x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message

commit 39226ef02bfb43248b7db12a4fdccb39d95318e3 upstream.

MDS is vulnerable with SMT.  Make that clear with a one-time printk
whenever SMT first gets enabled.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e1ed6c51f8664b4debc97dea08940df7d42433e4..3c33dd7a8f9d35e49e60d099e0a16a1a4057b8cb 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -712,6 +712,9 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
                static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
 /* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
 static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 {
@@ -732,6 +735,8 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
                static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
 }
 
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
        /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -755,6 +760,8 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
        switch (mds_mitigation) {
        case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
        case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+               if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+                       pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
                update_mds_branch_idle();
                break;
        case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
@@ -1134,6 +1141,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
 }
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS