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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
c6d38183 RS |
22 | /* |
23 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
24 | */ | |
25 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
26 | int x509err; | |
27 | int alert; | |
28 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
29 | ||
597c51bc MC |
30 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
31 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
32 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
33 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
34 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
35 | }; | |
36 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
37 | /* |
38 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
39 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
40 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 41 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
42 | { |
43 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 44 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
45 | |
46 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 47 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 48 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 49 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
51 | /* | |
52 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
53 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 54 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 55 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
56 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
57 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
58 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
59 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
60 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
61 | written)) | |
62 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 63 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
64 | if (s->msg_callback) |
65 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
66 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
67 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 68 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 69 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
70 | s->init_off += written; |
71 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 72 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 73 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 74 | |
4a01c59f | 75 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
76 | { |
77 | size_t msglen; | |
78 | ||
4a01c59f | 79 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 80 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 81 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
82 | return 0; |
83 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
84 | s->init_off = 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | return 1; | |
87 | } | |
88 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
89 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
90 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
91 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
92 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 93 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 94 | } |
c7f47786 | 95 | |
b186a592 MC |
96 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
97 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
98 | ||
c7f47786 | 99 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
100 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
101 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
102 | ||
103 | /* | |
104 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
105 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
106 | * ClientHello. | |
107 | */ | |
b5b993b2 | 108 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
4752c5de MC |
109 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
110 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
111 | return 0; |
112 | } | |
113 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
114 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
115 | ||
116 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
117 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
118 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
119 | ok = 1; | |
120 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
121 | ok = 1; | |
122 | } | |
123 | if (ok) | |
124 | break; | |
125 | } | |
126 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
127 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
128 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
129 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
130 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
131 | return 0; |
132 | } | |
c7f47786 | 133 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 134 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
9ef9088c | 135 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 136 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 137 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 138 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 MC |
139 | |
140 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
141 | } | |
142 | } else { | |
143 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
9ef9088c | 144 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 145 | else |
9ef9088c | 146 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 MC |
147 | |
148 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
149 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
150 | s->hit = 0; | |
151 | ||
152 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
153 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 154 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 155 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
156 | } |
157 | ||
158 | return 1; | |
159 | } | |
160 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
161 | /* |
162 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
163 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
164 | */ | |
165 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
166 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
167 | ||
168 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
169 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
170 | { | |
171 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
172 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
173 | ||
174 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
175 | size_t hashlen; | |
176 | ||
177 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
178 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
179 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
180 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
181 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
182 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
183 | else | |
184 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
185 | ||
186 | /* | |
187 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
188 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
189 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
190 | */ | |
191 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
192 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
193 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
194 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
195 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
196 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
197 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 198 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
199 | return 0; |
200 | } | |
201 | ||
202 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
203 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
204 | } else { | |
205 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 206 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 207 | |
60690b5b RL |
208 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); |
209 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
210 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, |
211 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 212 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 213 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
214 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
217 | return 1; | |
218 | } | |
219 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
220 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
221 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
222 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
223 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 224 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
225 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
226 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
227 | void *hdata; |
228 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 229 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 230 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 231 | |
ad4dd362 | 232 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
233 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
234 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
235 | goto err; |
236 | } | |
237 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 238 | |
168067b6 | 239 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
240 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
241 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
242 | goto err; |
243 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
244 | |
245 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
246 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
248 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
249 | goto err; |
250 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 251 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
252 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
253 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 254 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
255 | goto err; |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
ad4dd362 | 258 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
259 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
260 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
261 | goto err; |
262 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
263 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
264 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 | 265 | if (sig == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
267 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
268 | goto err; |
269 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 270 | |
75394189 | 271 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
272 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
273 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
274 | goto err; |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
ad4dd362 | 277 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 278 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
279 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
280 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
281 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
282 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
283 | goto err; |
284 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
285 | } |
286 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
287 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
288 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
289 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
290 | s->session->master_key) | |
291 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
292 | ||
d4d2f3a4 MC |
293 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
294 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
295 | goto err; |
296 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 297 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
298 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
299 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
300 | goto err; |
301 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 302 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
303 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
304 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
305 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
306 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
307 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
308 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
309 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 310 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
311 | } |
312 | #endif | |
313 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 314 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
315 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
316 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
317 | goto err; |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
320 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
321 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
322 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 323 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 324 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
325 | |
326 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
327 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
328 | return 1; | |
329 | err: | |
330 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
331 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
332 | return 0; |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
335 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
336 | { | |
337 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 338 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
339 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
340 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
341 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 342 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 343 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
344 | unsigned int len; |
345 | X509 *peer; | |
346 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 347 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 348 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 349 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 350 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 351 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
352 | |
353 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
355 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
356 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
357 | } |
358 | ||
359 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
360 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
361 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
362 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
363 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
364 | goto err; | |
365 | } | |
83b4049a | 366 | |
dd24857b | 367 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
368 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
369 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
370 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
371 | } |
372 | ||
f464f9c0 | 373 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
374 | unsigned int sigalg; |
375 | ||
376 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
377 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
378 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
379 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 380 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
381 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
382 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
383 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 384 | } |
f464f9c0 | 385 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
386 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
387 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
388 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
389 | } |
390 | ||
168067b6 | 391 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
392 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
393 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
394 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 395 | } |
f464f9c0 | 396 | |
572fa024 DY |
397 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
398 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) | |
399 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
400 | #endif | |
401 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
402 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
403 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
404 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
405 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
406 | */ |
407 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
408 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
409 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
410 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
411 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
412 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
413 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
414 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
415 | } else |
416 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 417 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
418 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
419 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
420 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 421 | } |
f464f9c0 | 422 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
423 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
424 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
425 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
426 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
427 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
428 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
429 | } |
430 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
431 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
432 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
433 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
434 | } |
435 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 436 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
437 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
438 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
439 | } |
440 | ||
441 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
442 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
443 | #endif | |
75394189 | 444 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
445 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
446 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
447 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
448 | } |
449 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
450 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 451 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
452 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
453 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
454 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
455 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
456 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
457 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
458 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
459 | } |
460 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
461 | data = gost_data; | |
462 | } | |
463 | } | |
464 | #endif | |
465 | ||
5554facb | 466 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 467 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
468 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
469 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
470 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
471 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
472 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 473 | } |
d8bc1399 | 474 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
475 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
476 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
477 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
478 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
479 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
480 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
481 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
482 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
483 | } |
484 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
485 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
486 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
487 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
488 | } |
489 | } else { | |
490 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 491 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
492 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
493 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
494 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 495 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
496 | } |
497 | ||
e4562014 MC |
498 | /* |
499 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
500 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
501 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
502 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
503 | * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual | |
504 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. | |
505 | */ | |
506 | if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) | |
507 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
508 | else | |
509 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 510 | err: |
d8bc1399 MC |
511 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); |
512 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
513 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
514 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
515 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
516 | #endif | |
517 | return ret; | |
518 | } | |
519 | ||
229185e6 | 520 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 521 | { |
12472b45 | 522 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 523 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 524 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 525 | |
f7e393be | 526 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 527 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
528 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
529 | ||
530 | /* | |
531 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
532 | * client certificate | |
533 | */ | |
534 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
535 | && !s->server | |
536 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
537 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
538 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
539 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 540 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
541 | } |
542 | ||
229185e6 MC |
543 | if (s->server) { |
544 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
545 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
546 | } else { | |
547 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
548 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
549 | } | |
0f113f3e | 550 | |
12472b45 MC |
551 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
552 | sender, slen, | |
553 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
554 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
555 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
556 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
557 | } |
558 | ||
12472b45 | 559 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 560 | |
12472b45 | 561 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
562 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
563 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
564 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 565 | } |
0f113f3e | 566 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
567 | /* |
568 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
569 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
570 | */ | |
571 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
572 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 573 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
574 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
575 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 576 | } |
2faa1b48 | 577 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
578 | /* |
579 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
580 | */ | |
380a522f | 581 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
582 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
583 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
584 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 585 | } |
23a635c0 | 586 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
587 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
588 | finish_md_len); | |
589 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 590 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
591 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
592 | finish_md_len); | |
593 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 594 | } |
0f113f3e | 595 | |
b9908bf9 | 596 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 597 | } |
d02b48c6 | 598 | |
44c04a2e MC |
599 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
600 | { | |
601 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
602 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
603 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
604 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
605 | } |
606 | ||
9412b3ad | 607 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 608 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
609 | } |
610 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
611 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
612 | { | |
613 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
614 | ||
82f992cb MC |
615 | s->key_update_count++; |
616 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
617 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
618 | SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
619 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
82f992cb MC |
620 | } |
621 | ||
524420d8 MC |
622 | /* |
623 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
624 | * be on a record boundary. | |
625 | */ | |
626 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
627 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
628 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
629 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
630 | } |
631 | ||
e1c3de44 | 632 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 633 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
634 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
635 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
636 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
637 | } |
638 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
639 | /* |
640 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
641 | * didn't recognise. | |
642 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
643 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
644 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
645 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
646 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
647 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
648 | } |
649 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
650 | /* |
651 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
652 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
653 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We |
654 | * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already | |
655 | * sent close_notify. | |
5bf47933 | 656 | */ |
1bf4cb0f MC |
657 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED |
658 | && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) | |
5bf47933 MC |
659 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
660 | ||
57389a32 | 661 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
662 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
663 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
664 | } |
665 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
666 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
667 | } | |
668 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
669 | /* |
670 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
671 | * to far. | |
672 | */ | |
5d671101 | 673 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
674 | { |
675 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 676 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 677 | |
49ae7423 | 678 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
679 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
680 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
681 | } else { | |
682 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
683 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
684 | } | |
685 | ||
5d671101 MC |
686 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
687 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, | |
688 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
689 | ||
690 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { | |
691 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
692 | return 0; | |
693 | } | |
694 | ||
695 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 696 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 697 | |
be3583fa | 698 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 699 | { |
348240c6 | 700 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 701 | |
73999b62 | 702 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
703 | /* |
704 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
705 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
706 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 707 | */ |
c69f2adf | 708 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 709 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
710 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
711 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
712 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
713 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
714 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
715 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
716 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
717 | } |
718 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 719 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
720 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
721 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
722 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
723 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 724 | } |
657da85e MC |
725 | } |
726 | ||
727 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
728 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
729 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
730 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
731 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
732 | } |
733 | ||
734 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
735 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
736 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
737 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
738 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
739 | } |
740 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
741 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
742 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
743 | ||
744 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
745 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
746 | ||
747 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
748 | /* | |
749 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
750 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
751 | * SCTP is used | |
752 | */ | |
753 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
754 | #endif | |
755 | } | |
756 | ||
b9908bf9 | 757 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
758 | } |
759 | ||
be3583fa | 760 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 761 | { |
12472b45 | 762 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 763 | |
d781d247 MC |
764 | |
765 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 766 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
767 | /* |
768 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
769 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less | |
770 | * than TLSv1.3 | |
771 | */ | |
772 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
773 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
774 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
775 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
776 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
777 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
778 | } | |
779 | } | |
d781d247 | 780 | |
524420d8 MC |
781 | /* |
782 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
783 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
784 | */ | |
785 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
786 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
787 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
788 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
789 | } |
790 | ||
0f113f3e | 791 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 792 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
793 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
794 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
795 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
796 | } |
797 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
798 | ||
12472b45 | 799 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 800 | |
12472b45 | 801 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
802 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
803 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
804 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
805 | } |
806 | ||
12472b45 MC |
807 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
808 | md_len) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
809 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
810 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
811 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
812 | } |
813 | ||
814 | /* | |
815 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
816 | */ | |
380a522f | 817 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
818 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
819 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
820 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 821 | } |
23a635c0 | 822 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
823 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
824 | md_len); | |
825 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 826 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
827 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
828 | md_len); | |
829 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
830 | } |
831 | ||
7776a36c MC |
832 | /* |
833 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
834 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
835 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
836 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
837 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
838 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
839 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 840 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
841 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
842 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
843 | } |
844 | } else { | |
845 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 846 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 847 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
848 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
849 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
850 | } |
851 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
852 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
853 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
854 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
855 | } | |
856 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
857 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
858 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
859 | } |
860 | } | |
861 | } | |
862 | ||
e6575156 | 863 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 864 | } |
d02b48c6 | 865 | |
7cea05dc | 866 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 867 | { |
7cea05dc | 868 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
869 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
870 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
871 | return 0; |
872 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 873 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
874 | return 1; |
875 | } | |
876 | ||
e96e0f8e | 877 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 878 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 879 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
880 | int len; |
881 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
882 | ||
883 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
884 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
885 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
886 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
887 | return 0; |
888 | } | |
889 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
890 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
891 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
892 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
893 | return 0; |
894 | } | |
895 | ||
896 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 897 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
898 | chain)) { |
899 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 900 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 901 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
902 | |
903 | return 1; | |
904 | } | |
905 | ||
906 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 907 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
908 | { |
909 | int i, chain_count; | |
910 | X509 *x; | |
911 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
912 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
913 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
914 | |
915 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
916 | return 1; | |
917 | ||
918 | x = cpk->x509; | |
919 | ||
920 | /* | |
921 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
922 | */ | |
d805a57b | 923 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
924 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
925 | else | |
926 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
927 | ||
928 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
929 | chain_store = NULL; | |
930 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
931 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
932 | else | |
933 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
934 | ||
d805a57b | 935 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
936 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
937 | ||
938 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
939 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
940 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
941 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
942 | } |
943 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
944 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
945 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
946 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
947 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
948 | } |
949 | /* | |
950 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
951 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
952 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
953 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
954 | */ | |
955 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
956 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
957 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
958 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
959 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
960 | if (i != 1) { | |
961 | #if 0 | |
962 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
964 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
965 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
966 | #endif | |
967 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
968 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
969 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
970 | } |
971 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
972 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
973 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
974 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
975 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
976 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 977 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 978 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
979 | } |
980 | } | |
981 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
982 | } else { | |
983 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
984 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
985 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
986 | return 0; | |
987 | } | |
988 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
989 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
990 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 991 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
992 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
993 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
994 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
995 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
996 | return 0; | |
997 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
998 | } |
999 | } | |
1000 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1001 | } |
1002 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1003 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 1004 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1005 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
1006 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1007 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1008 | return 0; | |
1009 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1010 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1011 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1012 | return 0; | |
1013 | ||
1014 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1015 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1016 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1017 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1018 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1019 | |
c49e1912 | 1020 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1021 | } |
1022 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1023 | /* |
1024 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1025 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1026 | * freed up as well. | |
1027 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 1028 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1029 | { |
1030 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
1031 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1032 | if (clearbufs) { |
1033 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1034 | /* | |
1035 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1036 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1037 | */ | |
1038 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1039 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1040 | } | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1041 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1042 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1043 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1044 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1045 | } |
30f05b19 | 1046 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1047 | } |
8723588e | 1048 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1049 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1050 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1051 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1052 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1053 | /* |
1054 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1055 | * post handshake exchange | |
1056 | */ | |
c7f47786 | 1057 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1058 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1059 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1060 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1061 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1062 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1063 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1064 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1065 | ||
8723588e | 1066 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1067 | /* |
1068 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1069 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1070 | */ | |
1071 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1072 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1073 | |
0e6161bc | 1074 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 1075 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1076 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
f7506416 MC |
1077 | |
1078 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
1079 | /* | |
1080 | * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going | |
1081 | * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight | |
1082 | * required. | |
1083 | */ | |
1084 | dtls1_start_timer(s); | |
1085 | } | |
8723588e | 1086 | } else { |
4cb00457 MC |
1087 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1088 | /* | |
1089 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1090 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1091 | */ | |
1092 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1093 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1094 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1095 | } else { | |
1096 | /* | |
1097 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1098 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1099 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1100 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1101 | } |
8723588e | 1102 | if (s->hit) |
9ef9088c | 1103 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
8723588e | 1104 | |
fe3a3291 | 1105 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
9ef9088c | 1106 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
f7506416 MC |
1107 | |
1108 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
1109 | /* | |
1110 | * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going | |
1111 | * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight | |
1112 | * required. | |
1113 | */ | |
1114 | dtls1_start_timer(s); | |
1115 | } | |
8723588e MC |
1116 | } |
1117 | ||
8723588e MC |
1118 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1119 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1120 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1121 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1122 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1123 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1124 | } |
1125 | } | |
1126 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1127 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1128 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1129 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1130 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1131 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1132 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1133 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1134 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1135 | if (cb != NULL) |
1136 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1137 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1138 | if (!stop) { |
1139 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1140 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1141 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1142 | } |
30f05b19 | 1143 | |
8723588e MC |
1144 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1145 | } | |
1146 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1147 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1148 | { | |
1149 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1150 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1151 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1152 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1153 | |
1154 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1155 | ||
1156 | do { | |
1157 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1158 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1159 | &p[s->init_num], |
1160 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1161 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1162 | if (i <= 0) { |
1163 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1164 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1165 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1166 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1167 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1168 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1169 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1170 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1171 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1172 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1173 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1174 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1175 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1176 | } |
e9359719 MC |
1177 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
1178 | && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { | |
1179 | /* | |
1180 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1181 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1182 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1183 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1184 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1185 | */ | |
1186 | return 0; | |
1187 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1188 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1189 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1190 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1191 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1192 | return 1; |
1193 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1194 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1195 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1196 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1197 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1198 | } |
54105ddd | 1199 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1200 | } |
1201 | ||
1202 | skip_message = 0; | |
1203 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1204 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1205 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1206 | /* |
1207 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1208 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1209 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1210 | * MAC. | |
1211 | */ | |
1212 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1213 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1214 | skip_message = 1; | |
1215 | ||
1216 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1217 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1218 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1219 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1220 | } | |
1221 | } while (skip_message); | |
1222 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1223 | ||
1224 | *mt = *p; | |
1225 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1226 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1227 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1228 | /* |
1229 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1230 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1231 | * |
1232 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1233 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1234 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1235 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1236 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1237 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1238 | ||
1239 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1240 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1241 | } else { | |
1242 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1243 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1244 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1245 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1246 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1247 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1248 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1249 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1250 | ||
1251 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1252 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
1255 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1256 | } |
1257 | ||
eda75751 | 1258 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1259 | { |
54105ddd | 1260 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1261 | unsigned char *p; |
1262 | int i; | |
1263 | ||
1264 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1265 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1266 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1267 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1268 | } |
1269 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1270 | p = s->init_msg; |
1271 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1272 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1273 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1274 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1275 | if (i <= 0) { |
1276 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1277 | *len = 0; |
1278 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1279 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1280 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1281 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1282 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1283 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1284 | /* |
1285 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1286 | * Finished verification. | |
1287 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1288 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1289 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1290 | *len = 0; | |
1291 | return 0; | |
1292 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1293 | |
0f113f3e | 1294 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1295 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1296 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1297 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1298 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1299 | *len = 0; |
1300 | return 0; | |
1301 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1302 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1303 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1304 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1305 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1306 | /* |
1307 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1308 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1309 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1310 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1311 | */ |
597c51bc | 1312 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 TS |
1313 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
1314 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET | |
1315 | && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1316 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
1317 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1318 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1319 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1320 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1321 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1322 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1323 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1324 | *len = 0; | |
1325 | return 0; | |
1326 | } | |
597c51bc | 1327 | } |
d166ed8c | 1328 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1329 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1330 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1331 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1332 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1333 | } | |
1334 | ||
eda75751 | 1335 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1336 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1337 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1338 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1339 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1340 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1341 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1342 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1343 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1344 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1345 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1346 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1347 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1348 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1349 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1350 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1351 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1352 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1353 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1354 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1355 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1356 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1357 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1358 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1359 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1360 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1361 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1362 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1363 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1364 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1365 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1366 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1367 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1368 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1369 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1370 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1371 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1372 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1373 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1374 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1375 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1376 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1377 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1378 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1379 | ||
1380 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1381 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1382 | }; | |
1383 | ||
1384 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1385 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1386 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1387 | ||
1388 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1389 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1390 | break; | |
1391 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1392 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1393 | |
b362ccab | 1394 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1395 | { |
1396 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1397 | return 0; | |
1398 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1399 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1400 | |
068c358a | 1401 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1402 | { |
1403 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1404 | ||
1405 | if (a == b) | |
1406 | return 0; | |
1407 | if (!dtls) | |
1408 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1409 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1410 | } | |
1411 | ||
1412 | typedef struct { | |
1413 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1414 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1415 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1416 | } version_info; |
1417 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1418 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1419 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1420 | #endif |
1421 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1422 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1423 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1424 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1425 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1426 | #else | |
1427 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1428 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1429 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1430 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1431 | #else |
a230b26e | 1432 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1433 | #endif |
1434 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1435 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1436 | #else |
a230b26e | 1437 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1438 | #endif |
1439 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1440 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1441 | #else |
a230b26e | 1442 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1443 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1444 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1445 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1446 | #else |
a230b26e | 1447 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1448 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1449 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1450 | }; |
1451 | ||
1452 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1453 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1454 | #endif | |
1455 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1456 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1457 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1458 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1459 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1460 | #else |
a230b26e | 1461 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1462 | #endif |
1463 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1464 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1465 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1466 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1467 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1468 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1469 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1470 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1471 | }; |
1472 | ||
1473 | /* | |
1474 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1475 | * | |
1476 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1477 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1478 | * | |
1479 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1480 | */ | |
068c358a | 1481 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1482 | { |
1483 | int version = method->version; | |
1484 | ||
1485 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1486 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1487 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1488 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1489 | ||
1490 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1491 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1492 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1493 | ||
1494 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1495 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1496 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1497 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1498 | |
1499 | return 0; | |
1500 | } | |
1501 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1502 | /* |
1503 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
cd3b53b8 MC |
1504 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise |
1505 | * returns 0. | |
baa45c3e MC |
1506 | */ |
1507 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) | |
1508 | { | |
de4dc598 MC |
1509 | int i, curve; |
1510 | EC_KEY *eckey; | |
baa45c3e | 1511 | |
d162340d MC |
1512 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1513 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1514 | return 1; | |
1515 | #endif | |
1516 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1517 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1518 | return 1; |
1519 | ||
1520 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1521 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1522 | switch (i) { | |
1523 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1524 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1525 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1526 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1527 | continue; | |
1528 | default: | |
1529 | break; | |
1530 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1531 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1532 | continue; | |
1533 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) | |
1534 | return 1; | |
1535 | /* | |
1536 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1537 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1538 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1539 | */ | |
1540 | eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); | |
1541 | if (eckey == NULL) | |
1542 | continue; | |
1543 | curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); | |
1544 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) | |
baa45c3e MC |
1545 | return 1; |
1546 | } | |
1547 | ||
1548 | return 0; | |
1549 | } | |
1550 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1551 | /* |
1552 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1553 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1554 | * | |
1555 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1556 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1557 | * | |
1558 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1559 | */ | |
4fd12788 | 1560 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) |
ccae4a15 FI |
1561 | { |
1562 | const version_info *vent; | |
1563 | const version_info *table; | |
1564 | ||
1565 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1566 | default: | |
1567 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1568 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1569 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1570 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1571 | break; | |
1572 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1573 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1574 | break; | |
1575 | } | |
1576 | ||
1577 | for (vent = table; | |
1578 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1579 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1580 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1581 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1582 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1583 | && (!s->server | |
1584 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1585 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1586 | if (meth != NULL) |
1587 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1588 | return 1; |
1589 | } | |
1590 | } | |
1591 | return 0; | |
1592 | } | |
1593 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1594 | /* |
1595 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1596 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1597 | * supported protocol version. | |
1598 | * | |
1599 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1600 | * | |
1601 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1602 | */ | |
1603 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1604 | { | |
1605 | const version_info *vent; | |
1606 | const version_info *table; | |
1607 | ||
1608 | /* | |
1609 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1610 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1611 | * s->method). | |
1612 | */ | |
1613 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1614 | return 1; | |
1615 | ||
1616 | /* | |
1617 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1618 | * highest protocol version). | |
1619 | */ | |
1620 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1621 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1622 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1623 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1624 | else { | |
1625 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1626 | return 0; | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | ||
1629 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1630 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1631 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1632 | } | |
1633 | return 0; | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | ||
1636 | /* | |
1637 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1638 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1639 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1640 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1641 | * | |
1642 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1643 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1644 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1645 | * | |
1646 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1647 | */ | |
1648 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1649 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1650 | if (version == 0) { |
1651 | *bound = version; | |
1652 | return 1; | |
1653 | } | |
1654 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1655 | /*- |
1656 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1657 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1658 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1659 | * | |
1660 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1661 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1662 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1663 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1664 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1665 | */ | |
1666 | switch (method_version) { | |
1667 | default: | |
1668 | /* | |
1669 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1670 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1671 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1672 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1673 | * versions. | |
1674 | */ | |
1675 | return 0; | |
1676 | ||
1677 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1678 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1679 | return 0; | |
1680 | break; | |
1681 | ||
1682 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1683 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1684 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1685 | return 0; |
1686 | break; | |
1687 | } | |
1688 | ||
1689 | *bound = version; | |
1690 | return 1; | |
1691 | } | |
1692 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1693 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1694 | { | |
1695 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1696 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1697 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
5627f9f2 MC |
1698 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1699 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1700 | /* | |
1701 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1702 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1703 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1704 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1705 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1706 | */ | |
1707 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1708 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1709 | } else { | |
1710 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1714 | /* |
1715 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1716 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1717 | * the version specific method. | |
1718 | * | |
1719 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1720 | * | |
1721 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1722 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1723 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1724 | { |
1725 | /*- | |
1726 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1727 | * | |
1728 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1729 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1730 | * | |
1731 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1732 | * handle version. | |
1733 | */ | |
1734 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1735 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1736 | const version_info *vent; |
1737 | const version_info *table; | |
1738 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1739 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1740 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1741 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1742 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1743 | switch (server_version) { |
1744 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1745 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1746 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1747 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1748 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1749 | /* |
1750 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1751 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1752 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1753 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1754 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1755 | */ | |
1756 | return 0; | |
1757 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1758 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1759 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1760 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1761 | */ |
018fcbec | 1762 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1763 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1764 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1765 | break; | |
1766 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1767 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1768 | break; | |
1769 | } | |
1770 | ||
70af3d8e | 1771 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1772 | |
6f40214f | 1773 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1774 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1775 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1776 | ||
70af3d8e | 1777 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1778 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1779 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1780 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1781 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1782 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1783 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1784 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1785 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1786 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1787 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1788 | } | |
1789 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1790 | /* |
1791 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1792 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1793 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1794 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1795 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1796 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1797 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1798 | */ | |
1799 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1800 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1801 | ||
cd998837 | 1802 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1803 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1804 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1805 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1806 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1807 | } |
1808 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1809 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1810 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1811 | } | |
1812 | ||
1813 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1814 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1815 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1816 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1817 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1818 | */ |
1819 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1820 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1821 | return 0; | |
1822 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1823 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1824 | s->version = best_vers; |
1825 | s->method = best_method; | |
1826 | return 0; | |
1827 | } | |
1828 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1829 | } | |
1830 | ||
1831 | /* | |
1832 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1833 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1834 | */ | |
1835 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1836 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1837 | ||
1838 | /* | |
1839 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1840 | * the ClientHello. | |
1841 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1842 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1843 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1844 | ||
1845 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1846 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1847 | continue; | |
1848 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1849 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1850 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1851 | s->version = vent->version; |
1852 | s->method = method; | |
1853 | return 0; | |
1854 | } | |
1855 | disabled = 1; | |
1856 | } | |
1857 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1858 | } | |
1859 | ||
1860 | /* | |
1861 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1862 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1863 | * the version specific method. | |
1864 | * | |
1865 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1866 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1867 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1868 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1869 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1870 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1871 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1872 | { |
1873 | const version_info *vent; | |
1874 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1875 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
4fa52141 | 1876 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1877 | origv = s->version; |
1878 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1879 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1880 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1881 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1882 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1883 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1884 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1885 | s->version = origv; | |
1886 | return 0; | |
1887 | } | |
1888 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1889 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1890 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1891 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1892 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1893 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1894 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1895 | } |
1896 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1897 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1898 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1899 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1900 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1901 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1902 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1903 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1904 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1905 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1906 | /* |
1907 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1908 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1909 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1910 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1911 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1912 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1913 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1914 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1915 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1916 | break; | |
1917 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1918 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1919 | break; | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1922 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1923 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1924 | s->version = origv; | |
1925 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1926 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); | |
1927 | return 0; | |
1928 | } | |
1929 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) | |
1930 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
1931 | s->version = origv; | |
1932 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1933 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1934 | return 0; | |
1935 | } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) | |
1936 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
1937 | s->version = origv; | |
1938 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1939 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1940 | return 0; | |
1941 | } | |
5df22060 | 1942 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1943 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
1944 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 1945 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1946 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
1947 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
1948 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1949 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1950 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1951 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1952 | s->version = origv; | |
1953 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1954 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1955 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1956 | return 0; | |
1957 | } | |
1958 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1959 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1960 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
1961 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1962 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1963 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1964 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1965 | s->version = origv; | |
1966 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1967 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1968 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1969 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1970 | } |
b5b993b2 | 1971 | } |
c3043dcd | 1972 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1973 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1974 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
1975 | continue; |
1976 | ||
b5b993b2 | 1977 | s->method = vent->cmeth(); |
29bfd5b7 | 1978 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1979 | } |
1980 | ||
88050dd1 | 1981 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1982 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1983 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1984 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1985 | } |
1986 | ||
068c358a | 1987 | /* |
38a73150 | 1988 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1989 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1990 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1991 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1992 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
1993 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
1994 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
1995 | * |
1996 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1997 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1998 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1999 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2000 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2001 | * |
0485d540 | 2002 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2003 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2004 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2005 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2006 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2007 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2008 | */ |
b5b993b2 MC |
2009 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, |
2010 | int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2011 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2012 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2013 | int hole; |
2014 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2015 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2016 | const version_info *table; | |
2017 | const version_info *vent; | |
2018 | ||
2019 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
2020 | default: | |
2021 | /* | |
2022 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2023 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2024 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2025 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2026 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2027 | */ | |
068c358a | 2028 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2029 | /* |
2030 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2031 | * flexible method. | |
2032 | */ | |
2033 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2034 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2035 | return 0; |
2036 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2037 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2038 | break; | |
2039 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2040 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2041 | break; | |
2042 | } | |
2043 | ||
2044 | /* | |
2045 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2046 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2047 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2048 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2049 | * | |
2050 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2051 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2052 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2053 | * | |
2054 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2055 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2056 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2057 | * | |
2058 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2059 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2060 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2061 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2062 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2063 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2064 | */ | |
068c358a | 2065 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2066 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2067 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2068 | *real_max = 0; | |
2069 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2070 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2071 | /* | |
2072 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2073 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2074 | */ | |
2075 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2076 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2077 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2078 | continue; |
2079 | } | |
2080 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2081 | |
2082 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2083 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2084 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2085 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2086 | hole = 1; | |
2087 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2088 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2089 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2090 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2091 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2092 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2093 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2094 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2095 | hole = 0; |
2096 | } | |
2097 | } | |
2098 | ||
068c358a KR |
2099 | *max_version = version; |
2100 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2101 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2102 | if (version == 0) | |
2103 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2104 | ||
068c358a KR |
2105 | return 0; |
2106 | } | |
2107 | ||
2108 | /* | |
2109 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2110 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2111 | * |
2112 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2113 | * | |
2114 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2115 | */ | |
2116 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2117 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2118 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2119 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2120 | /* |
2121 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2122 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2123 | */ | |
2124 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2125 | return 0; | |
2126 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2127 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2128 | |
2129 | if (ret != 0) | |
2130 | return ret; | |
2131 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2132 | s->version = ver_max; |
2133 | ||
2134 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2135 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2136 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2137 | ||
2138 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2139 | return 0; |
2140 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2141 | |
2142 | /* | |
2143 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2144 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2145 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2146 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2147 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 2148 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 2149 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2150 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2151 | { | |
2152 | size_t i; | |
2153 | ||
2154 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2155 | return 0; | |
2156 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2157 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2158 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2159 | ||
2160 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2161 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 2162 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2163 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2164 | } |
2165 | } | |
2166 | ||
0acee504 | 2167 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2168 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2169 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2170 | |
2171 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2172 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2173 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2174 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2175 | { |
43054d3d | 2176 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2177 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2178 | ||
2179 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2180 | |
43054d3d MC |
2181 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2182 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2183 | hashlen = 0; | |
2184 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2185 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2186 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2187 | &hashlen)) { | |
2188 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2189 | return 0; | |
2190 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2191 | } |
2192 | ||
2193 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2194 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2195 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2196 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2197 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2198 | |
2199 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2200 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2201 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2202 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2203 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2204 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2205 | return 0; |
2206 | } | |
2207 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2208 | /* |
2209 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2210 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2211 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2212 | */ | |
2213 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2214 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2215 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
2216 | s->s3->tmp.message_size | |
2217 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { | |
2218 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2219 | return 0; | |
2220 | } | |
2221 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2222 | return 1; |
2223 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2224 | |
2225 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2226 | { | |
2227 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2228 | } | |
2229 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2230 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2231 | { |
2232 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2233 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2234 | PACKET cadns; | |
2235 | ||
2236 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2237 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2238 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2239 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2240 | } |
2241 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2242 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2243 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2244 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2245 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2246 | } |
2247 | ||
2248 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2249 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2250 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2251 | ||
2252 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2253 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2254 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2255 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2256 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2257 | } |
2258 | ||
2259 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2260 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2261 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2262 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2263 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2264 | } |
2265 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2267 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2268 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2269 | } |
2270 | ||
2271 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2272 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2273 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2274 | goto err; |
2275 | } | |
2276 | xn = NULL; | |
2277 | } | |
2278 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2279 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2280 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2281 | |
2282 | return 1; | |
2283 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2284 | err: |
2285 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2286 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2287 | return 0; | |
2288 | } | |
2289 | ||
98732979 | 2290 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2291 | { |
98732979 | 2292 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; |
5d6cca05 | 2293 | |
98732979 MC |
2294 | if (s->server) { |
2295 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2296 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) | |
2297 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2298 | } | |
2299 | ||
2300 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
2301 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); | |
2302 | ||
2303 | return ca_sk; | |
2304 | } | |
2305 | ||
2306 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2307 | { | |
5d6cca05 | 2308 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2309 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2310 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2311 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2312 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2313 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2314 | |
2315 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2316 | int i; | |
2317 | ||
2318 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2319 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2320 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2321 | int namelen; | |
2322 | ||
2323 | if (name == NULL | |
2324 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2325 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2326 | &namebytes) | |
2327 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2328 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2329 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2330 | return 0; |
2331 | } | |
2332 | } | |
2333 | } | |
2334 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2335 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2336 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2337 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2338 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2339 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2340 | |
2341 | return 1; | |
2342 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2343 | |
2344 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2345 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2346 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2347 | { | |
2348 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2349 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2350 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2351 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2352 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2353 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2354 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2355 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2356 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2357 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2358 | ||
2359 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2360 | ||
2361 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2362 | return tbslen; | |
2363 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2364 | |
2365 | /* | |
2366 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2367 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2368 | */ | |
2369 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2370 | { | |
2371 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2372 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2373 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2374 | return 0; | |
2375 | ||
2376 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2377 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2379 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2380 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2381 | return 0; | |
2382 | } | |
2383 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
2384 | s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { | |
2385 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2386 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2387 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2388 | return 0; | |
2389 | } | |
2390 | } | |
2391 | return 1; | |
2392 | } | |
2393 | ||
2394 | /* | |
2395 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2396 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2397 | */ | |
2398 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2399 | { | |
2400 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2402 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2403 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2404 | return 0; | |
2405 | } | |
2406 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, | |
2407 | s->pha_dgst)) { | |
2408 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2409 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2410 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2411 | return 0; | |
2412 | } | |
2413 | return 1; | |
2414 | } |