2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
19 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
20 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
22 #include "crypto/random.h"
23 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
24 #include "ap_config.h"
25 #include "ieee802_11.h"
27 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
28 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
29 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
32 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
33 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
36 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
38 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
41 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
42 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
43 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
44 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
45 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
46 struct wpa_group
*group
);
47 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
48 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
49 struct wpa_group
*group
);
50 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
53 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
55 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
56 struct wpa_group
*group
);
57 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
58 struct wpa_group
*group
);
59 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
60 struct wpa_group
*group
);
61 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
63 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
64 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
65 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
66 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
67 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
69 /* TODO: make these configurable */
70 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
71 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
72 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
75 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
76 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
78 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
79 return wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
84 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
85 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
87 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.psk_failure_report
)
88 wpa_auth
->cb
.psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
92 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
93 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
96 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
97 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
101 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
102 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
104 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
106 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
110 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
112 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
115 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
117 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
122 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
123 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
125 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
127 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
131 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
133 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
134 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
136 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
138 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
143 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
144 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
146 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
148 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
153 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
154 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
156 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
158 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
164 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
167 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe
== NULL
)
169 return wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
171 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
174 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
175 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
178 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
180 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
184 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
185 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
188 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
190 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
194 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
195 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
197 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
199 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
203 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
204 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
210 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
213 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
214 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
219 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
222 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
228 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
231 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
233 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
234 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
235 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
239 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
242 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
243 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
245 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
246 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
247 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
249 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
250 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
256 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
258 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
260 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
261 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
264 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
265 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
266 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
269 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
270 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
271 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
276 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
278 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
279 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
281 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
282 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
284 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
286 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
288 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
289 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
290 } while (group
->changed
);
293 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
297 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
298 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
299 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
304 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
306 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
307 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
309 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
310 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
315 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
317 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
323 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
326 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
327 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
331 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
332 struct wpa_group
*group
)
334 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
338 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
340 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
343 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
344 * Local MAC Address || Time)
346 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
347 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
348 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
349 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
350 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
353 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
354 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
356 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
357 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
363 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
364 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
366 struct wpa_group
*group
;
368 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
372 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
373 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
374 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
376 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
377 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
378 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
379 "the first station connects");
383 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
384 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
385 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
386 * on embedded devices.
388 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
389 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
397 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
398 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
399 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
401 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
402 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
403 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
411 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
412 * @addr: Authenticator address
413 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
414 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
415 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
417 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
418 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
419 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
421 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
423 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
424 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
426 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
427 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
428 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
430 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
431 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
436 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
437 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
438 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
443 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
445 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
446 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
447 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
448 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
453 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
454 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
455 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
456 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
457 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
458 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
459 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
463 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
465 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
466 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
467 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
470 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
471 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
472 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
476 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
477 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
478 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
482 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
484 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
490 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
492 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
494 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
496 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
497 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
498 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
499 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
506 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
507 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
509 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
511 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
513 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
514 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
516 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
517 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
518 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
519 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
521 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
523 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
524 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
525 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
526 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
529 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
530 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
533 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
535 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
547 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
548 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
549 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
551 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
552 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
554 struct wpa_group
*group
;
555 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
558 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
559 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
560 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
565 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
568 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
569 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
571 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
572 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
573 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
579 struct wpa_state_machine
*
580 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
581 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
583 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
585 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
588 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
591 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
593 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
595 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
596 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
597 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
603 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
604 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
606 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
609 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
610 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
611 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
612 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
613 "start 4-way handshake");
614 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
615 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
618 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
621 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
622 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
623 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
624 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
625 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
628 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
631 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
632 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
633 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
636 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
637 "start authentication");
641 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
642 return 1; /* should not really happen */
644 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
645 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
649 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
651 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
652 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
653 * STA has not yet been removed. */
657 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
661 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
664 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
666 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
667 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
668 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
669 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
671 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
672 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
673 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
675 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
676 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
677 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
678 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
680 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
681 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
682 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
683 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
684 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
686 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
691 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
696 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
697 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
698 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
700 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
701 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
705 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
706 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
707 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
708 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
709 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
710 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
711 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
712 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
713 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
714 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
720 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
725 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
730 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
731 const u8
*replay_counter
)
734 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
737 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
738 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
745 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
746 const u8
*replay_counter
)
749 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
751 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
752 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
753 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
754 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
759 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
760 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
761 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
762 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
764 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
765 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
767 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
768 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
769 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
770 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
774 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
775 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
776 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
778 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
779 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
780 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
784 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
785 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
786 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
787 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
788 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
792 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
793 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
794 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
795 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
796 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
797 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
798 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
799 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
800 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
806 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
809 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
810 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
812 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
813 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
814 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
815 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
818 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
819 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
820 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
821 "group cipher is not TKIP");
822 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
823 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
824 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
825 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
827 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
828 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
829 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
830 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
834 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
835 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
837 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
842 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
847 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
848 unsigned int pmk_len
;
850 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
852 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
853 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
854 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
860 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
863 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
865 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
871 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
876 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
877 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
881 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
882 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
883 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
884 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
885 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
886 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
892 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
893 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
894 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
896 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
897 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
898 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
899 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
900 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
902 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
904 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
907 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
909 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
911 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
912 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
914 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
915 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
919 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
920 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
921 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
922 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
923 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
924 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
925 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
926 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
927 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
928 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
929 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
930 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
932 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
934 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
935 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
936 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
938 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
943 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
944 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
946 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
947 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
949 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
950 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
951 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
952 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
953 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
958 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
959 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
960 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
966 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
968 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
969 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
971 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
974 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
975 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
976 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
978 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
983 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
986 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
989 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
991 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
992 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
993 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
994 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
996 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
999 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1002 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
1003 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1005 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1006 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1007 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1008 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1009 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
1010 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1011 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1012 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1013 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1015 "advertised support for "
1016 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1021 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1022 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1023 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1024 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1026 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1032 if ((wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1033 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) &&
1034 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1035 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1036 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1041 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1042 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1043 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1044 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1045 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1046 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1047 "replayed counter");
1052 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1053 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1056 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1057 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1058 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1059 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1060 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1063 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1064 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1065 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1066 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1067 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1069 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1070 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1071 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1073 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1074 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1075 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1076 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1077 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1078 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1079 goto continue_processing
;
1082 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1083 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1084 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1085 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1087 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1088 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1089 * different SNonce values.
1091 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1092 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1093 goto continue_processing
;
1096 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1097 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1098 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1099 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1100 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1101 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1102 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1104 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1105 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1106 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1108 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1109 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1111 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1112 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1113 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1115 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1116 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1120 continue_processing
:
1122 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1123 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1124 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1125 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1128 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1132 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1133 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1134 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1135 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1136 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1137 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1138 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1142 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1143 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1145 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1146 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1147 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1148 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1149 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1150 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1153 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1154 "collect more entropy for random number "
1156 random_mark_pool_ready();
1157 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1162 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1164 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1165 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1166 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1172 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1173 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1174 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1175 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1176 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1177 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1181 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1185 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1186 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1187 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1190 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1191 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1192 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1193 "invalid state - dropped");
1197 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1201 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1202 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1207 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1208 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1210 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1211 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1212 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1216 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1217 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1218 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1219 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1224 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1225 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1226 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1227 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1230 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1232 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1233 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1235 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1237 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1238 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1239 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1240 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1245 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1246 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1247 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1248 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1251 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1252 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1253 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1254 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1257 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1258 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1259 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1260 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1261 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1263 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1264 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1270 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1271 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1272 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1274 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1275 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1276 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1277 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1279 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1280 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1282 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1283 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1284 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1285 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1286 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1288 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1289 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1290 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1291 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1293 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1294 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1295 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1299 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1300 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1302 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1303 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1306 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1307 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1308 key
->replay_counter
);
1310 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1312 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1313 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1314 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1315 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1316 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1318 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1319 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1321 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1322 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1326 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1327 * do not get copied again.
1329 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1332 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1333 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1334 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1337 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1339 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1340 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1341 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1343 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1344 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1346 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1347 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1348 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1349 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1350 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1355 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1356 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1358 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1362 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1363 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1364 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1365 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1366 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1369 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1370 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1371 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1372 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1374 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1377 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1378 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1379 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1380 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1383 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1389 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1391 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1392 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1394 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1395 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1396 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1401 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1402 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1403 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1404 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1405 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1407 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1408 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1409 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1411 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1413 int version
, pairwise
;
1415 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1417 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1418 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1420 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1423 version
= force_version
;
1424 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1425 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1426 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1427 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1428 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1429 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1430 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1431 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1433 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1435 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1437 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1438 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1441 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1442 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1443 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1444 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1445 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1447 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1449 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1450 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1451 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1452 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1453 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1455 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1456 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1459 len
+= key_data_len
;
1460 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1461 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1463 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1466 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1467 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1468 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1469 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1470 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1471 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1473 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1474 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1475 key_info
|= version
;
1476 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1477 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1478 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1479 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1480 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1482 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1483 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1484 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1485 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1487 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1488 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1489 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1490 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1491 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1492 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1494 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1495 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1496 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1497 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1498 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1499 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1502 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1505 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1508 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1509 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1511 } else if (!mic_len
) {
1515 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1516 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1519 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1520 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1521 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1522 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1523 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1524 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1525 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1526 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1527 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1531 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1532 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1533 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1534 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1535 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1541 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1547 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1549 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1550 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1551 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1552 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1553 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1554 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1559 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1560 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1561 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1563 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1564 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1565 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1566 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1567 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1568 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1569 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1570 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1571 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1580 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1581 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1582 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1583 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1589 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1590 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1591 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1592 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1594 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1596 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1597 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1598 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1601 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1604 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1606 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1612 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1613 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1614 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1615 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1616 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1619 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1625 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1628 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1629 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1630 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1631 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1633 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1634 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1635 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1636 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1637 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1638 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1639 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1643 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1646 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1647 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1650 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1651 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1653 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1656 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1657 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1658 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1659 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1660 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1661 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1662 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1663 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1664 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1665 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1667 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1672 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1674 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1675 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1676 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1677 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1678 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1682 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1689 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1690 "event %d notification", event
);
1695 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1696 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1701 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1706 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1709 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1712 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1713 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1714 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1715 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1716 * properly at this point.
1718 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1719 "started - initialize now");
1722 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1723 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1725 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1728 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1730 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1731 * update for this STA.
1733 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1734 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1735 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1737 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1740 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1741 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1742 "after association");
1743 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1745 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1746 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1748 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1750 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1753 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1754 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1755 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1757 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1758 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1760 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1762 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1763 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1765 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1768 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1769 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1771 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1775 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1777 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1778 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1783 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1787 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1789 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1791 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1792 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1793 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1797 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1798 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1799 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1800 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1801 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1802 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1803 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1806 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1808 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1810 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1811 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1812 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1817 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1819 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1820 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1821 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1825 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1827 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1828 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1832 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1834 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1835 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1836 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1837 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1839 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1840 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1844 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1845 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1847 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1850 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1851 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1852 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1853 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1854 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1856 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1858 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1859 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1860 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1861 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1863 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1864 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1867 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1868 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1869 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1870 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1871 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1872 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1877 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1879 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1881 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1882 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1885 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1886 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1887 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1888 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1889 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1890 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1891 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1893 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1894 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1896 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1899 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1901 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1902 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1903 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1909 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1911 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1912 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1914 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1915 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1917 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1919 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1920 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1921 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1922 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1923 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1925 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
)
1926 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1929 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1930 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1932 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1933 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1934 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1935 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1936 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1939 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1940 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1941 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1942 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1943 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1944 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1946 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1948 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1949 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
);
1950 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1953 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1955 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1956 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1957 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1958 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1959 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1960 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1961 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1962 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1963 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1964 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1968 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1971 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1972 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1974 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1975 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1976 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1977 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1978 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1979 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1981 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1985 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1987 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1988 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1990 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1991 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1992 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1993 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
1996 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1997 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1998 * immediately following this. */
2002 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2003 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2005 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2006 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2008 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2009 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2010 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2012 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2013 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2014 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2015 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2017 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2018 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2019 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2020 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2024 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2025 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2027 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2028 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2029 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2032 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2033 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2034 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2038 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2039 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2040 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2042 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2043 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2044 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2045 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2047 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2048 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2049 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2055 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2056 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
)
2058 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2062 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2063 snonce
, anonce
, &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2064 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2067 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2069 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2070 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2071 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, /* TODO: SK+PFS */
2072 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2073 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2074 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2075 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2077 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2078 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2079 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2085 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2086 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2088 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2089 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2096 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2097 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2098 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2099 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2100 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2101 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2102 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2103 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2106 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2108 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2112 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2113 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2115 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2116 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2117 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2118 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2119 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2120 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2124 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2125 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2126 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2129 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2130 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2131 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2132 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2133 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2135 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2140 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2141 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2142 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2145 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2146 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2150 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2151 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2152 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2156 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2157 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2158 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2162 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2163 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2164 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2165 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2166 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2168 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2172 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2176 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2177 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2179 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2180 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2181 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2189 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2190 "FILS: Could not find FILS Session element in Association Request frame - reject");
2193 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2194 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2195 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2196 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2197 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2198 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2201 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2203 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2204 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2205 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2209 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2211 /* The STA's MAC address */
2213 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2214 /* The AP's BSSID */
2216 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2217 /* The STA's nonce */
2218 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2219 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2220 /* The AP's nonce */
2221 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2222 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2224 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2225 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2227 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2228 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[0];
2230 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2231 1, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2232 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2233 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2236 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2237 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2239 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
, &elems
, 1) ==
2241 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2242 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2245 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2246 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2249 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2250 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2251 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2252 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2253 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2256 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2257 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2258 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2259 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2260 elems
.fils_key_confirm
,
2261 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2262 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2263 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2267 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2271 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2272 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
)
2274 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2275 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2276 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2277 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2278 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2280 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2282 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2286 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2289 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2290 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2293 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2295 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2297 /* The AP's BSSID */
2299 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2300 /* The STA's MAC address */
2302 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2303 /* The AP's nonce */
2304 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2305 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2306 /* The STA's nonce */
2307 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2308 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2310 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2311 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2312 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2314 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2315 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2317 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2319 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2323 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2325 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2326 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2327 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2328 /* Element ID Extension */
2329 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2330 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2332 /* TODO: FILS HLP Container */
2334 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2338 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2339 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2340 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2341 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2342 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2344 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2345 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2346 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2348 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2349 * of GTK in the BSS.
2351 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2357 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2359 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2360 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2362 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2365 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2366 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2367 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2369 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2371 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2372 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2373 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2378 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2381 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2382 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2383 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2388 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2389 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2390 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2391 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2394 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2400 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2405 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2408 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2409 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2411 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2412 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2413 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2414 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2421 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2424 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2426 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2428 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2429 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2430 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2432 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2433 u16 key_data_length
;
2434 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2435 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2436 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2437 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2439 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2440 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2441 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2442 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2444 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2446 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2447 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2450 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2451 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2452 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2459 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2462 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
2465 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2466 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2467 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2474 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2475 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2479 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2481 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2486 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2487 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2489 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2494 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2497 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2498 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2499 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2500 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2501 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2502 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2503 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2506 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2507 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2508 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2512 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2513 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2514 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2515 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2516 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2518 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2519 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2521 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2522 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2523 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2524 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2525 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2526 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2528 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2529 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2531 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2532 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2533 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2534 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2537 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2538 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2539 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2542 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2544 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2545 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2547 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2548 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2549 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2551 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2552 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2553 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2554 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2555 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2556 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2557 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2561 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2563 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2564 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2566 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2567 * with the value we derived.
2569 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2570 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2571 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2572 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2574 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2576 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2577 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2578 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2582 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2584 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2585 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2587 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2588 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2589 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2591 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2592 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2595 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2597 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2598 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2602 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2604 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2609 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2611 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2613 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2615 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2616 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2623 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2625 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2626 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2627 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2628 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2630 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2633 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2635 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2636 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2637 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2639 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2640 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2641 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2643 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2646 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2649 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2650 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2656 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2658 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2664 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2669 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2672 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2674 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2675 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2676 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2678 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2680 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2681 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2684 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2685 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2686 * immediately following this. */
2690 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2691 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2693 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2694 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2695 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2696 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2697 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2698 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2699 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2700 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2701 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2702 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2703 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2704 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2705 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2707 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2708 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2709 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2710 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2712 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2713 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2714 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2716 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2717 * of GTK in the BSS.
2719 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2727 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2733 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2735 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2736 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2737 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2738 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2739 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2740 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2742 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2743 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2744 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2749 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2751 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2752 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2753 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2754 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2755 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2757 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2759 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2760 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2761 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2762 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2767 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2769 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2770 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2775 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2777 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2778 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2785 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2788 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2790 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2793 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2795 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2796 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2798 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2800 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2801 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2802 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2803 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2804 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2805 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2807 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2808 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2810 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2814 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2815 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2821 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2822 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2824 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2825 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2828 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2829 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2831 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2832 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2835 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2837 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2839 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2840 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2841 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2842 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2843 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2845 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2847 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2848 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
2849 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
2850 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2851 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2852 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2857 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2859 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2860 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2862 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2863 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2864 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2865 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2866 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2869 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2870 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2872 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2873 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2874 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2875 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2879 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2880 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2881 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2885 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2887 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2888 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2889 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2892 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2895 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2896 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2897 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2898 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2901 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2902 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2903 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2905 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2906 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2907 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2913 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2916 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2917 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2918 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2919 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2920 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2921 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2923 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2924 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2925 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2926 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2927 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2928 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2929 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2930 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2931 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2932 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2934 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2935 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2937 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2938 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2940 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2941 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2943 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2944 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2945 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2946 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2947 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2948 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2949 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2950 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2952 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2953 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2954 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2955 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2957 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2958 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2959 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2960 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2963 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2964 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2966 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2968 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2969 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2970 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2971 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2974 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2975 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2976 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2977 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2978 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2979 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2980 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2981 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2982 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2983 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2984 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2985 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2986 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2988 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2989 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2990 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2991 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2992 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2993 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2994 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2995 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2997 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2998 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3000 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3001 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3002 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3003 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3004 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3005 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3006 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3007 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
3008 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3009 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3010 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
3012 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
3013 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3014 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3015 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3017 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3023 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3025 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3027 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3028 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3029 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3031 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3035 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3037 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3038 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3040 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3042 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3044 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3047 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
3048 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3049 * immediately following this. */
3053 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3054 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3055 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3056 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3057 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3058 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3059 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3060 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3061 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3063 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3064 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
3066 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3067 * of GTK in the BSS.
3069 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3073 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3074 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3075 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
3076 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3077 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3080 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3081 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3083 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3085 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3086 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3089 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3092 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3093 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3094 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3096 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3097 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3103 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3105 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3106 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3107 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3108 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3109 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3110 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3111 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3112 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3113 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3114 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3119 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3121 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3122 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3123 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3124 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3125 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3129 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3131 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3132 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3133 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3134 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3135 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3136 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3137 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3138 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3140 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3141 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3142 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3143 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3144 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3145 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
3146 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3147 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3148 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3150 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3151 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3153 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3154 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3160 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3161 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3165 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3166 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3167 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3168 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3169 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3171 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3172 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3174 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3175 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3177 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3178 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3179 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3180 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3181 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3182 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3184 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3185 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3187 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3193 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3194 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3196 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3197 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3198 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3199 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3202 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3205 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3208 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3209 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3210 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3214 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3216 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3219 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3220 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3221 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3222 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3225 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3227 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3228 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3229 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3231 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3232 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3233 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3236 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3237 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3240 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3241 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3249 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3250 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3252 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3255 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3259 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3262 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3266 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3268 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3273 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3276 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3277 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3278 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3279 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3281 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3282 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3285 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3286 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3288 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3290 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3291 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3297 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3298 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3300 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3302 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3306 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3308 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3309 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3310 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3312 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3316 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3319 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3321 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3322 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3326 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3327 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
3330 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3331 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3335 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3336 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3337 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3338 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3339 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3341 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3343 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3344 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3345 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3346 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3347 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3348 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3349 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3350 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3351 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3353 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3354 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3355 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3356 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3357 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3359 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3360 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3361 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3365 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3366 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3370 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3371 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3372 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3373 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3376 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3377 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3381 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3382 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3385 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3386 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3387 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3390 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3396 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3398 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3399 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3400 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3402 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3409 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3410 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3412 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3413 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3414 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3415 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3419 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3420 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3422 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3423 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3424 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3425 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3427 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3428 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3436 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3437 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3440 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3441 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3442 /* Do not allow group operations */
3443 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3444 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3445 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3446 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3448 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3449 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3450 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
3451 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3452 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
3453 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3458 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3463 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
3464 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3465 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3466 * recursive call. */
3467 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3471 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
3473 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3476 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3477 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
3479 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
3480 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3482 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
3483 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3485 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3486 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3487 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3489 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3490 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3491 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3492 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3499 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3501 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3506 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3510 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3514 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3517 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3519 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3522 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3524 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3526 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3528 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3529 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3530 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3531 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3532 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3533 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3534 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3539 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3541 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3545 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3546 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3547 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3549 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3552 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3553 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3554 const int preauth
= 1;
3555 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3556 const int preauth
= 0;
3557 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3559 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3562 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3563 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3564 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3565 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3566 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3567 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3568 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3569 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3570 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3574 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3575 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3578 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3579 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3580 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3581 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3582 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3583 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3584 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3585 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3586 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3587 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3588 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3589 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3590 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3591 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3592 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3593 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3594 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3595 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3596 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3597 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3598 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3599 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3600 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3601 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3602 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3604 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3605 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
3606 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
3607 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3608 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3609 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3610 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3611 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3612 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3613 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3615 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3616 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3617 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3618 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3619 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3620 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3624 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3625 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3628 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3629 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3630 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3638 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3646 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3648 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3650 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3651 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3657 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3658 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3659 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3660 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3661 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3662 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3663 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3664 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3665 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3666 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3667 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3669 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3670 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3671 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3672 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3677 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3678 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3679 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3681 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3682 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3690 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3693 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3697 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3699 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3703 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3705 return sm
->pairwise
;
3709 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3713 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3717 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3725 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3726 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3728 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3735 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3736 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3738 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3742 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3745 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3749 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3751 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3753 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3754 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3758 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3759 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3760 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3762 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3763 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3766 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
) {
3767 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3768 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3769 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3773 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3774 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3775 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3776 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3783 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3784 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3785 int session_timeout
,
3786 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3788 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3791 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3794 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3795 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3802 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3803 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
3805 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3808 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
3810 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3818 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3821 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3823 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3825 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3827 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3828 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3829 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3834 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
3837 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3839 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
3843 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3845 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3846 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
3850 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3851 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3854 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3856 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
3860 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
3861 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3862 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3869 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3870 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3871 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3876 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3877 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3880 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3881 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3883 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3885 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3889 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
3890 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3891 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
3901 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3902 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3903 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3905 /* Skip the special first group */
3906 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3909 group
->references
++;
3913 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3914 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3915 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3917 /* Skip the special first group */
3918 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3921 group
->references
--;
3922 if (group
->references
)
3924 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
3929 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
3930 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
3932 static struct wpa_group
*
3933 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3935 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3937 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
3940 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3942 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
3946 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
3947 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3954 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
3955 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
3956 * even if a negative value is returned.
3957 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
3959 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3961 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3963 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3966 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3968 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3970 group
= group
->next
;
3973 if (group
== NULL
) {
3974 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3979 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3980 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
3983 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
3984 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
3986 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3994 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
3995 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
3996 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
3999 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4001 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4004 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4007 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4009 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4011 group
= group
->next
;
4017 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4018 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4021 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4022 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4023 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4027 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4029 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4032 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4033 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4034 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4039 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4045 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4047 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4049 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4052 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4054 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4056 group
= group
->next
;
4059 if (group
== NULL
) {
4060 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4065 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4068 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4071 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4072 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4074 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4075 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4082 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4083 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4085 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4087 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4088 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4089 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4091 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4092 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4093 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4094 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4095 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4096 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4097 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4098 * the station has received the frame.
4100 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4101 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4102 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4104 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4105 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4106 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4107 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4112 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4116 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4120 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4124 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4129 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4131 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4133 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4136 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4139 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4140 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4142 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4146 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4148 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4152 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4153 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);