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2718 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2719 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2720 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2721 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2722 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2727 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2729 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2733 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2734 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2735 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2737 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2740 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
2741 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2742 const int preauth
= 1;
2743 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2744 const int preauth
= 0;
2745 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2747 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2750 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2751 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
2752 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
2753 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
2754 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
2755 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
2756 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
2757 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
2758 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2762 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
2763 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
2766 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2767 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
2768 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
2769 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
2770 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
2771 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
2772 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
2773 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
2774 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
2775 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
2776 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
2777 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
2778 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
2779 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
2780 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
2781 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2782 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2783 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2784 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
2785 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2786 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2787 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2788 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
2789 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
2790 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
2792 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
2793 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
2794 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
2795 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
2796 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
2797 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
2798 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
2799 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
2800 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
2801 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
2803 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
2804 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
2805 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
2806 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
2807 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
2808 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2812 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
2813 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
2816 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
2817 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
2818 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2826 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2834 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
2836 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
2838 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
2839 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
2845 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2846 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
2847 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
2848 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
2849 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2850 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
2851 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
2852 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
2853 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
2854 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
2855 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
2857 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
2858 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
2859 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
2860 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2865 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2866 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
2867 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
2869 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
2870 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2878 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2881 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
2885 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2887 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
2891 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2893 return sm
->pairwise
;
2897 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2901 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
2905 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2913 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2914 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
2916 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
2923 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
2924 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2926 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
2930 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2933 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
2937 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
2939 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2941 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2942 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2946 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2947 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
2949 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
2950 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
2953 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
,
2954 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
2955 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2962 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2963 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
2964 int session_timeout
,
2965 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
2967 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2970 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, wpa_auth
->addr
,
2971 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
2972 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
2979 static struct wpa_group
*
2980 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
2982 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2984 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
2987 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
2989 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
2993 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
2994 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3000 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3002 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3004 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3007 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3009 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3011 group
= group
->next
;
3014 if (group
== NULL
) {
3015 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3020 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3023 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3024 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3031 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3032 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3034 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3036 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3037 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3038 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3040 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3041 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3042 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3043 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3044 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3045 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3046 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3047 * the station has received the frame.
3049 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3050 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3051 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3053 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3054 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3055 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3056 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);