2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
17 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
20 #include "crypto/random.h"
21 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
22 #include "ap_config.h"
23 #include "ieee802_11.h"
25 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
27 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
34 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
35 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
36 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
38 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
39 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
40 struct wpa_group
*group
);
41 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
42 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
43 struct wpa_group
*group
);
44 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
45 struct wpa_group
*group
);
46 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
47 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
49 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
50 struct wpa_group
*group
);
51 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
52 struct wpa_group
*group
);
53 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
54 struct wpa_group
*group
);
56 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
57 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
58 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
59 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
60 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
62 /* TODO: make these configurable */
63 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
64 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
65 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
68 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
69 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
71 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
72 return wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
77 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
78 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
80 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.psk_failure_report
)
81 wpa_auth
->cb
.psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
85 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
86 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
89 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
90 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
94 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
95 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
97 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
99 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
103 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
105 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
108 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
110 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
115 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
116 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
118 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
120 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
124 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
126 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
127 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
129 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
131 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
136 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
137 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
139 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
141 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
146 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
147 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
149 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
151 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
157 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
160 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe
== NULL
)
162 return wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
164 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
167 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
168 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
171 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
173 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
177 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
178 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
181 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
183 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
187 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
188 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
190 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
192 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
196 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
197 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
203 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
206 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
207 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
212 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
215 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
221 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
224 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
226 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
227 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
228 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
232 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
235 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
236 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
238 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
239 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
240 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
242 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
243 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
249 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
251 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
253 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
254 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
257 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
258 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
259 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
262 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
263 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
264 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
269 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
271 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
272 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
274 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
275 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
277 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
279 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
281 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
282 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
283 } while (group
->changed
);
286 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
290 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
291 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
292 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
297 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
299 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
300 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
302 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
303 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
308 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
310 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
316 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
319 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
320 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
324 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
325 struct wpa_group
*group
)
327 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
331 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
333 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
336 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
337 * Local MAC Address || Time)
339 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
340 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
341 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
342 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
343 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
346 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
347 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
349 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
350 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
356 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
357 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
359 struct wpa_group
*group
;
361 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
365 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
366 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
367 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
369 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
370 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
371 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
372 "the first station connects");
376 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
377 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
378 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
379 * on embedded devices.
381 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
382 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
390 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
391 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
392 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
394 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
395 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
396 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
404 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
405 * @addr: Authenticator address
406 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
407 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
408 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
410 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
411 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
412 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
414 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
416 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
417 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
419 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
420 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
421 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
423 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
424 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
429 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
430 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
431 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
436 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
438 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
439 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
440 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
441 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
446 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
447 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
448 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
449 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
450 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
451 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
452 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
456 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
458 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
459 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
460 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
463 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
464 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
465 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
469 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
470 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
471 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
475 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
477 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
483 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
485 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
487 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
489 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
490 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
491 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
492 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
499 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
500 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
502 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
504 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
506 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
507 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
509 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
510 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
511 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
512 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
514 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
516 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
517 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
518 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
519 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
522 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
523 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
526 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
528 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
540 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
541 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
542 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
544 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
545 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
547 struct wpa_group
*group
;
548 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
551 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
552 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
553 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
558 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
561 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
562 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
564 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
565 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
566 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
572 struct wpa_state_machine
*
573 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
574 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
576 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
578 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
581 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
584 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
586 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
588 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
589 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
590 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
596 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
597 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
599 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
602 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
603 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
604 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
605 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
606 "start 4-way handshake");
607 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
608 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
611 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
614 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
615 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
616 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
619 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
620 "start authentication");
624 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
625 return 1; /* should not really happen */
627 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
628 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
632 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
634 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
635 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
636 * STA has not yet been removed. */
640 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
644 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
647 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
649 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
650 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
651 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
652 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
654 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
655 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
656 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
658 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
659 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
660 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
661 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
663 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
664 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
665 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
666 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
667 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
669 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
674 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
679 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
680 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
681 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
683 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
684 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
688 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
689 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
690 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
691 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
692 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
693 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
694 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
695 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
696 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
697 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
703 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
708 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
713 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
714 const u8
*replay_counter
)
717 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
720 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
721 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
728 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
729 const u8
*replay_counter
)
732 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
734 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
735 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
736 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
737 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
742 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
743 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
744 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
745 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
747 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
748 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
750 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
751 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
752 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
753 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
757 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
758 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
759 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
761 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
762 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
763 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
767 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
768 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
769 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
770 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
771 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
775 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
776 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
777 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
778 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
779 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
780 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
781 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
782 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
783 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
789 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
792 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
793 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
795 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
796 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
797 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
798 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
801 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
802 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
803 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
804 "group cipher is not TKIP");
805 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
806 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
807 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
808 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
810 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
811 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
812 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
813 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
817 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
818 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
820 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
825 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
830 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
831 unsigned int pmk_len
;
834 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
835 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
836 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
842 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
845 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
847 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
853 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
858 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
859 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
863 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
864 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
865 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
866 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
867 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
868 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
874 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
875 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
876 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
878 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
879 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
880 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
881 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
882 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
884 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
886 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
;
887 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
, keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
890 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
893 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
894 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
896 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
)
899 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
900 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
901 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
902 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
903 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
904 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
905 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
906 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
907 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
, key_data_length
);
908 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
909 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
910 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
912 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
917 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
918 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
920 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
921 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
923 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
924 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
925 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
926 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
927 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
932 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
933 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
934 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
940 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
942 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
943 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
945 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
948 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
949 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
950 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
952 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
957 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
960 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
963 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
965 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
966 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
968 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
971 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
974 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
975 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
977 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
978 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
979 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
980 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
981 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
982 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
983 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
984 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
986 "advertised support for "
987 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
992 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
993 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
994 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
996 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1002 if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1003 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1004 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1005 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1010 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1011 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1012 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1013 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1014 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1015 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1016 "replayed counter");
1021 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1022 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1025 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1026 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1027 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1028 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1029 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1032 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1033 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1034 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1035 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1036 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1038 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1039 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1040 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1042 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1043 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1044 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1045 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1046 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1047 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1048 goto continue_processing
;
1051 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1052 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1053 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1054 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1056 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1057 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1058 * different SNonce values.
1060 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1061 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1062 goto continue_processing
;
1065 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1066 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1067 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1068 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1069 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1070 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1071 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1073 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1074 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1075 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1077 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1078 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1080 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1081 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1082 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1084 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1085 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1089 continue_processing
:
1092 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1093 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1094 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1095 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1096 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1097 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1098 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1102 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1103 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1105 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1106 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1107 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1108 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1109 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1110 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1113 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1114 "collect more entropy for random number "
1116 random_mark_pool_ready();
1117 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1120 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
1121 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1122 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
1123 "invalid Key Data contents");
1127 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
1128 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
1129 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
1130 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
1131 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
1133 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
1134 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
1136 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1137 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1138 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
1139 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
1140 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
1141 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
1142 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1143 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
1144 "match with msg 2/4");
1146 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
1147 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
1149 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
1150 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
1151 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
1152 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1155 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1156 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
1157 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1160 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1162 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
1163 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
1165 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: IP address requested in "
1166 "EAPOL-Key exchange");
1167 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
1169 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.
1171 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
1172 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
1173 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Assigned IP "
1174 "address %u.%u.%u.%u to " MACSTR
,
1175 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
1176 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
1180 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
1183 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1185 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1186 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1187 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1193 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1194 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1195 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1196 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1197 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1198 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1202 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1206 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1207 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1208 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1211 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1212 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1213 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1214 "invalid state - dropped");
1218 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1222 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1223 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1228 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1229 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1231 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1232 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1233 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1237 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1238 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1239 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1243 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1244 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1245 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1247 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1248 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1249 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1250 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1253 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1254 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1255 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1258 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1259 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1260 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1261 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1262 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1264 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1265 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1271 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1272 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1273 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1275 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1276 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1277 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1278 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1280 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1281 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1283 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1284 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1285 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1286 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1287 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1289 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1290 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1291 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1292 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1294 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1295 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1296 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1300 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1301 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1303 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1304 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1307 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1308 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1309 key
->replay_counter
);
1311 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1313 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1314 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1315 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1316 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1317 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1319 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1320 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1322 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1323 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1327 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1328 * do not get copied again.
1330 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1333 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1334 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1335 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1338 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1340 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1341 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1342 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1344 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1345 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1347 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1348 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1349 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1350 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1351 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1356 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1357 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1359 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1363 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1364 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1365 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1366 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1367 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1370 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1371 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1372 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1373 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1375 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1378 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1379 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1380 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1381 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1384 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1390 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1392 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1393 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1395 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1396 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1397 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1402 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1403 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1404 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1405 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1406 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1408 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1409 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1410 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1412 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1414 int version
, pairwise
;
1416 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1418 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1419 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1421 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1424 version
= force_version
;
1425 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1426 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1427 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1428 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1429 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1430 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1431 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1433 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1435 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1437 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1438 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1441 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1442 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1443 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1444 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1445 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1447 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1449 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1450 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1451 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1452 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1453 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1455 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1456 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1459 len
+= key_data_len
;
1461 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1464 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1465 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1466 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1467 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1468 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1469 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1471 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1472 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1473 key_info
|= version
;
1474 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1475 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1476 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1477 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1478 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1480 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1481 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1482 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1483 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1485 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1486 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1487 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1488 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1489 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1490 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1492 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1493 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1494 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1495 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1496 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1497 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1500 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1503 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1506 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1507 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1508 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1509 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1515 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1521 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1523 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1524 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1525 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1526 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1527 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1528 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1533 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1534 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1535 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1537 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1538 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1539 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1540 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1541 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1542 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1543 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1544 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1545 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1554 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1555 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1556 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1557 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1563 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1564 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1565 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1566 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1568 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1570 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1571 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1572 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1575 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1578 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1580 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1586 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1587 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1588 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1589 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1590 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1593 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1599 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1602 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1603 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1604 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1605 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1607 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1608 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1609 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1610 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1611 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1612 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1613 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1617 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1620 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1621 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1624 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1625 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1627 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1630 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1631 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1632 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1633 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1634 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1635 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1636 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1637 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1638 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1639 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1641 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1646 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1648 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1649 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1650 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1651 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1652 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1656 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1663 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1664 "event %d notification", event
);
1669 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1670 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1675 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1680 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1683 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1686 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1687 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1688 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1689 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1690 * properly at this point.
1692 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1693 "started - initialize now");
1696 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1697 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1699 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1702 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1704 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1705 * update for this STA.
1707 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1708 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1709 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1711 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1714 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1715 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1716 "after association");
1717 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1719 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1720 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1722 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1724 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1727 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1728 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1729 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1731 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1732 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1734 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1737 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1738 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1740 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1744 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1746 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1747 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1752 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1756 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1758 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1760 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1761 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1762 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1766 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1767 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1768 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1769 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1770 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1771 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1772 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1775 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1777 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1779 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1780 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1781 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1786 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1788 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1789 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1790 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1794 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1796 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1797 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1801 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1803 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1804 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1805 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1806 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1808 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1809 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1813 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1814 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1816 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1819 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1820 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1821 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1822 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1823 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1825 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1827 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1828 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1829 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1830 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1832 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1833 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1836 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1837 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1838 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1839 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1840 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1841 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1846 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1848 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1850 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1851 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1854 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1855 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1856 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1857 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1858 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1859 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1860 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1862 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1863 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1865 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1868 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1870 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1871 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1872 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1878 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1880 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1881 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1883 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1884 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1886 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1888 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1889 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1890 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1891 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1892 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1894 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
)
1895 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1898 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1899 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1901 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1902 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1903 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1904 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1905 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1908 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1909 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1910 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1911 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1912 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1913 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1915 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1917 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1918 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
);
1919 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1922 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1924 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1925 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1926 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1927 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1928 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1929 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1930 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1931 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1932 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1933 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1937 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1940 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1941 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1943 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1944 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1945 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1946 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1947 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1948 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1950 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1954 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1956 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1957 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1959 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1960 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1961 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1962 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
1965 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1966 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1967 * immediately following this. */
1971 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1972 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1974 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1975 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1977 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1978 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1979 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
1981 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1982 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1983 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1984 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1986 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1987 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1988 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1989 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
1993 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1994 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1996 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
1997 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1998 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2001 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2002 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2003 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2007 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2008 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2009 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2011 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2012 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2013 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2014 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2016 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2017 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2018 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2022 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2025 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2026 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2027 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2029 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2030 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2031 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2033 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2034 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2037 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2038 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2039 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2046 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2049 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
2051 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2052 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2053 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2058 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2063 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2064 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2066 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2070 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2071 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2073 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2074 * with the value we derived.
2076 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2077 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2078 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2079 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2081 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2083 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2084 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2085 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2089 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2091 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2092 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2094 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2095 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2096 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2098 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2099 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2102 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2104 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2105 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2109 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2111 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2116 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2118 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2120 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2122 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2123 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2130 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2132 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2133 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2134 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2135 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2137 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2140 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2142 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2143 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2144 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2146 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2147 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2148 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2150 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2153 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2156 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2157 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2163 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2165 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2171 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2176 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2179 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2181 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2182 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2183 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2185 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2187 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2188 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2191 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2192 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2193 * immediately following this. */
2197 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2198 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2200 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2201 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2202 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2203 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2204 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2205 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2206 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2207 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2208 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2209 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2210 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2211 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2212 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2214 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2215 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2216 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2217 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2219 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2220 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2221 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2223 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2224 * of GTK in the BSS.
2226 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2234 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2240 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2242 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2243 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2244 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2245 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2246 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2247 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2249 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2250 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2251 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2256 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2258 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2259 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2260 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2261 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2262 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2264 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2266 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2267 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2268 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2269 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2274 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2276 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2277 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2282 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2284 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2285 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2292 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2295 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2297 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2300 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2302 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2303 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2305 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2307 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2308 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2309 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2310 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2311 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2312 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2314 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2315 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2317 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2321 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2322 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2328 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2329 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2331 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2332 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2335 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2336 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2338 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2339 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2342 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2344 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2346 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2347 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2348 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2349 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2350 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2352 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2354 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2355 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2356 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2357 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2358 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2363 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2365 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2366 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2368 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2369 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2370 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2371 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2372 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2375 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2376 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2378 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2379 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2380 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2381 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2385 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2386 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2387 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2391 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2393 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2394 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2395 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2398 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2401 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2402 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2403 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2404 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2407 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2408 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2409 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2411 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2412 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2413 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2419 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2422 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2423 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2424 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2425 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2426 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2427 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2429 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2430 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2431 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2432 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2433 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2434 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2435 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2436 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2437 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2438 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2440 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2441 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2443 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2444 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2446 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2447 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2449 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2450 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2451 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2452 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2453 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2454 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2455 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2456 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2458 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2459 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2460 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2461 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2463 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2464 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2465 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2466 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2469 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2470 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2472 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2474 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2475 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2476 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2477 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2480 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2481 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2482 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2483 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2484 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2485 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2486 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2487 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2488 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2489 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2490 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2491 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2492 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2494 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2495 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2496 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2497 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2498 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2499 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2500 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2501 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2503 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2504 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2506 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2507 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2508 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2509 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2510 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2511 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2512 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2513 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2514 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2515 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2516 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2518 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2519 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2520 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2521 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2523 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2529 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2531 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2533 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2534 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2535 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2537 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2541 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2543 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2544 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2546 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2548 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2550 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2553 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2554 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2555 * immediately following this. */
2559 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2560 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2561 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2562 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2563 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2564 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2565 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2566 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2567 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2569 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2570 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2572 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2573 * of GTK in the BSS.
2575 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2579 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2580 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2581 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2582 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2583 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
2586 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
2587 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2589 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2591 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2592 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
2595 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2598 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2599 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2601 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2602 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2608 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2610 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2611 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2612 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2613 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2614 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2615 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2616 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2617 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2618 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2619 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2624 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2626 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2627 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2628 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2629 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2630 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2634 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2636 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2637 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2638 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2639 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2640 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2641 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2642 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2643 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2645 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2646 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2647 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2648 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2649 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2650 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2651 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2652 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2653 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2655 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2656 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2658 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2659 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2665 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2666 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2670 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2671 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2672 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2673 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2674 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2676 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2677 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2679 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2680 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2682 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2683 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2684 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2685 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2686 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2687 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
2689 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2690 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2692 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2698 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2699 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2701 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2702 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2703 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2704 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2707 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2710 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2713 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2714 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2715 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2719 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2721 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
2724 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2725 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2726 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2727 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2730 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2732 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2733 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2734 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2736 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2737 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2738 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2741 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2742 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2745 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2746 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2754 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2755 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2757 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2760 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2764 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2767 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2771 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2773 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2778 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2781 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2782 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
2783 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2784 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2786 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2787 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
2790 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2791 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2793 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2795 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2796 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2802 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2803 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2805 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2807 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2811 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
2813 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2814 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
2815 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2817 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
2821 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2824 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2826 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2827 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2831 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2832 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2835 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2836 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2840 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2841 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2842 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2843 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2844 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2846 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2848 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2849 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2850 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2851 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2852 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2853 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2854 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2855 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2856 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2858 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2859 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2860 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2861 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2862 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2864 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
2865 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2866 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2870 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2871 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2875 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2876 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2877 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2878 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2881 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2882 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2886 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2887 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2890 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
2891 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2892 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
2895 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2901 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2903 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
2904 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
2905 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
2907 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2914 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2915 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2917 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
2918 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2919 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
2920 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
2924 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2925 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2928 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2929 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2930 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2932 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
2933 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
2941 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2942 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2945 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2946 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
2947 /* Do not allow group operations */
2948 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2949 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2950 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2951 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2953 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2954 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2955 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2956 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2957 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2958 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2963 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2968 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2969 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2970 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2971 * recursive call. */
2972 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2976 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2978 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2981 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2982 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2984 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2985 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2987 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2988 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2990 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
2991 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
2992 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
2994 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
2995 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2996 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
2997 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3004 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3006 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3011 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3015 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3019 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3022 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3024 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3027 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3029 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3031 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3033 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3034 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3035 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3036 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3037 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3038 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3039 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3044 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3046 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3050 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3051 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3052 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3054 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3057 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3058 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3059 const int preauth
= 1;
3060 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3061 const int preauth
= 0;
3062 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3064 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3067 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3068 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3069 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3070 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3071 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3072 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3073 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3074 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3075 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3079 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3080 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3083 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3084 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3085 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3086 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3087 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3088 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3089 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3090 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3091 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3092 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3093 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3094 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3095 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3096 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3097 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3098 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3099 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3100 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3101 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3102 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3103 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3104 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3105 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3106 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3107 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3109 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3110 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
3111 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
3112 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3113 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3114 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3115 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3116 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3117 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3118 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3120 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3121 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3122 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3123 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3124 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3125 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3129 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3130 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3133 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3134 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3135 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3143 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3151 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3153 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3155 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3156 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3162 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3163 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3164 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3165 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3166 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3167 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3168 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3169 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3170 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3171 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3172 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3174 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3175 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3176 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3177 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3182 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3183 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3184 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3186 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3187 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3195 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3198 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3202 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3204 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3208 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3210 return sm
->pairwise
;
3214 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3218 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3222 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3230 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3231 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3233 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3240 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3241 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3243 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3247 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3250 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3254 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3256 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3258 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3259 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3263 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3264 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3265 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3267 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3268 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3271 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
) {
3272 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3273 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3274 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3278 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3279 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3280 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3281 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3288 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3289 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3290 int session_timeout
,
3291 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3293 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3296 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3299 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3300 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3307 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3308 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
3310 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3313 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
3315 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3323 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3326 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3328 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3330 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3332 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3333 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3334 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3339 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
3342 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3344 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
3348 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3350 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3351 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
3355 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3356 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
)
3358 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3360 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3364 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
3365 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3366 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3373 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3374 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3375 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3380 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3381 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3384 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3385 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3387 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3389 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3393 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
3394 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3395 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
3405 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3406 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3407 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3409 /* Skip the special first group */
3410 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3413 group
->references
++;
3417 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3418 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3419 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3421 /* Skip the special first group */
3422 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3425 group
->references
--;
3426 if (group
->references
)
3428 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
3433 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
3434 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
3436 static struct wpa_group
*
3437 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3439 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3441 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
3444 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3446 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
3450 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
3451 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3458 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
3459 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
3460 * even if a negative value is returned.
3461 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
3463 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3465 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3467 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3470 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3472 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3474 group
= group
->next
;
3477 if (group
== NULL
) {
3478 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3483 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3484 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
3487 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
3488 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
3490 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3498 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
3499 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
3500 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
3503 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3505 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3508 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3511 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3513 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3515 group
= group
->next
;
3521 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3522 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
3525 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
3526 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
3527 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
3531 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
3533 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3536 if (group
->references
> 1) {
3537 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3538 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
3543 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
3549 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3551 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3553 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3556 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3558 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3560 group
= group
->next
;
3563 if (group
== NULL
) {
3564 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3569 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3572 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3575 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3576 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3578 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
3579 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3586 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3587 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3589 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3591 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3592 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3593 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3595 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3596 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3597 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3598 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3599 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3600 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3601 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3602 * the station has received the frame.
3604 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3605 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3606 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3608 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3609 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3610 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3611 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3616 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3620 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3624 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3628 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
3633 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
3635 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
3637 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3640 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3643 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3644 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
3646 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
3650 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3652 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3656 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
3657 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);