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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
48e5119a | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
258f8721 | 3 | * |
2c18d164 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
258f8721 MC |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
68570797 | 11 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
02a36fda | 12 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
c99c4c11 | 13 | #include "record_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 14 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
02a36fda MC |
15 | |
16 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { | |
17 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
18 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
19 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
20 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
21 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
22 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 | |
23 | }; | |
24 | ||
25 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { | |
26 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
27 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
28 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
29 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
30 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
31 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c | |
32 | }; | |
258f8721 | 33 | |
6b41b3f5 MC |
34 | /* |
35 | * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated | |
36 | */ | |
5607b275 | 37 | void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 38 | { |
94777c9c | 39 | unsigned char *comp; |
5607b275 | 40 | size_t i; |
6b41b3f5 | 41 | |
94777c9c MC |
42 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { |
43 | comp = r[i].comp; | |
44 | ||
45 | memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); | |
46 | r[i].comp = comp; | |
47 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
48 | } |
49 | ||
5607b275 | 50 | void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 51 | { |
5607b275 | 52 | size_t i; |
94777c9c MC |
53 | |
54 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { | |
55 | OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); | |
56 | r[i].comp = NULL; | |
57 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
58 | } |
59 | ||
258f8721 MC |
60 | void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) |
61 | { | |
e5bf62f7 | 62 | memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); |
258f8721 | 63 | } |
fe589e61 | 64 | |
94777c9c MC |
65 | /* |
66 | * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting | |
67 | * for us in the buffer. | |
68 | */ | |
ea71906e | 69 | static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) |
94777c9c MC |
70 | { |
71 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
8e6d03ca | 72 | size_t left, len; |
94777c9c MC |
73 | unsigned char *p; |
74 | ||
75 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); | |
76 | ||
77 | p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); | |
78 | if (p == NULL) | |
79 | return 0; | |
80 | ||
81 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
82 | ||
83 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
84 | return 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); | |
87 | ||
88 | /* | |
89 | * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version | |
90 | * etc later | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
93 | return 0; | |
94 | ||
95 | p += 3; | |
96 | n2s(p, len); | |
97 | ||
98 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) | |
99 | return 0; | |
100 | ||
101 | return 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | ||
196f2cbb | 104 | int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send) |
70ef40a0 | 105 | { |
4e8548e8 | 106 | uint32_t max_early_data; |
add8d0e9 | 107 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
70ef40a0 MC |
108 | |
109 | /* | |
7daf7156 | 110 | * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the |
add8d0e9 MC |
111 | * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early |
112 | * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data. | |
70ef40a0 | 113 | */ |
add8d0e9 MC |
114 | if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) { |
115 | if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL | |
116 | && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
117 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, |
118 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
add8d0e9 MC |
119 | return 0; |
120 | } | |
121 | sess = s->psksession; | |
122 | } | |
4e8548e8 MC |
123 | |
124 | if (!s->server) | |
add8d0e9 | 125 | max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data; |
4e8548e8 MC |
126 | else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) |
127 | max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data; | |
128 | else | |
129 | max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data | |
130 | ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data; | |
70ef40a0 MC |
131 | |
132 | if (max_early_data == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
133 | SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
134 | SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); | |
70ef40a0 MC |
135 | return 0; |
136 | } | |
137 | ||
138 | /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ | |
139 | max_early_data += overhead; | |
140 | ||
7daf7156 | 141 | if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { |
196f2cbb MC |
142 | SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
143 | SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); | |
70ef40a0 MC |
144 | return 0; |
145 | } | |
7daf7156 | 146 | s->early_data_count += length; |
70ef40a0 MC |
147 | |
148 | return 1; | |
149 | } | |
150 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
151 | /* |
152 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
153 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
154 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
155 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
156 | */ | |
157 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 | |
158 | ||
32ec4153 | 159 | #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 |
fe589e61 | 160 | /*- |
94777c9c | 161 | * Call this to get new input records. |
fe589e61 MC |
162 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
163 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
94777c9c MC |
164 | * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': |
165 | * rr[i].type - is the type of record | |
166 | * rr[i].data, - data | |
167 | * rr[i].length, - number of bytes | |
168 | * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all | |
169 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= | |
170 | * |max_pipelines| | |
fe589e61 MC |
171 | */ |
172 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | |
173 | int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) | |
174 | { | |
196f2cbb | 175 | int enc_err, rret; |
8e6d03ca MC |
176 | int i; |
177 | size_t more, n; | |
88858868 | 178 | SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; |
94777c9c | 179 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; |
fe589e61 MC |
180 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
181 | unsigned char *p; | |
182 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
6a149cee | 183 | unsigned int version; |
72716e79 MC |
184 | size_t mac_size; |
185 | int imac_size; | |
186 | size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; | |
6a149cee | 187 | PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; |
70ef40a0 | 188 | size_t first_rec_len; |
fe589e61 MC |
189 | |
190 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
94777c9c MC |
191 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
192 | max_recs = s->max_pipelines; | |
193 | if (max_recs == 0) | |
194 | max_recs = 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
195 | sess = s->session; |
196 | ||
94777c9c | 197 | do { |
88858868 MC |
198 | thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; |
199 | ||
94777c9c MC |
200 | /* check if we have the header */ |
201 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
202 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) | |
203 | < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
6a149cee MC |
204 | size_t sslv2len; |
205 | unsigned int type; | |
206 | ||
8e6d03ca MC |
207 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
208 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, | |
209 | num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); | |
210 | if (rret <= 0) | |
211 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
94777c9c MC |
212 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
213 | ||
214 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
6a149cee MC |
215 | if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), |
216 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
217 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
218 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
219 | return -1; | |
6a149cee MC |
220 | } |
221 | sslv2pkt = pkt; | |
222 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) | |
223 | || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
224 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
225 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
226 | return -1; | |
6a149cee | 227 | } |
94777c9c | 228 | /* |
78fcddbb | 229 | * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. |
94777c9c | 230 | */ |
78fcddbb | 231 | if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) |
6a149cee MC |
232 | && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 |
233 | && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { | |
be9c8deb MC |
234 | /* |
235 | * SSLv2 style record | |
236 | * | |
237 | * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because | |
238 | * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing | |
239 | * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here | |
240 | * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using | |
241 | * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency | |
242 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
243 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
244 | thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; | |
94777c9c | 245 | |
88858868 | 246 | thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; |
94777c9c | 247 | |
88858868 | 248 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) |
a230b26e | 249 | - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
250 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
251 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
252 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 253 | } |
fe589e61 | 254 | |
88858868 | 255 | if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { |
196f2cbb MC |
256 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
257 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
258 | return -1; | |
94777c9c MC |
259 | } |
260 | } else { | |
261 | /* SSLv3+ style record */ | |
262 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
263 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, | |
264 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
265 | ||
266 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
6a149cee MC |
267 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) |
268 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) | |
88858868 | 269 | || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
270 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
271 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
272 | return -1; | |
6a149cee | 273 | } |
88858868 MC |
274 | thisrr->type = type; |
275 | thisrr->rec_version = version; | |
94777c9c | 276 | |
a2b97bdf | 277 | /* |
3295d242 MC |
278 | * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field |
279 | * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the | |
beb30941 MC |
280 | * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3 |
281 | * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for | |
282 | * that explicitly | |
a2b97bdf | 283 | */ |
657a43f6 | 284 | if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fc7129dc | 285 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING |
6a149cee | 286 | && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { |
94777c9c MC |
287 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) |
288 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { | |
88858868 | 289 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
94777c9c MC |
290 | /* |
291 | * The record is using an incorrect version number, | |
292 | * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We | |
293 | * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a | |
294 | * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably | |
295 | * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just | |
296 | * end. | |
297 | */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
298 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
299 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
300 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 301 | } |
02db21df | 302 | /* |
94777c9c | 303 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) |
02db21df | 304 | */ |
94777c9c | 305 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
02db21df | 306 | } |
196f2cbb MC |
307 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
308 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
309 | return -1; | |
02db21df | 310 | } |
32ec4153 | 311 | |
94777c9c | 312 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
a01c86a2 | 313 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
94777c9c MC |
314 | /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes |
315 | * that we have. */ | |
316 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
317 | if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || | |
318 | strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || | |
319 | strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || | |
320 | strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
321 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
322 | SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
323 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 324 | } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { |
196f2cbb MC |
325 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
326 | SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
327 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 328 | } |
a01c86a2 MC |
329 | |
330 | /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
331 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
332 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
333 | return -1; | |
a01c86a2 | 334 | } else { |
196f2cbb MC |
335 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
336 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
337 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
338 | return -1; | |
124f6ff4 RJ |
339 | } |
340 | } | |
32ec4153 | 341 | |
3295d242 MC |
342 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { |
343 | if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
344 | && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
de9e884b MC |
345 | || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
346 | && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
347 | || s->statem.enc_read_state | |
348 | != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) { | |
3295d242 MC |
349 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
350 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
351 | return -1; | |
352 | } | |
353 | if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
355 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
356 | return -1; | |
357 | } | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
358 | } |
359 | ||
88858868 | 360 | if (thisrr->length > |
a230b26e | 361 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
362 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
363 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
364 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 365 | } |
32ec4153 | 366 | } |
94777c9c MC |
367 | |
368 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
fe589e61 MC |
369 | } |
370 | ||
43219695 MC |
371 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
372 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
373 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
374 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
375 | return -1; | |
43219695 MC |
376 | } |
377 | } else { | |
378 | size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; | |
379 | ||
4f7b76bf MC |
380 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
381 | /* | |
382 | * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH | |
383 | * does not include the compression overhead anyway. | |
384 | */ | |
43219695 MC |
385 | if (s->expand == NULL) |
386 | len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
4f7b76bf | 387 | #endif |
43219695 MC |
388 | |
389 | if (thisrr->length > len) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
390 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
391 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
392 | return -1; | |
43219695 MC |
393 | } |
394 | } | |
395 | ||
94777c9c MC |
396 | /* |
397 | * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. | |
398 | * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the | |
399 | * record | |
400 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
401 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
402 | more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
94777c9c MC |
403 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
404 | } else { | |
88858868 | 405 | more = thisrr->length; |
94777c9c | 406 | } |
8e6d03ca | 407 | if (more > 0) { |
94777c9c | 408 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
fe589e61 | 409 | |
8e6d03ca MC |
410 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); |
411 | if (rret <= 0) | |
412 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
94777c9c | 413 | } |
32ec4153 | 414 | |
94777c9c MC |
415 | /* set state for later operations */ |
416 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 | 417 | |
94777c9c | 418 | /* |
88858868 MC |
419 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH |
420 | * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
421 | * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
94777c9c | 422 | */ |
88858868 MC |
423 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
424 | thisrr->input = | |
94777c9c MC |
425 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
426 | } else { | |
88858868 | 427 | thisrr->input = |
94777c9c MC |
428 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
429 | } | |
fe589e61 | 430 | |
94777c9c | 431 | /* |
88858868 MC |
432 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input |
433 | * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into | |
434 | * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When | |
435 | * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will | |
436 | * be pointed at the new buffer | |
94777c9c | 437 | */ |
fe589e61 | 438 | |
94777c9c | 439 | /* |
88858868 MC |
440 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
441 | * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
94777c9c | 442 | */ |
fe589e61 | 443 | |
88858868 MC |
444 | /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ |
445 | thisrr->data = thisrr->input; | |
446 | thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; | |
255cfeac MC |
447 | |
448 | /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ | |
88858868 | 449 | thisrr->read = 0; |
255cfeac | 450 | |
94777c9c MC |
451 | num_recs++; |
452 | ||
453 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
454 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
78fcddbb | 455 | RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); |
de0717eb | 456 | } while (num_recs < max_recs |
88858868 | 457 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
94777c9c MC |
458 | && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) |
459 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
460 | && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) | |
a230b26e | 461 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) |
ea71906e | 462 | && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); |
fe589e61 | 463 | |
fdd92367 MC |
464 | if (num_recs == 1 |
465 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
fc7129dc | 466 | && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
fdd92367 MC |
467 | && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
468 | /* | |
469 | * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01 | |
470 | */ | |
471 | if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) { | |
472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
473 | SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE); | |
474 | return -1; | |
475 | } | |
476 | /* | |
477 | * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty | |
478 | * handshake record | |
479 | */ | |
480 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
481 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
482 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
483 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { | |
484 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
485 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE); | |
486 | return -1; | |
487 | } | |
488 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
489 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
490 | ||
491 | return 1; | |
492 | } | |
493 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
494 | /* |
495 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
496 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
497 | */ | |
28a31a0a | 498 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
fe589e61 | 499 | unsigned char *mac; |
72716e79 MC |
500 | /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ |
501 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
b77f3ed1 | 502 | if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
503 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
504 | ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
505 | return -1; | |
72716e79 MC |
506 | } |
507 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
94777c9c | 508 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
509 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
510 | ||
511 | if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
512 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
513 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
514 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 515 | } |
88858868 MC |
516 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
517 | mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; | |
518 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 519 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { |
196f2cbb | 520 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
94777c9c | 521 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
196f2cbb | 522 | return -1; |
94777c9c | 523 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
524 | } |
525 | } | |
526 | ||
70ef40a0 MC |
527 | first_rec_len = rr[0].length; |
528 | ||
94777c9c | 529 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); |
e60ce9c4 | 530 | |
fe589e61 MC |
531 | /*- |
532 | * enc_err is: | |
d781d247 | 533 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. |
fe589e61 MC |
534 | * 1: if the padding is valid |
535 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
536 | */ | |
537 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
538 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
539 | /* SSLfatal() already got called */ | |
540 | return -1; | |
541 | } | |
0a87d0ac MC |
542 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
543 | /* | |
d781d247 MC |
544 | * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as |
545 | * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. | |
0a87d0ac | 546 | */ |
70ef40a0 | 547 | |
0a87d0ac | 548 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
70ef40a0 MC |
549 | |
550 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, | |
196f2cbb MC |
551 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { |
552 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
553 | return -1; | |
554 | } | |
70ef40a0 | 555 | |
0a87d0ac MC |
556 | thisrr->length = 0; |
557 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
558 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 559 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
0a87d0ac MC |
560 | return 1; |
561 | } | |
196f2cbb MC |
562 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
563 | SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
564 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 | 565 | } |
d63a5e5e | 566 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
77376c05 | 567 | printf("dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length); |
fe589e61 | 568 | { |
eda75751 | 569 | size_t z; |
88858868 MC |
570 | for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++) |
571 | printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
fe589e61 MC |
572 | } |
573 | printf("\n"); | |
574 | #endif | |
575 | ||
576 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
577 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
578 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && | |
28a31a0a | 579 | (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
fe589e61 MC |
580 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
581 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
582 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
94777c9c | 583 | |
fe589e61 | 584 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
380a522f | 585 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
586 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
587 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
588 | return -1; | |
380a522f | 589 | } |
fe589e61 | 590 | |
a230b26e | 591 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 | 592 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
fe589e61 | 593 | /* |
94777c9c MC |
594 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
595 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
596 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
597 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
fe589e61 | 598 | */ |
88858868 | 599 | if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || |
94777c9c MC |
600 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
601 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
88858868 | 602 | thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
603 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
604 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
605 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 606 | } |
fe589e61 | 607 | |
94777c9c MC |
608 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
609 | /* | |
610 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
611 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
612 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
613 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
614 | */ | |
615 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f | 616 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
617 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
618 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
619 | return -1; | |
380a522f | 620 | } |
88858868 | 621 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
94777c9c MC |
622 | } else { |
623 | /* | |
624 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
625 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
626 | * |mac_size| above. | |
627 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
628 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
629 | mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; | |
94777c9c MC |
630 | } |
631 | ||
88858868 | 632 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 633 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
94777c9c MC |
634 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
635 | enc_err = -1; | |
88858868 | 636 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) |
94777c9c MC |
637 | enc_err = -1; |
638 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
639 | } |
640 | ||
641 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
642 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
643 | /* We already called SSLfatal() */ | |
644 | return -1; | |
645 | } | |
d781d247 MC |
646 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
647 | /* | |
648 | * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an | |
649 | * empty record | |
650 | */ | |
70ef40a0 MC |
651 | |
652 | /* | |
653 | * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above | |
654 | * so we use the previously saved value | |
655 | */ | |
656 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, | |
196f2cbb MC |
657 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { |
658 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
659 | return -1; | |
660 | } | |
70ef40a0 | 661 | |
d781d247 MC |
662 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
663 | thisrr->length = 0; | |
664 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
665 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 666 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
d781d247 MC |
667 | return 1; |
668 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
669 | /* |
670 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
671 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
672 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
673 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
674 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
675 | */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
676 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
677 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
678 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
679 | } |
680 | ||
94777c9c | 681 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
682 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
683 | ||
684 | /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ | |
94777c9c | 685 | if (s->expand != NULL) { |
88858868 | 686 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
687 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
688 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
689 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 690 | } |
88858868 | 691 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
692 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
693 | SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
694 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 695 | } |
fe589e61 | 696 | } |
94777c9c | 697 | |
de9e884b MC |
698 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
699 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
700 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
701 | size_t end; |
702 | ||
3c544acc MC |
703 | if (thisrr->length == 0 |
704 | || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
705 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
706 | SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
707 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
708 | } |
709 | ||
710 | /* Strip trailing padding */ | |
88858868 MC |
711 | for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; |
712 | end--) | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
713 | continue; |
714 | ||
88858868 MC |
715 | thisrr->length = end; |
716 | thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; | |
717 | if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
718 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
719 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
720 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
721 | SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
722 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 | 723 | } |
ad5100bc MC |
724 | if (s->msg_callback) |
725 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, | |
726 | &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
727 | } |
728 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
729 | /* |
730 | * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in | |
731 | * length. | |
732 | */ | |
fc4c15fa MC |
733 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
734 | && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
735 | || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) | |
736 | && thisrr->length == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
737 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
738 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
739 | return -1; | |
fc4c15fa MC |
740 | } |
741 | ||
88858868 | 742 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
743 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
744 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
745 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 | 746 | } |
fe589e61 | 747 | |
cf72c757 F |
748 | /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */ |
749 | if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) | |
750 | && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
751 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
752 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
753 | return -1; | |
cf72c757 F |
754 | } |
755 | ||
88858868 | 756 | thisrr->off = 0; |
94777c9c MC |
757 | /*- |
758 | * So at this point the following is true | |
88858868 MC |
759 | * thisrr->type is the type of record |
760 | * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record | |
761 | * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte | |
762 | * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). | |
94777c9c | 763 | */ |
fe589e61 | 764 | |
94777c9c | 765 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
88858868 | 766 | if (thisrr->length == 0) { |
255cfeac MC |
767 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); |
768 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
a230b26e | 769 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { |
196f2cbb MC |
770 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
771 | SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
772 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 773 | } |
255cfeac MC |
774 | } else { |
775 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 | 776 | } |
94777c9c | 777 | } |
fe589e61 | 778 | |
70ef40a0 MC |
779 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { |
780 | thisrr = &rr[0]; | |
781 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
196f2cbb MC |
782 | && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) { |
783 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
784 | return -1; | |
785 | } | |
70ef40a0 MC |
786 | } |
787 | ||
94777c9c MC |
788 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); |
789 | return 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
790 | } |
791 | ||
94777c9c | 792 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) |
fe589e61 MC |
793 | { |
794 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
795 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 796 | |
0220fee4 MC |
797 | if (rr->comp == NULL) { |
798 | rr->comp = (unsigned char *) | |
799 | OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); | |
800 | } | |
801 | if (rr->comp == NULL) | |
802 | return 0; | |
803 | ||
eda75751 | 804 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 805 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, |
a230b26e | 806 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 807 | if (i < 0) |
0220fee4 | 808 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
809 | else |
810 | rr->length = i; | |
811 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
812 | #endif | |
0220fee4 | 813 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
814 | } |
815 | ||
d102d9df | 816 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) |
fe589e61 MC |
817 | { |
818 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
819 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 820 | |
eda75751 | 821 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 822 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, |
c7c42022 | 823 | (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), |
fe589e61 MC |
824 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); |
825 | if (i < 0) | |
26a7d938 | 826 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
827 | else |
828 | wr->length = i; | |
829 | ||
830 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
831 | #endif | |
208fb891 | 832 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
833 | } |
834 | ||
02a36fda | 835 | /*- |
921d84a0 MC |
836 | * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Will call |
837 | * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise. | |
02a36fda MC |
838 | * |
839 | * Returns: | |
840 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
841 | * short etc). | |
842 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
843 | * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error | |
844 | * occurred. | |
845 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 846 | int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda MC |
847 | { |
848 | SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
849 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; | |
eda75751 | 850 | size_t l, i; |
72716e79 MC |
851 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0; |
852 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
853 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
854 | ||
d102d9df | 855 | rec = inrecs; |
37205971 MC |
856 | /* |
857 | * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case | |
858 | */ | |
859 | if (n_recs != 1) | |
860 | return 0; | |
aebe9e39 | 861 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 862 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; |
02a36fda MC |
863 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
864 | enc = NULL; | |
865 | else | |
866 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
867 | } else { | |
868 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
869 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
870 | enc = NULL; | |
871 | else | |
872 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
873 | } | |
874 | ||
875 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { | |
876 | memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); | |
877 | rec->input = rec->data; | |
878 | } else { | |
879 | l = rec->length; | |
eda75751 | 880 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
846ec07d | 881 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); |
02a36fda MC |
882 | |
883 | /* COMPRESS */ | |
884 | ||
aebe9e39 | 885 | if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 886 | i = bs - (l % bs); |
02a36fda MC |
887 | |
888 | /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ | |
889 | l += i; | |
890 | /* | |
891 | * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the | |
892 | * padding length. | |
893 | */ | |
894 | memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); | |
895 | rec->length += i; | |
c08d12ca | 896 | rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); |
02a36fda MC |
897 | } |
898 | ||
aebe9e39 | 899 | if (!sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
900 | if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) |
901 | return 0; | |
902 | /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ | |
903 | } | |
904 | ||
eda75751 | 905 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
c08d12ca | 906 | if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) |
02a36fda MC |
907 | return -1; |
908 | ||
72716e79 MC |
909 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
910 | /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ | |
911 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
921d84a0 MC |
912 | if (imac_size < 0) { |
913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_ENC, | |
914 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 915 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 916 | } |
72716e79 MC |
917 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; |
918 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 919 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) |
a773b52a | 920 | return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); |
02a36fda | 921 | } |
208fb891 | 922 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
923 | } |
924 | ||
72716e79 | 925 | #define MAX_PADDING 256 |
02a36fda | 926 | /*- |
921d84a0 MC |
927 | * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for |
928 | * internal errors, but not otherwise. | |
02a36fda MC |
929 | * |
930 | * Returns: | |
931 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
932 | * short etc). | |
933 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
934 | * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, | |
935 | * an internal error occurred. | |
936 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 937 | int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda | 938 | { |
02a36fda | 939 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
d102d9df MC |
940 | size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
941 | unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; | |
72716e79 MC |
942 | int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; |
943 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; | |
944 | unsigned char padval; | |
945 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
946 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
947 | ||
921d84a0 MC |
948 | if (n_recs == 0) { |
949 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
950 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
a3004c82 | 951 | return 0; |
921d84a0 | 952 | } |
a3004c82 | 953 | |
aebe9e39 | 954 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
955 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { |
956 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
380a522f | 957 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921d84a0 MC |
958 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
959 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380a522f MC |
960 | return -1; |
961 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
962 | } |
963 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
964 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
965 | enc = NULL; | |
966 | else { | |
967 | int ivlen; | |
968 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
969 | /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ | |
970 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) | |
971 | && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
972 | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); | |
973 | else | |
974 | ivlen = 0; | |
975 | if (ivlen > 1) { | |
37205971 | 976 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
977 | if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { |
978 | /* | |
979 | * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever | |
980 | * happen?? (steve) | |
981 | */ | |
921d84a0 MC |
982 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
983 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df | 984 | return -1; |
16cfc2c9 | 985 | } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
986 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
987 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df MC |
988 | return -1; |
989 | } | |
990 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
991 | } |
992 | } | |
993 | } else { | |
994 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { | |
995 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f | 996 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921d84a0 MC |
997 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
998 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380a522f MC |
999 | return -1; |
1000 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1001 | } |
1002 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
1003 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
1004 | enc = NULL; | |
1005 | else | |
1006 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
02a36fda | 1009 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { |
37205971 | 1010 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1011 | memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); |
1012 | recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; | |
1013 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1014 | ret = 1; |
1015 | } else { | |
d102d9df MC |
1016 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); |
1017 | ||
37205971 | 1018 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
e8aa8b6c | 1019 | if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 1020 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { |
d102d9df MC |
1021 | /* |
1022 | * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the | |
1023 | * cipher doesn't support pipelining | |
1024 | */ | |
921d84a0 MC |
1025 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1026 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
d102d9df MC |
1027 | return -1; |
1028 | } | |
1029 | } | |
37205971 | 1030 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1031 | reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; |
1032 | ||
1033 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) | |
a230b26e | 1034 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { |
d102d9df MC |
1035 | unsigned char *seq; |
1036 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1037 | seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) |
d102d9df MC |
1038 | : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
1039 | ||
1040 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1041 | /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ | |
1042 | unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; | |
1043 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1044 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : |
d102d9df MC |
1045 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); |
1046 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); | |
1047 | memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); | |
1048 | } else { | |
1049 | memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); | |
1050 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ | |
1051 | ++seq[i]; | |
1052 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1053 | break; | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | } | |
02a36fda | 1056 | |
d102d9df MC |
1057 | buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; |
1058 | buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
1059 | buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
c08d12ca MC |
1060 | buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); |
1061 | buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); | |
d102d9df MC |
1062 | pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, |
1063 | EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); | |
921d84a0 MC |
1064 | if (pad <= 0) { |
1065 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1066 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df | 1067 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1068 | } |
d102d9df | 1069 | |
aebe9e39 | 1070 | if (sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1071 | reclen[ctr] += pad; |
1072 | recs[ctr].length += pad; | |
02a36fda | 1073 | } |
02a36fda | 1074 | |
aebe9e39 | 1075 | } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 1076 | padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); |
02a36fda | 1077 | |
d102d9df | 1078 | /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
02a36fda | 1079 | |
921d84a0 MC |
1080 | if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { |
1081 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1082 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 1083 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1084 | } |
72716e79 | 1085 | /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ |
c08d12ca | 1086 | padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); |
72716e79 MC |
1087 | for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) |
1088 | recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; | |
1089 | reclen[ctr] += padnum; | |
1090 | recs[ctr].length += padnum; | |
d102d9df MC |
1091 | } |
1092 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1093 | if (!sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1094 | if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) |
1095 | return 0; | |
1096 | } | |
02a36fda | 1097 | } |
37205971 | 1098 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
d102d9df | 1099 | unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
02a36fda | 1100 | |
d102d9df | 1101 | /* Set the output buffers */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1102 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1103 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; |
1104 | } | |
1105 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1106 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1107 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1108 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
1109 | return -1; | |
d102d9df MC |
1110 | } |
1111 | /* Set the input buffers */ | |
e8aa8b6c | 1112 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1113 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; |
1114 | } | |
1115 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1116 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 |
d102d9df | 1117 | || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, |
c08d12ca | 1118 | (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1119 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1120 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
d102d9df MC |
1121 | return -1; |
1122 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1123 | } |
1124 | ||
c08d12ca MC |
1125 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
1126 | tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, | |
1127 | (unsigned int)reclen[0]); | |
d102d9df | 1128 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 1129 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) |
72716e79 MC |
1130 | ? (tmpr < 0) |
1131 | : (tmpr == 0)) | |
02a36fda | 1132 | return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ |
921d84a0 | 1133 | |
aebe9e39 | 1134 | if (sending == 0) { |
e75c5a79 | 1135 | if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1136 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1137 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1138 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1139 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1140 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1141 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1142 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1143 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1144 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1145 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1146 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1147 | } |
02a36fda | 1148 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1149 | |
1150 | ret = 1; | |
28a31a0a | 1151 | if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
72716e79 | 1152 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
921d84a0 MC |
1153 | if (imac_size < 0) { |
1154 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1155 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 1156 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1157 | } |
72716e79 MC |
1158 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; |
1159 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1160 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { |
94777c9c | 1161 | int tmpret; |
37205971 | 1162 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c | 1163 | tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); |
f9cf774c MC |
1164 | /* |
1165 | * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can | |
1166 | * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant | |
1167 | * time behaviour. | |
1168 | */ | |
1169 | if (tmpret == 0) | |
1170 | return 0; | |
1171 | ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), | |
1172 | ret, -1); | |
94777c9c MC |
1173 | } |
1174 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1175 | if (pad && !sending) { |
37205971 | 1176 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c MC |
1177 | recs[ctr].length -= pad; |
1178 | } | |
d102d9df | 1179 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1180 | } |
1181 | return ret; | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1184 | int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1185 | { |
02a36fda | 1186 | unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; |
02a36fda MC |
1187 | const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
1188 | unsigned char *p, rec_char; | |
1189 | size_t md_size; | |
c08d12ca | 1190 | size_t npad; |
02a36fda MC |
1191 | int t; |
1192 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1193 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 1194 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1195 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1196 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1197 | } else { | |
02a36fda | 1198 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1199 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1200 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1201 | } | |
1202 | ||
1203 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
1204 | if (t < 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1205 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1206 | md_size = t; |
1207 | npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; | |
1208 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1209 | if (!sending && |
02a36fda MC |
1210 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1211 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { | |
1212 | /* | |
1213 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1214 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1215 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1216 | */ | |
1217 | ||
1218 | /*- | |
1219 | * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: | |
1220 | * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. | |
1221 | * | |
1222 | * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size | |
1223 | * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller | |
1224 | * total size. | |
1225 | */ | |
1226 | unsigned char header[75]; | |
c08d12ca | 1227 | size_t j = 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1228 | memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); |
1229 | j += md_size; | |
1230 | memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); | |
1231 | j += npad; | |
1232 | memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); | |
1233 | j += 8; | |
1234 | header[j++] = rec->type; | |
c08d12ca MC |
1235 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1236 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda MC |
1237 | |
1238 | /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1239 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, |
1240 | md, &md_size, | |
1241 | header, rec->input, | |
1242 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1243 | mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1244 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1245 | } else { |
1246 | unsigned int md_size_u; | |
1247 | /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ | |
bfb0641f | 1248 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
1249 | |
1250 | if (md_ctx == NULL) | |
a14aa99b | 1251 | return 0; |
02a36fda | 1252 | |
02a36fda | 1253 | rec_char = rec->type; |
02a36fda MC |
1254 | p = md; |
1255 | s2n(rec->length, p); | |
6e59a892 | 1256 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1257 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 |
1258 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 | |
1259 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 | |
1260 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 | |
1261 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 | |
1262 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 | |
1263 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 | |
1264 | || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 | |
1265 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 | |
1266 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 | |
1267 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 | |
1268 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { | |
302d1697 | 1269 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
a14aa99b | 1270 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1271 | } |
02a36fda | 1272 | |
bfb0641f | 1273 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
02a36fda MC |
1274 | } |
1275 | ||
1276 | ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); | |
a14aa99b | 1277 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1278 | } |
1279 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1280 | int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1281 | { |
02a36fda MC |
1282 | unsigned char *seq; |
1283 | EVP_MD_CTX *hash; | |
1284 | size_t md_size; | |
1285 | int i; | |
6e59a892 | 1286 | EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; |
02a36fda | 1287 | unsigned char header[13]; |
aebe9e39 | 1288 | int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) |
02a36fda MC |
1289 | : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
1290 | int t; | |
1291 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1292 | if (sending) { |
de07f311 | 1293 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1294 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1295 | } else { | |
de07f311 | 1296 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1297 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1298 | } | |
1299 | ||
1300 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
380a522f MC |
1301 | if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) |
1302 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1303 | md_size = t; |
1304 | ||
1305 | /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ | |
1306 | if (stream_mac) { | |
1307 | mac_ctx = hash; | |
1308 | } else { | |
bfb0641f | 1309 | hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
a080c3e8 BE |
1310 | if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) { |
1311 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); | |
a14aa99b | 1312 | return 0; |
a080c3e8 | 1313 | } |
6e59a892 | 1314 | mac_ctx = hmac; |
02a36fda MC |
1315 | } |
1316 | ||
1317 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1318 | unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; | |
1319 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1320 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : |
78a39fe7 | 1321 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); |
02a36fda MC |
1322 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
1323 | ||
1324 | memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); | |
1325 | } else | |
1326 | memcpy(header, seq, 8); | |
1327 | ||
1328 | header[8] = rec->type; | |
1329 | header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); | |
1330 | header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); | |
348240c6 MC |
1331 | header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1332 | header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda | 1333 | |
aebe9e39 | 1334 | if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && |
02a36fda MC |
1335 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1336 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { | |
1337 | /* | |
1338 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1339 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1340 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1341 | */ | |
1342 | /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1343 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, |
1344 | md, &md_size, | |
1345 | header, rec->input, | |
1346 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1347 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, | |
1348 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1349 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
aabe3a35 | 1350 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1351 | } |
02a36fda | 1352 | } else { |
eda75751 | 1353 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ |
5f3d93e4 | 1354 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1355 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 |
1356 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1357 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
a14aa99b | 1358 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1359 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1360 | } |
1361 | ||
bfb0641f | 1362 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
5f3d93e4 | 1363 | |
d63a5e5e | 1364 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1365 | fprintf(stderr, "seq="); |
1366 | { | |
1367 | int z; | |
1368 | for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) | |
1369 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); | |
1370 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1371 | } | |
1372 | fprintf(stderr, "rec="); | |
1373 | { | |
eda75751 | 1374 | size_t z; |
02a36fda MC |
1375 | for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) |
1376 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); | |
1377 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1378 | } | |
1379 | #endif | |
1380 | ||
1381 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1382 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1383 | ++seq[i]; | |
1384 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1385 | break; | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | } | |
d63a5e5e | 1388 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
02a36fda MC |
1389 | { |
1390 | unsigned int z; | |
1391 | for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) | |
1392 | fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); | |
1393 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | #endif | |
a14aa99b | 1396 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1397 | } |
1398 | ||
1399 | /*- | |
1400 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC | |
1401 | * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. | |
1402 | * | |
1403 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1404 | * returns: | |
1405 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1406 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1407 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1408 | */ | |
a773b52a | 1409 | int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
72716e79 | 1410 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1411 | { |
72716e79 | 1412 | size_t padding_length; |
2688e7a0 | 1413 | size_t good; |
72716e79 | 1414 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; |
02a36fda MC |
1415 | |
1416 | /* | |
1417 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. | |
1418 | */ | |
1419 | if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1420 | return 0; | |
1421 | ||
1422 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1423 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); |
02a36fda | 1424 | /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ |
2688e7a0 | 1425 | good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); |
02a36fda | 1426 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
2688e7a0 | 1427 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1428 | } |
1429 | ||
1430 | /*- | |
1431 | * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC | |
1432 | * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and | |
1433 | * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record | |
1434 | * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the | |
1435 | * padding was removed. | |
1436 | * | |
1437 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1438 | * returns: | |
1439 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1440 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1441 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1442 | */ | |
1443 | int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, | |
1444 | SSL3_RECORD *rec, | |
72716e79 | 1445 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1446 | { |
2688e7a0 | 1447 | size_t good; |
72716e79 MC |
1448 | size_t padding_length, to_check, i; |
1449 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
1450 | /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ |
1451 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { | |
1452 | /* | |
1453 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant | |
1454 | * time. | |
1455 | */ | |
1456 | if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) | |
1457 | return 0; | |
1458 | /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ | |
1459 | rec->data += block_size; | |
1460 | rec->input += block_size; | |
1461 | rec->length -= block_size; | |
1462 | rec->orig_len -= block_size; | |
1463 | } else if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1464 | return 0; | |
1465 | ||
1466 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
1467 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1468 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & |
1469 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { | |
02a36fda MC |
1470 | /* padding is already verified */ |
1471 | rec->length -= padding_length + 1; | |
1472 | return 1; | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1475 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); |
02a36fda MC |
1476 | /* |
1477 | * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and | |
1478 | * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length | |
1479 | * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of | |
1480 | * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that | |
1481 | * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the | |
1482 | * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record | |
1483 | * is public information so we can use it.) | |
1484 | */ | |
eea8723c AL |
1485 | to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ |
1486 | if (to_check > rec->length) | |
1487 | to_check = rec->length; | |
02a36fda MC |
1488 | |
1489 | for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { | |
2688e7a0 | 1490 | unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); |
02a36fda MC |
1491 | unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; |
1492 | /* | |
1493 | * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value | |
1494 | * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. | |
1495 | */ | |
1496 | good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | ||
1499 | /* | |
1500 | * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one | |
1501 | * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. | |
1502 | */ | |
2688e7a0 | 1503 | good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); |
02a36fda MC |
1504 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
1505 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1506 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1507 | } |
1508 | ||
1509 | /*- | |
1510 | * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in | |
1511 | * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may | |
1512 | * vary within a 256-byte window). | |
1513 | * | |
1514 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to | |
1515 | * this function. | |
1516 | * | |
1517 | * On entry: | |
1518 | * rec->orig_len >= md_size | |
1519 | * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
1520 | * | |
1521 | * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with | |
1522 | * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into | |
1523 | * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't | |
1524 | * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are | |
1525 | * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. | |
1526 | */ | |
1527 | #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE | |
1528 | ||
380a522f | 1529 | int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, |
72716e79 | 1530 | const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) |
02a36fda MC |
1531 | { |
1532 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1533 | unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1534 | unsigned char *rotated_mac; | |
1535 | #else | |
1536 | unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1537 | #endif | |
1538 | ||
1539 | /* | |
1540 | * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. | |
1541 | */ | |
72716e79 MC |
1542 | size_t mac_end = rec->length; |
1543 | size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; | |
8f77fab8 | 1544 | size_t in_mac; |
02a36fda MC |
1545 | /* |
1546 | * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the | |
1547 | * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. | |
1548 | */ | |
72716e79 | 1549 | size_t scan_start = 0; |
2688e7a0 | 1550 | size_t i, j; |
2688e7a0 | 1551 | size_t rotate_offset; |
02a36fda | 1552 | |
380a522f MC |
1553 | if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size |
1554 | && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) | |
1555 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1556 | |
1557 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1558 | rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); | |
1559 | #endif | |
1560 | ||
1561 | /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ | |
1562 | if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) | |
1563 | scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); | |
02a36fda | 1564 | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1565 | in_mac = 0; |
1566 | rotate_offset = 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1567 | memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); |
1568 | for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1569 | size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); |
1570 | size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); | |
02a36fda | 1571 | unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; |
8f77fab8 AP |
1572 | |
1573 | in_mac |= mac_started; | |
1574 | in_mac &= mac_ended; | |
1575 | rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; | |
1576 | rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; | |
2688e7a0 | 1577 | j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1578 | } |
1579 | ||
1580 | /* Now rotate the MAC */ | |
1581 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1582 | j = 0; | |
1583 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { | |
1584 | /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ | |
1585 | ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; | |
1586 | out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1587 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1588 | } |
1589 | #else | |
1590 | memset(out, 0, md_size); | |
1591 | rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; | |
2688e7a0 | 1592 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1593 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { |
1594 | for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) | |
2688e7a0 | 1595 | out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); |
02a36fda | 1596 | rotate_offset++; |
2688e7a0 | 1597 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1598 | } |
1599 | #endif | |
380a522f MC |
1600 | |
1601 | return 1; | |
02a36fda MC |
1602 | } |
1603 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 1604 | int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
fe589e61 | 1605 | { |
c2853382 | 1606 | int i; |
fe589e61 MC |
1607 | int enc_err; |
1608 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1609 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
72716e79 MC |
1610 | int imac_size; |
1611 | size_t mac_size; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1612 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
1613 | ||
1614 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1615 | sess = s->session; | |
1616 | ||
1617 | /* | |
1618 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
1619 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
1620 | */ | |
7a7048af | 1621 | rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
fe589e61 MC |
1622 | |
1623 | /* | |
1624 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
1625 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
1626 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
1627 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
1628 | */ | |
1629 | ||
1630 | /* | |
1631 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
1632 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
1633 | */ | |
1634 | ||
1635 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
1636 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1637 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1638 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1639 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1640 | } |
1641 | ||
1642 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
1643 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
1644 | rr->orig_len = rr->length; | |
1645 | ||
28a31a0a | 1646 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
e23d5071 DW |
1647 | unsigned char *mac; |
1648 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f | 1649 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1650 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1651 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1652 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1653 | } |
e23d5071 | 1654 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { |
c2853382 MC |
1655 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1656 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1657 | return 0; | |
e23d5071 DW |
1658 | } |
1659 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1660 | mac = rr->data + rr->length; | |
1661 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 1662 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { |
c2853382 | 1663 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
e23d5071 | 1664 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
c2853382 | 1665 | return 0; |
e23d5071 DW |
1666 | } |
1667 | } | |
1668 | ||
d102d9df | 1669 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); |
fe589e61 MC |
1670 | /*- |
1671 | * enc_err is: | |
1672 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
1673 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
1674 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
1675 | */ | |
1676 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
1677 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1678 | /* SSLfatal() got called */ | |
1679 | return 0; | |
1680 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
1681 | /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ |
1682 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1683 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
c2853382 | 1684 | return 0; |
fe589e61 | 1685 | } |
d63a5e5e | 1686 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
eda75751 | 1687 | printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 1688 | { |
eda75751 | 1689 | size_t z; |
fe589e61 MC |
1690 | for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) |
1691 | printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); | |
1692 | } | |
1693 | printf("\n"); | |
1694 | #endif | |
1695 | ||
1696 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
28a31a0a | 1697 | if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && |
fe589e61 MC |
1698 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
1699 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
1700 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
1701 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
72716e79 MC |
1702 | |
1703 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ | |
1704 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
1705 | if (imac_size < 0) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1706 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1707 | ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
1708 | return 0; | |
72716e79 MC |
1709 | } |
1710 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
380a522f | 1711 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1712 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1713 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1714 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1715 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1716 | |
1717 | /* | |
1718 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
1719 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
1720 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
1721 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
1722 | */ | |
1723 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || | |
1724 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
1725 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
1726 | rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1727 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1728 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1729 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1730 | } |
1731 | ||
1732 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
1733 | /* | |
1734 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
1735 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
1736 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
1737 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
1738 | */ | |
1739 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f | 1740 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1741 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1742 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1743 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1744 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1745 | rr->length -= mac_size; |
1746 | } else { | |
1747 | /* | |
1748 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
1749 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
1750 | * |mac_size| above. | |
1751 | */ | |
1752 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1753 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
1754 | } | |
1755 | ||
d102d9df | 1756 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 1757 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
72716e79 | 1758 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) |
fe589e61 MC |
1759 | enc_err = -1; |
1760 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
1761 | enc_err = -1; | |
1762 | } | |
1763 | ||
1764 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
1765 | /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ | |
1766 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1767 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
c2853382 | 1768 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
1769 | } |
1770 | ||
1771 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
1772 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
1773 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1774 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1775 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1776 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 | 1777 | } |
94777c9c | 1778 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1779 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, |
1780 | SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
1781 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1782 | } |
1783 | } | |
1784 | ||
1785 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1786 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1787 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1788 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1789 | } |
1790 | ||
1791 | rr->off = 0; | |
1792 | /*- | |
1793 | * So at this point the following is true | |
1794 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
1795 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
1796 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
1797 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
1798 | * after use :-). | |
1799 | */ | |
1800 | ||
1801 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
7a7048af | 1802 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1803 | |
1804 | /* Mark receipt of record. */ | |
1805 | dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); | |
1806 | ||
208fb891 | 1807 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1808 | } |
1809 | ||
fe589e61 | 1810 | /* |
69687aa8 | 1811 | * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed |
fe589e61 MC |
1812 | */ |
1813 | #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ | |
1814 | dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ | |
cb2ce7ab | 1815 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) |
fe589e61 MC |
1816 | |
1817 | /*- | |
1818 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
1819 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error | |
1820 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
1821 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
1822 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1823 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1824 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes | |
1825 | */ | |
1826 | /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ | |
1827 | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) | |
1828 | { | |
1829 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor; | |
8e6d03ca MC |
1830 | int rret; |
1831 | size_t more, n; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1832 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
1833 | unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
1834 | unsigned short version; | |
1835 | DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; | |
1836 | unsigned int is_next_epoch; | |
1837 | ||
1838 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1839 | ||
738ad946 | 1840 | again: |
fe589e61 MC |
1841 | /* |
1842 | * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. | |
1843 | * This is a non-blocking operation. | |
1844 | */ | |
c2853382 MC |
1845 | if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) { |
1846 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe589e61 | 1847 | return -1; |
c2853382 | 1848 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1849 | |
1850 | /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ | |
1851 | if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) | |
1852 | return 1; | |
1853 | ||
1854 | /* get something from the wire */ | |
738ad946 | 1855 | |
fe589e61 | 1856 | /* check if we have the header */ |
295c3f41 | 1857 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
7a7048af | 1858 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
8e6d03ca MC |
1859 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
1860 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1861 | /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
c2853382 MC |
1862 | if (rret <= 0) { |
1863 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
8e6d03ca | 1864 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ |
c2853382 | 1865 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1866 | |
1867 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ | |
a230b26e EK |
1868 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != |
1869 | DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
7a7048af | 1870 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1871 | goto again; |
1872 | } | |
1873 | ||
295c3f41 | 1874 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
fe589e61 | 1875 | |
7a7048af | 1876 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1877 | |
1878 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1879 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
1880 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1881 | ||
1882 | /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ | |
1883 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
1884 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
1885 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
1886 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
1887 | ||
1888 | /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ | |
1889 | n2s(p, rr->epoch); | |
1890 | ||
de07f311 | 1891 | memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); |
fe589e61 MC |
1892 | p += 6; |
1893 | ||
1894 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
66fab923 | 1895 | rr->read = 0; |
fe589e61 | 1896 | |
08455bc9 MC |
1897 | /* |
1898 | * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact | |
1899 | * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors) | |
1900 | */ | |
1901 | if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
fe589e61 MC |
1902 | if (version != s->version) { |
1903 | /* unexpected version, silently discard */ | |
1904 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1905 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1906 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1907 | goto again; |
1908 | } | |
1909 | } | |
1910 | ||
1911 | if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { | |
1912 | /* wrong version, silently discard record */ | |
1913 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1914 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1915 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1916 | goto again; |
1917 | } | |
1918 | ||
1919 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1920 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1921 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1922 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1923 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1924 | goto again; |
1925 | } | |
1926 | ||
cf72c757 F |
1927 | /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */ |
1928 | if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) | |
1929 | && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) { | |
1930 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1931 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1932 | rr->read = 1; |
cf72c757 F |
1933 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
1934 | goto again; | |
1935 | } | |
1936 | ||
295c3f41 | 1937 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1938 | } |
1939 | ||
295c3f41 | 1940 | /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
fe589e61 | 1941 | |
7a7048af MC |
1942 | if (rr->length > |
1943 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
fe589e61 | 1944 | /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
8e6d03ca MC |
1945 | more = rr->length; |
1946 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1947 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
8e6d03ca | 1948 | if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { |
c2853382 MC |
1949 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1950 | /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */ | |
1951 | return -1; | |
1952 | } | |
fe589e61 | 1953 | rr->length = 0; |
66fab923 | 1954 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1955 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1956 | goto again; |
1957 | } | |
1958 | ||
1959 | /* | |
1960 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == | |
1961 | * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length | |
1962 | */ | |
1963 | } | |
295c3f41 MC |
1964 | /* set state for later operations */ |
1965 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1966 | |
1967 | /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ | |
1968 | bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); | |
1969 | if (bitmap == NULL) { | |
1970 | rr->length = 0; | |
a230b26e | 1971 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1972 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1973 | } | |
1974 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1975 | /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ | |
1976 | if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
1977 | #endif | |
912c89c5 | 1978 | /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1979 | /* |
1980 | * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where | |
1981 | * we have no integrity negotiated yet? | |
1982 | */ | |
912c89c5 | 1983 | if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { |
fe589e61 | 1984 | rr->length = 0; |
66fab923 | 1985 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1986 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1987 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1988 | } | |
1989 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1990 | } | |
1991 | #endif | |
1992 | ||
1993 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
66fab923 MC |
1994 | if (rr->length == 0) { |
1995 | rr->read = 1; | |
fe589e61 | 1996 | goto again; |
66fab923 | 1997 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1998 | |
1999 | /* | |
2000 | * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a | |
2001 | * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be | |
912c89c5 | 2002 | * processed at this time. |
fe589e61 MC |
2003 | */ |
2004 | if (is_next_epoch) { | |
024f543c | 2005 | if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { |
c2853382 MC |
2006 | if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, |
2007 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), | |
2008 | rr->seq_num) < 0) { | |
2009 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe589e61 | 2010 | return -1; |
c2853382 | 2011 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
2012 | } |
2013 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 2014 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 2015 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
2016 | goto again; |
2017 | } | |
2018 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 2019 | if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { |
c2853382 MC |
2020 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
2021 | /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */ | |
2022 | return -1; | |
2023 | } | |
fe589e61 | 2024 | rr->length = 0; |
66fab923 | 2025 | rr->read = 1; |
a230b26e | 2026 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
2027 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
2028 | } | |
fe589e61 | 2029 | |
208fb891 | 2030 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
2031 | |
2032 | } | |
079ef6bd MC |
2033 | |
2034 | int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off) | |
2035 | { | |
2036 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
2037 | ||
2038 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
2039 | memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); | |
2040 | ||
2041 | rr->length = len; | |
2042 | rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
2043 | memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num)); | |
2044 | rr->off = off; | |
2045 | ||
2046 | s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf; | |
2047 | s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len; | |
2048 | rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
2049 | ||
2050 | if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), | |
2051 | SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <= 0) { | |
2052 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2053 | return 0; | |
2054 | } | |
2055 | ||
2056 | return 1; | |
2057 | } |