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1=pod
2
3=head1 NAME
4
1bc74519 5CMS_decrypt - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
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6
7=head1 SYNOPSIS
8
9 #include <openssl/cms.h>
10
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11 int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
12 BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
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13
14=head1 DESCRIPTION
15
38d3a738 16CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData
e33ffaca 17structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the
a12a6b99 18recipient's certificate, B<out> is a BIO to write the content to and
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19B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
20
21The B<dcont> parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
22is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
23
24=head1 NOTES
25
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26Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
27needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
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28structure.
29
30If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
31is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
32PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
33not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
34the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
35to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an
36error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
37use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> is set
38then the above behaviour is modified and an error B<is> returned if no
39recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B<without> generating a random
40content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
41B<extreme caution> especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
42open to attack.
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43
44It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
c420fab5 45example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
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46in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this
47case both B<cert> and B<pkey> should be set to NULL.
48
38d3a738 49To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()
df578aa0 50and CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and
38d3a738 51B<cert> and B<pkey> set to NULL.
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52
53The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
54
55If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
56from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
57returned.
58
59=head1 RETURN VALUES
60
61CMS_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
62The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
63
64=head1 BUGS
65
fb777e1f 66The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
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67mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt().
68
69=head1 SEE ALSO
70
9b86974e 71L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_encrypt(3)>
e33ffaca 72
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73=head1 COPYRIGHT
74
75Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
76
4746f25a 77Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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78this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
79in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
80L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
81
82=cut