2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
19 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
20 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
22 #include "crypto/random.h"
23 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
24 #include "ap_config.h"
25 #include "ieee802_11.h"
27 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
28 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
29 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
32 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
33 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
36 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
38 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
41 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
42 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
43 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
44 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
45 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
46 struct wpa_group
*group
);
47 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
48 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
49 struct wpa_group
*group
);
50 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
53 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
55 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
56 struct wpa_group
*group
);
57 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
58 struct wpa_group
*group
);
59 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
60 struct wpa_group
*group
);
61 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
63 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
64 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
65 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
67 /* TODO: make these configurable */
68 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
69 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
70 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
73 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
74 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
76 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
77 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
82 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
83 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
85 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
86 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
90 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
91 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
94 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
95 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
99 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
100 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
102 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
104 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
108 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
110 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
113 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
115 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
120 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
121 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
123 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
125 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
129 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
131 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
132 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
134 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
136 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
141 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
142 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
144 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
146 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
151 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
152 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
154 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
156 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
162 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
165 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
167 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
169 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
172 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
173 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
176 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
178 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
182 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
183 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
186 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
188 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
192 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
193 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
195 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
197 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
201 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
202 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
208 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
211 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
212 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
217 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
220 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
226 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
229 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
231 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
232 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
,
233 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
237 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
240 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
241 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
243 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
244 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
245 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
247 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
248 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
254 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
256 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
258 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
259 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
262 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
263 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
264 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
267 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
268 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
269 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
274 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
276 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
277 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
279 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
280 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
282 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
284 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
286 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
287 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
288 } while (group
->changed
);
291 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
295 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
296 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
297 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
302 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
304 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
305 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
307 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
308 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
313 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
315 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
321 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
324 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
325 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
329 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
330 struct wpa_group
*group
)
332 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
336 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
338 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
341 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
342 * Local MAC Address || Time)
344 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
345 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
346 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
347 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
348 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
351 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
352 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
354 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
355 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
361 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
362 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
364 struct wpa_group
*group
;
366 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
370 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
371 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
372 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
374 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
375 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
376 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
377 "the first station connects");
381 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
382 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
383 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
384 * on embedded devices.
386 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
387 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
395 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
396 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
397 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
399 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
400 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
401 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
409 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
410 * @addr: Authenticator address
411 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
412 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
413 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
415 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
416 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
417 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
420 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
422 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
423 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
425 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
426 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
428 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
430 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
431 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
436 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
437 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
438 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
443 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
445 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
446 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
447 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
448 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
453 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
454 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
455 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
456 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
457 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
458 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
459 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
463 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
465 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
466 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
467 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
470 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
471 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
472 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
476 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
477 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
478 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
482 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
484 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
490 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
492 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
494 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
496 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
497 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
498 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
499 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
506 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
507 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
509 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
511 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
513 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
514 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
516 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
518 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
519 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
520 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
521 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
524 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
525 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
528 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
530 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
542 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
543 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
544 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
546 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
547 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
549 struct wpa_group
*group
;
550 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
553 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
554 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
555 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
560 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
563 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
564 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
566 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
567 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
568 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
574 struct wpa_state_machine
*
575 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
576 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
578 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
580 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
583 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
586 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
588 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
590 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
591 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
592 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
598 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
599 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
601 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
604 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
605 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
606 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
607 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
608 "start 4-way handshake");
609 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
610 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
614 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
617 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
618 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
619 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
620 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
621 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
625 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
628 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
629 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
630 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
633 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
634 "start authentication");
638 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
639 return 1; /* should not really happen */
641 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
642 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
646 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
648 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
649 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
650 * STA has not yet been removed. */
654 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
658 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
661 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
663 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
664 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
665 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
666 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
668 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
669 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
670 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
672 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
673 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
674 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
675 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
677 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
678 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
679 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
680 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
681 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
683 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
688 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
693 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
694 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
695 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
697 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
698 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
702 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
703 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
704 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
705 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
706 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
707 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
708 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
709 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
710 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
711 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
717 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
722 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
727 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
728 const u8
*replay_counter
)
731 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
734 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
735 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
742 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
743 const u8
*replay_counter
)
746 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
748 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
749 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
750 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
751 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
756 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
757 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
758 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
759 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
761 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
762 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
764 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
765 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
766 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
767 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
771 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
772 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
773 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
775 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
776 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
777 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
781 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
782 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
783 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
784 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
785 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
789 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
790 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
791 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
792 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
793 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
794 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
795 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
796 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
797 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
803 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
806 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
807 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
809 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
810 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
811 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
812 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
815 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
816 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
817 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
818 "group cipher is not TKIP");
819 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
820 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
821 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
822 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
824 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
825 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
826 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
827 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
831 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
832 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
834 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
839 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
844 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
845 unsigned int pmk_len
;
847 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
849 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
850 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
851 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
857 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
860 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
863 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
869 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
874 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
875 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
879 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
880 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
881 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
882 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
883 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
884 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
890 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
891 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
892 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
894 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
895 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
896 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
897 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
898 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
900 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
902 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
905 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
907 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
909 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
910 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
912 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
913 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
917 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
918 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
919 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
920 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
921 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
922 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
923 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
924 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
925 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
926 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
927 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
928 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
930 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
932 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
933 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
934 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
936 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
941 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
942 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
944 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
945 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
947 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
948 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
949 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
950 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
951 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
956 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
957 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
958 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
964 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
966 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
967 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
969 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
972 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
973 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
974 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
976 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
981 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
984 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
987 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
989 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
990 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
991 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
992 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
994 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
997 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1000 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
1001 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1003 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1004 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1005 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1006 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1007 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
1008 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1009 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1010 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1011 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1013 "advertised support for "
1014 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1019 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1020 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1021 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1022 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1024 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1030 if ((wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1031 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) &&
1032 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1033 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1034 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1039 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1040 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1041 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1042 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1043 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1044 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1045 "replayed counter");
1050 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1051 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1054 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1055 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1056 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1057 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1058 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1061 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1062 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1063 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1064 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1065 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1067 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1068 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1069 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1071 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1072 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1073 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1074 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1075 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1076 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1077 goto continue_processing
;
1080 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1081 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1082 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1083 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1085 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1086 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1087 * different SNonce values.
1089 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1090 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1091 goto continue_processing
;
1094 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1095 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1096 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1097 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1098 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1099 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1100 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1102 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1103 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1104 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1106 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1107 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1109 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1110 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1111 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1113 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1114 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1118 continue_processing
:
1120 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1121 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1122 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1123 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1126 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1130 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1131 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1132 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1133 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1134 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1135 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1136 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1140 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1141 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1143 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1144 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1145 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1146 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1147 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1148 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1151 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1152 "collect more entropy for random number "
1154 random_mark_pool_ready();
1155 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1160 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1162 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1163 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1164 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1170 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1171 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1172 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1173 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1174 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1175 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1179 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1183 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1184 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1185 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1188 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1189 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1190 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1191 "invalid state - dropped");
1195 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1199 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1200 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1205 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1206 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1208 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1209 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1210 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1214 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1215 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1216 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1217 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1222 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1223 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1224 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1225 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1228 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1230 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1231 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1233 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1235 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1236 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1237 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1238 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1243 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1244 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1245 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1246 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1249 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1250 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1251 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1252 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1255 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1256 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1257 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1258 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1259 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1261 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1262 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1268 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1269 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1270 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1272 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1273 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1274 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1275 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1277 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1278 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1280 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1281 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1282 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1283 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1284 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1286 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1287 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1288 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1289 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1291 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1292 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1293 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1297 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1298 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1300 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1301 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1304 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1305 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1306 key
->replay_counter
);
1308 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1310 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1311 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1312 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1313 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1314 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1316 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1317 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1319 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1320 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1324 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1325 * do not get copied again.
1327 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1330 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1331 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1332 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1335 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1337 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1338 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1339 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1341 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1342 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1344 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1345 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1346 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1347 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1348 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1353 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1354 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1356 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1360 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1361 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1362 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1363 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1364 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1367 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1368 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1369 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1370 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1372 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1375 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1376 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1377 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1378 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1381 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1387 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1389 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1390 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1392 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1393 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1394 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1399 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1400 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1401 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1402 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1403 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1405 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1406 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1407 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1409 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1411 int version
, pairwise
;
1413 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1415 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1416 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1418 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1421 version
= force_version
;
1422 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1423 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1424 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1425 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1426 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1427 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1428 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1429 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1431 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1433 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1435 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1436 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1439 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1440 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1441 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1442 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1443 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1445 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1447 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1448 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1449 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1450 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1451 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1453 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1454 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1457 len
+= key_data_len
;
1458 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1459 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1461 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1464 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1465 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1466 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1467 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1468 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1469 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1471 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1472 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1473 key_info
|= version
;
1474 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1475 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1476 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1477 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1478 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1480 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1481 if ((key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) ||
1482 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& !pairwise
))
1483 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1485 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1487 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1488 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1489 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1490 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1491 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1492 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1494 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1495 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1496 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1497 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1498 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1499 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1502 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1505 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1508 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1509 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1511 } else if (!mic_len
) {
1515 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1516 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1519 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1520 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1521 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1522 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1523 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1524 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1525 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1526 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1527 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1531 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1532 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1533 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1534 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1535 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1541 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1547 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1549 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1550 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1551 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1552 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1553 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1554 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1559 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1560 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1561 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1563 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1564 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1565 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1566 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1567 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1568 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1569 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1570 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1571 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1580 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1581 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1582 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1583 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1589 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1590 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1591 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1592 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1594 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1596 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1597 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1598 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1601 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1604 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1606 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1612 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1613 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1614 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1615 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1616 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1619 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1625 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1628 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1629 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1630 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1631 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1633 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1634 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1635 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1636 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1637 "counter %u)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1638 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1639 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1643 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1646 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1647 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1650 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1651 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1653 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1656 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1657 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1658 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1659 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1660 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1661 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1662 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1663 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1664 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1665 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1667 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1672 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1674 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1675 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1676 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1678 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1679 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1680 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1681 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1685 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1692 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1693 "event %d notification", event
);
1698 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1699 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1704 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1709 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1712 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1715 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1716 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1717 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1718 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1719 * properly at this point.
1721 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1722 "started - initialize now");
1725 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1726 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1728 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1731 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1733 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1734 * update for this STA.
1736 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1737 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1738 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1740 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1743 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1744 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1745 "after association");
1746 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1748 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1749 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1751 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1753 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1756 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1757 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1758 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1760 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1761 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1763 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1765 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1766 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1768 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1771 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1772 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1774 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1778 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1780 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1781 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1786 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1790 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1792 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1794 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1795 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1796 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1800 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1801 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1802 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1803 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1804 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1805 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1806 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1809 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1811 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1813 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1814 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1815 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1820 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1822 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1823 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1824 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1828 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1830 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1831 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1835 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1837 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1838 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1839 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1840 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1842 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1843 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1847 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1848 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1850 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1853 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1854 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1855 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1856 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1857 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1859 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1861 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1862 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1863 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1864 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1866 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1867 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1870 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1871 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1872 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1873 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1874 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1875 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1880 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1882 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1884 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1885 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1888 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1889 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1890 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1891 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1892 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1893 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1894 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1896 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1897 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1899 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1902 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1904 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1905 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1906 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1912 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1914 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1915 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1917 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1918 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1920 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1922 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1923 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1924 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1925 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1926 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1928 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1929 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1932 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1933 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1935 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1936 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1937 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1938 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1939 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1942 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1943 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1944 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1945 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1946 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1947 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1949 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1951 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1952 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
1953 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1956 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1958 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1959 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1960 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1961 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1962 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1963 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1964 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1965 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1966 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1967 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1971 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1974 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1975 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1977 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1978 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1979 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1980 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1981 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1982 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1984 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1988 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1990 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1991 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1993 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1994 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1995 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1996 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
1999 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2000 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2001 * immediately following this. */
2005 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2006 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2008 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2009 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2011 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2012 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2013 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2015 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2016 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2017 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2018 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2020 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2021 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2022 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2023 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2027 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2028 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2030 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2031 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2032 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2035 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2036 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2037 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2041 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2042 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2043 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2045 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2046 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2047 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2048 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2050 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2051 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2052 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2058 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2059 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
)
2061 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2065 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2066 snonce
, anonce
, &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2067 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2070 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2072 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2073 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2074 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, /* TODO: SK+PFS */
2075 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2076 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2077 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2078 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2080 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2081 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2082 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2088 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2089 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2091 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2092 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2099 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2100 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2101 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2102 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2103 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2104 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2105 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2106 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2109 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2111 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2115 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2116 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2118 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2119 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2120 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2121 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2122 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2123 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2127 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2128 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2129 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2132 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2133 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2134 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2135 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2136 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2138 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2143 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2144 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2145 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2148 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2149 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2153 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2154 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2155 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2159 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2160 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2161 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2165 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2166 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2167 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2168 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2169 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2171 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2175 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2179 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2180 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2182 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2183 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2184 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2192 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2193 "FILS: Could not find FILS Session element in Association Request frame - reject");
2196 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2197 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2198 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2199 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2200 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2201 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2204 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2206 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2207 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2208 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2212 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2214 /* The STA's MAC address */
2216 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2217 /* The AP's BSSID */
2219 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2220 /* The STA's nonce */
2221 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2222 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2223 /* The AP's nonce */
2224 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2225 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2227 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2228 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2230 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2231 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2233 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2234 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2235 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2236 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2239 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2240 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2242 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
, &elems
, 1) ==
2244 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2245 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2248 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2249 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2252 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2253 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2254 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2255 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2256 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2259 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2260 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2261 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2262 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2263 elems
.fils_key_confirm
,
2264 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2265 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2266 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2270 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2274 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2275 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2276 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2278 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2279 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2280 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2281 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2282 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2284 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2286 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2290 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2293 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2294 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2297 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2299 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2301 /* The AP's BSSID */
2303 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2304 /* The STA's MAC address */
2306 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2307 /* The AP's nonce */
2308 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2309 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2310 /* The STA's nonce */
2311 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2312 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2314 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2315 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2316 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2318 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2319 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2321 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2323 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2327 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2329 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2330 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2331 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2332 /* Element ID Extension */
2333 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2334 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2336 /* FILS HLP Container */
2338 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2340 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2344 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2345 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2346 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2347 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2348 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2350 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2351 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2352 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2354 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2355 * of GTK in the BSS.
2357 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2363 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2365 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2366 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2368 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2371 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2372 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2373 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2375 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2377 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2378 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2379 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2384 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2387 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2388 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2389 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2394 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2395 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2396 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2397 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2400 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2406 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2411 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2414 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2415 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2417 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2418 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2419 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2420 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2427 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2430 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2432 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2434 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2435 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2436 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2438 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2439 u16 key_data_length
;
2440 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2441 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2442 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2443 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2445 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2446 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2447 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2448 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2450 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2452 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2453 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2456 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2457 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2458 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2465 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2468 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
2472 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2473 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2474 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2481 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2482 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2486 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2488 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2493 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2494 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2496 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2501 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2504 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2505 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2506 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2507 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2508 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2509 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2510 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2513 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2514 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2515 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2519 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2520 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2521 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2522 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2523 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2525 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2526 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2528 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2529 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2530 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2531 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2532 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2533 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2535 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2536 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2538 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2539 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2540 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2541 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2544 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2545 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2546 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2549 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2551 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2552 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2554 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2555 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2556 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2558 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2559 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2560 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2561 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2562 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2563 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2564 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2568 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2570 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2571 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2573 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2574 * with the value we derived.
2576 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2577 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2578 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2579 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2581 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2583 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2584 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2585 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2589 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2591 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2592 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2594 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2595 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2596 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2598 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2599 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2602 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2604 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2605 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2609 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2611 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2616 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2618 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2620 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2622 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2623 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2630 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2632 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2633 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2634 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2635 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2637 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2640 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2642 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2643 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2644 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2646 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2647 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2648 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2650 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2653 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2656 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2657 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2663 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2665 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2671 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2676 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2679 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2681 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2682 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2683 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2685 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2687 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2688 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2691 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2692 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2693 * immediately following this. */
2697 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2698 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2700 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2701 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2702 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2703 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2704 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2705 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2706 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2707 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2708 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2709 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2710 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2711 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2712 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2714 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2715 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2716 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2717 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2719 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2720 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2721 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2723 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2724 * of GTK in the BSS.
2726 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2734 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2740 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2742 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2743 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2744 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2745 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2746 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2747 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2749 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2750 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2751 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2756 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2758 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2759 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2760 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2761 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2762 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2764 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2766 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2767 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2768 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2769 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2774 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2776 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2777 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2782 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2784 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2785 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2792 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2795 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2797 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2800 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2802 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2803 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2805 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2807 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2808 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2809 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2810 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2811 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2812 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2814 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2815 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2817 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2821 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2822 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2828 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2829 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2831 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2832 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2835 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2836 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2838 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2839 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2842 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2844 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2846 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2847 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2848 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2849 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2850 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2852 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2854 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2855 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
2856 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
2857 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2858 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2859 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2864 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2866 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2867 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2869 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2870 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2871 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2872 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2873 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2876 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2877 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2879 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2880 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2881 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2882 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2886 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2887 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2888 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2892 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2894 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2895 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2896 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2899 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2902 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2903 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2904 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2905 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2908 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2909 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2910 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2912 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2913 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2914 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2920 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2923 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2924 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2925 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2926 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2927 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2928 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2930 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2931 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2932 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2933 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2934 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2935 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2936 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2937 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2938 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2939 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2941 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2942 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2944 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2945 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2947 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2948 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2950 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2951 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2952 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2953 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2954 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2955 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2956 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2957 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2959 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2960 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2961 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2962 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2964 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2965 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2966 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2967 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2970 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2971 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2973 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2975 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2976 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2977 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2978 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2981 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2982 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2983 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2984 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2985 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2986 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2987 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2989 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2990 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
2991 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
2992 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2993 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2994 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2996 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2997 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2998 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2999 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3000 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3001 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3002 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3003 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3005 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3006 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3008 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3009 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3010 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3011 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3012 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3013 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3014 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3015 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3016 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3018 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3019 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
3020 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3021 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3022 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3023 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3025 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3031 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3033 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3035 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3036 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3037 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3039 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3043 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3045 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3046 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3048 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3050 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3052 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3055 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
) {
3056 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3057 * immediately following this. */
3061 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3062 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3063 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3064 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3065 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3066 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3067 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3068 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3069 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3071 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3072 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
3074 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3075 * of GTK in the BSS.
3077 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3081 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3082 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3083 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
3084 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3085 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3088 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3089 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3091 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3093 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3094 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3097 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3100 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3101 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3102 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3104 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3105 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3111 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3113 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3114 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3115 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3116 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3117 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3118 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3119 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3120 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3121 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3122 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3127 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3129 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3130 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3131 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3132 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3133 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3134 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3135 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
3136 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN",
3137 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
);
3141 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3143 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3144 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3145 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3146 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3147 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3148 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3149 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3150 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3152 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3153 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3154 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3155 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3156 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3157 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
)
3158 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3159 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3160 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3162 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3163 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3165 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3166 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3172 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3173 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3177 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3178 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3179 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3180 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3181 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3183 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3184 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3186 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3187 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3189 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3190 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3191 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3192 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3193 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3194 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3196 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3197 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3199 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3205 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3206 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3208 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3209 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3210 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3211 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3214 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3217 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3220 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3221 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3222 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3226 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3228 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3231 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3232 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3233 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3234 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3237 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3239 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3240 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3241 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3243 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3244 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3245 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3248 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3249 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3252 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3253 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3261 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3262 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3264 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3267 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3271 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3274 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3278 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3280 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3285 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3288 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3289 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3290 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3291 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3293 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3294 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3297 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3298 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3300 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3302 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3303 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3309 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3310 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3312 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3314 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3318 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3320 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3321 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3322 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3324 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3328 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3331 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3333 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3334 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3338 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3339 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
3342 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3343 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3347 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3348 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3349 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3350 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3351 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3353 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3355 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3356 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3357 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3358 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3359 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3360 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3361 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3362 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3363 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3365 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3366 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3367 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3368 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3369 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3371 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3372 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3373 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3377 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3378 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3382 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3383 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3384 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3385 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3388 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3389 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3393 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3394 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3397 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3398 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3399 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3402 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3408 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3410 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3411 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3412 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3414 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3421 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3422 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3424 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3425 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3426 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3427 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3431 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3432 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3434 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3435 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3436 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3437 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3439 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3440 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3448 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3449 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3452 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3453 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3454 /* Do not allow group operations */
3455 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3456 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3457 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3458 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3460 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3461 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3462 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
3463 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3464 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
3465 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3470 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3475 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
3476 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3477 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3478 * recursive call. */
3479 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3483 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
3485 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3488 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3489 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
3491 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
3492 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3494 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
3495 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3497 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3498 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3499 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3501 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3502 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3503 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3504 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3511 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3513 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3518 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3522 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3526 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3529 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3531 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3534 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3536 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3538 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3540 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3541 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3542 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3543 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3544 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3545 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3546 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3551 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3553 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3557 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3558 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3559 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3561 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3564 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3565 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3566 const int preauth
= 1;
3567 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3568 const int preauth
= 0;
3569 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3571 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3574 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3575 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3576 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3577 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3578 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3579 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3580 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3581 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3582 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3586 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3587 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3590 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3591 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3592 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3593 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3594 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3595 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3596 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3597 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3598 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3599 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3600 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3601 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3602 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3603 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3604 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3605 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3606 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3607 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3608 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3609 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3610 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3611 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3612 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3613 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3614 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3616 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3617 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
,
3618 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
,
3619 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3620 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3621 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3622 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3623 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3624 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3625 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3627 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3628 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3629 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3630 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3631 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3632 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3636 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3637 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3640 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3641 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3642 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3650 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3658 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3660 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3662 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3663 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3669 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3670 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3671 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3672 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3673 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3674 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3675 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3676 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3677 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3678 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3679 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3681 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3682 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3683 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3684 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3689 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3690 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3691 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3693 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3694 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3702 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3705 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3709 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3711 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3715 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3717 return sm
->pairwise
;
3721 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3725 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3729 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3737 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3738 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3740 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3747 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3748 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3750 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3754 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3757 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3761 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3763 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3765 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3766 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3770 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3771 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3772 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3774 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3775 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3778 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3779 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3780 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3781 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3785 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3786 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3787 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3788 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3795 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3796 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3797 int session_timeout
,
3798 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3800 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3803 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3806 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3807 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3814 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3815 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
3817 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3820 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
3822 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3830 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3833 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3835 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3837 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3839 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3840 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3841 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3846 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
3849 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3851 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
3855 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3857 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3858 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
3862 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
3865 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3866 char *buf
, size_t len
)
3868 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3871 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
3875 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3876 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
3877 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
3879 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
3880 struct os_reltime now
;
3882 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
3883 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
3887 os_get_reltime(&now
);
3888 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
3893 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3894 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3898 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3901 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
3903 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3904 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
3905 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
3910 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
3911 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
3914 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3915 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3918 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3920 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
3924 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
3925 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3926 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3933 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3934 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3935 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3940 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3941 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3944 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3945 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3947 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3949 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3953 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
3954 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3955 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
3965 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3966 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3967 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3969 /* Skip the special first group */
3970 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3973 group
->references
++;
3977 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3978 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3979 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3981 /* Skip the special first group */
3982 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3985 group
->references
--;
3986 if (group
->references
)
3988 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
3993 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
3994 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
3996 static struct wpa_group
*
3997 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3999 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4001 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4004 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4006 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4010 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4011 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4018 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4019 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4020 * even if a negative value is returned.
4021 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4023 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4025 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4027 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4030 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4032 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4034 group
= group
->next
;
4037 if (group
== NULL
) {
4038 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4043 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4044 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4047 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4048 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4050 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4058 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4059 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4060 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4063 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4065 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4068 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4071 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4073 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4075 group
= group
->next
;
4081 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4082 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4085 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4086 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4087 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4091 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4093 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4096 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4097 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4098 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4103 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4109 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4111 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4113 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4116 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4118 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4120 group
= group
->next
;
4123 if (group
== NULL
) {
4124 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4129 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4132 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4135 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4136 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4138 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4139 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4146 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4147 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4149 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4151 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4152 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4153 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4155 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4156 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4157 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4158 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4159 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4160 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4161 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4162 * the station has received the frame.
4164 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4165 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4166 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4168 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4169 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4170 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4171 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4176 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4180 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4184 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4188 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4193 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4195 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4197 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4200 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4203 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4204 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4206 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4210 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4212 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4216 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4217 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4223 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
{
4224 struct wpa_authenticator
*auth
;
4226 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4232 static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
)
4234 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
*data
= ctx
;
4236 if (a
== data
->auth
|| !a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
||
4237 os_memcmp(a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
, data
->cache_id
,
4238 FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN
) != 0)
4240 data
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(a
->pmksa
, data
->spa
, data
->pmkid
);
4241 return data
->pmksa
!= NULL
;
4245 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4246 wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4247 const u8
*sta_addr
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4249 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata
;
4251 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
)
4253 idata
.auth
= wpa_auth
;
4254 idata
.cache_id
= wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id
;
4256 idata
.spa
= sta_addr
;
4257 idata
.pmkid
= pmkid
;
4258 wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_fils_iter
, &idata
);
4262 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */