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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
a8b966f4 | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
a8b966f4 | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
a8b966f4 | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
a8b966f4 | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
a8b966f4 | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
a8b966f4 | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 RE |
62 | |
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
d02b48c6 | 72 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
73 | /* CRL score values */ |
74 | ||
75 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
76 | ||
a8b966f4 | 77 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
78 | |
79 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
80 | ||
a8b966f4 | 81 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
82 | |
83 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
84 | ||
a8b966f4 | 85 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
86 | |
87 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
88 | ||
a8b966f4 | 89 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
90 | |
91 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
92 | ||
93 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
94 | ||
95 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
96 | ||
a8b966f4 | 97 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
98 | |
99 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
100 | ||
a8b966f4 | 101 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
102 | |
103 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
104 | ||
a8b966f4 | 105 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
106 | |
107 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
108 | ||
a8b966f4 | 109 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 110 | |
a8b966f4 | 111 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
112 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
113 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 114 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 115 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 116 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
117 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
118 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 119 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
4b96839f DSH |
120 | |
121 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
a8b966f4 | 122 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 123 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
a8b966f4 MC |
124 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
125 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
126 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
127 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
128 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
129 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 130 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
a8b966f4 | 131 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
132 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
133 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
134 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
135 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 136 | |
d02b48c6 | 137 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
a8b966f4 | 138 | const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
d02b48c6 | 139 | |
6b691a5c | 140 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
a8b966f4 MC |
141 | { |
142 | return ok; | |
143 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
144 | |
145 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 146 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
a8b966f4 MC |
147 | { |
148 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); | |
149 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
150 | #endif |
151 | ||
6b691a5c | 152 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
153 | { |
154 | X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL; | |
155 | int bad_chain = 0; | |
156 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
157 | int depth, i, ok = 0; | |
158 | int num; | |
159 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
160 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
161 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { | |
162 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
163 | return -1; | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
167 | ||
168 | /* | |
169 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
170 | * the first entry is in place | |
171 | */ | |
172 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) { | |
173 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || | |
174 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
175 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
176 | goto end; | |
177 | } | |
178 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
179 | ctx->last_untrusted = 1; | |
180 | } | |
181 | ||
182 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | |
183 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | |
184 | && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
185 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
186 | goto end; | |
187 | } | |
188 | ||
189 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
190 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
191 | depth = param->depth; | |
192 | ||
193 | for (;;) { | |
194 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
195 | if (depth < num) | |
196 | break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | |
197 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | |
198 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code | |
199 | * later. */ | |
200 | ||
201 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
202 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | |
203 | break; | |
204 | ||
205 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
206 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { | |
207 | xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
208 | if (xtmp != NULL) { | |
209 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
210 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
211 | goto end; | |
212 | } | |
213 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
214 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); | |
215 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | |
216 | x = xtmp; | |
217 | num++; | |
218 | /* | |
219 | * reparse the full chain for the next one | |
220 | */ | |
221 | continue; | |
222 | } | |
223 | } | |
224 | break; | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
227 | /* | |
228 | * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. | |
229 | * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we | |
230 | * complain. | |
231 | */ | |
232 | ||
233 | /* | |
234 | * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. | |
235 | */ | |
236 | ||
237 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
238 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); | |
239 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { | |
240 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
241 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { | |
242 | /* | |
243 | * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find | |
244 | * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible | |
245 | * impersonation. | |
246 | */ | |
247 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
248 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { | |
249 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
250 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
251 | ctx->error_depth = i - 1; | |
252 | if (ok == 1) | |
253 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
254 | bad_chain = 1; | |
255 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
256 | if (!ok) | |
257 | goto end; | |
258 | } else { | |
259 | /* | |
260 | * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so | |
261 | * we get any trust settings. | |
262 | */ | |
263 | X509_free(x); | |
264 | x = xtmp; | |
265 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | |
266 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
267 | } | |
268 | } else { | |
269 | /* | |
270 | * extract and save self signed certificate for later use | |
271 | */ | |
272 | chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
273 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | |
274 | num--; | |
275 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
276 | } | |
277 | } | |
278 | ||
279 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
280 | for (;;) { | |
281 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
282 | if (depth < num) | |
283 | break; | |
284 | ||
285 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
286 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | |
287 | break; | |
288 | ||
289 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
290 | ||
291 | if (ok < 0) | |
292 | return ok; | |
293 | if (ok == 0) | |
294 | break; | |
295 | ||
296 | x = xtmp; | |
297 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { | |
298 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
299 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
300 | return 0; | |
301 | } | |
302 | num++; | |
303 | } | |
304 | ||
305 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
306 | ||
307 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | |
308 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { | |
309 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { | |
310 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
311 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
312 | else | |
313 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
314 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
315 | } else { | |
316 | ||
317 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); | |
318 | num++; | |
319 | ctx->last_untrusted = num; | |
320 | ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; | |
321 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
322 | chain_ss = NULL; | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
326 | bad_chain = 1; | |
327 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
328 | if (!ok) | |
329 | goto end; | |
330 | } | |
331 | ||
332 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | |
333 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); | |
334 | ||
335 | if (!ok) | |
336 | goto end; | |
337 | ||
338 | /* Check name constraints */ | |
339 | ||
340 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
341 | ||
342 | if (!ok) | |
343 | goto end; | |
344 | ||
345 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | |
346 | ||
347 | if (param->trust > 0) | |
348 | ok = check_trust(ctx); | |
349 | ||
350 | if (!ok) | |
351 | goto end; | |
352 | ||
353 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | |
354 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
355 | ||
356 | /* | |
357 | * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because | |
358 | * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
359 | */ | |
360 | ||
361 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
362 | if (!ok) | |
363 | goto end; | |
364 | ||
365 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ | |
366 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
367 | ok = ctx->verify(ctx); | |
368 | else | |
369 | ok = internal_verify(ctx); | |
370 | if (!ok) | |
371 | goto end; | |
5d7c222d | 372 | |
10ca15f3 | 373 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
a8b966f4 MC |
374 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
375 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
376 | if (!ok) | |
377 | goto end; | |
378 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
379 | if (!ok) | |
380 | goto end; | |
96ea4ae9 BL |
381 | #endif |
382 | ||
a8b966f4 MC |
383 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
384 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
385 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
386 | if (!ok) | |
387 | goto end; | |
388 | if (0) { | |
389 | end: | |
390 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
391 | } | |
392 | if (sktmp != NULL) | |
393 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
394 | if (chain_ss != NULL) | |
395 | X509_free(chain_ss); | |
396 | return ok; | |
397 | } | |
398 | ||
399 | /* | |
400 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 DSH |
401 | */ |
402 | ||
403 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
404 | { | |
a8b966f4 MC |
405 | int i; |
406 | X509 *issuer; | |
407 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
408 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
409 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | |
410 | return issuer; | |
411 | } | |
412 | return NULL; | |
2f043896 DSH |
413 | } |
414 | ||
415 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
416 | ||
417 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
418 | { | |
a8b966f4 MC |
419 | int ret; |
420 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
421 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
422 | return 1; | |
423 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
424 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
425 | return 0; | |
426 | ||
427 | ctx->error = ret; | |
428 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
429 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
430 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
431 | return 0; | |
2f043896 DSH |
432 | } |
433 | ||
434 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
435 | ||
436 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
437 | { | |
a8b966f4 MC |
438 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
439 | if (*issuer) { | |
440 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
441 | return 1; | |
442 | } else | |
443 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 444 | } |
2f043896 | 445 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
446 | /* |
447 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
448 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
449 | */ |
450 | ||
30b415b0 | 451 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 452 | { |
cf1b7d96 | 453 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
a8b966f4 | 454 | return 1; |
11262391 | 455 | #else |
a8b966f4 MC |
456 | int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
457 | X509 *x; | |
458 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
459 | int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
460 | int purpose; | |
461 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
462 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
463 | ||
3d7a9aca MC |
464 | /*- |
465 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
466 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
467 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
468 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
469 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
470 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
471 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
472 | */ | |
a8b966f4 MC |
473 | must_be_ca = -1; |
474 | ||
475 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
476 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
477 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
478 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
479 | } else { | |
480 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
481 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
482 | /* | |
483 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
484 | * happy | |
485 | */ | |
486 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
487 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
488 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
489 | } | |
490 | ||
491 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
492 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { | |
493 | int ret; | |
494 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
495 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
496 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
497 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
498 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
499 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
500 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
501 | if (!ok) | |
502 | goto end; | |
503 | } | |
504 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
505 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
506 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
507 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
508 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
509 | if (!ok) | |
510 | goto end; | |
511 | } | |
512 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
513 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
514 | case -1: | |
515 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
516 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
517 | ret = 0; | |
518 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
519 | } else | |
520 | ret = 1; | |
521 | break; | |
522 | case 0: | |
523 | if (ret != 0) { | |
524 | ret = 0; | |
525 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
526 | } else | |
527 | ret = 1; | |
528 | break; | |
529 | default: | |
530 | if ((ret == 0) | |
531 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
532 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
533 | ret = 0; | |
534 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
535 | } else | |
536 | ret = 1; | |
537 | break; | |
538 | } | |
539 | if (ret == 0) { | |
540 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
541 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
542 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
543 | if (!ok) | |
544 | goto end; | |
545 | } | |
546 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { | |
547 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); | |
548 | if ((ret == 0) | |
549 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
550 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
551 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
552 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
553 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
554 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
555 | if (!ok) | |
556 | goto end; | |
557 | } | |
558 | } | |
559 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
560 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
561 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
562 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
563 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
564 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
565 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
566 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
567 | if (!ok) | |
568 | goto end; | |
569 | } | |
570 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
571 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
572 | plen++; | |
573 | /* | |
574 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
575 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
576 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
577 | */ | |
578 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
579 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
580 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
581 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
582 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
583 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
584 | if (!ok) | |
585 | goto end; | |
586 | } | |
587 | proxy_path_length++; | |
588 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
589 | } else | |
590 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
591 | } | |
592 | ok = 1; | |
82aec1cc | 593 | end: |
a8b966f4 | 594 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
595 | #endif |
596 | } | |
597 | ||
e9746e03 | 598 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
599 | { |
600 | X509 *x; | |
601 | int i, j, rv; | |
602 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
603 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
604 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
605 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
606 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
607 | continue; | |
608 | /* | |
609 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
610 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
611 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
612 | * to be obeyed. | |
613 | */ | |
614 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
615 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
616 | if (nc) { | |
617 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
618 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
619 | ctx->error = rv; | |
620 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
621 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
622 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
623 | return 0; | |
624 | } | |
625 | } | |
626 | } | |
627 | } | |
628 | return 1; | |
629 | } | |
e9746e03 | 630 | |
51630a37 DSH |
631 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
632 | { | |
cf1b7d96 | 633 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
a8b966f4 | 634 | return 1; |
51630a37 | 635 | #else |
a8b966f4 MC |
636 | int i, ok; |
637 | X509 *x; | |
638 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
639 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
51630a37 | 640 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ |
a8b966f4 MC |
641 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
642 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
643 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
644 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | |
645 | return 1; | |
646 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
647 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
648 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
649 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
650 | else | |
651 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
652 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
653 | return ok; | |
51630a37 DSH |
654 | #endif |
655 | } | |
656 | ||
b545dc67 | 657 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
658 | { |
659 | int i, last, ok; | |
660 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | |
661 | return 1; | |
662 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
663 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
664 | else { | |
665 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
666 | if (ctx->parent) | |
667 | return 1; | |
668 | last = 0; | |
669 | } | |
670 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
671 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
672 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
673 | if (!ok) | |
674 | return ok; | |
675 | } | |
676 | return 1; | |
677 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
678 | |
679 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
680 | { |
681 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
682 | X509 *x; | |
683 | int ok, cnum; | |
684 | unsigned int last_reasons; | |
685 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
686 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
687 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
688 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
689 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
690 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
691 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
692 | last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
693 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
694 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
695 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
696 | else | |
697 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
698 | /* | |
699 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
700 | */ | |
701 | if (!ok) { | |
702 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
703 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
704 | goto err; | |
705 | } | |
706 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
707 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
708 | if (!ok) | |
709 | goto err; | |
710 | ||
711 | if (dcrl) { | |
712 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
713 | if (!ok) | |
714 | goto err; | |
715 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
716 | if (!ok) | |
717 | goto err; | |
718 | } else | |
719 | ok = 1; | |
720 | ||
721 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
722 | if (ok != 2) { | |
723 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
724 | if (!ok) | |
725 | goto err; | |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
728 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
729 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
730 | crl = NULL; | |
731 | dcrl = NULL; | |
732 | /* | |
733 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
734 | * so exit loop. | |
735 | */ | |
736 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
737 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
738 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
739 | goto err; | |
740 | } | |
741 | } | |
742 | err: | |
743 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
744 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
745 | ||
746 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
747 | return ok; | |
748 | ||
749 | } | |
b545dc67 | 750 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
751 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
752 | ||
753 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
754 | { |
755 | time_t *ptime; | |
756 | int i; | |
757 | if (notify) | |
758 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
759 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
760 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
761 | else | |
762 | ptime = NULL; | |
763 | ||
764 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
765 | if (i == 0) { | |
766 | if (!notify) | |
767 | return 0; | |
768 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
769 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
770 | return 0; | |
771 | } | |
772 | ||
773 | if (i > 0) { | |
774 | if (!notify) | |
775 | return 0; | |
776 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
777 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
778 | return 0; | |
779 | } | |
780 | ||
781 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
782 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
783 | ||
784 | if (i == 0) { | |
785 | if (!notify) | |
786 | return 0; | |
787 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
788 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
789 | return 0; | |
790 | } | |
791 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
792 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
793 | if (!notify) | |
794 | return 0; | |
795 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
796 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
797 | return 0; | |
798 | } | |
799 | } | |
800 | ||
801 | if (notify) | |
802 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
803 | ||
804 | return 1; | |
805 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 806 | |
d43c4497 | 807 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
a8b966f4 MC |
808 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
809 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
810 | { | |
811 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
812 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
813 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
814 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
815 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
816 | ||
817 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
818 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
819 | reasons = *preasons; | |
820 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
821 | ||
822 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
823 | best_crl = crl; | |
824 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
825 | best_score = crl_score; | |
826 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
827 | } | |
828 | } | |
829 | ||
830 | if (best_crl) { | |
831 | if (*pcrl) | |
832 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
833 | *pcrl = best_crl; | |
834 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
835 | *pscore = best_score; | |
836 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
837 | CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
838 | if (*pdcrl) { | |
839 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); | |
840 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
841 | } | |
842 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); | |
843 | } | |
844 | ||
845 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
846 | return 1; | |
847 | ||
848 | return 0; | |
849 | } | |
850 | ||
851 | /* | |
852 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
853 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
854 | */ | |
855 | ||
856 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
857 | { |
858 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
859 | int i; | |
860 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
861 | if (i >= 0) { | |
862 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
863 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
864 | return 0; | |
865 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
866 | } else | |
867 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 868 | |
a8b966f4 | 869 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 870 | |
a8b966f4 | 871 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 872 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
873 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
874 | return 0; | |
875 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
876 | } else | |
877 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 878 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
879 | if (!exta && !extb) |
880 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 881 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
882 | if (!exta || !extb) |
883 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 884 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
885 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
886 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 887 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
888 | return 1; |
889 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
890 | |
891 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
892 | ||
893 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
894 | { |
895 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
896 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
897 | return 0; | |
898 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
899 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
900 | return 0; | |
901 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
902 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
903 | return 0; | |
904 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
905 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
906 | return 0; | |
907 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
908 | return 0; | |
909 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
910 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
911 | return 0; | |
912 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
913 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
914 | return 1; | |
915 | return 0; | |
916 | } | |
917 | ||
918 | /* | |
919 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
920 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
921 | */ |
922 | ||
923 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
924 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
925 | { | |
926 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
927 | int i; | |
928 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
929 | return; | |
930 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
931 | return; | |
932 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
933 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
934 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
935 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
936 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
937 | CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
938 | *dcrl = delta; | |
939 | return; | |
940 | } | |
941 | } | |
942 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
943 | } | |
944 | ||
945 | /* | |
946 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
947 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
948 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
949 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
950 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
951 | */ |
952 | ||
953 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
954 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
955 | { | |
956 | ||
957 | int crl_score = 0; | |
958 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
959 | ||
960 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
961 | ||
962 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
963 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
964 | return 0; | |
965 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
966 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
967 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
968 | return 0; | |
969 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
970 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
971 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
972 | return 0; | |
973 | } | |
974 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
975 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
976 | return 0; | |
977 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
978 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
979 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
980 | return 0; | |
981 | } else | |
982 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
983 | ||
984 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
985 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
986 | ||
987 | /* Check expiry */ | |
988 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
989 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
990 | ||
991 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
992 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
993 | ||
994 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
995 | ||
996 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
997 | return 0; | |
998 | ||
999 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1000 | ||
1001 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1002 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1003 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1004 | return 0; | |
1005 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1006 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
1009 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1010 | ||
1011 | return crl_score; | |
1012 | ||
1013 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1014 | |
1015 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1016 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1017 | { | |
1018 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1019 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1020 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1021 | int i; | |
1022 | ||
1023 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1024 | cidx++; | |
1025 | ||
1026 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1027 | ||
1028 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1029 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1030 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1031 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1032 | return; | |
1033 | } | |
1034 | } | |
1035 | ||
1036 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1037 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1038 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1039 | continue; | |
1040 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1041 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1042 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1043 | return; | |
1044 | } | |
1045 | } | |
1046 | ||
1047 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1048 | ||
1049 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1050 | return; | |
1051 | ||
1052 | /* | |
1053 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1054 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1055 | */ | |
1056 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1057 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1058 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1059 | continue; | |
1060 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1061 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1062 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1063 | return; | |
1064 | } | |
1065 | } | |
1066 | } | |
1067 | ||
1068 | /* | |
1069 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1070 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
a8b966f4 MC |
1071 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1072 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1073 | */ |
1074 | ||
1075 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1076 | { |
1077 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1078 | int ret; | |
1079 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1080 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1081 | return 0; | |
1082 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1083 | return -1; | |
1084 | ||
1085 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1086 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1087 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1088 | ||
1089 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1090 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1091 | ||
1092 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1093 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1094 | ||
1095 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1096 | goto err; | |
1097 | ||
1098 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1099 | ||
1100 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1101 | err: | |
1102 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1103 | return ret; | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | ||
1106 | /* | |
1107 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1108 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1109 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1110 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1111 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1112 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1113 | */ |
1114 | ||
1115 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1116 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1117 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1118 | { | |
1119 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1120 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1121 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1122 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1123 | return 1; | |
1124 | return 0; | |
1125 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1126 | |
89f6c5b4 MC |
1127 | /*- |
1128 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1129 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1130 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1131 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1132 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1133 | */ |
1134 | ||
3e727a3b | 1135 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1136 | { |
1137 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1138 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1139 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1140 | int i, j; | |
1141 | if (!a || !b) | |
1142 | return 1; | |
1143 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1144 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1145 | return 0; | |
1146 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1147 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1148 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1149 | return 0; | |
1150 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1151 | return 1; | |
1152 | else | |
1153 | return 0; | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1156 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1157 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1158 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1159 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1160 | return 0; | |
1161 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1162 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1163 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | ||
1166 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1167 | if (nm) { | |
1168 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1169 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1170 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1171 | continue; | |
1172 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1173 | return 1; | |
1174 | } | |
1175 | return 0; | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
1178 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1179 | ||
1180 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1181 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1182 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1183 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1184 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1185 | return 1; | |
1186 | } | |
1187 | } | |
1188 | ||
1189 | return 0; | |
1190 | ||
1191 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1192 | |
4b96839f | 1193 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1194 | { |
1195 | int i; | |
1196 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1197 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1198 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1199 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1200 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1201 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1202 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1203 | continue; | |
1204 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1205 | return 1; | |
1206 | } | |
1207 | return 0; | |
1208 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1209 | |
4b96839f | 1210 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1211 | |
4b96839f | 1212 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
a8b966f4 MC |
1213 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1214 | { | |
1215 | int i; | |
1216 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1217 | return 0; | |
1218 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1219 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1220 | return 0; | |
1221 | } else { | |
1222 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1223 | return 0; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1226 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1227 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1228 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1229 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1230 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1231 | return 1; | |
1232 | } | |
1233 | } | |
1234 | } | |
1235 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1236 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1237 | return 1; | |
1238 | return 0; | |
1239 | } | |
1240 | ||
1241 | /* | |
1242 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1243 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1244 | */ |
a8b966f4 | 1245 | |
d43c4497 | 1246 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
a8b966f4 MC |
1247 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1248 | { | |
1249 | int ok; | |
1250 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1251 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1252 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1253 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1254 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1255 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1256 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1257 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1258 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1259 | ||
1260 | if (ok) | |
1261 | goto done; | |
1262 | ||
1263 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1264 | ||
1265 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1266 | ||
1267 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1268 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1269 | goto done; | |
1270 | ||
1271 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1272 | ||
1273 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1274 | ||
1275 | done: | |
1276 | ||
1277 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1278 | if (crl) { | |
1279 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1280 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1281 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1282 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1283 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1284 | return 1; | |
1285 | } | |
1286 | ||
1287 | return 0; | |
1288 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1289 | |
1290 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1291 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1292 | { |
1293 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1294 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1295 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1296 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1297 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1298 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1299 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1300 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1301 | ||
1302 | /* | |
1303 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1304 | * certificate in chain. | |
1305 | */ | |
1306 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1307 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1308 | else { | |
1309 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1310 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1311 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
1312 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1313 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1314 | if (!ok) | |
1315 | goto err; | |
1316 | } | |
1317 | } | |
1318 | ||
1319 | if (issuer) { | |
1320 | /* | |
1321 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1322 | */ | |
1323 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1324 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1325 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1326 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
1327 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1328 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1329 | if (!ok) | |
1330 | goto err; | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | ||
1333 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
1334 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1335 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1336 | if (!ok) | |
1337 | goto err; | |
1338 | } | |
1339 | ||
1340 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
1341 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
1342 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1343 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1344 | if (!ok) | |
1345 | goto err; | |
1346 | } | |
1347 | } | |
1348 | ||
1349 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
1350 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1351 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1352 | if (!ok) | |
1353 | goto err; | |
1354 | } | |
1355 | ||
1356 | } | |
1357 | ||
1358 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
1359 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1360 | if (!ok) | |
1361 | goto err; | |
1362 | } | |
1363 | ||
1364 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
1365 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1366 | ||
1367 | if (!ikey) { | |
1368 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1369 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1370 | if (!ok) | |
1371 | goto err; | |
1372 | } else { | |
1373 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1374 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
1375 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1376 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1377 | if (!ok) | |
1378 | goto err; | |
1379 | } | |
1380 | } | |
1381 | } | |
1382 | ||
1383 | ok = 1; | |
1384 | ||
1385 | err: | |
1386 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1387 | return ok; | |
1388 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1389 | |
1390 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1391 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1392 | { |
1393 | int ok; | |
1394 | X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1395 | /* | |
1396 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1397 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
1398 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
1399 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1400 | */ | |
1401 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1402 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
1403 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1404 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1405 | if (!ok) | |
1406 | return 0; | |
1407 | } | |
1408 | /* | |
1409 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
1410 | * is not removeFromCRL. | |
1411 | */ | |
1412 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1413 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1414 | return 2; | |
1415 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1416 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1417 | if (!ok) | |
1418 | return 0; | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
1421 | return 1; | |
1422 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1423 | |
5d7c222d | 1424 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1425 | { |
1426 | int ret; | |
1427 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1428 | return 1; | |
1429 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1430 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
1431 | if (ret == 0) { | |
1432 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1433 | return 0; | |
1434 | } | |
1435 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1436 | if (ret == -1) { | |
1437 | /* | |
1438 | * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
1439 | */ | |
1440 | X509 *x; | |
1441 | int i; | |
1442 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
1443 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1444 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1445 | continue; | |
1446 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1447 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1448 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1449 | return 0; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | return 1; | |
1452 | } | |
1453 | if (ret == -2) { | |
1454 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1455 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1456 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | ||
1459 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1460 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1461 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1462 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1463 | return 0; | |
1464 | } | |
1465 | ||
1466 | return 1; | |
1467 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1468 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1469 | static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1470 | { |
1471 | time_t *ptime; | |
1472 | int i; | |
1473 | ||
1474 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1475 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
1476 | else | |
1477 | ptime = NULL; | |
1478 | ||
1479 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1480 | if (i == 0) { | |
1481 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1482 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1483 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1484 | return 0; | |
1485 | } | |
1486 | ||
1487 | if (i > 0) { | |
1488 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1489 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1490 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1491 | return 0; | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
1494 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1495 | if (i == 0) { | |
1496 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1497 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1498 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1499 | return 0; | |
1500 | } | |
1501 | ||
1502 | if (i < 0) { | |
1503 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1504 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1505 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1506 | return 0; | |
1507 | } | |
1508 | ||
1509 | return 1; | |
1510 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1511 | |
6b691a5c | 1512 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1513 | { |
1514 | int ok = 0, n; | |
1515 | X509 *xs, *xi; | |
1516 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1517 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
1518 | ||
1519 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1520 | ||
1521 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
1522 | ctx->error_depth = n - 1; | |
1523 | n--; | |
1524 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1525 | ||
1526 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
1527 | xs = xi; | |
1528 | else { | |
1529 | if (n <= 0) { | |
1530 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1531 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1532 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
1533 | goto end; | |
1534 | } else { | |
1535 | n--; | |
1536 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1537 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1538 | } | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | ||
1541 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1542 | while (n >= 0) { | |
1543 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1544 | ||
1545 | /* | |
1546 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1547 | * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
1548 | * time. | |
1549 | */ | |
1550 | if (!xs->valid | |
1551 | && (xs != xi | |
1552 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { | |
1553 | if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { | |
1554 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1555 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1556 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1557 | if (!ok) | |
1558 | goto end; | |
1559 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
1560 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1561 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1562 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1563 | if (!ok) { | |
1564 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1565 | goto end; | |
1566 | } | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1569 | pkey = NULL; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
1572 | xs->valid = 1; | |
1573 | ||
1574 | ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); | |
1575 | if (!ok) | |
1576 | goto end; | |
1577 | ||
1578 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1579 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
1580 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1581 | ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); | |
1582 | if (!ok) | |
1583 | goto end; | |
1584 | ||
1585 | n--; | |
1586 | if (n >= 0) { | |
1587 | xi = xs; | |
1588 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | } | |
1591 | ok = 1; | |
1592 | end: | |
1593 | return ok; | |
1594 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1595 | |
91b73acb | 1596 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1597 | { |
a8b966f4 | 1598 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1599 | } |
1600 | ||
91b73acb | 1601 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1602 | { |
1603 | char *str; | |
1604 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1605 | long offset; | |
1606 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
1607 | int i, j; | |
1608 | ||
1609 | p = buff1; | |
1610 | i = ctm->length; | |
1611 | str = (char *)ctm->data; | |
1612 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1613 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) | |
1614 | return 0; | |
1615 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1616 | p += 10; | |
1617 | str += 10; | |
1618 | } else { | |
1619 | if (i < 13) | |
1620 | return 0; | |
1621 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1622 | p += 12; | |
1623 | str += 12; | |
1624 | } | |
1625 | ||
1626 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1627 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1628 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1629 | } else { | |
1630 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
1631 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
1632 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | |
1633 | if (*str == '.') { | |
1634 | str++; | |
1635 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) | |
1636 | str++; | |
1637 | } | |
1638 | ||
1639 | } | |
1640 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1641 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1642 | ||
1643 | if (*str == 'Z') | |
1644 | offset = 0; | |
1645 | else { | |
1646 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) | |
1647 | return 0; | |
1648 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; | |
1649 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1650 | if (*str == '-') | |
1651 | offset = -offset; | |
1652 | } | |
1653 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1654 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1655 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1656 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1657 | ||
1658 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1659 | return 0; | |
1660 | ||
1661 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1662 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1663 | if (i < 50) | |
1664 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1665 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1666 | if (j < 50) | |
1667 | j += 100; | |
1668 | ||
1669 | if (i < j) | |
1670 | return -1; | |
1671 | if (i > j) | |
1672 | return 1; | |
1673 | } | |
1674 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1675 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1676 | return -1; | |
1677 | else | |
1678 | return i; | |
1679 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1680 | |
284ef5f3 | 1681 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1682 | { |
a8b966f4 | 1683 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1684 | } |
1685 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1686 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1687 | { |
1688 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1689 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1690 | |
1691 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1692 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1693 | { | |
1694 | time_t t; | |
1695 | ||
1696 | if (in_tm) | |
1697 | t = *in_tm; | |
1698 | else | |
1699 | time(&t); | |
1700 | ||
1701 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1702 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1703 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1704 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1705 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1706 | } | |
1707 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1708 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1709 | |
7e258a56 | 1710 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1711 | { |
1712 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1713 | int i, j; | |
1714 | ||
1715 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1716 | return 1; | |
1717 | ||
1718 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
1719 | ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); | |
1720 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1721 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1722 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1723 | return 0; | |
1724 | } | |
1725 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1726 | break; | |
1727 | else { | |
1728 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1729 | ktmp = NULL; | |
1730 | } | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1733 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1734 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1735 | return 0; | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | ||
1738 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1739 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
1740 | ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); | |
1741 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); | |
1742 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | |
1743 | } | |
1744 | ||
1745 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1746 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
1747 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1748 | return 1; | |
1749 | } | |
1750 | ||
1751 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, | |
1752 | CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | |
1753 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, | |
1754 | CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
1755 | { | |
1756 | /* | |
1757 | * This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
1758 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). | |
1759 | */ | |
1760 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
1761 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
1762 | } | |
58964a49 | 1763 | |
6b691a5c | 1764 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1765 | { |
1766 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
1767 | } | |
58964a49 | 1768 | |
6b691a5c | 1769 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1770 | { |
1771 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
1772 | } | |
58964a49 | 1773 | |
6b691a5c | 1774 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1775 | { |
1776 | return ctx->error; | |
1777 | } | |
58964a49 | 1778 | |
6b691a5c | 1779 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1780 | { |
1781 | ctx->error = err; | |
1782 | } | |
58964a49 | 1783 | |
6b691a5c | 1784 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1785 | { |
1786 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
1787 | } | |
58964a49 | 1788 | |
6b691a5c | 1789 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1790 | { |
1791 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
1792 | } | |
58964a49 | 1793 | |
7e258a56 | 1794 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1795 | { |
1796 | return ctx->chain; | |
1797 | } | |
58964a49 | 1798 | |
c7cb16a8 | 1799 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1800 | { |
1801 | int i; | |
1802 | X509 *x; | |
1803 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
1804 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) | |
1805 | return NULL; | |
1806 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
1807 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1808 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
1809 | } | |
1810 | return chain; | |
1811 | } | |
25f923dd | 1812 | |
4a7f7171 | 1813 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1814 | { |
1815 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
1816 | } | |
4a7f7171 DSH |
1817 | |
1818 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1819 | { |
1820 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
1821 | } | |
4a7f7171 DSH |
1822 | |
1823 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1824 | { |
1825 | return ctx->parent; | |
1826 | } | |
4a7f7171 | 1827 | |
6b691a5c | 1828 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1829 | { |
1830 | ctx->cert = x; | |
1831 | } | |
58964a49 | 1832 | |
6b691a5c | 1833 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1834 | { |
1835 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
1836 | } | |
58964a49 | 1837 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1838 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1839 | { |
1840 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
1841 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1842 | |
13938ace | 1843 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1844 | { |
1845 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
1846 | } | |
11262391 | 1847 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 1848 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
a8b966f4 MC |
1849 | { |
1850 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
1851 | } | |
1852 | ||
1853 | /* | |
1854 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
1855 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
1856 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
1857 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
1858 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
1859 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
1860 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
1861 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
1862 | */ |
1863 | ||
1864 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1865 | int purpose, int trust) |
1866 | { | |
1867 | int idx; | |
1868 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
1869 | if (!purpose) | |
1870 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
1871 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
1872 | if (purpose) { | |
1873 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
1874 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
1875 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1876 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1877 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1878 | return 0; | |
1879 | } | |
1880 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
1881 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
1882 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
1883 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1884 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1885 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1886 | return 0; | |
1887 | } | |
1888 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
1889 | } | |
1890 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
1891 | if (!trust) | |
1892 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
1893 | } | |
1894 | if (trust) { | |
1895 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
1896 | if (idx == -1) { | |
1897 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1898 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
1899 | return 0; | |
1900 | } | |
1901 | } | |
1902 | ||
1903 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
1904 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
1905 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
1906 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
1907 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
1908 | } |
1909 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
1910 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
1911 | { | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1912 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; |
1913 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
1914 | if (!ctx) { | |
1915 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1916 | return NULL; | |
1917 | } | |
1918 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
1919 | return ctx; | |
2f043896 DSH |
1920 | } |
1921 | ||
1922 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1923 | { | |
690d040b RS |
1924 | if (!ctx) |
1925 | return; | |
a8b966f4 MC |
1926 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
1927 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
1928 | } |
1929 | ||
79aa04ef | 1930 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
a8b966f4 MC |
1931 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
1932 | { | |
1933 | int ret = 1; | |
1934 | ctx->ctx = store; | |
1935 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
1936 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
1937 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
1938 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
1939 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
1940 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; | |
1941 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
1942 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
1943 | ctx->error = 0; | |
1944 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
1945 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
1946 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1947 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
1948 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1949 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
1950 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
1951 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
1952 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
1953 | ||
1954 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
1955 | ||
1956 | if (!ctx->param) { | |
1957 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1958 | return 0; | |
1959 | } | |
1960 | ||
1961 | /* | |
1962 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
1963 | */ | |
1964 | ||
1965 | if (store) | |
1966 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
1967 | else | |
1968 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
1969 | ||
1970 | if (store) { | |
1971 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
1972 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | |
1973 | } else | |
1974 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
1975 | ||
1976 | if (ret) | |
1977 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
1978 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
1979 | ||
1980 | if (ret == 0) { | |
1981 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1982 | return 0; | |
1983 | } | |
1984 | ||
1985 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
1986 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
1987 | else | |
1988 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
1989 | ||
1990 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
1991 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
1992 | else | |
1993 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
1994 | ||
1995 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
1996 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
1997 | else | |
1998 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
1999 | ||
2000 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2001 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2002 | else | |
2003 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2004 | ||
2005 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2006 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2007 | else | |
2008 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2009 | ||
2010 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2011 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
2012 | else | |
2013 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
2014 | ||
2015 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2016 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2017 | else | |
2018 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2019 | ||
2020 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2021 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2022 | else | |
2023 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2024 | ||
2025 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2026 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2027 | else | |
2028 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2029 | ||
2030 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2031 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2032 | else | |
2033 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2034 | ||
2035 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2036 | ||
2037 | /* | |
2038 | * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As | |
2039 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
2040 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. | |
2041 | */ | |
2042 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
2043 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
2044 | &(ctx->ex_data))) { | |
2045 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2046 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2047 | return 0; | |
2048 | } | |
2049 | return 1; | |
2050 | } | |
2051 | ||
2052 | /* | |
2053 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2054 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 DSH |
2055 | */ |
2056 | ||
2057 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2058 | { | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2059 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2060 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2061 | } |
2062 | ||
2063 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2064 | { |
2065 | if (ctx->cleanup) | |
2066 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); | |
2067 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { | |
2068 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2069 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2070 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2071 | } | |
2072 | if (ctx->tree != NULL) { | |
2073 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); | |
2074 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2075 | } | |
2076 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { | |
2077 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2078 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2079 | } | |
2080 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); | |
2081 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | |
2082 | } | |
13938ace | 2083 | |
5d7c222d | 2084 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
a8b966f4 MC |
2085 | { |
2086 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2087 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2088 | |
5d7c222d | 2089 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
a8b966f4 MC |
2090 | { |
2091 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2092 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2093 | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2094 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2095 | time_t t) | |
2096 | { | |
2097 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2098 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2099 | |
db089ad6 | 2100 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
a8b966f4 MC |
2101 | int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
2102 | { | |
2103 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2104 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2105 | |
5d7c222d | 2106 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
a8b966f4 MC |
2107 | { |
2108 | return ctx->tree; | |
2109 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2110 | |
2111 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2112 | { |
2113 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2114 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2115 | |
2116 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2117 | { |
2118 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2119 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2120 | if (!param) | |
2121 | return 0; | |
2122 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2123 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2124 | |
2125 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2126 | { |
2127 | return ctx->param; | |
2128 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2129 | |
2130 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
a8b966f4 MC |
2131 | { |
2132 | if (ctx->param) | |
2133 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2134 | ctx->param = param; | |
2135 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2136 | |
f73e07cf | 2137 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
a8b966f4 | 2138 | |
f73e07cf | 2139 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) |
d500de16 | 2140 | |
f73e07cf | 2141 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
d500de16 | 2142 | |
f5fedc04 | 2143 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
a8b966f4 | 2144 | |
d500de16 | 2145 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |