]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
48e5119a | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
258f8721 | 3 | * |
2c18d164 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
258f8721 MC |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
68570797 | 11 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
49b26f54 | 12 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
02a36fda | 13 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
c99c4c11 | 14 | #include "record_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 15 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
02a36fda MC |
16 | |
17 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { | |
18 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
19 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
20 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
21 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
22 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, | |
23 | 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 | |
24 | }; | |
25 | ||
26 | static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { | |
27 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
28 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
29 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
30 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
31 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, | |
32 | 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c | |
33 | }; | |
258f8721 | 34 | |
6b41b3f5 MC |
35 | /* |
36 | * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated | |
37 | */ | |
5607b275 | 38 | void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 39 | { |
94777c9c | 40 | unsigned char *comp; |
5607b275 | 41 | size_t i; |
6b41b3f5 | 42 | |
94777c9c MC |
43 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { |
44 | comp = r[i].comp; | |
45 | ||
46 | memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); | |
47 | r[i].comp = comp; | |
48 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
49 | } |
50 | ||
5607b275 | 51 | void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) |
258f8721 | 52 | { |
5607b275 | 53 | size_t i; |
94777c9c MC |
54 | |
55 | for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { | |
56 | OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); | |
57 | r[i].comp = NULL; | |
58 | } | |
258f8721 MC |
59 | } |
60 | ||
258f8721 MC |
61 | void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) |
62 | { | |
e5bf62f7 | 63 | memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); |
258f8721 | 64 | } |
fe589e61 | 65 | |
94777c9c MC |
66 | /* |
67 | * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting | |
68 | * for us in the buffer. | |
69 | */ | |
ea71906e | 70 | static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) |
94777c9c MC |
71 | { |
72 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
8e6d03ca | 73 | size_t left, len; |
94777c9c MC |
74 | unsigned char *p; |
75 | ||
76 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); | |
77 | ||
78 | p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); | |
79 | if (p == NULL) | |
80 | return 0; | |
81 | ||
82 | left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); | |
83 | ||
84 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
85 | return 0; | |
86 | ||
87 | p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); | |
88 | ||
89 | /* | |
90 | * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version | |
91 | * etc later | |
92 | */ | |
93 | if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
94 | return 0; | |
95 | ||
96 | p += 3; | |
97 | n2s(p, len); | |
98 | ||
99 | if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) | |
100 | return 0; | |
101 | ||
102 | return 1; | |
103 | } | |
104 | ||
196f2cbb | 105 | int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send) |
70ef40a0 | 106 | { |
4e8548e8 | 107 | uint32_t max_early_data; |
add8d0e9 | 108 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
70ef40a0 MC |
109 | |
110 | /* | |
7daf7156 | 111 | * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the |
add8d0e9 MC |
112 | * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early |
113 | * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data. | |
70ef40a0 | 114 | */ |
add8d0e9 MC |
115 | if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) { |
116 | if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL | |
117 | && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
118 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, |
119 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
add8d0e9 MC |
120 | return 0; |
121 | } | |
122 | sess = s->psksession; | |
123 | } | |
4e8548e8 MC |
124 | |
125 | if (!s->server) | |
add8d0e9 | 126 | max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data; |
4e8548e8 MC |
127 | else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) |
128 | max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data; | |
129 | else | |
130 | max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data | |
131 | ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data; | |
70ef40a0 MC |
132 | |
133 | if (max_early_data == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
134 | SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
135 | SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); | |
70ef40a0 MC |
136 | return 0; |
137 | } | |
138 | ||
139 | /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ | |
140 | max_early_data += overhead; | |
141 | ||
7daf7156 | 142 | if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { |
196f2cbb MC |
143 | SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
144 | SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); | |
70ef40a0 MC |
145 | return 0; |
146 | } | |
7daf7156 | 147 | s->early_data_count += length; |
70ef40a0 MC |
148 | |
149 | return 1; | |
150 | } | |
151 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
152 | /* |
153 | * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that | |
154 | * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an | |
155 | * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and | |
156 | * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. | |
157 | */ | |
158 | #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 | |
159 | ||
32ec4153 | 160 | #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 |
fe589e61 | 161 | /*- |
94777c9c | 162 | * Call this to get new input records. |
fe589e61 MC |
163 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
164 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
94777c9c MC |
165 | * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': |
166 | * rr[i].type - is the type of record | |
167 | * rr[i].data, - data | |
168 | * rr[i].length, - number of bytes | |
169 | * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all | |
170 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= | |
171 | * |max_pipelines| | |
fe589e61 MC |
172 | */ |
173 | /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | |
174 | int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) | |
175 | { | |
196f2cbb | 176 | int enc_err, rret; |
8e6d03ca MC |
177 | int i; |
178 | size_t more, n; | |
88858868 | 179 | SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; |
94777c9c | 180 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; |
fe589e61 MC |
181 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
182 | unsigned char *p; | |
183 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
6a149cee | 184 | unsigned int version; |
72716e79 MC |
185 | size_t mac_size; |
186 | int imac_size; | |
187 | size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; | |
6a149cee | 188 | PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; |
70ef40a0 | 189 | size_t first_rec_len; |
c35e921f | 190 | int is_ktls_left; |
fe589e61 MC |
191 | |
192 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
94777c9c | 193 | rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
c35e921f | 194 | is_ktls_left = (rbuf->left > 0); |
94777c9c MC |
195 | max_recs = s->max_pipelines; |
196 | if (max_recs == 0) | |
197 | max_recs = 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
198 | sess = s->session; |
199 | ||
94777c9c | 200 | do { |
88858868 MC |
201 | thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; |
202 | ||
94777c9c MC |
203 | /* check if we have the header */ |
204 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || | |
205 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) | |
206 | < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
6a149cee MC |
207 | size_t sslv2len; |
208 | unsigned int type; | |
209 | ||
8e6d03ca MC |
210 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
211 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, | |
212 | num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); | |
c35e921f | 213 | if (rret <= 0) { |
3119ab3c | 214 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS |
c35e921f BP |
215 | if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) |
216 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
c35e921f BP |
217 | switch (errno) { |
218 | case EBADMSG: | |
219 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, | |
220 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
221 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
222 | break; | |
223 | case EMSGSIZE: | |
224 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, | |
225 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
226 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
227 | break; | |
228 | case EINVAL: | |
229 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
230 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
231 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
232 | break; | |
233 | default: | |
234 | break; | |
235 | } | |
c35e921f | 236 | #endif |
3119ab3c | 237 | return rret; |
c35e921f | 238 | } |
94777c9c MC |
239 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
240 | ||
241 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
6a149cee MC |
242 | if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), |
243 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
244 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
245 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
246 | return -1; | |
6a149cee MC |
247 | } |
248 | sslv2pkt = pkt; | |
249 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) | |
250 | || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
251 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
252 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
253 | return -1; | |
6a149cee | 254 | } |
94777c9c | 255 | /* |
78fcddbb | 256 | * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. |
94777c9c | 257 | */ |
78fcddbb | 258 | if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) |
6a149cee MC |
259 | && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 |
260 | && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { | |
be9c8deb MC |
261 | /* |
262 | * SSLv2 style record | |
263 | * | |
264 | * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because | |
265 | * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing | |
266 | * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here | |
267 | * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using | |
268 | * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency | |
269 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
270 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
271 | thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; | |
94777c9c | 272 | |
88858868 | 273 | thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; |
94777c9c | 274 | |
88858868 | 275 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) |
a230b26e | 276 | - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
277 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
278 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
279 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 280 | } |
fe589e61 | 281 | |
88858868 | 282 | if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { |
196f2cbb MC |
283 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
284 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
285 | return -1; | |
94777c9c MC |
286 | } |
287 | } else { | |
288 | /* SSLv3+ style record */ | |
289 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
290 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, | |
291 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
292 | ||
293 | /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
6a149cee MC |
294 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) |
295 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) | |
88858868 | 296 | || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
297 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
298 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
299 | return -1; | |
6a149cee | 300 | } |
88858868 MC |
301 | thisrr->type = type; |
302 | thisrr->rec_version = version; | |
94777c9c | 303 | |
a2b97bdf | 304 | /* |
3295d242 MC |
305 | * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field |
306 | * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the | |
beb30941 MC |
307 | * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3 |
308 | * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for | |
309 | * that explicitly | |
a2b97bdf | 310 | */ |
657a43f6 | 311 | if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fc7129dc | 312 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING |
6a149cee | 313 | && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { |
94777c9c MC |
314 | if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) |
315 | && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { | |
88858868 | 316 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
94777c9c MC |
317 | /* |
318 | * The record is using an incorrect version number, | |
319 | * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We | |
320 | * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a | |
321 | * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably | |
322 | * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just | |
323 | * end. | |
324 | */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
325 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
326 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
327 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 328 | } |
02db21df | 329 | /* |
94777c9c | 330 | * Send back error using their minor version number :-) |
02db21df | 331 | */ |
94777c9c | 332 | s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
02db21df | 333 | } |
196f2cbb MC |
334 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
335 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
336 | return -1; | |
02db21df | 337 | } |
32ec4153 | 338 | |
94777c9c | 339 | if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { |
a01c86a2 | 340 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
94777c9c MC |
341 | /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes |
342 | * that we have. */ | |
343 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); | |
344 | if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || | |
345 | strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || | |
346 | strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || | |
347 | strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
348 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
349 | SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); | |
350 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 351 | } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { |
196f2cbb MC |
352 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
353 | SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); | |
354 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 355 | } |
a01c86a2 MC |
356 | |
357 | /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
359 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
360 | return -1; | |
a01c86a2 | 361 | } else { |
196f2cbb MC |
362 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
363 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
364 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
365 | return -1; | |
124f6ff4 RJ |
366 | } |
367 | } | |
32ec4153 | 368 | |
3295d242 MC |
369 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { |
370 | if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
371 | && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
de9e884b MC |
372 | || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
373 | && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
374 | || s->statem.enc_read_state | |
375 | != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) { | |
3295d242 MC |
376 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
377 | SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
378 | return -1; | |
379 | } | |
380 | if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
382 | SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
383 | return -1; | |
384 | } | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
385 | } |
386 | ||
88858868 | 387 | if (thisrr->length > |
a230b26e | 388 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
389 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
390 | SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
391 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 392 | } |
32ec4153 | 393 | } |
94777c9c MC |
394 | |
395 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
fe589e61 MC |
396 | } |
397 | ||
43219695 MC |
398 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
399 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
400 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
401 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
402 | return -1; | |
43219695 MC |
403 | } |
404 | } else { | |
405 | size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; | |
406 | ||
4f7b76bf MC |
407 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
408 | /* | |
409 | * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH | |
410 | * does not include the compression overhead anyway. | |
411 | */ | |
43219695 MC |
412 | if (s->expand == NULL) |
413 | len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
4f7b76bf | 414 | #endif |
43219695 | 415 | |
c35e921f | 416 | if (thisrr->length > len && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
417 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
418 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
419 | return -1; | |
43219695 MC |
420 | } |
421 | } | |
422 | ||
94777c9c MC |
423 | /* |
424 | * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. | |
425 | * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the | |
426 | * record | |
427 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
428 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
429 | more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
94777c9c MC |
430 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
431 | } else { | |
88858868 | 432 | more = thisrr->length; |
94777c9c | 433 | } |
c35e921f | 434 | |
8e6d03ca | 435 | if (more > 0) { |
94777c9c | 436 | /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
fe589e61 | 437 | |
8e6d03ca MC |
438 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); |
439 | if (rret <= 0) | |
440 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ | |
94777c9c | 441 | } |
32ec4153 | 442 | |
94777c9c MC |
443 | /* set state for later operations */ |
444 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 | 445 | |
94777c9c | 446 | /* |
88858868 MC |
447 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH |
448 | * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH | |
449 | * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
94777c9c | 450 | */ |
88858868 MC |
451 | if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { |
452 | thisrr->input = | |
94777c9c MC |
453 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
454 | } else { | |
88858868 | 455 | thisrr->input = |
94777c9c MC |
456 | &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
457 | } | |
fe589e61 | 458 | |
94777c9c | 459 | /* |
88858868 MC |
460 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input |
461 | * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into | |
462 | * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When | |
463 | * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will | |
464 | * be pointed at the new buffer | |
94777c9c | 465 | */ |
fe589e61 | 466 | |
94777c9c | 467 | /* |
88858868 MC |
468 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
469 | * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
94777c9c | 470 | */ |
fe589e61 | 471 | |
88858868 MC |
472 | /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ |
473 | thisrr->data = thisrr->input; | |
474 | thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; | |
255cfeac MC |
475 | |
476 | /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ | |
88858868 | 477 | thisrr->read = 0; |
255cfeac | 478 | |
94777c9c MC |
479 | num_recs++; |
480 | ||
481 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
482 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); | |
78fcddbb | 483 | RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); |
de0717eb | 484 | } while (num_recs < max_recs |
88858868 | 485 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
94777c9c MC |
486 | && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) |
487 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
488 | && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) | |
a230b26e | 489 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) |
ea71906e | 490 | && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); |
fe589e61 | 491 | |
fdd92367 MC |
492 | if (num_recs == 1 |
493 | && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
fc7129dc | 494 | && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
fdd92367 MC |
495 | && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
496 | /* | |
497 | * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01 | |
498 | */ | |
499 | if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) { | |
500 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
501 | SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE); | |
502 | return -1; | |
503 | } | |
504 | /* | |
505 | * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty | |
506 | * handshake record | |
507 | */ | |
508 | thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
509 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
510 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
511 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { | |
512 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, | |
513 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE); | |
514 | return -1; | |
515 | } | |
516 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
517 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
518 | ||
519 | return 1; | |
520 | } | |
521 | ||
c35e921f BP |
522 | /* |
523 | * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left, | |
524 | * then it is from before enabling ktls | |
525 | */ | |
526 | if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left) | |
527 | goto skip_decryption; | |
528 | ||
fe589e61 MC |
529 | /* |
530 | * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All | |
531 | * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. | |
532 | */ | |
28a31a0a | 533 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
fe589e61 | 534 | unsigned char *mac; |
72716e79 MC |
535 | /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ |
536 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
b77f3ed1 | 537 | if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
538 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
539 | ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
540 | return -1; | |
72716e79 MC |
541 | } |
542 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
94777c9c | 543 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
544 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
545 | ||
546 | if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
547 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
548 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
549 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 550 | } |
88858868 MC |
551 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
552 | mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; | |
553 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 554 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { |
196f2cbb | 555 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
94777c9c | 556 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
196f2cbb | 557 | return -1; |
94777c9c | 558 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
559 | } |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
70ef40a0 MC |
562 | first_rec_len = rr[0].length; |
563 | ||
94777c9c | 564 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); |
e60ce9c4 | 565 | |
fe589e61 MC |
566 | /*- |
567 | * enc_err is: | |
d781d247 | 568 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. |
fe589e61 MC |
569 | * 1: if the padding is valid |
570 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
571 | */ | |
572 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
573 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
574 | /* SSLfatal() already got called */ | |
575 | return -1; | |
576 | } | |
0a87d0ac MC |
577 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
578 | /* | |
d781d247 MC |
579 | * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as |
580 | * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. | |
0a87d0ac | 581 | */ |
70ef40a0 | 582 | |
0a87d0ac | 583 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
70ef40a0 MC |
584 | |
585 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, | |
196f2cbb MC |
586 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { |
587 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
588 | return -1; | |
589 | } | |
70ef40a0 | 590 | |
0a87d0ac MC |
591 | thisrr->length = 0; |
592 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
593 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 594 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
0a87d0ac MC |
595 | return 1; |
596 | } | |
196f2cbb MC |
597 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
598 | SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); | |
599 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 | 600 | } |
49b26f54 RL |
601 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { |
602 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length); | |
603 | BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr[0].data, rr[0].length, 4); | |
604 | } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); | |
fe589e61 MC |
605 | |
606 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
607 | if ((sess != NULL) && | |
608 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && | |
28a31a0a | 609 | (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
fe589e61 MC |
610 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
611 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
612 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
94777c9c | 613 | |
fe589e61 | 614 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
380a522f | 615 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
616 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
617 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
618 | return -1; | |
380a522f | 619 | } |
fe589e61 | 620 | |
a230b26e | 621 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 | 622 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
fe589e61 | 623 | /* |
94777c9c MC |
624 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
625 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
626 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
627 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
fe589e61 | 628 | */ |
88858868 | 629 | if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || |
94777c9c MC |
630 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
631 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
88858868 | 632 | thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
633 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
634 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
635 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 636 | } |
fe589e61 | 637 | |
94777c9c MC |
638 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
639 | /* | |
640 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
641 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
642 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
643 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
644 | */ | |
645 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f | 646 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
647 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
648 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
649 | return -1; | |
380a522f | 650 | } |
88858868 | 651 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
94777c9c MC |
652 | } else { |
653 | /* | |
654 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
655 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
656 | * |mac_size| above. | |
657 | */ | |
88858868 MC |
658 | thisrr->length -= mac_size; |
659 | mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; | |
94777c9c MC |
660 | } |
661 | ||
88858868 | 662 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 663 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
94777c9c MC |
664 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
665 | enc_err = -1; | |
88858868 | 666 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) |
94777c9c MC |
667 | enc_err = -1; |
668 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
669 | } |
670 | ||
671 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
672 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
673 | /* We already called SSLfatal() */ | |
674 | return -1; | |
675 | } | |
d781d247 MC |
676 | if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { |
677 | /* | |
678 | * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an | |
679 | * empty record | |
680 | */ | |
70ef40a0 MC |
681 | |
682 | /* | |
683 | * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above | |
684 | * so we use the previously saved value | |
685 | */ | |
686 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, | |
196f2cbb MC |
687 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { |
688 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
689 | return -1; | |
690 | } | |
70ef40a0 | 691 | |
d781d247 MC |
692 | thisrr = &rr[0]; |
693 | thisrr->length = 0; | |
694 | thisrr->read = 1; | |
695 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); | |
67f78ead | 696 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
d781d247 MC |
697 | return 1; |
698 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
699 | /* |
700 | * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, | |
701 | * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption | |
702 | * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should | |
703 | * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become | |
704 | * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) | |
705 | */ | |
196f2cbb MC |
706 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
707 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
708 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
709 | } |
710 | ||
c35e921f BP |
711 | skip_decryption: |
712 | ||
94777c9c | 713 | for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { |
88858868 MC |
714 | thisrr = &rr[j]; |
715 | ||
716 | /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ | |
94777c9c | 717 | if (s->expand != NULL) { |
88858868 | 718 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { |
196f2cbb MC |
719 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
720 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
721 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 722 | } |
88858868 | 723 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
724 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
725 | SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
726 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 727 | } |
fe589e61 | 728 | } |
94777c9c | 729 | |
de9e884b MC |
730 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
731 | && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL | |
732 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
733 | size_t end; |
734 | ||
3c544acc MC |
735 | if (thisrr->length == 0 |
736 | || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
737 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
738 | SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
739 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
740 | } |
741 | ||
742 | /* Strip trailing padding */ | |
88858868 MC |
743 | for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; |
744 | end--) | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
745 | continue; |
746 | ||
88858868 MC |
747 | thisrr->length = end; |
748 | thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; | |
749 | if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
750 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
751 | && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
752 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
753 | SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); | |
754 | return -1; | |
e60ce9c4 | 755 | } |
ad5100bc MC |
756 | if (s->msg_callback) |
757 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, | |
758 | &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
e60ce9c4 MC |
759 | } |
760 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
761 | /* |
762 | * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in | |
763 | * length. | |
764 | */ | |
fc4c15fa MC |
765 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
766 | && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
767 | || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) | |
768 | && thisrr->length == 0) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
769 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
770 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
771 | return -1; | |
fc4c15fa MC |
772 | } |
773 | ||
c35e921f | 774 | if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) { |
196f2cbb MC |
775 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
776 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
777 | return -1; | |
fe589e61 | 778 | } |
fe589e61 | 779 | |
cf72c757 F |
780 | /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */ |
781 | if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) | |
c35e921f BP |
782 | && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session) |
783 | && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) { | |
196f2cbb MC |
784 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
785 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
786 | return -1; | |
cf72c757 F |
787 | } |
788 | ||
88858868 | 789 | thisrr->off = 0; |
94777c9c MC |
790 | /*- |
791 | * So at this point the following is true | |
88858868 MC |
792 | * thisrr->type is the type of record |
793 | * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record | |
794 | * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte | |
795 | * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). | |
94777c9c | 796 | */ |
fe589e61 | 797 | |
94777c9c | 798 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
88858868 | 799 | if (thisrr->length == 0) { |
255cfeac MC |
800 | RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); |
801 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) | |
a230b26e | 802 | > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { |
196f2cbb MC |
803 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, |
804 | SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); | |
805 | return -1; | |
94777c9c | 806 | } |
255cfeac MC |
807 | } else { |
808 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); | |
fe589e61 | 809 | } |
94777c9c | 810 | } |
fe589e61 | 811 | |
70ef40a0 MC |
812 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { |
813 | thisrr = &rr[0]; | |
814 | if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
196f2cbb MC |
815 | && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) { |
816 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
817 | return -1; | |
818 | } | |
70ef40a0 MC |
819 | } |
820 | ||
94777c9c MC |
821 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); |
822 | return 1; | |
fe589e61 MC |
823 | } |
824 | ||
94777c9c | 825 | int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) |
fe589e61 MC |
826 | { |
827 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
828 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 829 | |
0220fee4 MC |
830 | if (rr->comp == NULL) { |
831 | rr->comp = (unsigned char *) | |
832 | OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); | |
833 | } | |
834 | if (rr->comp == NULL) | |
835 | return 0; | |
836 | ||
eda75751 | 837 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 838 | i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, |
a230b26e | 839 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); |
fe589e61 | 840 | if (i < 0) |
0220fee4 | 841 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
842 | else |
843 | rr->length = i; | |
844 | rr->data = rr->comp; | |
845 | #endif | |
0220fee4 | 846 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
847 | } |
848 | ||
d102d9df | 849 | int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) |
fe589e61 MC |
850 | { |
851 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
852 | int i; | |
fe589e61 | 853 | |
eda75751 | 854 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
fe589e61 | 855 | i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, |
c7c42022 | 856 | (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), |
fe589e61 MC |
857 | wr->input, (int)wr->length); |
858 | if (i < 0) | |
26a7d938 | 859 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
860 | else |
861 | wr->length = i; | |
862 | ||
863 | wr->input = wr->data; | |
864 | #endif | |
208fb891 | 865 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
866 | } |
867 | ||
02a36fda | 868 | /*- |
921d84a0 MC |
869 | * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Will call |
870 | * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise. | |
02a36fda MC |
871 | * |
872 | * Returns: | |
873 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
874 | * short etc). | |
875 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
876 | * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error | |
877 | * occurred. | |
878 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 879 | int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda MC |
880 | { |
881 | SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
882 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; | |
eda75751 | 883 | size_t l, i; |
72716e79 MC |
884 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0; |
885 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
886 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
887 | ||
d102d9df | 888 | rec = inrecs; |
37205971 MC |
889 | /* |
890 | * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case | |
891 | */ | |
892 | if (n_recs != 1) | |
893 | return 0; | |
aebe9e39 | 894 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 895 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; |
02a36fda MC |
896 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
897 | enc = NULL; | |
898 | else | |
899 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
900 | } else { | |
901 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
902 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
903 | enc = NULL; | |
904 | else | |
905 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
906 | } | |
907 | ||
908 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { | |
909 | memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); | |
910 | rec->input = rec->data; | |
911 | } else { | |
912 | l = rec->length; | |
eda75751 | 913 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
846ec07d | 914 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); |
02a36fda MC |
915 | |
916 | /* COMPRESS */ | |
917 | ||
aebe9e39 | 918 | if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 919 | i = bs - (l % bs); |
02a36fda MC |
920 | |
921 | /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ | |
922 | l += i; | |
923 | /* | |
924 | * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the | |
925 | * padding length. | |
926 | */ | |
927 | memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); | |
928 | rec->length += i; | |
c08d12ca | 929 | rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); |
02a36fda MC |
930 | } |
931 | ||
aebe9e39 | 932 | if (!sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
933 | if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) |
934 | return 0; | |
935 | /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ | |
936 | } | |
937 | ||
eda75751 | 938 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
c08d12ca | 939 | if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) |
02a36fda MC |
940 | return -1; |
941 | ||
72716e79 MC |
942 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
943 | /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ | |
944 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
921d84a0 MC |
945 | if (imac_size < 0) { |
946 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_ENC, | |
947 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 948 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 949 | } |
72716e79 MC |
950 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; |
951 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 952 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) |
a773b52a | 953 | return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); |
02a36fda | 954 | } |
208fb891 | 955 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
956 | } |
957 | ||
72716e79 | 958 | #define MAX_PADDING 256 |
02a36fda | 959 | /*- |
921d84a0 MC |
960 | * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for |
961 | * internal errors, but not otherwise. | |
02a36fda MC |
962 | * |
963 | * Returns: | |
964 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
965 | * short etc). | |
966 | * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
967 | * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, | |
968 | * an internal error occurred. | |
969 | */ | |
aebe9e39 | 970 | int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) |
02a36fda | 971 | { |
02a36fda | 972 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
d102d9df MC |
973 | size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
974 | unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; | |
72716e79 MC |
975 | int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; |
976 | size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; | |
977 | unsigned char padval; | |
978 | int imac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
979 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
980 | ||
921d84a0 MC |
981 | if (n_recs == 0) { |
982 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
983 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
a3004c82 | 984 | return 0; |
921d84a0 | 985 | } |
a3004c82 | 986 | |
aebe9e39 | 987 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda MC |
988 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { |
989 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
380a522f | 990 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921d84a0 MC |
991 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
992 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380a522f MC |
993 | return -1; |
994 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
995 | } |
996 | ds = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
997 | if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
998 | enc = NULL; | |
999 | else { | |
1000 | int ivlen; | |
1001 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
1002 | /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ | |
1003 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) | |
1004 | && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
1005 | ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); | |
1006 | else | |
1007 | ivlen = 0; | |
1008 | if (ivlen > 1) { | |
37205971 | 1009 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1010 | if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { |
1011 | /* | |
1012 | * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever | |
1013 | * happen?? (steve) | |
1014 | */ | |
921d84a0 MC |
1015 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1016 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df | 1017 | return -1; |
16cfc2c9 | 1018 | } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1019 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1020 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df MC |
1021 | return -1; |
1022 | } | |
1023 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1024 | } |
1025 | } | |
1026 | } else { | |
1027 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { | |
1028 | int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f | 1029 | if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1030 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1031 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380a522f MC |
1032 | return -1; |
1033 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1034 | } |
1035 | ds = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
02a36fda MC |
1036 | if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
1037 | enc = NULL; | |
1038 | else | |
1039 | enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
1040 | } | |
1041 | ||
02a36fda | 1042 | if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { |
37205971 | 1043 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1044 | memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); |
1045 | recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; | |
1046 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1047 | ret = 1; |
1048 | } else { | |
d102d9df MC |
1049 | bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); |
1050 | ||
37205971 | 1051 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
e8aa8b6c | 1052 | if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 1053 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { |
d102d9df MC |
1054 | /* |
1055 | * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the | |
1056 | * cipher doesn't support pipelining | |
1057 | */ | |
921d84a0 MC |
1058 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1059 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
d102d9df MC |
1060 | return -1; |
1061 | } | |
1062 | } | |
37205971 | 1063 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1064 | reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; |
1065 | ||
1066 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) | |
a230b26e | 1067 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { |
d102d9df MC |
1068 | unsigned char *seq; |
1069 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1070 | seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) |
d102d9df MC |
1071 | : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); |
1072 | ||
1073 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1074 | /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ | |
1075 | unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; | |
1076 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1077 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : |
d102d9df MC |
1078 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); |
1079 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); | |
1080 | memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); | |
1081 | } else { | |
1082 | memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); | |
1083 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ | |
1084 | ++seq[i]; | |
1085 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1086 | break; | |
1087 | } | |
1088 | } | |
02a36fda | 1089 | |
d102d9df MC |
1090 | buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; |
1091 | buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
1092 | buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
c08d12ca MC |
1093 | buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); |
1094 | buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); | |
d102d9df MC |
1095 | pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, |
1096 | EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); | |
921d84a0 MC |
1097 | if (pad <= 0) { |
1098 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1099 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d102d9df | 1100 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1101 | } |
d102d9df | 1102 | |
aebe9e39 | 1103 | if (sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1104 | reclen[ctr] += pad; |
1105 | recs[ctr].length += pad; | |
02a36fda | 1106 | } |
02a36fda | 1107 | |
aebe9e39 | 1108 | } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { |
c08d12ca | 1109 | padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); |
02a36fda | 1110 | |
d102d9df | 1111 | /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
02a36fda | 1112 | |
921d84a0 MC |
1113 | if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { |
1114 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1115 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 1116 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1117 | } |
72716e79 | 1118 | /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ |
c08d12ca | 1119 | padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); |
72716e79 MC |
1120 | for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) |
1121 | recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; | |
1122 | reclen[ctr] += padnum; | |
1123 | recs[ctr].length += padnum; | |
d102d9df MC |
1124 | } |
1125 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1126 | if (!sending) { |
d102d9df MC |
1127 | if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) |
1128 | return 0; | |
1129 | } | |
02a36fda | 1130 | } |
37205971 | 1131 | if (n_recs > 1) { |
d102d9df | 1132 | unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
02a36fda | 1133 | |
d102d9df | 1134 | /* Set the output buffers */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1135 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1136 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; |
1137 | } | |
1138 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1139 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1140 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1141 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
1142 | return -1; | |
d102d9df MC |
1143 | } |
1144 | /* Set the input buffers */ | |
e8aa8b6c | 1145 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1146 | data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; |
1147 | } | |
1148 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, | |
c08d12ca | 1149 | (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 |
d102d9df | 1150 | || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, |
c08d12ca | 1151 | (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { |
921d84a0 MC |
1152 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, |
1153 | SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); | |
d102d9df MC |
1154 | return -1; |
1155 | } | |
02a36fda MC |
1156 | } |
1157 | ||
c08d12ca MC |
1158 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ |
1159 | tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, | |
1160 | (unsigned int)reclen[0]); | |
d102d9df | 1161 | if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) |
a230b26e | 1162 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) |
72716e79 MC |
1163 | ? (tmpr < 0) |
1164 | : (tmpr == 0)) | |
02a36fda | 1165 | return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ |
921d84a0 | 1166 | |
aebe9e39 | 1167 | if (sending == 0) { |
e75c5a79 | 1168 | if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1169 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1170 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1171 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1172 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1173 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1174 | } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
37205971 | 1175 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
d102d9df MC |
1176 | recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
1177 | recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1178 | recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
1179 | } | |
e75c5a79 | 1180 | } |
02a36fda | 1181 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1182 | |
1183 | ret = 1; | |
28a31a0a | 1184 | if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { |
72716e79 | 1185 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
921d84a0 MC |
1186 | if (imac_size < 0) { |
1187 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, | |
1188 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
72716e79 | 1189 | return -1; |
921d84a0 | 1190 | } |
72716e79 MC |
1191 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; |
1192 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1193 | if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { |
94777c9c | 1194 | int tmpret; |
37205971 | 1195 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c | 1196 | tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); |
f9cf774c MC |
1197 | /* |
1198 | * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can | |
1199 | * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant | |
1200 | * time behaviour. | |
1201 | */ | |
1202 | if (tmpret == 0) | |
1203 | return 0; | |
1204 | ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), | |
1205 | ret, -1); | |
94777c9c MC |
1206 | } |
1207 | } | |
aebe9e39 | 1208 | if (pad && !sending) { |
37205971 | 1209 | for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
94777c9c MC |
1210 | recs[ctr].length -= pad; |
1211 | } | |
d102d9df | 1212 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1213 | } |
1214 | return ret; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1217 | int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1218 | { |
02a36fda | 1219 | unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; |
02a36fda MC |
1220 | const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
1221 | unsigned char *p, rec_char; | |
1222 | size_t md_size; | |
c08d12ca | 1223 | size_t npad; |
02a36fda MC |
1224 | int t; |
1225 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1226 | if (sending) { |
02a36fda | 1227 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1228 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1229 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1230 | } else { | |
02a36fda | 1231 | mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
de07f311 | 1232 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1233 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1234 | } | |
1235 | ||
1236 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
1237 | if (t < 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1238 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1239 | md_size = t; |
1240 | npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; | |
1241 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1242 | if (!sending && |
02a36fda MC |
1243 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1244 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { | |
1245 | /* | |
1246 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1247 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1248 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1249 | */ | |
1250 | ||
1251 | /*- | |
1252 | * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: | |
1253 | * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. | |
1254 | * | |
1255 | * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size | |
1256 | * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller | |
1257 | * total size. | |
1258 | */ | |
1259 | unsigned char header[75]; | |
c08d12ca | 1260 | size_t j = 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1261 | memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); |
1262 | j += md_size; | |
1263 | memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); | |
1264 | j += npad; | |
1265 | memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); | |
1266 | j += 8; | |
1267 | header[j++] = rec->type; | |
c08d12ca MC |
1268 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1269 | header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda MC |
1270 | |
1271 | /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1272 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, |
1273 | md, &md_size, | |
1274 | header, rec->input, | |
1275 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1276 | mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) | |
a14aa99b | 1277 | return 0; |
02a36fda MC |
1278 | } else { |
1279 | unsigned int md_size_u; | |
1280 | /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ | |
bfb0641f | 1281 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
6e59a892 RL |
1282 | |
1283 | if (md_ctx == NULL) | |
a14aa99b | 1284 | return 0; |
02a36fda | 1285 | |
02a36fda | 1286 | rec_char = rec->type; |
02a36fda MC |
1287 | p = md; |
1288 | s2n(rec->length, p); | |
6e59a892 | 1289 | if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1290 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 |
1291 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 | |
1292 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 | |
1293 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 | |
1294 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 | |
1295 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 | |
1296 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 | |
1297 | || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 | |
1298 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 | |
1299 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 | |
1300 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 | |
1301 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { | |
302d1697 | 1302 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
a14aa99b | 1303 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1304 | } |
02a36fda | 1305 | |
bfb0641f | 1306 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
02a36fda MC |
1307 | } |
1308 | ||
1309 | ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); | |
a14aa99b | 1310 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1311 | } |
1312 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1313 | int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) |
02a36fda | 1314 | { |
02a36fda MC |
1315 | unsigned char *seq; |
1316 | EVP_MD_CTX *hash; | |
1317 | size_t md_size; | |
1318 | int i; | |
6e59a892 | 1319 | EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; |
02a36fda | 1320 | unsigned char header[13]; |
aebe9e39 | 1321 | int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) |
02a36fda MC |
1322 | : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
1323 | int t; | |
1324 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1325 | if (sending) { |
de07f311 | 1326 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1327 | hash = ssl->write_hash; |
1328 | } else { | |
de07f311 | 1329 | seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); |
02a36fda MC |
1330 | hash = ssl->read_hash; |
1331 | } | |
1332 | ||
1333 | t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
380a522f MC |
1334 | if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) |
1335 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1336 | md_size = t; |
1337 | ||
1338 | /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ | |
1339 | if (stream_mac) { | |
1340 | mac_ctx = hash; | |
1341 | } else { | |
bfb0641f | 1342 | hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
a080c3e8 BE |
1343 | if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) { |
1344 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); | |
a14aa99b | 1345 | return 0; |
a080c3e8 | 1346 | } |
6e59a892 | 1347 | mac_ctx = hmac; |
02a36fda MC |
1348 | } |
1349 | ||
1350 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1351 | unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; | |
1352 | ||
aebe9e39 | 1353 | s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : |
78a39fe7 | 1354 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); |
02a36fda MC |
1355 | memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
1356 | ||
1357 | memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); | |
1358 | } else | |
1359 | memcpy(header, seq, 8); | |
1360 | ||
1361 | header[8] = rec->type; | |
1362 | header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); | |
1363 | header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); | |
348240c6 MC |
1364 | header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
1365 | header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); | |
02a36fda | 1366 | |
aebe9e39 | 1367 | if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && |
02a36fda MC |
1368 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
1369 | ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { | |
1370 | /* | |
1371 | * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
1372 | * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we | |
1373 | * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. | |
1374 | */ | |
1375 | /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ | |
5f3d93e4 MC |
1376 | if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, |
1377 | md, &md_size, | |
1378 | header, rec->input, | |
1379 | rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, | |
1380 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, | |
1381 | ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1382 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
aabe3a35 | 1383 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1384 | } |
02a36fda | 1385 | } else { |
eda75751 | 1386 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ |
5f3d93e4 | 1387 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
a230b26e EK |
1388 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 |
1389 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { | |
bfb0641f | 1390 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
a14aa99b | 1391 | return 0; |
5f3d93e4 | 1392 | } |
02a36fda MC |
1393 | } |
1394 | ||
bfb0641f | 1395 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
5f3d93e4 | 1396 | |
49b26f54 RL |
1397 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { |
1398 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n"); | |
1399 | BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4); | |
1400 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n"); | |
1401 | BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4); | |
1402 | } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); | |
02a36fda MC |
1403 | |
1404 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
1405 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1406 | ++seq[i]; | |
1407 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1408 | break; | |
1409 | } | |
1410 | } | |
49b26f54 RL |
1411 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { |
1412 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n"); | |
1413 | BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4); | |
1414 | } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); | |
a14aa99b | 1415 | return 1; |
02a36fda MC |
1416 | } |
1417 | ||
1418 | /*- | |
1419 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC | |
1420 | * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. | |
1421 | * | |
1422 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1423 | * returns: | |
1424 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1425 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1426 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1427 | */ | |
a773b52a | 1428 | int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, |
72716e79 | 1429 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1430 | { |
72716e79 | 1431 | size_t padding_length; |
2688e7a0 | 1432 | size_t good; |
72716e79 | 1433 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; |
02a36fda MC |
1434 | |
1435 | /* | |
1436 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. | |
1437 | */ | |
1438 | if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1439 | return 0; | |
1440 | ||
1441 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1442 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); |
02a36fda | 1443 | /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ |
2688e7a0 | 1444 | good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); |
02a36fda | 1445 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
2688e7a0 | 1446 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1447 | } |
1448 | ||
1449 | /*- | |
1450 | * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC | |
1451 | * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and | |
1452 | * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record | |
1453 | * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the | |
1454 | * padding was removed. | |
1455 | * | |
1456 | * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. | |
1457 | * returns: | |
1458 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. | |
1459 | * 1: if the padding was valid | |
1460 | * -1: otherwise. | |
1461 | */ | |
1462 | int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, | |
1463 | SSL3_RECORD *rec, | |
72716e79 | 1464 | size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) |
02a36fda | 1465 | { |
2688e7a0 | 1466 | size_t good; |
72716e79 MC |
1467 | size_t padding_length, to_check, i; |
1468 | const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; | |
02a36fda MC |
1469 | /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ |
1470 | if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { | |
1471 | /* | |
1472 | * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant | |
1473 | * time. | |
1474 | */ | |
1475 | if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) | |
1476 | return 0; | |
1477 | /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ | |
1478 | rec->data += block_size; | |
1479 | rec->input += block_size; | |
1480 | rec->length -= block_size; | |
1481 | rec->orig_len -= block_size; | |
1482 | } else if (overhead > rec->length) | |
1483 | return 0; | |
1484 | ||
1485 | padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; | |
1486 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1487 | if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & |
1488 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { | |
02a36fda MC |
1489 | /* padding is already verified */ |
1490 | rec->length -= padding_length + 1; | |
1491 | return 1; | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1494 | good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); |
02a36fda MC |
1495 | /* |
1496 | * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and | |
1497 | * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length | |
1498 | * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of | |
1499 | * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that | |
1500 | * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the | |
1501 | * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record | |
1502 | * is public information so we can use it.) | |
1503 | */ | |
eea8723c AL |
1504 | to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ |
1505 | if (to_check > rec->length) | |
1506 | to_check = rec->length; | |
02a36fda MC |
1507 | |
1508 | for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { | |
2688e7a0 | 1509 | unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); |
02a36fda MC |
1510 | unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; |
1511 | /* | |
1512 | * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value | |
1513 | * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. | |
1514 | */ | |
1515 | good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); | |
1516 | } | |
1517 | ||
1518 | /* | |
1519 | * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one | |
1520 | * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. | |
1521 | */ | |
2688e7a0 | 1522 | good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); |
02a36fda MC |
1523 | rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); |
1524 | ||
2688e7a0 | 1525 | return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); |
02a36fda MC |
1526 | } |
1527 | ||
1528 | /*- | |
1529 | * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in | |
1530 | * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may | |
1531 | * vary within a 256-byte window). | |
1532 | * | |
1533 | * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to | |
1534 | * this function. | |
1535 | * | |
1536 | * On entry: | |
1537 | * rec->orig_len >= md_size | |
1538 | * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
1539 | * | |
1540 | * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with | |
1541 | * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into | |
1542 | * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't | |
1543 | * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are | |
1544 | * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. | |
1545 | */ | |
1546 | #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE | |
1547 | ||
380a522f | 1548 | int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, |
72716e79 | 1549 | const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) |
02a36fda MC |
1550 | { |
1551 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1552 | unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1553 | unsigned char *rotated_mac; | |
1554 | #else | |
1555 | unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1556 | #endif | |
1557 | ||
1558 | /* | |
1559 | * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. | |
1560 | */ | |
72716e79 MC |
1561 | size_t mac_end = rec->length; |
1562 | size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; | |
8f77fab8 | 1563 | size_t in_mac; |
02a36fda MC |
1564 | /* |
1565 | * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the | |
1566 | * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. | |
1567 | */ | |
72716e79 | 1568 | size_t scan_start = 0; |
2688e7a0 | 1569 | size_t i, j; |
2688e7a0 | 1570 | size_t rotate_offset; |
02a36fda | 1571 | |
380a522f MC |
1572 | if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size |
1573 | && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) | |
1574 | return 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1575 | |
1576 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1577 | rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); | |
1578 | #endif | |
1579 | ||
1580 | /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ | |
1581 | if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) | |
1582 | scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); | |
02a36fda | 1583 | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1584 | in_mac = 0; |
1585 | rotate_offset = 0; | |
02a36fda MC |
1586 | memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); |
1587 | for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { | |
8f77fab8 AP |
1588 | size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); |
1589 | size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); | |
02a36fda | 1590 | unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; |
8f77fab8 AP |
1591 | |
1592 | in_mac |= mac_started; | |
1593 | in_mac &= mac_ended; | |
1594 | rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; | |
1595 | rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; | |
2688e7a0 | 1596 | j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1597 | } |
1598 | ||
1599 | /* Now rotate the MAC */ | |
1600 | #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) | |
1601 | j = 0; | |
1602 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { | |
1603 | /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ | |
1604 | ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; | |
1605 | out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; | |
2688e7a0 | 1606 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1607 | } |
1608 | #else | |
1609 | memset(out, 0, md_size); | |
1610 | rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; | |
2688e7a0 | 1611 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1612 | for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { |
1613 | for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) | |
2688e7a0 | 1614 | out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); |
02a36fda | 1615 | rotate_offset++; |
2688e7a0 | 1616 | rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); |
02a36fda MC |
1617 | } |
1618 | #endif | |
380a522f MC |
1619 | |
1620 | return 1; | |
02a36fda MC |
1621 | } |
1622 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 1623 | int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
fe589e61 | 1624 | { |
c2853382 | 1625 | int i; |
fe589e61 MC |
1626 | int enc_err; |
1627 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1628 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
72716e79 MC |
1629 | int imac_size; |
1630 | size_t mac_size; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1631 | unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
1632 | ||
1633 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1634 | sess = s->session; | |
1635 | ||
1636 | /* | |
1637 | * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, | |
1638 | * and we have that many bytes in s->packet | |
1639 | */ | |
7a7048af | 1640 | rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
fe589e61 MC |
1641 | |
1642 | /* | |
1643 | * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points | |
1644 | * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either | |
1645 | * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into | |
1646 | * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer | |
1647 | */ | |
1648 | ||
1649 | /* | |
1650 | * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length | |
1651 | * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. | |
1652 | */ | |
1653 | ||
1654 | /* check is not needed I believe */ | |
1655 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1656 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1657 | SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1658 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1659 | } |
1660 | ||
1661 | /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ | |
1662 | rr->data = rr->input; | |
1663 | rr->orig_len = rr->length; | |
1664 | ||
28a31a0a | 1665 | if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { |
e23d5071 DW |
1666 | unsigned char *mac; |
1667 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
380a522f | 1668 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1669 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1670 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1671 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1672 | } |
e23d5071 | 1673 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { |
c2853382 MC |
1674 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1675 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1676 | return 0; | |
e23d5071 DW |
1677 | } |
1678 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1679 | mac = rr->data + rr->length; | |
1680 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); | |
a14aa99b | 1681 | if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { |
c2853382 | 1682 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
e23d5071 | 1683 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
c2853382 | 1684 | return 0; |
e23d5071 DW |
1685 | } |
1686 | } | |
1687 | ||
d102d9df | 1688 | enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); |
fe589e61 MC |
1689 | /*- |
1690 | * enc_err is: | |
1691 | * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. | |
1692 | * 1: if the padding is valid | |
1693 | * -1: if the padding is invalid | |
1694 | */ | |
1695 | if (enc_err == 0) { | |
921d84a0 MC |
1696 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1697 | /* SSLfatal() got called */ | |
1698 | return 0; | |
1699 | } | |
fe589e61 MC |
1700 | /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ |
1701 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1702 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
c2853382 | 1703 | return 0; |
fe589e61 | 1704 | } |
49b26f54 RL |
1705 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { |
1706 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %ld\n", rr->length); | |
1707 | BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr->data, rr->length, 4); | |
1708 | } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1709 | |
1710 | /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ | |
28a31a0a | 1711 | if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && |
fe589e61 MC |
1712 | (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { |
1713 | /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ | |
1714 | unsigned char *mac = NULL; | |
1715 | unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
72716e79 MC |
1716 | |
1717 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ | |
1718 | imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
1719 | if (imac_size < 0) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1720 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1721 | ERR_LIB_EVP); | |
1722 | return 0; | |
72716e79 MC |
1723 | } |
1724 | mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; | |
380a522f | 1725 | if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1726 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1727 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1728 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1729 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1730 | |
1731 | /* | |
1732 | * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was | |
1733 | * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, | |
1734 | * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount | |
1735 | * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. | |
1736 | */ | |
1737 | if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || | |
1738 | /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ | |
1739 | (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
1740 | rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1741 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1742 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1743 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1744 | } |
1745 | ||
1746 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
1747 | /* | |
1748 | * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be | |
1749 | * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in | |
1750 | * constant time from within the record, without leaking the | |
1751 | * contents of the padding bytes. | |
1752 | */ | |
1753 | mac = mac_tmp; | |
380a522f | 1754 | if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1755 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1756 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1757 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 1758 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1759 | rr->length -= mac_size; |
1760 | } else { | |
1761 | /* | |
1762 | * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals | |
1763 | * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for | |
1764 | * |mac_size| above. | |
1765 | */ | |
1766 | rr->length -= mac_size; | |
1767 | mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; | |
1768 | } | |
1769 | ||
d102d9df | 1770 | i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); |
a14aa99b | 1771 | if (i == 0 || mac == NULL |
72716e79 | 1772 | || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) |
fe589e61 MC |
1773 | enc_err = -1; |
1774 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) | |
1775 | enc_err = -1; | |
1776 | } | |
1777 | ||
1778 | if (enc_err < 0) { | |
1779 | /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ | |
1780 | rr->length = 0; | |
7a7048af | 1781 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
c2853382 | 1782 | return 0; |
fe589e61 MC |
1783 | } |
1784 | ||
1785 | /* r->length is now just compressed */ | |
1786 | if (s->expand != NULL) { | |
1787 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1788 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1789 | SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1790 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 | 1791 | } |
94777c9c | 1792 | if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { |
c2853382 MC |
1793 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, |
1794 | SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
1795 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1796 | } |
1797 | } | |
1798 | ||
1799 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
c2853382 MC |
1800 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, |
1801 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1802 | return 0; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1803 | } |
1804 | ||
1805 | rr->off = 0; | |
1806 | /*- | |
1807 | * So at this point the following is true | |
1808 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record | |
1809 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record | |
1810 | * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte | |
1811 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment | |
1812 | * after use :-). | |
1813 | */ | |
1814 | ||
1815 | /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
7a7048af | 1816 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1817 | |
1818 | /* Mark receipt of record. */ | |
1819 | dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); | |
1820 | ||
208fb891 | 1821 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
1822 | } |
1823 | ||
fe589e61 | 1824 | /* |
69687aa8 | 1825 | * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed |
fe589e61 MC |
1826 | */ |
1827 | #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ | |
1828 | dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ | |
cb2ce7ab | 1829 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) |
fe589e61 MC |
1830 | |
1831 | /*- | |
1832 | * Call this to get a new input record. | |
1833 | * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error | |
1834 | * or non-blocking IO. | |
1835 | * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
1836 | * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
1837 | * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data | |
1838 | * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes | |
1839 | */ | |
1840 | /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ | |
1841 | int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) | |
1842 | { | |
1843 | int ssl_major, ssl_minor; | |
8e6d03ca MC |
1844 | int rret; |
1845 | size_t more, n; | |
fe589e61 MC |
1846 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
1847 | unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
1848 | unsigned short version; | |
1849 | DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; | |
1850 | unsigned int is_next_epoch; | |
1851 | ||
1852 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
1853 | ||
738ad946 | 1854 | again: |
fe589e61 MC |
1855 | /* |
1856 | * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. | |
1857 | * This is a non-blocking operation. | |
1858 | */ | |
c2853382 MC |
1859 | if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) { |
1860 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe589e61 | 1861 | return -1; |
c2853382 | 1862 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1863 | |
1864 | /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ | |
1865 | if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) | |
1866 | return 1; | |
1867 | ||
1868 | /* get something from the wire */ | |
738ad946 | 1869 | |
fe589e61 | 1870 | /* check if we have the header */ |
295c3f41 | 1871 | if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
7a7048af | 1872 | (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
8e6d03ca MC |
1873 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
1874 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1875 | /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
c2853382 MC |
1876 | if (rret <= 0) { |
1877 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
8e6d03ca | 1878 | return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ |
c2853382 | 1879 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
1880 | |
1881 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ | |
a230b26e EK |
1882 | if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != |
1883 | DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
7a7048af | 1884 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1885 | goto again; |
1886 | } | |
1887 | ||
295c3f41 | 1888 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); |
fe589e61 | 1889 | |
7a7048af | 1890 | p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1891 | |
1892 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1893 | s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
1894 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1895 | ||
1896 | /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ | |
1897 | rr->type = *(p++); | |
1898 | ssl_major = *(p++); | |
1899 | ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
1900 | version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
1901 | ||
1902 | /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ | |
1903 | n2s(p, rr->epoch); | |
1904 | ||
de07f311 | 1905 | memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); |
fe589e61 MC |
1906 | p += 6; |
1907 | ||
1908 | n2s(p, rr->length); | |
66fab923 | 1909 | rr->read = 0; |
fe589e61 | 1910 | |
08455bc9 MC |
1911 | /* |
1912 | * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact | |
1913 | * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors) | |
1914 | */ | |
1915 | if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
fe589e61 MC |
1916 | if (version != s->version) { |
1917 | /* unexpected version, silently discard */ | |
1918 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1919 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1920 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1921 | goto again; |
1922 | } | |
1923 | } | |
1924 | ||
1925 | if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { | |
1926 | /* wrong version, silently discard record */ | |
1927 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1928 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1929 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1930 | goto again; |
1931 | } | |
1932 | ||
1933 | if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { | |
1934 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1935 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1936 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1937 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1938 | goto again; |
1939 | } | |
1940 | ||
cf72c757 F |
1941 | /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */ |
1942 | if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) | |
1943 | && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) { | |
1944 | /* record too long, silently discard it */ | |
1945 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 1946 | rr->read = 1; |
cf72c757 F |
1947 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
1948 | goto again; | |
1949 | } | |
1950 | ||
295c3f41 | 1951 | /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1952 | } |
1953 | ||
295c3f41 | 1954 | /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
fe589e61 | 1955 | |
7a7048af MC |
1956 | if (rr->length > |
1957 | RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
fe589e61 | 1958 | /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
8e6d03ca MC |
1959 | more = rr->length; |
1960 | rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); | |
fe589e61 | 1961 | /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
8e6d03ca | 1962 | if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { |
c2853382 MC |
1963 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
1964 | /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */ | |
1965 | return -1; | |
1966 | } | |
fe589e61 | 1967 | rr->length = 0; |
66fab923 | 1968 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 1969 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
1970 | goto again; |
1971 | } | |
1972 | ||
1973 | /* | |
1974 | * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == | |
1975 | * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length | |
1976 | */ | |
1977 | } | |
295c3f41 MC |
1978 | /* set state for later operations */ |
1979 | RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); | |
fe589e61 MC |
1980 | |
1981 | /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ | |
1982 | bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); | |
1983 | if (bitmap == NULL) { | |
1984 | rr->length = 0; | |
a230b26e | 1985 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
1986 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
1987 | } | |
1988 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1989 | /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ | |
1990 | if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
1991 | #endif | |
912c89c5 | 1992 | /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ |
1fb9fdc3 MC |
1993 | /* |
1994 | * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where | |
1995 | * we have no integrity negotiated yet? | |
1996 | */ | |
912c89c5 | 1997 | if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { |
fe589e61 | 1998 | rr->length = 0; |
66fab923 | 1999 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 2000 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
2001 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
2002 | } | |
2003 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
2004 | } | |
2005 | #endif | |
2006 | ||
2007 | /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
66fab923 MC |
2008 | if (rr->length == 0) { |
2009 | rr->read = 1; | |
fe589e61 | 2010 | goto again; |
66fab923 | 2011 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
2012 | |
2013 | /* | |
2014 | * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a | |
2015 | * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be | |
912c89c5 | 2016 | * processed at this time. |
fe589e61 MC |
2017 | */ |
2018 | if (is_next_epoch) { | |
024f543c | 2019 | if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { |
c2853382 MC |
2020 | if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, |
2021 | &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), | |
2022 | rr->seq_num) < 0) { | |
2023 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe589e61 | 2024 | return -1; |
c2853382 | 2025 | } |
fe589e61 MC |
2026 | } |
2027 | rr->length = 0; | |
66fab923 | 2028 | rr->read = 1; |
7a7048af | 2029 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
fe589e61 MC |
2030 | goto again; |
2031 | } | |
2032 | ||
1fb9fdc3 | 2033 | if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { |
c2853382 MC |
2034 | if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
2035 | /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */ | |
2036 | return -1; | |
2037 | } | |
fe589e61 | 2038 | rr->length = 0; |
66fab923 | 2039 | rr->read = 1; |
a230b26e | 2040 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ |
fe589e61 MC |
2041 | goto again; /* get another record */ |
2042 | } | |
fe589e61 | 2043 | |
208fb891 | 2044 | return 1; |
fe589e61 MC |
2045 | |
2046 | } | |
079ef6bd MC |
2047 | |
2048 | int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off) | |
2049 | { | |
2050 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
2051 | ||
2052 | rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); | |
2053 | memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); | |
2054 | ||
2055 | rr->length = len; | |
2056 | rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
2057 | memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num)); | |
2058 | rr->off = off; | |
2059 | ||
2060 | s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf; | |
2061 | s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len; | |
2062 | rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
2063 | ||
2064 | if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), | |
2065 | SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <= 0) { | |
2066 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2067 | return 0; | |
2068 | } | |
2069 | ||
2070 | return 1; | |
2071 | } |