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b1322259 | 1 | /* |
3c95ef22 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
3e4b43b9 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
b1322259 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
5b5eea4b SL |
10 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
11 | ||
d02b48c6 RE |
12 | #include <stdio.h> |
13 | #include <time.h> | |
14 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 15 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 16 | |
25f2138b | 17 | #include "crypto/ctype.h" |
b39fc560 | 18 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 19 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
20 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
21 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 24 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 25 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
3bcc933e | 26 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
176db6dc | 27 | #include "internal/dane.h" |
25f2138b | 28 | #include "crypto/x509.h" |
706457b7 | 29 | #include "x509_local.h" |
d02b48c6 | 30 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
31 | /* CRL score values */ |
32 | ||
88444854 DDO |
33 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ |
34 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
35 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */ | |
36 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
37 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \ | |
38 | (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
39 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
40 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
41 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
42 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
d43c4497 | 43 | |
3c95ef22 TS |
44 | static int x509_verify_x509(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
45 | static int x509_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
46 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
47 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
3c95ef22 | 48 | static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
170b7358 | 49 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3c95ef22 | 50 | static int dane_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 51 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
52 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
53 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
4ef70dbc | 54 | static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 55 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 56 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 57 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
58 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
59 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 60 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 61 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
170b7358 | 62 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); |
3c95ef22 TS |
63 | static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); |
64 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); | |
fbb82a60 | 65 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); |
cccf532f | 66 | static int check_curve(X509 *cert); |
4b96839f DSH |
67 | |
68 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 69 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 70 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
71 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
72 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
73 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
74 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
75 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
76 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 77 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 78 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
79 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
80 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
81 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
82 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 83 | |
d02b48c6 | 84 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 85 | |
6b691a5c | 86 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
87 | { |
88 | return ok; | |
89 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 90 | |
0d8dbb52 | 91 | /*- |
ade08735 | 92 | * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error. |
0d8dbb52 | 93 | * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested. |
4669015d | 94 | * It calls ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions() |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
95 | * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any |
96 | * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc. | |
ade08735 | 97 | */ |
6725682d | 98 | int X509_self_signed(X509 *cert, int verify_signature) |
0f113f3e | 99 | { |
0d8dbb52 | 100 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0c56a648 | 101 | |
0d8dbb52 | 102 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL) { /* handles cert == NULL */ |
9311d0c4 | 103 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
104 | return -1; |
105 | } | |
4669015d | 106 | if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
107 | return -1; |
108 | if ((cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 109 | return 0; |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
110 | if (!verify_signature) |
111 | return 1; | |
6725682d | 112 | return X509_verify(cert, pkey); |
0d8dbb52 | 113 | } |
2dabd822 | 114 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
115 | /* |
116 | * Given a certificate, try and find an exact match in the store. | |
117 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on not found, -1 on internal error. | |
118 | */ | |
119 | static int lookup_cert_match(X509 **result, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
120 | { |
121 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
122 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
7e365d51 | 123 | int i, ret; |
88444854 | 124 | |
7e365d51 | 125 | *result = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 126 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ |
bf973d06 | 127 | ERR_set_mark(); |
0f113f3e | 128 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); |
bf973d06 | 129 | ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
0f113f3e | 130 | if (certs == NULL) |
7e365d51 | 131 | return -1; |
c34e7876 | 132 | |
0f113f3e MC |
133 | /* Look for exact match */ |
134 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
135 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
579262af | 136 | if (X509_cmp(xtmp, x) == 0) |
0f113f3e | 137 | break; |
e9e7b5df | 138 | xtmp = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 139 | } |
7e365d51 DDO |
140 | ret = xtmp != NULL; |
141 | if (ret) { | |
142 | if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) | |
143 | ret = -1; | |
144 | else | |
145 | *result = xtmp; | |
146 | } | |
79b2a2f2 | 147 | OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs); |
7e365d51 | 148 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 149 | } |
2dabd822 | 150 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
151 | /*- |
152 | * Inform the verify callback of an error. | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
153 | * The error code is set to |err| if |err| is not X509_V_OK, else |
154 | * |ctx->error| is left unchanged (under the assumption it is set elsewhere). | |
155 | * The error depth is |depth| if >= 0, else it defaults to |ctx->error_depth|. | |
c633b973 | 156 | * The error cert is |x| if not NULL, else the cert in |ctx->chain| at |depth|. |
70dd3c65 VD |
157 | * |
158 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
159 | */ | |
160 | static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) | |
161 | { | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
162 | if (depth < 0) |
163 | depth = ctx->error_depth; | |
164 | else | |
165 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
c633b973 | 166 | ctx->current_cert = x != NULL ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); |
70dd3c65 VD |
167 | if (err != X509_V_OK) |
168 | ctx->error = err; | |
169 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
170 | } | |
171 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
172 | #define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \ |
173 | if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \ | |
6e5e118c DO |
174 | return 0 |
175 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
176 | /*- |
177 | * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the | |
178 | * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error | |
179 | * number. | |
180 | * | |
181 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
182 | */ | |
183 | static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
184 | { | |
185 | ctx->error = err; | |
186 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
187 | } | |
188 | ||
0ce8271c | 189 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */ |
fbb82a60 VD |
190 | static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
191 | { | |
192 | int i; | |
193 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
194 | ||
195 | if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) | |
196 | return 1; | |
197 | ||
198 | for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
199 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
200 | ||
201 | /* | |
202 | * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only | |
203 | * check the security of issuer keys. | |
204 | */ | |
3c95ef22 | 205 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_cert_key_level(ctx, cert), |
07b6068d | 206 | ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
fbb82a60 VD |
207 | /* |
208 | * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates | |
209 | * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. | |
210 | */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
211 | CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert), |
212 | ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
fbb82a60 VD |
213 | } |
214 | return 1; | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
217 | /*- |
218 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
219 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). | |
220 | */ | |
221 | static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
222 | { | |
223 | /* Not much to verify on a RPK */ | |
224 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
225 | return ctx->verify(ctx); | |
226 | ||
227 | return !!ctx->verify_cb(ctx->error == X509_V_OK, ctx); | |
228 | } | |
229 | ||
230 | ||
0ce8271c DDO |
231 | /*- |
232 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
233 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). | |
234 | */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
235 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
236 | { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
237 | int err; |
238 | int ok; | |
239 | ||
364246a9 | 240 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) <= 0 |
4ef70dbc | 241 | || (ok = check_extensions(ctx)) <= 0 |
364246a9 DDO |
242 | || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) <= 0 |
243 | || (ok = check_id(ctx)) <= 0 | |
244 | || (ok = X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain) ? 1 : -1) <= 0 | |
245 | || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) <= 0) | |
246 | return ok; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
247 | |
248 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
249 | ctx->param->flags); | |
07b6068d | 250 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err); |
d9b8b89b VD |
251 | |
252 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
88444854 | 253 | ok = ctx->verify != NULL ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); |
7e365d51 DDO |
254 | if (ok <= 0) |
255 | return ok; | |
d9b8b89b | 256 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
257 | if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) <= 0) |
258 | return ok; | |
8545051c | 259 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
260 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
261 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
7e365d51 DDO |
262 | if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0) |
263 | return ok; | |
264 | if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0) | |
265 | return ok; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
266 | #endif |
267 | ||
268 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
579262af | 269 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) != 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
270 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); |
271 | return ok; | |
272 | } | |
273 | ||
11ddbf84 DDO |
274 | int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
275 | { | |
276 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
277 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
278 | return -1; | |
279 | } | |
3c95ef22 TS |
280 | if (ctx->rpk != NULL) |
281 | return x509_verify_rpk(ctx); | |
11ddbf84 DDO |
282 | if (ctx->cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted) >= 1) |
283 | ctx->cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, 0); | |
3c95ef22 TS |
284 | return x509_verify_x509(ctx); |
285 | } | |
286 | ||
287 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
288 | { | |
289 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
290 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
291 | return -1; | |
292 | } | |
293 | return (ctx->rpk != NULL) ? x509_verify_rpk(ctx) : x509_verify_x509(ctx); | |
11ddbf84 DDO |
294 | } |
295 | ||
0ce8271c DDO |
296 | /*- |
297 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
298 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). | |
299 | */ | |
3c95ef22 TS |
300 | static int x509_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
301 | { | |
302 | int ret; | |
303 | ||
304 | /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ | |
305 | if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->rpk) | |
306 | && verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0) | |
307 | return 0; | |
308 | ||
309 | /* Barring any data to verify the RPK, simply report it as untrusted */ | |
310 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_RPK_UNTRUSTED; | |
311 | ||
312 | ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify_rpk(ctx) : verify_rpk(ctx); | |
313 | ||
314 | /* | |
315 | * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, | |
316 | * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored | |
317 | * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). | |
318 | */ | |
319 | if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) | |
320 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
321 | return ret; | |
322 | } | |
323 | ||
324 | /*- | |
325 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
326 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). | |
327 | */ | |
328 | static int x509_verify_x509(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 329 | { |
f3e235ed | 330 | int ret; |
d9b8b89b | 331 | |
0f113f3e | 332 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 333 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); |
f3e235ed | 334 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
0f113f3e MC |
335 | return -1; |
336 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 337 | |
aae41f8c MC |
338 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
339 | /* | |
340 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
341 | * cannot do another one. | |
342 | */ | |
9311d0c4 | 343 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
f3e235ed | 344 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
aae41f8c MC |
345 | return -1; |
346 | } | |
0f113f3e | 347 | |
c1be4d61 | 348 | if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, ctx->cert, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { |
f3e235ed | 349 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b | 350 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 351 | } |
d9b8b89b | 352 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 353 | |
fbb82a60 | 354 | /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ |
3c95ef22 | 355 | CB_FAIL_IF(!check_cert_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert), |
07b6068d | 356 | ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
fbb82a60 | 357 | |
11ddbf84 | 358 | ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx); |
f3e235ed | 359 | |
170b7358 | 360 | /* |
f3e235ed VD |
361 | * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, |
362 | * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored | |
363 | * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). | |
170b7358 | 364 | */ |
f3e235ed VD |
365 | if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
366 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
367 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e MC |
368 | } |
369 | ||
3bed88a3 DDO |
370 | static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) |
371 | { | |
372 | int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); | |
373 | ||
374 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
375 | if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) | |
376 | return 1; | |
377 | return 0; | |
378 | } | |
379 | ||
0f113f3e | 380 | /* |
c476c06f DDO |
381 | * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|. |
382 | * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that | |
383 | * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element. | |
384 | * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one. | |
2f043896 | 385 | */ |
2f043896 DSH |
386 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
387 | { | |
0f113f3e | 388 | int i; |
c53f7355 | 389 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; |
fbb82a60 | 390 | |
0f113f3e | 391 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
c53f7355 | 392 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
4dd00918 | 393 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) |
3bed88a3 DDO |
394 | && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
395 | || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { | |
4669015d | 396 | if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1)) |
4dd00918 | 397 | return issuer; |
c476c06f DDO |
398 | if (rv == NULL || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer), |
399 | X509_get0_notAfter(rv)) > 0) | |
400 | rv = issuer; | |
c53f7355 | 401 | } |
0f113f3e | 402 | } |
c53f7355 | 403 | return rv; |
2f043896 DSH |
404 | } |
405 | ||
c34e7876 | 406 | /* Check that the given certificate |x| is issued by the certificate |issuer| */ |
3bed88a3 | 407 | static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) |
2f043896 | 408 | { |
4669015d | 409 | int err = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, x); |
d1e85cdf DDO |
410 | |
411 | if (err == X509_V_OK) | |
412 | return 1; | |
413 | /* | |
414 | * SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH just means 'x' is clearly not issued by 'issuer'. | |
415 | * Every other error code likely indicates a real error. | |
416 | */ | |
0b3139e8 | 417 | return 0; |
2f043896 DSH |
418 | } |
419 | ||
f1343f45 DDO |
420 | /*- |
421 | * Alternative get_issuer method: look up from a STACK_OF(X509) in other_ctx. | |
7e365d51 DDO |
422 | * Returns -1 on internal error. |
423 | */ | |
2f043896 DSH |
424 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
425 | { | |
0f113f3e | 426 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
c34e7876 DDO |
427 | if (*issuer == NULL) |
428 | return 0; | |
429 | return X509_up_ref(*issuer) ? 1 : -1; | |
2f043896 | 430 | } |
2f043896 | 431 | |
f1343f45 DDO |
432 | /*- |
433 | * Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx. | |
0ce8271c | 434 | * Returns NULL on internal/fatal error, empty stack if not found. |
f1343f45 | 435 | */ |
c34e7876 | 436 | static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const X509_NAME *nm) |
c864e761 | 437 | { |
7e365d51 | 438 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = sk_X509_new_null(); |
c864e761 DSH |
439 | X509 *x; |
440 | int i; | |
7fcdbd83 | 441 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
442 | if (sk == NULL) |
443 | return NULL; | |
c864e761 DSH |
444 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { |
445 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); | |
446 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { | |
7e365d51 | 447 | if (!X509_add_cert(sk, x, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { |
79b2a2f2 | 448 | OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk); |
7fcdbd83 | 449 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
c864e761 DSH |
450 | return NULL; |
451 | } | |
c864e761 DSH |
452 | } |
453 | } | |
454 | return sk; | |
455 | } | |
456 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
457 | /* |
458 | * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local | |
459 | * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. | |
0ce8271c | 460 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). |
0daccd4d VD |
461 | */ |
462 | static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, | |
463 | int must_be_ca) | |
464 | { | |
0daccd4d VD |
465 | int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
466 | ||
467 | /* | |
468 | * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust | |
33cc5dde | 469 | * settings trump the purpose constraints. |
0daccd4d VD |
470 | * |
471 | * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in | |
472 | * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in | |
473 | * ctx->param->purpose! | |
474 | * | |
475 | * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from | |
476 | * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets | |
477 | * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however | |
478 | * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value | |
479 | * via the X509_PURPOSE API. | |
480 | * | |
481 | * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're | |
482 | * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is | |
33cc5dde | 483 | * also set. |
0daccd4d VD |
484 | */ |
485 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) | |
486 | tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); | |
487 | ||
33cc5dde VD |
488 | switch (tr_ok) { |
489 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
0daccd4d | 490 | return 1; |
33cc5dde VD |
491 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: |
492 | break; | |
0ce8271c | 493 | default: /* can only be X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED */ |
33cc5dde VD |
494 | switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { |
495 | case 1: | |
496 | return 1; | |
497 | case 0: | |
498 | break; | |
499 | default: | |
500 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) | |
501 | return 1; | |
502 | } | |
503 | break; | |
504 | } | |
0daccd4d | 505 | |
70dd3c65 | 506 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
0daccd4d VD |
507 | } |
508 | ||
0ce8271c | 509 | /*- |
7e365d51 | 510 | * Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose. |
0ce8271c | 511 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). |
7e365d51 | 512 | */ |
4ef70dbc | 513 | static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 514 | { |
0daccd4d | 515 | int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 516 | X509 *x; |
88444854 DDO |
517 | int ret, proxy_path_length = 0; |
518 | int purpose, allow_proxy_certs, num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
0f113f3e | 519 | |
35a1cc90 MC |
520 | /*- |
521 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
522 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
523 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
524 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
525 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
526 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
527 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
528 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
529 | must_be_ca = -1; |
530 | ||
531 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
88444854 | 532 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
533 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; |
534 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
535 | } else { | |
536 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
88444854 | 537 | (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
538 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; |
539 | } | |
540 | ||
0daccd4d | 541 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
0f113f3e | 542 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
07b6068d DDO |
543 | CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 |
544 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
545 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); | |
88444854 | 546 | CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0, |
07b6068d | 547 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED); |
0f113f3e MC |
548 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
549 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
550 | case -1: | |
07b6068d DDO |
551 | CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 |
552 | && ret != 1 && ret != 0, | |
553 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); | |
0f113f3e MC |
554 | break; |
555 | case 0: | |
07b6068d | 556 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA); |
0f113f3e MC |
557 | break; |
558 | default: | |
4d9e33ac | 559 | /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ |
07b6068d DDO |
560 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0 |
561 | || ((i + 1 < num | |
88444854 | 562 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0) |
07b6068d | 563 | && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); |
0f113f3e MC |
564 | break; |
565 | } | |
cccf532f TM |
566 | if (num > 1) { |
567 | /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ | |
568 | ret = check_curve(x); | |
07b6068d DDO |
569 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED); |
570 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS); | |
cccf532f | 571 | } |
d72c8b45 | 572 | /* |
e99505b4 | 573 | * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested |
d72c8b45 DDO |
574 | * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs |
575 | * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2. | |
576 | */ | |
577 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 | |
e41a2c4c DDO |
578 | && num > 1) { /* |
579 | * this should imply | |
580 | * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 | |
581 | * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0) | |
582 | */ | |
1e41dadf DDO |
583 | /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */ |
584 | if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) { | |
07b6068d DDO |
585 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0, |
586 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); | |
587 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx, | |
588 | x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN); | |
1e41dadf | 589 | } |
07b6068d DDO |
590 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 |
591 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0 | |
592 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0, | |
593 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL); | |
d72c8b45 | 594 | /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */ |
bb377c8d | 595 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { |
07b6068d DDO |
596 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0, |
597 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE); | |
bb377c8d | 598 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
599 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i, |
600 | X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); | |
bb377c8d | 601 | } |
1e41dadf | 602 | /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
603 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0, |
604 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY); | |
1e41dadf | 605 | /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
606 | CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 |
607 | || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0 | |
608 | || x->altname == NULL) | |
609 | && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0, | |
610 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY); | |
611 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0 | |
612 | && x->altname != NULL | |
613 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0, | |
614 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL); | |
1e41dadf | 615 | /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
616 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL |
617 | && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0, | |
618 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME); | |
1e41dadf | 619 | /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
620 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0, |
621 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY); | |
622 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL | |
623 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
624 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); | |
625 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL | |
626 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
627 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); | |
cdf63a37 | 628 | if (X509_get_version(x) >= X509_VERSION_3) { |
1e41dadf | 629 | /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
630 | CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /* |
631 | * this means not last cert in chain, | |
632 | * taken as "generated by conforming CAs" | |
633 | */ | |
634 | && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx, | |
635 | x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER); | |
1e41dadf | 636 | /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
637 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL, |
638 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER); | |
82bdd641 | 639 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
640 | CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0, |
641 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3); | |
1e41dadf | 642 | } |
fa86e2ee | 643 | } |
6e5e118c | 644 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
645 | /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ |
646 | if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) | |
647 | return 0; | |
e99505b4 | 648 | /* Check path length */ |
07b6068d DDO |
649 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1 |
650 | && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length, | |
651 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); | |
ade08735 | 652 | /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */ |
dc5831da | 653 | if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
654 | plen++; |
655 | /* | |
656 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
657 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
658 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
659 | */ | |
660 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
ed17c7c1 RL |
661 | /* |
662 | * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint | |
663 | * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to | |
664 | * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length | |
665 | * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. | |
666 | * | |
667 | * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start | |
668 | * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, | |
669 | * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, | |
670 | * increment proxy_path_length. | |
671 | */ | |
672 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { | |
07b6068d DDO |
673 | CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen, |
674 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); | |
ed17c7c1 | 675 | proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; |
0f113f3e MC |
676 | } |
677 | proxy_path_length++; | |
678 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
88444854 | 679 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 680 | must_be_ca = 1; |
88444854 | 681 | } |
0f113f3e | 682 | } |
0daccd4d | 683 | return 1; |
11262391 DSH |
684 | } |
685 | ||
55a6250f VD |
686 | static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype) |
687 | { | |
688 | int i; | |
689 | int ret = 0; | |
690 | GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); | |
691 | ||
692 | if (gs == NULL) | |
6894e20b | 693 | return 0; |
55a6250f VD |
694 | |
695 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) { | |
696 | GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i); | |
697 | ||
698 | if (g->type == gtype) { | |
699 | ret = 1; | |
700 | break; | |
701 | } | |
702 | } | |
703 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs); | |
704 | return ret; | |
705 | } | |
706 | ||
0ce8271c DDO |
707 | /*- |
708 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
709 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). | |
710 | */ | |
e9746e03 | 711 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 712 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
713 | int i; |
714 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
715 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
716 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
717 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
718 | int j; | |
719 | ||
ade08735 | 720 | /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */ |
88444854 | 721 | if (i != 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 722 | continue; |
c8223538 RL |
723 | |
724 | /* | |
725 | * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the | |
726 | * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry | |
727 | * added. | |
728 | * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) | |
729 | */ | |
88444854 | 730 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) { |
c8223538 RL |
731 | X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
732 | X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
733 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; | |
88444854 | 734 | int last_nid = 0; |
c8223538 | 735 | int err = X509_V_OK; |
88444854 | 736 | int last_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; |
c8223538 RL |
737 | |
738 | /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ | |
88444854 | 739 | if (last_loc < 1) { |
c8223538 RL |
740 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
741 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
744 | /* | |
745 | * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as | |
746 | * there is in issuer. | |
747 | */ | |
748 | if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) | |
749 | != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { | |
750 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
751 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
752 | } | |
753 | ||
754 | /* | |
755 | * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a | |
e99505b4 | 756 | * multi-valued RDN |
c8223538 | 757 | */ |
88444854 | 758 | if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc)) |
c8223538 | 759 | == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, |
88444854 | 760 | last_loc - 1))) { |
c8223538 RL |
761 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
762 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
763 | } | |
764 | ||
765 | /* | |
766 | * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that | |
767 | * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly | |
768 | */ | |
769 | tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); | |
770 | if (tmpsubject == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 771 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
c8223538 | 772 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
7e365d51 | 773 | return -1; |
c8223538 RL |
774 | } |
775 | ||
88444854 DDO |
776 | tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc); |
777 | last_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); | |
c8223538 | 778 | |
88444854 | 779 | if (last_nid != NID_commonName |
c8223538 RL |
780 | || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { |
781 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
782 | } | |
783 | ||
784 | X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); | |
785 | X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); | |
786 | ||
88444854 | 787 | proxy_name_done: |
07b6068d | 788 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err); |
c8223538 RL |
789 | } |
790 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
791 | /* |
792 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
793 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
794 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
795 | * to be obeyed. | |
796 | */ | |
797 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
798 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
70dd3c65 | 799 | |
0f113f3e | 800 | if (nc) { |
70dd3c65 | 801 | int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
7e365d51 | 802 | int ret = 1; |
70dd3c65 | 803 | |
5bd5dcd4 | 804 | /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ |
55a6250f VD |
805 | if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 |
806 | && (ctx->param->hostflags | |
807 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 | |
808 | && ((ctx->param->hostflags | |
809 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 | |
7e365d51 | 810 | || (ret = has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)) == 0)) |
5bd5dcd4 | 811 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); |
7e365d51 DDO |
812 | if (ret < 0) |
813 | return ret; | |
5bd5dcd4 | 814 | |
f3e235ed VD |
815 | switch (rv) { |
816 | case X509_V_OK: | |
817 | break; | |
818 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
7e365d51 | 819 | return -1; |
f3e235ed | 820 | default: |
07b6068d | 821 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, x, i, rv); |
f3e235ed VD |
822 | break; |
823 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
824 | } |
825 | } | |
826 | } | |
827 | return 1; | |
828 | } | |
e9746e03 | 829 | |
3bf15e29 | 830 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e | 831 | { |
70dd3c65 | 832 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); |
0f113f3e | 833 | } |
3bf15e29 | 834 | |
9689a6ae | 835 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
836 | { |
837 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 838 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
839 | char *name; |
840 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
841 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
842 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
843 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 844 | } |
0f113f3e | 845 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
846 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
847 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
848 | return 1; |
849 | } | |
850 | return n == 0; | |
851 | } | |
8abffa4a | 852 | |
3bf15e29 | 853 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
854 | { |
855 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 856 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
88444854 DDO |
857 | |
858 | if (vpm->hosts != NULL && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
859 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
860 | return 0; | |
861 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
862 | if (vpm->email != NULL |
863 | && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
864 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
865 | return 0; | |
866 | } | |
88444854 | 867 | if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
868 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
869 | return 0; | |
870 | } | |
871 | return 1; | |
872 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 873 | |
7e365d51 | 874 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
d9b8b89b | 875 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 876 | { |
7e365d51 | 877 | int i, res; |
0f113f3e | 878 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 879 | X509 *mx; |
b9aec69a | 880 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
881 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
882 | int trust; | |
883 | ||
bdcadca2 VD |
884 | /* |
885 | * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) | |
886 | * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. | |
887 | */ | |
888 | if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { | |
7e365d51 DDO |
889 | trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted); |
890 | if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED) | |
170b7358 | 891 | return trust; |
170b7358 VD |
892 | } |
893 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
894 | /* |
895 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
896 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
897 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
898 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
899 | */ | |
900 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 901 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 902 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
f1343f45 | 903 | /* If explicitly trusted (so not neutral nor rejected) return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
904 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
905 | goto trusted; | |
906 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
907 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 908 | } |
d9b8b89b | 909 | |
0f113f3e | 910 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
911 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
912 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 913 | */ |
d9b8b89b | 914 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
579262af | 915 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
916 | goto trusted; |
917 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
918 | } | |
919 | ||
579262af DDO |
920 | if (num_untrusted == num |
921 | && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
922 | /* |
923 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
924 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
925 | */ | |
bdcadca2 VD |
926 | i = 0; |
927 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
7e365d51 DDO |
928 | res = lookup_cert_match(&mx, ctx, x); |
929 | if (res < 0) | |
930 | return res; | |
c34e7876 | 931 | if (res == 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
932 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
933 | ||
934 | /* | |
935 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
936 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
937 | */ | |
938 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
939 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
940 | X509_free(mx); | |
941 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 942 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
943 | |
944 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
88444854 | 945 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); |
d9b8b89b VD |
946 | X509_free(x); |
947 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
948 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
949 | } |
950 | ||
951 | /* | |
952 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
953 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
954 | */ | |
955 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
956 | |
957 | rejected: | |
6e5e118c DO |
958 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) == 0 |
959 | ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED : X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
960 | |
961 | trusted: | |
170b7358 VD |
962 | if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
963 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
964 | if (dane->pdpth < 0) | |
965 | dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; | |
966 | /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ | |
967 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
968 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
969 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
970 | } |
971 | ||
7e365d51 | 972 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */ |
b545dc67 | 973 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 974 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 975 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
88444854 DDO |
976 | |
977 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 978 | return 1; |
88444854 | 979 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 980 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
88444854 | 981 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 982 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ |
0ce8271c | 983 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
984 | return 1; |
985 | last = 0; | |
986 | } | |
987 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
988 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
989 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
990 | if (!ok) | |
991 | return ok; | |
992 | } | |
993 | return 1; | |
994 | } | |
b545dc67 | 995 | |
7e365d51 | 996 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */ |
b545dc67 | 997 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
998 | { |
999 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1000 | int ok = 0; |
1001 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1002 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
1003 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1004 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
1005 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
1006 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
1007 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1008 | |
88444854 | 1009 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) |
790555d6 RL |
1010 | return 1; |
1011 | ||
0f113f3e | 1012 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1013 | unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
1014 | ||
0f113f3e | 1015 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
88444854 | 1016 | if (ctx->get_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1017 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); |
1018 | else | |
1019 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
07b6068d | 1020 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ |
0f113f3e | 1021 | if (!ok) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1022 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
1023 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1024 | } |
1025 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
1026 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
1027 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 1028 | goto done; |
0f113f3e | 1029 | |
88444854 | 1030 | if (dcrl != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1031 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); |
1032 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 1033 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
1034 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
1035 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 1036 | goto done; |
88444854 | 1037 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1038 | ok = 1; |
88444854 | 1039 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1040 | |
1041 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
1042 | if (ok != 2) { | |
1043 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
1044 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 1045 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
1046 | } |
1047 | ||
1048 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
1049 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
1050 | crl = NULL; | |
1051 | dcrl = NULL; | |
1052 | /* | |
60250017 | 1053 | * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, |
0f113f3e MC |
1054 | * so exit loop. |
1055 | */ | |
1056 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1057 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
1058 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1059 | } |
1060 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 1061 | done: |
0f113f3e MC |
1062 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
1063 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
1064 | ||
1065 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1066 | return ok; | |
0f113f3e | 1067 | } |
b545dc67 | 1068 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1069 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
e1a27eb3 | 1070 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) |
0f113f3e MC |
1071 | { |
1072 | time_t *ptime; | |
1073 | int i; | |
70dd3c65 | 1074 | |
88444854 | 1075 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 1076 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
88444854 | 1077 | else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
d35ff2c0 | 1078 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1079 | else |
1080 | ptime = NULL; | |
c92c3dfb RK |
1081 | if (notify) |
1082 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
0f113f3e | 1083 | |
568ce3a5 | 1084 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); |
0f113f3e MC |
1085 | if (i == 0) { |
1086 | if (!notify) | |
1087 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1088 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1089 | return 0; |
1090 | } | |
1091 | ||
1092 | if (i > 0) { | |
1093 | if (!notify) | |
1094 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1095 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1096 | return 0; |
1097 | } | |
1098 | ||
568ce3a5 DSH |
1099 | if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { |
1100 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1101 | |
1102 | if (i == 0) { | |
1103 | if (!notify) | |
1104 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1105 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1106 | return 0; |
1107 | } | |
e99505b4 | 1108 | /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */ |
88444854 DDO |
1109 | if (i < 0 && (ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA) == 0) { |
1110 | if (!notify || !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1111 | return 0; |
1112 | } | |
1113 | } | |
1114 | ||
1115 | if (notify) | |
1116 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1117 | ||
1118 | return 1; | |
1119 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1120 | |
d43c4497 | 1121 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
1122 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
1123 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
1124 | { | |
1125 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
1126 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
1127 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
1128 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
1129 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1130 | ||
1131 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1132 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1133 | reasons = *preasons; | |
1134 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
8b7c51a0 | 1135 | if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) |
626aa248 DSH |
1136 | continue; |
1137 | /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ | |
8b7c51a0 | 1138 | if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { |
626aa248 | 1139 | int day, sec; |
88444854 | 1140 | |
568ce3a5 DSH |
1141 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), |
1142 | X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) | |
626aa248 | 1143 | continue; |
e032117d DSH |
1144 | /* |
1145 | * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| | |
1146 | * and |sec|. | |
1147 | */ | |
1148 | if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) | |
626aa248 | 1149 | continue; |
0f113f3e | 1150 | } |
626aa248 DSH |
1151 | best_crl = crl; |
1152 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
1153 | best_score = crl_score; | |
1154 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1155 | } |
1156 | ||
88444854 | 1157 | if (best_crl != NULL) { |
222561fe | 1158 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1159 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
1160 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
1161 | *pscore = best_score; | |
1162 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 1163 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
1164 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
1165 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1166 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
1167 | } | |
1168 | ||
1169 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
1170 | return 1; | |
1171 | ||
1172 | return 0; | |
1173 | } | |
1174 | ||
1175 | /* | |
1176 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1177 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
1178 | */ | |
d43c4497 | 1179 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) |
0f113f3e | 1180 | { |
88444854 DDO |
1181 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta = NULL, *extb = NULL; |
1182 | int i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
1183 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1184 | if (i >= 0) { |
1185 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1186 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1187 | return 0; | |
1188 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
88444854 | 1189 | } |
d43c4497 | 1190 | |
0f113f3e | 1191 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
0f113f3e | 1192 | if (i >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1193 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1194 | return 0; | |
1195 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
88444854 | 1196 | } |
d43c4497 | 1197 | |
88444854 | 1198 | if (exta == NULL && extb == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1199 | return 1; |
d43c4497 | 1200 | |
88444854 | 1201 | if (exta == NULL || extb == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1202 | return 0; |
d43c4497 | 1203 | |
88444854 | 1204 | return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb) == 0; |
0f113f3e | 1205 | } |
d43c4497 DSH |
1206 | |
1207 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
d43c4497 | 1208 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) |
0f113f3e MC |
1209 | { |
1210 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
88444854 | 1211 | if (delta->base_crl_number == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1212 | return 0; |
1213 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1214 | if (base->crl_number == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1215 | return 0; |
1216 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1217 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), |
1218 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1219 | return 0; |
1220 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1221 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1222 | return 0; | |
1223 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1224 | return 0; | |
1225 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1226 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1227 | return 0; | |
1228 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1229 | return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1230 | } |
1231 | ||
1232 | /* | |
1233 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1234 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 | 1235 | */ |
d43c4497 | 1236 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, |
0f113f3e MC |
1237 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1238 | { | |
1239 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1240 | int i; | |
88444854 DDO |
1241 | |
1242 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1243 | return; |
88444854 | 1244 | if (((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1245 | return; |
1246 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1247 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1248 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1249 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1250 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1251 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1252 | *dcrl = delta; |
1253 | return; | |
1254 | } | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1257 | } | |
1258 | ||
1259 | /* | |
1260 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1261 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1262 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1263 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1264 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f | 1265 | */ |
4b96839f | 1266 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
0f113f3e MC |
1267 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1268 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1269 | int crl_score = 0; |
1270 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1271 | ||
1272 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1273 | ||
1274 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
88444854 | 1275 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1276 | return 0; |
1277 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
88444854 | 1278 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1279 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) |
1280 | return 0; | |
88444854 | 1281 | } else if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1282 | /* If no new reasons reject */ |
88444854 | 1283 | if ((crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1284 | return 0; |
1285 | } | |
1286 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
88444854 | 1287 | else if (crl->base_crl_number != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1288 | return 0; |
1289 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1290 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) != 0) { |
1291 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1292 | return 0; |
88444854 | 1293 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1294 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; |
88444854 | 1295 | } |
0f113f3e | 1296 | |
88444854 | 1297 | if ((crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1298 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; |
1299 | ||
e99505b4 | 1300 | /* Check expiration */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1301 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) |
1302 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1303 | ||
1304 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1305 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1306 | ||
1307 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
88444854 | 1308 | if ((crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1309 | return 0; |
1310 | ||
1311 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1312 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { |
1313 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
88444854 | 1314 | if ((crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1315 | return 0; |
1316 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1317 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1318 | } | |
1319 | ||
1320 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1321 | ||
1322 | return crl_score; | |
1323 | ||
1324 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1325 | |
1326 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1327 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1328 | { | |
1329 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
8cc86b81 | 1330 | const X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1331 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
1332 | int i; | |
1333 | ||
1334 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1335 | cidx++; | |
1336 | ||
1337 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1338 | ||
1339 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1340 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1341 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1342 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1343 | return; | |
1344 | } | |
1345 | } | |
1346 | ||
1347 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1348 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1349 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1350 | continue; | |
1351 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1352 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1353 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1354 | return; | |
1355 | } | |
1356 | } | |
1357 | ||
1358 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
88444854 | 1359 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1360 | return; |
1361 | ||
1362 | /* | |
1363 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1364 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1365 | */ | |
1366 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1367 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
88444854 | 1368 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1369 | continue; |
1370 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1371 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1372 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1373 | return; | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | } | |
1376 | } | |
1377 | ||
1378 | /* | |
1379 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1380 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1381 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1382 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed | 1383 | */ |
9d84d4ed | 1384 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 1385 | { |
c926a5ec | 1386 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx = {0}; |
0f113f3e | 1387 | int ret; |
70dd3c65 | 1388 | |
0f113f3e | 1389 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
88444854 | 1390 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1391 | return 0; |
faa9dcd4 | 1392 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1393 | return -1; |
1394 | ||
1395 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1396 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1397 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1398 | ||
1399 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1400 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1401 | ||
1402 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1403 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1404 | if (ret <= 0) |
1405 | goto err; | |
1406 | ||
1407 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1408 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
1409 | err: | |
1410 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1411 | return ret; | |
1412 | } | |
1413 | ||
1414 | /* | |
1415 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1416 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
e99505b4 | 1417 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more |
0f113f3e MC |
1418 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, |
1419 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1420 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed | 1421 | */ |
9d84d4ed | 1422 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1423 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1424 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1425 | { | |
88444854 DDO |
1426 | X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); |
1427 | X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1428 | ||
1429 | return X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta) == 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1430 | } |
9d84d4ed | 1431 | |
3a83462d MC |
1432 | /*- |
1433 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1434 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1435 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1436 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1437 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b | 1438 | */ |
3e727a3b | 1439 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1440 | { |
1441 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1442 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1443 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1444 | int i, j; | |
88444854 DDO |
1445 | |
1446 | if (a == NULL || b == NULL) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1447 | return 1; |
1448 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1449 | if (a->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1450 | return 0; |
1451 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1452 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1453 | if (b->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1454 | return 0; |
88444854 | 1455 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname) == 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1456 | } |
1457 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1458 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1459 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1460 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1461 | if (b->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1462 | return 0; |
1463 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1464 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1465 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1466 | } | |
1467 | ||
1468 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
88444854 | 1469 | if (nm != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1470 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
1471 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1472 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1473 | continue; | |
88444854 | 1474 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1475 | return 1; |
1476 | } | |
1477 | return 0; | |
1478 | } | |
1479 | ||
1480 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1481 | ||
1482 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1483 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1484 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1485 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
88444854 | 1486 | if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1487 | return 1; |
1488 | } | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | ||
1491 | return 0; | |
1492 | ||
1493 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1494 | |
4b96839f | 1495 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1496 | { |
1497 | int i; | |
8cc86b81 | 1498 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
88444854 | 1499 | |
0f113f3e | 1500 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ |
88444854 DDO |
1501 | if (dp->CRLissuer == NULL) |
1502 | return (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1503 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
1504 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
88444854 | 1505 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1506 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
1507 | continue; | |
88444854 | 1508 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1509 | return 1; |
1510 | } | |
1511 | return 0; | |
1512 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1513 | |
4b96839f | 1514 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
4b96839f | 1515 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1516 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1517 | { | |
1518 | int i; | |
88444854 DDO |
1519 | |
1520 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) != 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1521 | return 0; |
88444854 DDO |
1522 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { |
1523 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) != 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1524 | return 0; |
1525 | } else { | |
88444854 | 1526 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1527 | return 0; |
1528 | } | |
1529 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1530 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1531 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
88444854 | 1532 | |
0f113f3e | 1533 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { |
88444854 DDO |
1534 | if (crl->idp == NULL |
1535 | || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1536 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; |
1537 | return 1; | |
1538 | } | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
1541 | return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL) |
1542 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1543 | } |
1544 | ||
1545 | /* | |
1546 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1547 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1548 | */ |
d43c4497 | 1549 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1550 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1551 | { | |
1552 | int ok; | |
1553 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1554 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1555 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1556 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1557 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
8cc86b81 | 1558 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
70dd3c65 | 1559 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1560 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
1561 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1562 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1563 | if (ok) |
1564 | goto done; | |
1565 | ||
1566 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1567 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
1568 | ||
1569 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
88444854 | 1570 | if (skcrl == NULL && crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1571 | goto done; |
1572 | ||
1573 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1574 | ||
1575 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1576 | ||
1577 | done: | |
0f113f3e | 1578 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
88444854 | 1579 | if (crl != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1580 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
1581 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1582 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1583 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1584 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1585 | return 1; | |
1586 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1587 | return 0; |
1588 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1589 | |
1590 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1591 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1592 | { |
1593 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1594 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1595 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1596 | int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1597 | ||
ade08735 | 1598 | /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
88444854 | 1599 | if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 1600 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; |
0f113f3e MC |
1601 | /* |
1602 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1603 | * certificate in chain. | |
1604 | */ | |
88444854 | 1605 | } else if (cnum < chnum) { |
0f113f3e | 1606 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
88444854 | 1607 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1608 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); |
ade08735 | 1609 | /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */ |
70dd3c65 VD |
1610 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && |
1611 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) | |
1612 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1613 | } |
1614 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
1615 | if (issuer == NULL) |
1616 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1617 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1618 | /* |
1619 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1620 | */ | |
88444854 | 1621 | if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) { |
70dd3c65 | 1622 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
88444854 DDO |
1623 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && |
1624 | (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 && | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1625 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) |
1626 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1627 | |
88444854 | 1628 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1629 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) |
1630 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1631 | |
88444854 | 1632 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1633 | check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && |
1634 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) | |
1635 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1636 | |
88444854 | 1637 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1638 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) |
1639 | return 0; | |
1640 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1641 | |
88444854 | 1642 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1643 | !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) |
1644 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1645 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1646 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1647 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); | |
88444854 | 1648 | if (ikey == NULL && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1649 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) |
1650 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1651 | |
88444854 | 1652 | if (ikey != NULL) { |
70dd3c65 | 1653 | int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); |
0f113f3e | 1654 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1655 | if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) |
1656 | return 0; | |
1657 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1658 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && | |
1659 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1660 | return 0; | |
1661 | } | |
1662 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1663 | } |
b545dc67 DSH |
1664 | |
1665 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1666 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 1667 | { |
0f113f3e | 1668 | X509_REVOKED *rev; |
70dd3c65 | 1669 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1670 | /* |
1671 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1672 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
70dd3c65 | 1673 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can |
0f113f3e MC |
1674 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. |
1675 | */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1676 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 |
1677 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 && | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1678 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) |
1679 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1680 | /* |
70dd3c65 VD |
1681 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure |
1682 | * reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
0f113f3e MC |
1683 | */ |
1684 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1685 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1686 | return 2; | |
70dd3c65 | 1687 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1688 | return 0; |
1689 | } | |
1690 | ||
1691 | return 1; | |
1692 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1693 | |
0ce8271c | 1694 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */ |
5d7c222d | 1695 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1696 | { |
1697 | int ret; | |
3921ded7 | 1698 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1699 | if (ctx->parent) |
1700 | return 1; | |
3921ded7 VD |
1701 | /* |
1702 | * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a | |
1703 | * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor | |
1704 | * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 | |
1705 | * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the | |
1706 | * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look | |
1707 | * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain | |
1708 | * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it | |
1709 | * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the | |
1710 | * X509_policy_check() call. | |
1711 | */ | |
e077455e RL |
1712 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { |
1713 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
7e365d51 | 1714 | goto memerr; |
e077455e | 1715 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1716 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
1717 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
3921ded7 | 1718 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) |
225c9660 | 1719 | (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
3921ded7 | 1720 | |
e077455e RL |
1721 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { |
1722 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
7e365d51 | 1723 | goto memerr; |
e077455e | 1724 | } |
0f113f3e | 1725 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ |
895c2f84 | 1726 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { |
e4142ec4 | 1727 | int i, cbcalled = 0; |
70dd3c65 VD |
1728 | |
1729 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ | |
e4142ec4 | 1730 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1731 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
1732 | ||
e4142ec4 MC |
1733 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0) |
1734 | cbcalled = 1; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1735 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, |
1736 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | |
0f113f3e | 1737 | } |
e4142ec4 MC |
1738 | if (!cbcalled) { |
1739 | /* Should not be able to get here */ | |
1740 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1741 | return 0; | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1744 | return 1; |
1745 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1746 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1747 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
1748 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1749 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1750 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1751 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { |
9311d0c4 | 1752 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
895c2f84 VD |
1753 | return 0; |
1754 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1755 | |
88444854 | 1756 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1757 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
f3e235ed VD |
1758 | /* |
1759 | * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed | |
1760 | * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then | |
1761 | * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier | |
1762 | * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. | |
1763 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1764 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
1765 | return 0; | |
1766 | } | |
1767 | ||
1768 | return 1; | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1769 | |
1770 | memerr: | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1771 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
1772 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e | 1773 | } |
5d7c222d | 1774 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1775 | /*- |
1776 | * Check certificate validity times. | |
1777 | * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return | |
1778 | * the validation status. | |
1779 | * | |
1780 | * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
0ce8271c | 1781 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). |
70dd3c65 | 1782 | */ |
4669015d | 1783 | int ossl_x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
1784 | { |
1785 | time_t *ptime; | |
1786 | int i; | |
1787 | ||
88444854 | 1788 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 1789 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
88444854 | 1790 | else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
d35ff2c0 | 1791 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1792 | else |
1793 | ptime = NULL; | |
1794 | ||
568ce3a5 | 1795 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1796 | if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) |
1797 | return 0; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1798 | CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD); |
1799 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID); | |
0f113f3e | 1800 | |
568ce3a5 | 1801 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1802 | if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) |
1803 | return 0; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1804 | CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD); |
1805 | CB_FAIL_IF(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1806 | return 1; |
1807 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1808 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
1809 | /* |
1810 | * Verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain. | |
0ce8271c | 1811 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). |
7e365d51 | 1812 | */ |
6b691a5c | 1813 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 1814 | { |
3c95ef22 TS |
1815 | int n; |
1816 | X509 *xi; | |
1817 | X509 *xs; | |
1818 | ||
1819 | /* For RPK: just do the verify callback */ | |
1820 | if (ctx->rpk != NULL) { | |
1821 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(ctx->error == X509_V_OK, ctx)) | |
1822 | return 0; | |
1823 | return 1; | |
1824 | } | |
1825 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1826 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1827 | xs = xi; | |
0f113f3e | 1828 | |
88444854 | 1829 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
170b7358 | 1830 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { |
88444854 DDO |
1831 | /* |
1832 | * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, | |
1833 | * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps. | |
1834 | * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key. | |
1835 | */ | |
170b7358 | 1836 | xi = NULL; |
4669015d | 1837 | } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi, xi) != X509_V_OK |
88444854 DDO |
1838 | /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */ |
1839 | && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) { | |
1840 | if (n > 0) { | |
1841 | n--; | |
1842 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1843 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1844 | } else { | |
1845 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0, | |
1846 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); | |
02a25671 | 1847 | } |
88444854 DDO |
1848 | /* |
1849 | * The below code will certainly not do a | |
1850 | * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued. | |
1851 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1852 | } |
1853 | ||
d9b8b89b | 1854 | /* |
d1e85cdf | 1855 | * Do not clear error (by ctx->error = X509_V_OK), it must be "sticky", |
88444854 | 1856 | * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). |
d9b8b89b | 1857 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1858 | while (n >= 0) { |
07b6068d | 1859 | /*- |
0b670a21 DDO |
1860 | * For each iteration of this loop: |
1861 | * n is the subject depth | |
1862 | * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked | |
88444854 DDO |
1863 | * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures |
1864 | * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use | |
0b670a21 | 1865 | * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. |
88444854 DDO |
1866 | */ |
1867 | /* | |
1868 | * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly | |
ade08735 | 1869 | * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. |
0f113f3e | 1870 | */ |
88444854 DDO |
1871 | if (xi != NULL |
1872 | && (xs != xi | |
579262af | 1873 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) != 0 |
88444854 | 1874 | && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0))) { |
02369787 | 1875 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0b670a21 DDO |
1876 | /* |
1877 | * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage | |
1878 | * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer | |
1879 | * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). | |
1880 | */ | |
1881 | int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); | |
1882 | /* | |
1883 | * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 | |
1884 | * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert | |
1885 | * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. | |
1886 | * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 | |
e99505b4 DDO |
1887 | * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of |
1888 | * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. | |
0b670a21 DDO |
1889 | * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is |
1890 | * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., | |
1891 | * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply | |
1892 | * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus | |
1893 | * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. | |
1894 | */ | |
1895 | int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 | |
4669015d | 1896 | ? X509_V_OK : ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); |
02369787 | 1897 | |
07b6068d | 1898 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret); |
c01ff880 | 1899 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
07b6068d DDO |
1900 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, |
1901 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
6e5e118c | 1902 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
1903 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0, |
1904 | ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); | |
0f113f3e | 1905 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1906 | } |
1907 | ||
f1343f45 | 1908 | /* In addition to RFC 5280 requirements do also for trust anchor cert */ |
70dd3c65 | 1909 | /* Calls verify callback as needed */ |
4669015d | 1910 | if (!ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) |
70dd3c65 | 1911 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1912 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1913 | /* |
1914 | * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) | |
1915 | * is retained. | |
1916 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1917 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
1918 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1919 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
1920 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) | |
1921 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1922 | |
70dd3c65 | 1923 | if (--n >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1924 | xi = xs; |
1925 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1926 | } | |
1927 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 1928 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1929 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1930 | |
91b73acb | 1931 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1932 | { |
0f113f3e | 1933 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1934 | } |
1935 | ||
c34e7876 | 1936 | /* returns 0 on error, otherwise 1 if ctm > cmp_time, else -1 */ |
91b73acb | 1937 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e | 1938 | { |
80770da3 EK |
1939 | static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; |
1940 | static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; | |
1941 | ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; | |
1942 | int i, day, sec, ret = 0; | |
48102247 | 1943 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
1944 | const char upper_z = 0x5A; | |
1945 | #else | |
1946 | const char upper_z = 'Z'; | |
1947 | #endif | |
88444854 | 1948 | |
07b6068d | 1949 | /*- |
80770da3 EK |
1950 | * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. |
1951 | * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1952 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
1953 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
80770da3 EK |
1954 | * |
1955 | * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: | |
1956 | * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate | |
1957 | * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity | |
1958 | * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." | |
f48b83b4 | 1959 | */ |
80770da3 EK |
1960 | switch (ctm->type) { |
1961 | case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: | |
1962 | if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1963 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1964 | break; |
1965 | case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: | |
1966 | if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1967 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1968 | break; |
1969 | default: | |
1970 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1971 | } |
1972 | ||
80770da3 EK |
1973 | /** |
1974 | * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more | |
1975 | * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. | |
1976 | * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. | |
1977 | */ | |
1978 | for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { | |
adf7e6d1 | 1979 | if (!ossl_ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i])) |
f48b83b4 | 1980 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1981 | } |
48102247 | 1982 | if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z) |
f48b83b4 | 1983 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1984 | |
80770da3 EK |
1985 | /* |
1986 | * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no | |
1987 | * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, | |
1988 | * so we go through ASN.1 | |
1989 | */ | |
1990 | asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); | |
1991 | if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) | |
1992 | goto err; | |
88444854 | 1993 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time) == 0) |
80770da3 | 1994 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1995 | |
80770da3 EK |
1996 | /* |
1997 | * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. | |
1998 | * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. | |
1999 | */ | |
2000 | ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; | |
2001 | ||
2002 | err: | |
2003 | ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); | |
2004 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e | 2005 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2006 | |
25d7cd1d DDO |
2007 | /* |
2008 | * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range, | |
2009 | * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start | |
2010 | */ | |
2011 | int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, | |
2012 | const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end) | |
2013 | { | |
2014 | time_t ref_time; | |
2015 | time_t *time = NULL; | |
2016 | unsigned long flags = vpm == NULL ? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm); | |
2017 | ||
2018 | if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
2019 | ref_time = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm); | |
2020 | time = &ref_time; | |
2021 | } else if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
2022 | return 0; /* this means ok */ | |
2023 | } /* else reference time is the current time */ | |
2024 | ||
2025 | if (end != NULL && X509_cmp_time(end, time) < 0) | |
2026 | return 1; | |
2027 | if (start != NULL && X509_cmp_time(start, time) > 0) | |
2028 | return -1; | |
2029 | return 0; | |
2030 | } | |
2031 | ||
284ef5f3 | 2032 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 2033 | { |
0f113f3e | 2034 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
2035 | } |
2036 | ||
87d3a0cd | 2037 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
2038 | { |
2039 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
2040 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
2041 | |
2042 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2043 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
2044 | { | |
2045 | time_t t; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | if (in_tm) | |
2048 | t = *in_tm; | |
2049 | else | |
2050 | time(&t); | |
2051 | ||
88444854 | 2052 | if (s != NULL && (s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING) == 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2053 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
2054 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
2055 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
2056 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
2057 | } | |
2058 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
2059 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2060 | |
364246a9 | 2061 | /* Copy any missing public key parameters up the chain towards pkey */ |
7e258a56 | 2062 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
2063 | { |
2064 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
2065 | int i, j; | |
2066 | ||
579262af | 2067 | if (pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2068 | return 1; |
2069 | ||
2070 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 2071 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e | 2072 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2073 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
0f113f3e MC |
2074 | return 0; |
2075 | } | |
2076 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
2077 | break; | |
364246a9 | 2078 | ktmp = NULL; |
0f113f3e MC |
2079 | } |
2080 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2081 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); |
0f113f3e MC |
2082 | return 0; |
2083 | } | |
2084 | ||
2085 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
2086 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 2087 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
364246a9 DDO |
2088 | if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp)) |
2089 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2090 | } |
2091 | ||
2092 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
364246a9 | 2093 | return EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
2094 | return 1; |
2095 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2096 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
2097 | /* |
2098 | * Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs. | |
2099 | * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error. | |
2100 | */ | |
2e8cb108 | 2101 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, |
0f113f3e MC |
2102 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
2103 | { | |
2104 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
2105 | int i; | |
2106 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
c633b973 | 2107 | |
0f113f3e | 2108 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ |
88444854 | 2109 | if (base->base_crl_number != NULL || newer->base_crl_number != NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2110 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); |
0f113f3e MC |
2111 | return NULL; |
2112 | } | |
2113 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 2114 | if (base->crl_number == NULL || newer->crl_number == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2115 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); |
0f113f3e MC |
2116 | return NULL; |
2117 | } | |
2118 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
88444854 DDO |
2119 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), |
2120 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2121 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
2122 | return NULL; |
2123 | } | |
2124 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
2125 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2126 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
2127 | return NULL; |
2128 | } | |
2129 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2130 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
2131 | return NULL; |
2132 | } | |
2133 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
2134 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2135 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); |
0f113f3e MC |
2136 | return NULL; |
2137 | } | |
2138 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
88444854 DDO |
2139 | if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || |
2140 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2141 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
2142 | return NULL; |
2143 | } | |
2144 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
e6c2f964 | 2145 | crl = X509_CRL_new_ex(base->libctx, base->propq); |
e077455e RL |
2146 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2)) { |
2147 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2148 | goto err; | |
2149 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2150 | /* Set issuer name */ |
e077455e RL |
2151 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { |
2152 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2153 | goto err; | |
2154 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2155 | |
e077455e RL |
2156 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) { |
2157 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2158 | goto err; | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) { | |
2161 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2162 | goto err; | |
2163 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2164 | |
2165 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
e077455e RL |
2166 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) { |
2167 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2168 | goto err; | |
2169 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2170 | |
2171 | /* | |
2172 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
2173 | * number to correct value too. | |
2174 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2175 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { |
88444854 DDO |
2176 | X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); |
2177 | ||
e077455e RL |
2178 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) { |
2179 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2180 | goto err; | |
2181 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2182 | } |
2183 | ||
2184 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2185 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); |
2186 | ||
2187 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
2188 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
88444854 | 2189 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2190 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); |
2191 | /* | |
69e21cb6 P |
2192 | * Add only if not also in base. |
2193 | * Need something cleverer here for some more complex CRLs covering | |
2194 | * multiple CAs. | |
0f113f3e | 2195 | */ |
34a42e14 | 2196 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e | 2197 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
e077455e RL |
2198 | if (rvtmp == NULL) { |
2199 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2200 | goto err; | |
2201 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2202 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { |
2203 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
e077455e RL |
2204 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
2205 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2206 | } |
2207 | } | |
2208 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2209 | |
e077455e RL |
2210 | if (skey != NULL && md != NULL && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) { |
2211 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
2212 | goto err; | |
2213 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2214 | |
2215 | return crl; | |
2216 | ||
e077455e | 2217 | err: |
222561fe | 2218 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
2219 | return NULL; |
2220 | } | |
2221 | ||
6b691a5c | 2222 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2223 | { |
2224 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2225 | } | |
58964a49 | 2226 | |
8cc86b81 | 2227 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2228 | { |
2229 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2230 | } | |
58964a49 | 2231 | |
8cc86b81 | 2232 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2233 | { |
2234 | return ctx->error; | |
2235 | } | |
58964a49 | 2236 | |
6b691a5c | 2237 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2238 | { |
2239 | ctx->error = err; | |
2240 | } | |
58964a49 | 2241 | |
8cc86b81 | 2242 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2243 | { |
2244 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2245 | } | |
58964a49 | 2246 | |
51227177 VD |
2247 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2248 | { | |
2249 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
2250 | } | |
2251 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2252 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2253 | { |
2254 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2255 | } | |
58964a49 | 2256 | |
c9654873 VD |
2257 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
2258 | { | |
2259 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
2260 | } | |
2261 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2262 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2263 | { |
2264 | return ctx->chain; | |
2265 | } | |
58964a49 | 2266 | |
8cc86b81 | 2267 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 2268 | { |
88444854 | 2269 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2270 | return NULL; |
2271 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2272 | } | |
25f923dd | 2273 | |
8cc86b81 | 2274 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2275 | { |
2276 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2277 | } | |
2008e714 | 2278 | |
8cc86b81 | 2279 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2280 | { |
2281 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2282 | } | |
2008e714 | 2283 | |
8cc86b81 | 2284 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2285 | { |
2286 | return ctx->parent; | |
2287 | } | |
2008e714 | 2288 | |
6b691a5c | 2289 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2290 | { |
2291 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2292 | } | |
58964a49 | 2293 | |
3c95ef22 TS |
2294 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *rpk) |
2295 | { | |
2296 | ctx->rpk = rpk; | |
2297 | } | |
2298 | ||
e1a27eb3 | 2299 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2300 | { |
2301 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2302 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2303 | |
13938ace | 2304 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e | 2305 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2306 | /* |
2307 | * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? | |
2308 | * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust | |
2309 | * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). | |
2310 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2311 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
2312 | } | |
11262391 | 2313 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2314 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e | 2315 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2316 | /* |
2317 | * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default | |
2318 | * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. | |
2319 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2320 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
2321 | } | |
2322 | ||
2323 | /* | |
2324 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2325 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2326 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2327 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2328 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2329 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2330 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2331 | * client/server. | |
13938ace | 2332 | */ |
13938ace | 2333 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, |
0f113f3e MC |
2334 | int purpose, int trust) |
2335 | { | |
2336 | int idx; | |
88444854 | 2337 | |
0f113f3e | 2338 | /* If purpose not set use default */ |
12a765a5 | 2339 | if (purpose == 0) |
0f113f3e | 2340 | purpose = def_purpose; |
4aa82850 MC |
2341 | /* |
2342 | * If purpose is set but we don't have a default then set the default to | |
2343 | * the current purpose | |
2344 | */ | |
2345 | else if (def_purpose == 0) | |
2346 | def_purpose = purpose; | |
0f113f3e | 2347 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ |
12a765a5 | 2348 | if (purpose != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 2349 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
88444854 | 2350 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2351 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
2352 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2353 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2354 | return 0; |
2355 | } | |
2356 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2357 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2358 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
2359 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2360 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2361 | return 0; |
2362 | } | |
2363 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2364 | } | |
2365 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
88444854 | 2366 | if (trust == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2367 | trust = ptmp->trust; |
2368 | } | |
88444854 | 2369 | if (trust != 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2370 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
2371 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2372 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2373 | return 0; |
2374 | } | |
2375 | } | |
2376 | ||
88444854 | 2377 | if (ctx->param->purpose == 0 && purpose != 0) |
0f113f3e | 2378 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
88444854 | 2379 | if (ctx->param->trust == 0 && trust != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2380 | ctx->param->trust = trust; |
2381 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2382 | } |
2383 | ||
b4250010 | 2384 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) |
2f043896 | 2385 | { |
b51bce94 | 2386 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2387 | |
e077455e | 2388 | if (ctx == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2389 | return NULL; |
1143c27b MC |
2390 | |
2391 | ctx->libctx = libctx; | |
2392 | if (propq != NULL) { | |
2393 | ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq); | |
2394 | if (ctx->propq == NULL) { | |
2395 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1143c27b MC |
2396 | return NULL; |
2397 | } | |
2398 | } | |
2399 | ||
0f113f3e | 2400 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2401 | } |
2402 | ||
1143c27b MC |
2403 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2404 | { | |
d8652be0 | 2405 | return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL); |
1143c27b MC |
2406 | } |
2407 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2408 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2409 | { | |
c001ce33 | 2410 | if (ctx == NULL) |
222561fe | 2411 | return; |
c001ce33 | 2412 | |
0f113f3e | 2413 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
1143c27b MC |
2414 | |
2415 | /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */ | |
2416 | OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); | |
0f113f3e | 2417 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
2418 | } |
2419 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
2420 | |
2421 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, EVP_PKEY *rpk) | |
2422 | { | |
2423 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, NULL, NULL)) | |
2424 | return 0; | |
2425 | ctx->rpk = rpk; | |
2426 | return 1; | |
2427 | } | |
2428 | ||
79aa04ef | 2429 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2430 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2431 | { | |
c926a5ec DDO |
2432 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
2433 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
2434 | return 0; | |
2435 | } | |
2436 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
2437 | ||
faa9dcd4 | 2438 | ctx->store = store; |
0f113f3e MC |
2439 | ctx->cert = x509; |
2440 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2441 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2442 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2443 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2444 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2445 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
d1e85cdf | 2446 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; |
0f113f3e MC |
2447 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; |
2448 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2449 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2450 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2451 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2452 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2453 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2454 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2455 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2456 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
170b7358 | 2457 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; |
3c95ef22 | 2458 | ctx->rpk = NULL; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2459 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2460 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2461 | |
7b7eb472 | 2462 | /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ |
88444854 | 2463 | if (store != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2464 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
7b7eb472 | 2465 | else |
c926a5ec | 2466 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2467 | |
88444854 | 2468 | if (store != NULL && store->check_issued != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2469 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
2470 | else | |
2471 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2472 | ||
88444854 | 2473 | if (store != NULL && store->get_issuer != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2474 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
2475 | else | |
2476 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2477 | ||
88444854 | 2478 | if (store != NULL && store->verify_cb != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2479 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
2480 | else | |
2481 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2482 | ||
88444854 | 2483 | if (store != NULL && store->verify != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2484 | ctx->verify = store->verify; |
2485 | else | |
2486 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2487 | ||
88444854 | 2488 | if (store != NULL && store->check_revocation != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2489 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
2490 | else | |
2491 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2492 | ||
88444854 | 2493 | if (store != NULL && store->get_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2494 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
311f2785 VD |
2495 | else |
2496 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2497 | |
88444854 | 2498 | if (store != NULL && store->check_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2499 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
2500 | else | |
2501 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2502 | ||
88444854 | 2503 | if (store != NULL && store->cert_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2504 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
2505 | else | |
2506 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2507 | ||
88444854 | 2508 | if (store != NULL && store->check_policy != NULL) |
0a5fe2eb RL |
2509 | ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; |
2510 | else | |
2511 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2512 | ||
88444854 | 2513 | if (store != NULL && store->lookup_certs != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2514 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; |
2515 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2516 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; |
0f113f3e | 2517 | |
88444854 | 2518 | if (store != NULL && store->lookup_crls != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2519 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; |
2520 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2521 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; |
0f113f3e | 2522 | |
ecdaa1ae | 2523 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2524 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 2525 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
ecdaa1ae | 2526 | goto err; |
2527 | } | |
2528 | ||
07b6068d | 2529 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ |
4fdc16af | 2530 | if (store == NULL) |
ecdaa1ae | 2531 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; |
4fdc16af DO |
2532 | else if (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) == 0) |
2533 | goto err; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2534 | |
4fdc16af | 2535 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, "default")) |
ecdaa1ae | 2536 | goto err; |
ecdaa1ae | 2537 | |
0daccd4d VD |
2538 | /* |
2539 | * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the | |
2540 | * purpose if this still yields the default value. | |
2541 | */ | |
2542 | if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2543 | int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); | |
2544 | X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2545 | ||
2546 | if (xp != NULL) | |
2547 | ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); | |
2548 | } | |
2549 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2550 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2551 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2552 | return 1; | |
e077455e | 2553 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
ecdaa1ae | 2554 | |
d9b8b89b | 2555 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2556 | /* |
2557 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2558 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2559 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2560 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2561 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2562 | } |
2563 | ||
2564 | /* | |
f1343f45 DDO |
2565 | * Set alternative get_issuer method: just from a STACK of trusted certificates. |
2566 | * This avoids the complexity of X509_STORE where it is not needed. | |
2f043896 | 2567 | */ |
f0e0fd51 | 2568 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2f043896 | 2569 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
2570 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2571 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
c864e761 | 2572 | ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; |
2f043896 DSH |
2573 | } |
2574 | ||
2575 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2576 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2577 | /* |
2578 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2579 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2580 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2581 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2582 | */ | |
c926a5ec | 2583 | /* Seems to always be NULL in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ |
e29c73c9 | 2584 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 2585 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2586 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2587 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2588 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2589 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2590 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2591 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2592 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2593 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2594 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
79b2a2f2 | 2595 | OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx->chain); |
222561fe | 2596 | ctx->chain = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2597 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2598 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2599 | } |
13938ace | 2600 | |
5d7c222d | 2601 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2602 | { |
2603 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2604 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2605 | |
5d7c222d | 2606 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2607 | { |
2608 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2609 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2610 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2611 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2612 | time_t t) | |
2613 | { | |
2614 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2615 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2616 | |
8cc86b81 | 2617 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2618 | { |
2619 | return ctx->cert; | |
2620 | } | |
2621 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
2622 | EVP_PKEY *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_rpk(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2623 | { | |
2624 | return ctx->rpk; | |
2625 | } | |
2626 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2627 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2628 | { |
2629 | return ctx->untrusted; | |
2630 | } | |
2631 | ||
2632 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2633 | { | |
2634 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2635 | } | |
2636 | ||
2637 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2638 | { | |
79b2a2f2 | 2639 | OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx->chain); |
1060a50b RL |
2640 | ctx->chain = sk; |
2641 | } | |
2642 | ||
db089ad6 | 2643 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
f0e0fd51 | 2644 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) |
0f113f3e MC |
2645 | { |
2646 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2647 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2648 | |
8cc86b81 | 2649 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2650 | { |
2651 | return ctx->verify_cb; | |
2652 | } | |
2653 | ||
4a7b3a7b VD |
2654 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
2655 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) | |
2656 | { | |
2657 | ctx->verify = verify; | |
2658 | } | |
2659 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2660 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2661 | { |
1060a50b | 2662 | return ctx->verify; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2663 | } |
2664 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2665 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn |
2666 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2667 | { |
1060a50b | 2668 | return ctx->get_issuer; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2669 | } |
2670 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2671 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn |
88444854 | 2672 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
4dba585f | 2673 | { |
1060a50b | 2674 | return ctx->check_issued; |
4dba585f DSH |
2675 | } |
2676 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2677 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn |
88444854 | 2678 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2679 | { |
1060a50b | 2680 | return ctx->check_revocation; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2681 | } |
2682 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2683 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2684 | { |
1060a50b | 2685 | return ctx->get_crl; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2686 | } |
2687 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2688 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn |
2689 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2690 | { |
1060a50b RL |
2691 | return ctx->check_crl; |
2692 | } | |
2693 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2694 | X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn |
2695 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1060a50b RL |
2696 | { |
2697 | return ctx->cert_crl; | |
2698 | } | |
2699 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2700 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn |
88444854 | 2701 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2702 | { |
2703 | return ctx->check_policy; | |
2704 | } | |
2705 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2706 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn |
88444854 | 2707 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2708 | { |
2709 | return ctx->lookup_certs; | |
2710 | } | |
2711 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2712 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn |
88444854 | 2713 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2714 | { |
2715 | return ctx->lookup_crls; | |
2716 | } | |
2717 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2718 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2719 | { |
2720 | return ctx->cleanup; | |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2721 | } |
2722 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2723 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2724 | { |
2725 | return ctx->tree; | |
2726 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2727 | |
8cc86b81 | 2728 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2729 | { |
2730 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2731 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2732 | |
8cc86b81 | 2733 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
7f3f41d8 | 2734 | { |
d9b8b89b | 2735 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2736 | } |
2737 | ||
5d7c222d | 2738 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2739 | { |
2740 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
12a765a5 | 2741 | |
0f113f3e | 2742 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); |
4fdc16af DO |
2743 | if (param == NULL) { |
2744 | ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID, "name=%s", name); | |
0f113f3e | 2745 | return 0; |
4fdc16af | 2746 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
2747 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); |
2748 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2749 | |
8cc86b81 | 2750 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2751 | { |
2752 | return ctx->param; | |
2753 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2754 | |
2755 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2756 | { |
222561fe | 2757 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2758 | ctx->param = param; |
2759 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2760 | |
b9aec69a | 2761 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) |
919ba009 VD |
2762 | { |
2763 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2764 | } | |
2765 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2766 | static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, |
2767 | unsigned int *i2dlen) | |
170b7358 VD |
2768 | { |
2769 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
2770 | int len; | |
2771 | ||
2772 | /* | |
2773 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
2774 | */ | |
2775 | switch (selector) { | |
2776 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
2777 | len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); | |
2778 | break; | |
2779 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
2780 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); | |
2781 | break; | |
2782 | default: | |
9311d0c4 | 2783 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); |
170b7358 VD |
2784 | return NULL; |
2785 | } | |
2786 | ||
2787 | if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 2788 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
170b7358 VD |
2789 | return NULL; |
2790 | } | |
2791 | ||
2792 | *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
2793 | return buf; | |
2794 | } | |
2795 | ||
88444854 | 2796 | #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ |
170b7358 | 2797 | |
7e365d51 | 2798 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
3c95ef22 | 2799 | static int dane_match_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) |
170b7358 | 2800 | { |
b9aec69a | 2801 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2802 | unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; |
2803 | unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2804 | unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2805 | unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2806 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
2807 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
2808 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2809 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; | |
2810 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
2811 | int i; | |
2812 | int recnum; | |
2813 | int matched = 0; | |
2814 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
2815 | uint32_t mask; | |
2816 | ||
2817 | mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; | |
2818 | ||
07b6068d | 2819 | /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */ |
170b7358 VD |
2820 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) |
2821 | mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2822 | ||
2823 | /* | |
2824 | * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any | |
02e112a8 | 2825 | * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. |
170b7358 VD |
2826 | * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. |
2827 | */ | |
2828 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
2829 | mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2830 | ||
2831 | /*- | |
2832 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 | |
2833 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 | |
2834 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 | |
2835 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 | |
2836 | * | |
2837 | * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building | |
2838 | * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with | |
2839 | * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which | |
2840 | * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). | |
2841 | * | |
2842 | * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX | |
2843 | * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest | |
2844 | * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. | |
2845 | * | |
2846 | * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we | |
2847 | * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers | |
2848 | * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch | |
2849 | * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", | |
2850 | * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public | |
2851 | * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" | |
2852 | * or multiple "3 0 1" records. | |
2853 | * | |
2854 | * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either | |
2855 | * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after | |
0d4fb843 | 2856 | * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is |
170b7358 VD |
2857 | * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. |
2858 | */ | |
88444854 | 2859 | recnum = (dane->umask & mask) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; |
170b7358 VD |
2860 | for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { |
2861 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2862 | if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) | |
2863 | continue; | |
2864 | if (t->usage != usage) { | |
2865 | usage = t->usage; | |
2866 | ||
2867 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2868 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2869 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2870 | } | |
2871 | if (t->selector != selector) { | |
2872 | selector = t->selector; | |
2873 | ||
2874 | /* Update per-selector state */ | |
2875 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2876 | i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); | |
2877 | if (i2dbuf == NULL) | |
2878 | return -1; | |
2879 | ||
2880 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2881 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2882 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2883 | } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
2884 | /*- | |
2885 | * Digest agility: | |
2886 | * | |
2887 | * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9> | |
2888 | * | |
2889 | * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the | |
2890 | * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals | |
2891 | * other than "Full". | |
2892 | */ | |
2893 | if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) | |
2894 | continue; | |
2895 | } | |
2896 | ||
2897 | /* | |
2898 | * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant | |
2899 | * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. | |
2900 | */ | |
2901 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
2902 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
88444854 | 2903 | |
170b7358 VD |
2904 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; |
2905 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
2906 | ||
2907 | if (md != NULL) { | |
dccd20d1 F |
2908 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; |
2909 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
2910 | matched = -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
2911 | break; |
2912 | } | |
2913 | } | |
2914 | } | |
2915 | ||
2916 | /* | |
2917 | * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any | |
2918 | * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a | |
2919 | * full chain. | |
2920 | */ | |
2921 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && | |
2922 | memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
2923 | if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) | |
2924 | matched = 1; | |
2925 | if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { | |
2926 | dane->mdpth = depth; | |
2927 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2928 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); | |
2929 | dane->mcert = cert; | |
2930 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
2931 | } | |
2932 | break; | |
2933 | } | |
2934 | } | |
2935 | ||
2936 | /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ | |
2937 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2938 | return matched; | |
2939 | } | |
2940 | ||
7e365d51 | 2941 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
170b7358 VD |
2942 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2943 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2944 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2945 | int matched = 0; |
2946 | X509 *cert; | |
2947 | ||
2948 | if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) | |
88444854 | 2949 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2950 | |
2951 | /* | |
ade08735 | 2952 | * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if |
170b7358 VD |
2953 | * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking |
2954 | * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). | |
2955 | */ | |
2956 | cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
3c95ef22 | 2957 | if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match_cert(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) |
7e365d51 | 2958 | return matched; |
170b7358 VD |
2959 | if (matched > 0) { |
2960 | ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; | |
88444854 | 2961 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2962 | } |
2963 | ||
88444854 | 2964 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2965 | } |
2966 | ||
2967 | static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2968 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2969 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2970 | danetls_record *t; |
2971 | int num = ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2972 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2973 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
2974 | int i; | |
2975 | ||
2976 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2977 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2978 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || | |
2979 | t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || | |
2980 | t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || | |
6725682d | 2981 | X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) |
170b7358 VD |
2982 | continue; |
2983 | ||
c0a445a9 | 2984 | /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ |
170b7358 VD |
2985 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2986 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2987 | ||
2988 | /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ | |
2989 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; | |
2990 | dane->mdpth = num - 1; | |
2991 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2992 | ||
2993 | /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ | |
2994 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2995 | for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) | |
2996 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2997 | ||
2998 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2999 | } | |
3000 | ||
3001 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
3002 | } | |
3003 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
3004 | /* |
3005 | * Only DANE-EE and SPKI are supported | |
3006 | * Returns -1 on internal error | |
3007 | */ | |
3008 | static int dane_match_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *rpk) | |
3009 | { | |
3010 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; | |
3011 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
3012 | int mtype = DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL; | |
3013 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
3014 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
3015 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
3016 | unsigned char *cmpbuf; | |
3017 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
3018 | int len; | |
3019 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
3020 | int i; | |
3021 | int matched = 0; | |
3022 | ||
3023 | /* Calculate ASN.1 DER of RPK */ | |
3024 | if ((len = i2d_PUBKEY(rpk, &i2dbuf)) <= 0) | |
3025 | return -1; | |
3026 | cmplen = i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
3027 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; | |
3028 | ||
3029 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; i++) { | |
3030 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
3031 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE || t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI) | |
3032 | continue; | |
3033 | ||
3034 | /* Calculate hash - keep only one around */ | |
3035 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
3036 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
3037 | ||
3038 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; | |
3039 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
3040 | ||
3041 | if (md != NULL) { | |
3042 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; | |
3043 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
3044 | matched = -1; | |
3045 | break; | |
3046 | } | |
3047 | } | |
3048 | } | |
3049 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
3050 | matched = 1; | |
3051 | dane->mdpth = 0; | |
3052 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
3053 | break; | |
3054 | } | |
3055 | } | |
3056 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
3057 | return matched; | |
3058 | } | |
3059 | ||
b9aec69a | 3060 | static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) |
170b7358 | 3061 | { |
07b6068d | 3062 | /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */ |
170b7358 VD |
3063 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
3064 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
3065 | dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
3066 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
3067 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
3068 | } | |
3069 | ||
0ce8271c | 3070 | /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */ |
6e328256 VD |
3071 | static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
3072 | { | |
3073 | int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); | |
3074 | ||
07b6068d | 3075 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err); |
6e5e118c | 3076 | return 1; |
6e328256 VD |
3077 | } |
3078 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
3079 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
3080 | static int dane_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
3081 | { | |
3082 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; | |
3083 | int matched; | |
3084 | ||
3085 | dane_reset(dane); | |
3086 | ||
3087 | /* | |
3088 | * Look for a DANE record for RPK | |
3089 | * If error, return -1 | |
3090 | * If found, call ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx) | |
3091 | * If not found call ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx) | |
3092 | */ | |
3093 | matched = dane_match_rpk(ctx, ctx->rpk); | |
3094 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
3095 | ||
3096 | if (matched < 0) { | |
3097 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3098 | return -1; | |
3099 | } | |
3100 | ||
3101 | if (matched > 0) | |
3102 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
3103 | else | |
3104 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH; | |
3105 | ||
3106 | return verify_rpk(ctx); | |
3107 | } | |
3108 | ||
7e365d51 | 3109 | /* Returns -1 on internal error */ |
170b7358 VD |
3110 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
3111 | { | |
3112 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; | |
b9aec69a | 3113 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
3114 | int matched; |
3115 | int done; | |
3116 | ||
3117 | dane_reset(dane); | |
3118 | ||
89ff989d VD |
3119 | /*- |
3120 | * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, | |
3121 | * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) | |
3122 | * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the | |
ade08735 | 3123 | * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor. |
89ff989d VD |
3124 | * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done |
3125 | * if: | |
3126 | * + matched < 0, internal error. | |
3127 | * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record | |
3128 | * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no | |
3129 | * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. | |
3130 | */ | |
3c95ef22 | 3131 | matched = dane_match_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); |
170b7358 VD |
3132 | done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); |
3133 | ||
7e365d51 DDO |
3134 | if (done && !X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain)) |
3135 | return -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
3136 | |
3137 | if (matched > 0) { | |
70dd3c65 | 3138 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
6e328256 VD |
3139 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
3140 | return 0; | |
5ae4ceb9 VD |
3141 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
3142 | if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && | |
3143 | !check_id(ctx)) | |
3144 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 3145 | /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ |
170b7358 VD |
3146 | ctx->error_depth = 0; |
3147 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
6e328256 | 3148 | return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
3149 | } |
3150 | ||
3151 | if (matched < 0) { | |
3152 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
3153 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
3154 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
3155 | return -1; | |
3156 | } | |
3157 | ||
3158 | if (done) { | |
3159 | /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ | |
6e328256 VD |
3160 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
3161 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 3162 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
170b7358 VD |
3163 | } |
3164 | ||
3165 | /* | |
3166 | * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 | |
3167 | * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. | |
3168 | */ | |
3169 | return verify_chain(ctx); | |
3170 | } | |
3171 | ||
7e365d51 | 3172 | /* |
558f2a01 | 3173 | * Get trusted issuer, without duplicate suppression |
7e365d51 DDO |
3174 | * Returns -1 on internal error. |
3175 | */ | |
558f2a01 | 3176 | static int get1_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
fbb82a60 VD |
3177 | { |
3178 | STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; | |
3179 | int ok; | |
3180 | ||
3181 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
3182 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); | |
3183 | ctx->chain = saved_chain; | |
3184 | ||
3185 | return ok; | |
3186 | } | |
3187 | ||
0ce8271c DDO |
3188 | /*- |
3189 | * Returns -1 on internal error. | |
3190 | * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). | |
3191 | */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3192 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
3193 | { | |
b9aec69a | 3194 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b | 3195 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
88444854 | 3196 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk_untrusted = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 3197 | unsigned int search; |
170b7358 | 3198 | int may_trusted = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3199 | int may_alternate = 0; |
3200 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
3201 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
e2abc685 | 3202 | int max_depth; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3203 | int ok = 0; |
3204 | int i; | |
3205 | ||
3206 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
88444854 DDO |
3207 | if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) |
3208 | goto int_err; | |
88444854 DDO |
3209 | |
3210 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ | |
3211 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
3212 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
d9b8b89b | 3213 | /* |
f9ac6f69 DDO |
3214 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled, |
3215 | * which is the default. | |
170b7358 VD |
3216 | * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the |
3217 | * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, | |
3218 | * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain | |
3219 | * if no luck with untrusted first. | |
d9b8b89b | 3220 | */ |
579262af | 3221 | search = ctx->untrusted != NULL ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; |
170b7358 | 3222 | if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { |
88444854 | 3223 | if (search == 0 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) != 0) |
170b7358 VD |
3224 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; |
3225 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
3226 | may_alternate = 1; | |
3227 | may_trusted = 1; | |
3228 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 3229 | |
661de442 | 3230 | /* Initialize empty untrusted stack. */ |
e077455e RL |
3231 | if ((sk_untrusted = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
3232 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
7e365d51 | 3233 | goto memerr; |
e077455e | 3234 | } |
d9b8b89b | 3235 | |
69664d6a | 3236 | /* |
661de442 VD |
3237 | * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, *prepend* them |
3238 | * to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. | |
69664d6a | 3239 | */ |
adc11e1b | 3240 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL |
e077455e RL |
3241 | && !X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) { |
3242 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
adc11e1b | 3243 | goto memerr; |
e077455e | 3244 | } |
170b7358 | 3245 | |
661de442 VD |
3246 | /* |
3247 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
3248 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so we can make | |
3249 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
3250 | */ | |
e077455e RL |
3251 | if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, ctx->untrusted, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) { |
3252 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
661de442 | 3253 | goto memerr; |
e077455e | 3254 | } |
661de442 | 3255 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3256 | /* |
3257 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
3258 | * might be reasonable. | |
3259 | */ | |
88444854 DDO |
3260 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX / 2) |
3261 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX / 2; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3262 | |
3263 | /* | |
ade08735 | 3264 | * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. |
d9b8b89b VD |
3265 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, |
3266 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
3267 | */ | |
e2abc685 | 3268 | max_depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3269 | |
3270 | while (search != 0) { | |
fc48b5c8 | 3271 | X509 *curr, *issuer = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 3272 | |
d1e85cdf DDO |
3273 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3274 | ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3275 | /* |
3276 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3277 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we |
3278 | * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point | |
ade08735 | 3279 | * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. |
fbb82a60 VD |
3280 | * |
3281 | * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the | |
3282 | * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last | |
3283 | * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, | |
3284 | * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer | |
3285 | * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be | |
3286 | * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain | |
3287 | * would be a-priori too long. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3288 | */ |
3289 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
d1e85cdf | 3290 | i = num; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3291 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { |
3292 | /* | |
3293 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
3294 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
3295 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
3296 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
3297 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
3298 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
3299 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
3300 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
3301 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
3302 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
3303 | * | |
3304 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
3305 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
3306 | */ | |
3307 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
3308 | } | |
88444854 | 3309 | curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); |
d9b8b89b | 3310 | |
558f2a01 DDO |
3311 | /* Note: get1_trusted_issuer() must be used even if self-signed. */ |
3312 | ok = num > max_depth ? 0 : get1_trusted_issuer(&issuer, ctx, curr); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3313 | |
3314 | if (ok < 0) { | |
7e365d51 | 3315 | trust = -1; |
f3e235ed | 3316 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
88444854 | 3317 | break; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3318 | } |
3319 | ||
3320 | if (ok > 0) { | |
aaa584ce DDO |
3321 | int self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0); |
3322 | ||
558f2a01 DDO |
3323 | if (self_signed < 0) { |
3324 | X509_free(issuer); | |
aaa584ce | 3325 | goto int_err; |
558f2a01 | 3326 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
3327 | /* |
3328 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
3329 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
3330 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
ade08735 DDO |
3331 | * that despite the current trust store match we might still |
3332 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3333 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try |
3334 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
3335 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
170b7358 VD |
3336 | * |
3337 | * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust | |
3338 | * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted | |
3339 | * certificate among the ones from the trust store. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3340 | */ |
3341 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
02369787 | 3342 | if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && !self_signed)) { |
88444854 | 3343 | X509_free(issuer); |
7e365d51 | 3344 | goto int_err; |
24664a3b | 3345 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
3346 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; |
3347 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
3348 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
3349 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
170b7358 VD |
3350 | |
3351 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3352 | dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
3353 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
3354 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
3355 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
3356 | } | |
3357 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3358 | dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
3359 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3360 | } |
3361 | ||
c34e7876 DDO |
3362 | if (!self_signed) { /* untrusted not self-signed certificate */ |
3363 | /* Grow the chain by trusted issuer */ | |
fc48b5c8 | 3364 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, issuer)) { |
88444854 | 3365 | X509_free(issuer); |
e077455e | 3366 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
7e365d51 | 3367 | goto memerr; |
0c56a648 | 3368 | } |
aaa584ce DDO |
3369 | if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(issuer, 0)) < 0) |
3370 | goto int_err; | |
558f2a01 | 3371 | } else { |
d9b8b89b | 3372 | /* |
c34e7876 | 3373 | * We have a self-signed untrusted cert that has the same |
d9b8b89b | 3374 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as |
ade08735 | 3375 | * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid |
d9b8b89b VD |
3376 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. |
3377 | */ | |
88444854 | 3378 | if (X509_cmp(curr, issuer) != 0) { |
d9b8b89b | 3379 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ |
88444854 | 3380 | X509_free(issuer); |
d9b8b89b | 3381 | ok = 0; |
88444854 | 3382 | } else { /* curr "==" issuer */ |
c34e7876 DDO |
3383 | /* |
3384 | * Replace self-signed untrusted certificate | |
3385 | * by its trusted matching issuer. | |
3386 | */ | |
88444854 | 3387 | X509_free(curr); |
d9b8b89b | 3388 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; |
88444854 | 3389 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, issuer); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3390 | } |
3391 | } | |
3392 | ||
3393 | /* | |
e99505b4 | 3394 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check |
d9b8b89b VD |
3395 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. |
3396 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
3397 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
170b7358 VD |
3398 | * |
3399 | * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the | |
3400 | * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE | |
3401 | * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from | |
3402 | * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the | |
3403 | * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted | |
3404 | * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3405 | */ |
3406 | if (ok) { | |
88444854 DDO |
3407 | if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) |
3408 | goto int_err; | |
d9b8b89b | 3409 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
88444854 | 3410 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); |
7e365d51 | 3411 | if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED) |
88444854 | 3412 | break; |
02369787 | 3413 | if (!self_signed) |
d9b8b89b VD |
3414 | continue; |
3415 | } | |
3416 | } | |
3417 | ||
3418 | /* | |
3419 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
3420 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
3421 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
3422 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
3423 | */ | |
3424 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
3425 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
3426 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
3427 | continue; | |
3428 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
3429 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
3430 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
3431 | break; | |
3432 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
3433 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
3434 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3435 | } |
3436 | } | |
3437 | ||
3438 | /* | |
c34e7876 | 3439 | * Try to extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificate |
d9b8b89b VD |
3440 | */ |
3441 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
3442 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
88444854 DDO |
3443 | if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) |
3444 | goto int_err; | |
3445 | curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
64c428c3 | 3446 | issuer = (X509_self_signed(curr, 0) > 0 || num > max_depth) ? |
88444854 DDO |
3447 | NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr); |
3448 | if (issuer == NULL) { | |
3449 | /* | |
e2abc685 | 3450 | * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth |
88444854 DDO |
3451 | * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking |
3452 | * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
3453 | */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3454 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
3455 | if (may_trusted) | |
3456 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
3457 | continue; | |
3458 | } | |
3459 | ||
fbb82a60 | 3460 | /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ |
88444854 | 3461 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted, issuer); |
fbb82a60 | 3462 | |
c34e7876 | 3463 | /* Grow the chain by untrusted issuer */ |
579262af | 3464 | if (!X509_add_cert(ctx->chain, issuer, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) |
88444854 | 3465 | goto int_err; |
fbb82a60 | 3466 | |
d9b8b89b | 3467 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; |
d9b8b89b | 3468 | |
07b6068d | 3469 | /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */ |
88444854 DDO |
3470 | trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1); |
3471 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
3472 | break; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3473 | } |
3474 | } | |
88444854 | 3475 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
d9b8b89b | 3476 | |
7e365d51 DDO |
3477 | if (trust < 0) /* internal error */ |
3478 | return trust; | |
3479 | ||
d9b8b89b | 3480 | /* |
170b7358 VD |
3481 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key |
3482 | * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
d9b8b89b | 3483 | */ |
497ecc0d | 3484 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
e2abc685 | 3485 | if (num <= max_depth) { |
170b7358 VD |
3486 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) |
3487 | trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); | |
497ecc0d VD |
3488 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) |
3489 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3490 | } |
3491 | ||
3492 | switch (trust) { | |
3493 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3494 | return 1; | |
3495 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
70dd3c65 | 3496 | /* Callback already issued */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
3497 | return 0; |
3498 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
3499 | default: | |
1287dabd | 3500 | switch (ctx->error) { |
0b3139e8 DDO |
3501 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: |
3502 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
3503 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
3504 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
c633b973 | 3505 | return 0; /* Callback already done by ossl_x509_check_cert_time() */ |
0b3139e8 DDO |
3506 | default: /* A preliminary error has become final */ |
3507 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, ctx->error); | |
3508 | case X509_V_OK: | |
3509 | break; | |
3510 | } | |
e2abc685 | 3511 | CB_FAIL_IF(num > max_depth, |
88444854 | 3512 | ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); |
07b6068d DDO |
3513 | CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) |
3514 | && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0), | |
88444854 | 3515 | ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
64c428c3 | 3516 | if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1), 0) > 0) |
88444854 | 3517 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, |
fc48b5c8 | 3518 | num == 1 |
6e5e118c DO |
3519 | ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT |
3520 | : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); | |
88444854 | 3521 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, |
6e5e118c DO |
3522 | ctx->num_untrusted < num |
3523 | ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT | |
3524 | : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); | |
d9b8b89b | 3525 | } |
88444854 DDO |
3526 | |
3527 | int_err: | |
88444854 DDO |
3528 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3529 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
adc11e1b | 3530 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
7e365d51 DDO |
3531 | return -1; |
3532 | ||
3533 | memerr: | |
7e365d51 | 3534 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
adc11e1b | 3535 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
7e365d51 | 3536 | return -1; |
d9b8b89b | 3537 | } |
fbb82a60 | 3538 | |
1c0eede9 DDO |
3539 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_build_chain(X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
3540 | X509_STORE *store, int with_self_signed, | |
3541 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) | |
3542 | { | |
3543 | int finish_chain = store != NULL; | |
3544 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
3545 | int flags = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF; | |
3546 | STACK_OF(X509) *result = NULL; | |
3547 | ||
3548 | if (target == NULL) { | |
3549 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
3550 | return NULL; | |
3551 | } | |
3552 | ||
3553 | if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(libctx, propq)) == NULL) | |
3554 | return NULL; | |
3555 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, target, finish_chain ? certs : NULL)) | |
3556 | goto err; | |
3557 | if (!finish_chain) | |
3558 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, certs); | |
3559 | if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, target, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { | |
3560 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
3561 | goto err; | |
3562 | } | |
3563 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; | |
3564 | ||
3565 | if (!build_chain(ctx) && finish_chain) | |
3566 | goto err; | |
3567 | ||
3568 | /* result list to store the up_ref'ed certificates */ | |
3569 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) > 1 && !with_self_signed) | |
3570 | flags |= X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS; | |
3571 | if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&result, ctx->chain, flags)) { | |
3572 | sk_X509_free(result); | |
3573 | result = NULL; | |
3574 | } | |
3575 | ||
3576 | err: | |
3577 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3578 | return result; | |
3579 | } | |
3580 | ||
657489e8 HK |
3581 | /* |
3582 | * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table in ssl/ssl_cert.c | |
3583 | * in ssl_get_security_level_bits that's used for selection of DH parameters | |
3584 | */ | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3585 | static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; |
3586 | static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); | |
3587 | ||
07b6068d | 3588 | /*- |
3c95ef22 | 3589 | * Check whether the given public key meets the security level of `ctx`. |
fbb82a60 VD |
3590 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
3591 | */ | |
3c95ef22 | 3592 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) |
fbb82a60 | 3593 | { |
fbb82a60 VD |
3594 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; |
3595 | ||
baba1545 KG |
3596 | /* |
3597 | * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public | |
3598 | * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the | |
3599 | * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security | |
3600 | * floor. | |
3601 | */ | |
3602 | if (level <= 0) | |
3603 | return 1; | |
3604 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3605 | /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ |
3606 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3607 | return 0; | |
3608 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3609 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) |
3610 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3611 | ||
ed576acd | 3612 | return EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; |
fbb82a60 VD |
3613 | } |
3614 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
3615 | /*- |
3616 | * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`. | |
3617 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3618 | */ | |
3619 | static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3620 | { | |
3621 | return check_key_level(ctx, X509_get0_pubkey(cert)); | |
3622 | } | |
3623 | ||
07b6068d | 3624 | /*- |
cccf532f TM |
3625 | * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params |
3626 | * for an elliptic curve. | |
3627 | * | |
3628 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. | |
3629 | */ | |
3630 | static int check_curve(X509 *cert) | |
3631 | { | |
cccf532f | 3632 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); |
c633b973 | 3633 | int ret, val; |
cccf532f TM |
3634 | |
3635 | /* Unsupported or malformed key */ | |
3636 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3637 | return -1; | |
c633b973 DDO |
3638 | if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) |
3639 | return 1; | |
cccf532f | 3640 | |
c633b973 DDO |
3641 | ret = |
3642 | EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey, | |
3643 | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, | |
3644 | &val); | |
3645 | return ret < 0 ? ret : !val; | |
cccf532f TM |
3646 | } |
3647 | ||
07b6068d | 3648 | /*- |
fbb82a60 VD |
3649 | * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security |
3650 | * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether | |
3651 | * self-signed or otherwise). | |
3652 | * | |
3653 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3654 | */ | |
3655 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3656 | { | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3657 | int secbits = -1; |
3658 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3659 | ||
3660 | if (level <= 0) | |
3661 | return 1; | |
3662 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) | |
3663 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3664 | ||
c3c8823c DSH |
3665 | if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) |
3666 | return 0; | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3667 | |
3668 | return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3669 | } |