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58964a49 RE |
1 | /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ |
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
3 | * All rights reserved. | |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
40720ce3 | 8 | * |
58964a49 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
40720ce3 | 15 | * |
58964a49 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
40720ce3 | 22 | * |
58964a49 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
40720ce3 | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
58964a49 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40720ce3 | 40 | * |
58964a49 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
40720ce3 | 52 | * |
58964a49 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
ec577822 | 60 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
865a90eb DSH |
61 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
62 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
a5232767 | 63 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
58964a49 RE |
64 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
65 | ||
40720ce3 | 66 | const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
58964a49 | 67 | |
865a90eb DSH |
68 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
69 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, | |
40720ce3 MC |
70 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
71 | SSL_SESSION **psess); | |
865a90eb DSH |
72 | #endif |
73 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
74 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { |
75 | tls1_enc, | |
76 | tls1_mac, | |
77 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
78 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
79 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
80 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
81 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, | |
82 | tls1_cert_verify_mac, | |
83 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
84 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
85 | tls1_alert_code, | |
86 | }; | |
58964a49 | 87 | |
222f2246 | 88 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
40720ce3 MC |
89 | { |
90 | /* | |
91 | * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for | |
92 | * http, the cache would over fill | |
93 | */ | |
94 | return (60 * 60 * 2); | |
95 | } | |
58964a49 | 96 | |
222f2246 | 97 | IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(tlsv1_base_method, |
40720ce3 MC |
98 | ssl_undefined_function, |
99 | ssl_undefined_function, ssl_bad_method) | |
58964a49 | 100 | |
6b691a5c | 101 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
102 | { |
103 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) | |
104 | return (0); | |
105 | s->method->ssl_clear(s); | |
106 | return (1); | |
107 | } | |
58964a49 | 108 | |
6b691a5c | 109 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
110 | { |
111 | ssl3_free(s); | |
112 | } | |
58964a49 | 113 | |
6b691a5c | 114 | void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
115 | { |
116 | ssl3_clear(s); | |
117 | s->version = TLS1_VERSION; | |
118 | } | |
58964a49 RE |
119 | |
120 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 121 | long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, char *parg) |
40720ce3 MC |
122 | { |
123 | return (0); | |
124 | } | |
125 | ||
126 | long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void *(*fp) ()) | |
127 | { | |
128 | return (0); | |
129 | } | |
58964a49 | 130 | #endif |
865a90eb DSH |
131 | |
132 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | |
40720ce3 MC |
133 | unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, |
134 | unsigned char *limit) | |
135 | { | |
136 | int extdatalen = 0; | |
137 | unsigned char *ret = p; | |
138 | ||
139 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ | |
140 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
141 | return p; | |
142 | ||
143 | ret += 2; | |
144 | ||
145 | if (ret >= limit) | |
146 | return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | |
147 | ||
148 | if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
149 | /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ | |
150 | unsigned long size_str; | |
151 | long lenmax; | |
152 | ||
02f0c26c MC |
153 | /*- |
154 | * check for enough space. | |
155 | * 4 for the servername type and entension length | |
156 | * 2 for servernamelist length | |
157 | * 1 for the hostname type | |
158 | * 2 for hostname length | |
159 | * + hostname length | |
160 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
161 | |
162 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 | |
163 | || (size_str = | |
164 | strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) | |
165 | return NULL; | |
166 | ||
167 | /* extension type and length */ | |
168 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
169 | s2n(size_str + 5, ret); | |
170 | ||
171 | /* length of servername list */ | |
172 | s2n(size_str + 3, ret); | |
173 | ||
174 | /* hostname type, length and hostname */ | |
175 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | |
176 | s2n(size_str, ret); | |
177 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); | |
178 | ret += size_str; | |
179 | ||
180 | } | |
181 | ||
182 | /* Add RI if renegotiating */ | |
183 | if (s->new_session) { | |
184 | int el; | |
185 | ||
186 | if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
187 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
188 | return NULL; | |
189 | } | |
190 | ||
191 | if ((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) | |
192 | return NULL; | |
193 | ||
194 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); | |
195 | s2n(el, ret); | |
196 | ||
197 | if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
198 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
199 | return NULL; | |
c2b78c31 BL |
200 | } |
201 | ||
40720ce3 MC |
202 | ret += el; |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
205 | if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { | |
206 | int ticklen; | |
207 | if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) | |
208 | ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; | |
209 | else | |
210 | ticklen = 0; | |
211 | /* | |
212 | * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for | |
213 | * ticket | |
214 | */ | |
215 | if (limit - ret - 4 - ticklen < 0) | |
216 | return NULL; | |
217 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
218 | s2n(ticklen, ret); | |
219 | if (ticklen) { | |
220 | memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); | |
221 | ret += ticklen; | |
c2b78c31 | 222 | } |
40720ce3 MC |
223 | } |
224 | ||
225 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && | |
226 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
227 | int i; | |
228 | long extlen, idlen, itmp; | |
229 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
230 | ||
231 | idlen = 0; | |
232 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { | |
233 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | |
234 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); | |
235 | if (itmp <= 0) | |
236 | return NULL; | |
237 | idlen += itmp + 2; | |
238 | } | |
239 | ||
240 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { | |
241 | extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); | |
242 | if (extlen < 0) | |
243 | return NULL; | |
244 | } else | |
245 | extlen = 0; | |
246 | ||
247 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) | |
248 | return NULL; | |
249 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
250 | if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) | |
251 | return NULL; | |
252 | s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); | |
253 | *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | |
254 | s2n(idlen, ret); | |
255 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { | |
256 | /* save position of id len */ | |
257 | unsigned char *q = ret; | |
258 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | |
259 | /* skip over id len */ | |
260 | ret += 2; | |
261 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); | |
262 | /* write id len */ | |
263 | s2n(itmp, q); | |
264 | } | |
265 | s2n(extlen, ret); | |
266 | if (extlen > 0) | |
267 | i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); | |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
270 | if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0) | |
271 | return p; | |
272 | ||
273 | s2n(extdatalen, p); | |
274 | return ret; | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
277 | unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, | |
278 | unsigned char *limit) | |
279 | { | |
280 | int extdatalen = 0; | |
281 | unsigned char *ret = p; | |
282 | ||
283 | /* | |
284 | * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation | |
285 | */ | |
286 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
287 | return p; | |
288 | ||
289 | ret += 2; | |
290 | if (ret >= limit) | |
291 | return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | |
292 | ||
293 | if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 | |
294 | && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
295 | if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) | |
296 | return NULL; | |
297 | ||
298 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
299 | s2n(0, ret); | |
300 | } | |
301 | ||
302 | if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
303 | int el; | |
304 | ||
305 | if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
306 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
307 | return NULL; | |
308 | } | |
309 | ||
310 | if ((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) | |
311 | return NULL; | |
312 | ||
313 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); | |
314 | s2n(el, ret); | |
315 | ||
316 | if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
317 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
318 | return NULL; | |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
321 | ret += el; | |
322 | } | |
323 | ||
324 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { | |
325 | if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) | |
326 | return NULL; | |
327 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
328 | s2n(0, ret); | |
329 | } | |
330 | ||
331 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { | |
332 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
333 | return NULL; | |
334 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
335 | s2n(0, ret); | |
336 | } | |
337 | ||
338 | if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0) | |
339 | return p; | |
340 | ||
341 | s2n(extdatalen, p); | |
342 | return ret; | |
343 | } | |
344 | ||
345 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
b558c8d5 TH |
346 | /*- |
347 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
cadbbd51 RS |
348 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. |
349 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
350 | * SNI, | |
351 | * elliptic_curves | |
352 | * ec_point_formats | |
353 | * | |
354 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
355 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
356 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
357 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
358 | */ | |
40720ce3 MC |
359 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, |
360 | const unsigned char *d, int n) | |
361 | { | |
362 | unsigned short type, size; | |
363 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { | |
364 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
365 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
366 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
367 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
368 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
369 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
370 | ||
371 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
372 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
373 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
374 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
375 | }; | |
376 | ||
377 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
378 | static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { | |
379 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
380 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
381 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
382 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
383 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
384 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
385 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
386 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
387 | }; | |
388 | ||
389 | if (data >= (d + n - 2)) | |
390 | return; | |
391 | data += 2; | |
392 | ||
393 | if (data > (d + n - 4)) | |
394 | return; | |
395 | n2s(data, type); | |
396 | n2s(data, size); | |
397 | ||
398 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
399 | return; | |
400 | ||
401 | if (data + size > d + n) | |
402 | return; | |
403 | data += size; | |
404 | ||
405 | if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
406 | const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); | |
407 | const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); | |
408 | ||
409 | if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) | |
410 | return; | |
411 | if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) | |
412 | return; | |
413 | if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) | |
414 | return; | |
415 | } else { | |
416 | const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); | |
417 | ||
418 | if (data + len != d + n) | |
419 | return; | |
420 | if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) | |
421 | return; | |
422 | } | |
423 | ||
424 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; | |
cadbbd51 | 425 | } |
40720ce3 | 426 | # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
cadbbd51 | 427 | |
40720ce3 MC |
428 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, |
429 | int n, int *al) | |
430 | { | |
431 | unsigned short type; | |
432 | unsigned short size; | |
433 | unsigned short len; | |
434 | unsigned char *data = *p; | |
435 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
c2b78c31 | 436 | |
40720ce3 MC |
437 | s->servername_done = 0; |
438 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
865a90eb | 439 | |
40720ce3 MC |
440 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
441 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
442 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); | |
443 | # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
cadbbd51 | 444 | |
40720ce3 MC |
445 | if (data >= (d + n - 2)) |
446 | goto ri_check; | |
efbe446f | 447 | |
40720ce3 | 448 | n2s(data, len); |
865a90eb | 449 | |
40720ce3 MC |
450 | if (data > (d + n - len)) |
451 | goto ri_check; | |
865a90eb | 452 | |
40720ce3 MC |
453 | while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { |
454 | n2s(data, type); | |
455 | n2s(data, size); | |
865a90eb | 456 | |
40720ce3 MC |
457 | if (data + size > (d + n)) |
458 | goto ri_check; | |
865a90eb | 459 | |
40720ce3 MC |
460 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
461 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); | |
b558c8d5 TH |
462 | /*- |
463 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
464 | * | |
465 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
466 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
467 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
468 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
469 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
40720ce3 MC |
470 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
471 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
472 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
b558c8d5 TH |
473 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
474 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
475 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
476 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
477 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
40720ce3 | 478 | * the value of the Host: field. |
b558c8d5 | 479 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
40720ce3 MC |
480 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the |
481 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
482 | * extension. | |
483 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
b558c8d5 | 484 | * |
40720ce3 MC |
485 | */ |
486 | ||
487 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { | |
488 | unsigned char *sdata; | |
489 | int servname_type; | |
490 | int dsize; | |
491 | ||
492 | if (size < 2) { | |
493 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
494 | return 0; | |
495 | } | |
496 | n2s(data, dsize); | |
497 | size -= 2; | |
498 | if (dsize > size) { | |
499 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
500 | return 0; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
503 | sdata = data; | |
504 | while (dsize > 3) { | |
505 | servname_type = *(sdata++); | |
506 | n2s(sdata, len); | |
507 | dsize -= 3; | |
508 | ||
509 | if (len > dsize) { | |
510 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
511 | return 0; | |
512 | } | |
513 | if (s->servername_done == 0) | |
514 | switch (servname_type) { | |
515 | case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: | |
516 | if (!s->hit) { | |
517 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { | |
518 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
519 | return 0; | |
520 | } | |
521 | if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
522 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
523 | return 0; | |
524 | } | |
525 | if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = | |
526 | OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { | |
527 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
528 | return 0; | |
529 | } | |
530 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); | |
531 | s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; | |
532 | if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { | |
533 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); | |
534 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; | |
535 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
536 | return 0; | |
537 | } | |
538 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
539 | ||
540 | } else | |
541 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | |
542 | && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len | |
543 | && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, | |
544 | (char *)sdata, len) == 0; | |
545 | ||
546 | break; | |
547 | ||
548 | default: | |
549 | break; | |
550 | } | |
551 | ||
552 | dsize -= len; | |
553 | } | |
554 | if (dsize != 0) { | |
555 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
556 | return 0; | |
557 | } | |
558 | ||
559 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
560 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) | |
561 | return 0; | |
562 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
563 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && | |
564 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { | |
565 | ||
566 | if (size < 5) { | |
567 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
568 | return 0; | |
569 | } | |
570 | ||
571 | s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; | |
572 | size--; | |
573 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { | |
574 | const unsigned char *sdata; | |
575 | int dsize; | |
576 | /* Read in responder_id_list */ | |
577 | n2s(data, dsize); | |
578 | size -= 2; | |
579 | if (dsize > size) { | |
580 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
581 | return 0; | |
582 | } | |
583 | while (dsize > 0) { | |
584 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
585 | int idsize; | |
586 | if (dsize < 4) { | |
587 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
588 | return 0; | |
589 | } | |
590 | n2s(data, idsize); | |
591 | dsize -= 2 + idsize; | |
592 | size -= 2 + idsize; | |
593 | if (dsize < 0) { | |
594 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
595 | return 0; | |
596 | } | |
597 | sdata = data; | |
598 | data += idsize; | |
599 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); | |
600 | if (!id) { | |
601 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
602 | return 0; | |
603 | } | |
604 | if (data != sdata) { | |
605 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
606 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
607 | return 0; | |
608 | } | |
609 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids | |
610 | && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = | |
611 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { | |
612 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
613 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
614 | return 0; | |
615 | } | |
616 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { | |
617 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
618 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
619 | return 0; | |
620 | } | |
621 | } | |
622 | ||
623 | /* Read in request_extensions */ | |
624 | if (size < 2) { | |
625 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
626 | return 0; | |
627 | } | |
628 | n2s(data, dsize); | |
629 | size -= 2; | |
630 | if (dsize != size) { | |
631 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
632 | return 0; | |
633 | } | |
634 | sdata = data; | |
635 | if (dsize > 0) { | |
636 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { | |
637 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, | |
638 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
639 | } | |
640 | ||
641 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = | |
642 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); | |
643 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) { | |
644 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
645 | return 0; | |
646 | } | |
647 | } | |
648 | } | |
649 | /* | |
650 | * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. | |
651 | */ | |
652 | else | |
653 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
654 | } | |
655 | ||
656 | /* session ticket processed earlier */ | |
657 | ||
658 | data += size; | |
659 | } | |
660 | *p = data; | |
661 | ||
662 | ri_check: | |
663 | ||
664 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ | |
665 | ||
666 | if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && | |
667 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
668 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
669 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
670 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
671 | return 0; | |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
674 | return 1; | |
675 | } | |
676 | ||
677 | int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, | |
678 | int n, int *al) | |
679 | { | |
680 | unsigned short length; | |
681 | unsigned short type; | |
682 | unsigned short size; | |
683 | unsigned char *data = *p; | |
684 | int tlsext_servername = 0; | |
685 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
686 | ||
687 | if (data >= (d + n - 2)) | |
688 | goto ri_check; | |
689 | ||
690 | n2s(data, length); | |
691 | if (data + length != d + n) { | |
692 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
693 | return 0; | |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
696 | while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { | |
697 | n2s(data, type); | |
698 | n2s(data, size); | |
699 | ||
700 | if (data + size > (d + n)) | |
701 | goto ri_check; | |
702 | ||
703 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) | |
704 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); | |
705 | ||
706 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { | |
707 | if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { | |
708 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
709 | return 0; | |
710 | } | |
711 | tlsext_servername = 1; | |
712 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
713 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | |
714 | || (size > 0)) { | |
715 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
716 | return 0; | |
717 | } | |
718 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
719 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && | |
720 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
721 | /* | |
722 | * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status | |
723 | * request message. | |
724 | */ | |
725 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { | |
726 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
727 | return 0; | |
728 | } | |
729 | /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ | |
730 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | |
731 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
732 | if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) | |
733 | return 0; | |
734 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
735 | } | |
736 | data += size; | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
739 | if (data != d + n) { | |
740 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
741 | return 0; | |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
744 | if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { | |
745 | if (s->tlsext_hostname) { | |
746 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
747 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); | |
748 | if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { | |
749 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
750 | return 0; | |
751 | } | |
752 | } else { | |
753 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
754 | return 0; | |
755 | } | |
756 | } | |
757 | } | |
758 | ||
759 | *p = data; | |
760 | ||
761 | ri_check: | |
762 | ||
763 | /* | |
764 | * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid | |
765 | * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello | |
766 | * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. | |
767 | * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which | |
768 | * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on | |
769 | * initial connect only. | |
770 | */ | |
771 | if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) | |
772 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
773 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
774 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
775 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
776 | return 0; | |
777 | } | |
778 | ||
779 | return 1; | |
780 | } | |
865a90eb | 781 | |
48bcdad0 | 782 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) |
40720ce3 MC |
783 | { |
784 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
785 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
786 | ||
787 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
788 | ret = | |
789 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
790 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
791 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
792 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
793 | ret = | |
794 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
795 | s-> | |
796 | initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
797 | ||
798 | switch (ret) { | |
799 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
800 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
801 | return -1; | |
802 | ||
803 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
804 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
805 | return 1; | |
806 | ||
807 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
808 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
809 | ||
810 | default: | |
811 | return 1; | |
812 | } | |
813 | } | |
48bcdad0 BL |
814 | |
815 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) | |
40720ce3 MC |
816 | { |
817 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
818 | int al; | |
819 | ||
820 | /* | |
821 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
822 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has | |
823 | * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because | |
824 | * this may influence which certificate is sent | |
825 | */ | |
826 | if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { | |
827 | int r; | |
828 | CERT_PKEY *certpkey; | |
829 | certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
830 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ | |
831 | if (certpkey == NULL) { | |
832 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
833 | return 1; | |
834 | } | |
835 | /* | |
836 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
837 | * et al can pick it up. | |
838 | */ | |
839 | s->cert->key = certpkey; | |
840 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); | |
841 | switch (r) { | |
842 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
843 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
844 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
845 | break; | |
846 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
847 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
848 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) | |
849 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | |
850 | else | |
851 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
852 | break; | |
853 | /* something bad happened */ | |
854 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
855 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
856 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
857 | goto err; | |
858 | } | |
859 | } else | |
860 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
48bcdad0 BL |
861 | |
862 | err: | |
40720ce3 MC |
863 | switch (ret) { |
864 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
865 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
866 | return -1; | |
867 | ||
868 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
869 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
870 | return 1; | |
871 | ||
872 | default: | |
873 | return 1; | |
874 | } | |
875 | } | |
865a90eb DSH |
876 | |
877 | int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) | |
40720ce3 MC |
878 | { |
879 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
880 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
881 | ||
882 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
883 | ret = | |
884 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
885 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
886 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
887 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
888 | ret = | |
889 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
890 | s-> | |
891 | initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
892 | ||
893 | /* | |
894 | * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the | |
895 | * callback | |
896 | */ | |
897 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) | |
898 | && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { | |
899 | int r; | |
900 | /* | |
901 | * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no | |
902 | * response. | |
903 | */ | |
904 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { | |
905 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); | |
906 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; | |
907 | } | |
908 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; | |
909 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); | |
910 | if (r == 0) { | |
911 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; | |
912 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
913 | } | |
914 | if (r < 0) { | |
915 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
916 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
917 | } | |
918 | } | |
919 | ||
920 | switch (ret) { | |
921 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
922 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
923 | return -1; | |
924 | ||
925 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
926 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
927 | return 1; | |
928 | ||
929 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
930 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
931 | default: | |
932 | return 1; | |
933 | } | |
934 | } | |
935 | ||
936 | /* | |
937 | * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client | |
865a90eb DSH |
938 | * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS |
939 | * session ticket extension at the same time. | |
940 | */ | |
941 | ||
942 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, | |
40720ce3 MC |
943 | const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) |
944 | { | |
945 | /* Point after session ID in client hello */ | |
946 | const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; | |
947 | unsigned short i; | |
948 | ||
949 | /* | |
950 | * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful | |
951 | * resumption. | |
952 | */ | |
953 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | |
954 | return 1; | |
955 | ||
956 | if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) | |
957 | return 1; | |
958 | if (p >= limit) | |
959 | return -1; | |
960 | /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ | |
961 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
962 | i = *(p++); | |
963 | p += i; | |
964 | if (p >= limit) | |
965 | return -1; | |
966 | } | |
967 | /* Skip past cipher list */ | |
968 | n2s(p, i); | |
969 | p += i; | |
970 | if (p >= limit) | |
971 | return -1; | |
972 | /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ | |
973 | i = *(p++); | |
974 | p += i; | |
975 | if (p > limit) | |
976 | return -1; | |
977 | /* Now at start of extensions */ | |
978 | if ((p + 2) >= limit) | |
979 | return 1; | |
980 | n2s(p, i); | |
981 | while ((p + 4) <= limit) { | |
982 | unsigned short type, size; | |
983 | n2s(p, type); | |
984 | n2s(p, size); | |
985 | if (p + size > limit) | |
986 | return 1; | |
987 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
988 | /* | |
989 | * If zero length note client will accept a ticket and indicate | |
990 | * cache miss to trigger full handshake | |
991 | */ | |
992 | if (size == 0) { | |
993 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
994 | return 0; /* Cache miss */ | |
995 | } | |
996 | return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); | |
997 | } | |
998 | p += size; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | return 1; | |
1001 | } | |
1002 | ||
1003 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, | |
1004 | int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, | |
1005 | int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) | |
1006 | { | |
1007 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
1008 | unsigned char *sdec; | |
1009 | const unsigned char *p; | |
1010 | int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; | |
1011 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1012 | HMAC_CTX hctx; | |
1013 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | |
1014 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
1015 | /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ | |
1016 | if (eticklen < 48) | |
1017 | goto tickerr; | |
1018 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ | |
1019 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); | |
1020 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
1021 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { | |
1022 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; | |
1023 | int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, | |
1024 | &ctx, &hctx, 0); | |
1025 | if (rv < 0) | |
1026 | return -1; | |
1027 | if (rv == 0) | |
1028 | goto tickerr; | |
1029 | if (rv == 2) | |
1030 | renew_ticket = 1; | |
1031 | } else { | |
1032 | /* Check key name matches */ | |
1033 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) | |
1034 | goto tickerr; | |
1035 | HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, | |
1036 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); | |
1037 | EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | |
1038 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); | |
1039 | } | |
1040 | /* | |
1041 | * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity | |
1042 | * checks on ticket. | |
1043 | */ | |
1044 | mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); | |
1045 | eticklen -= mlen; | |
1046 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ | |
1047 | HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); | |
1048 | HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); | |
1049 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
1050 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { | |
1051 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
1052 | goto tickerr; | |
1053 | } | |
1054 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ | |
1055 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ | |
1056 | p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
1057 | eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
1058 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); | |
1059 | if (!sdec) { | |
1060 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
1061 | return -1; | |
1062 | } | |
1063 | EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); | |
1064 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { | |
1065 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
1066 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
1067 | goto tickerr; | |
1068 | } | |
1069 | slen += mlen; | |
1070 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
1071 | p = sdec; | |
1072 | ||
1073 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); | |
1074 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
1075 | if (sess) { | |
1076 | /* | |
1077 | * The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to detect that | |
1078 | * the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session | |
1079 | * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by | |
1080 | * standard. | |
1081 | */ | |
1082 | if (sesslen) | |
1083 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); | |
1084 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; | |
1085 | *psess = sess; | |
1086 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; | |
1087 | return 1; | |
1088 | } | |
1089 | /* | |
1090 | * If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to send | |
1091 | * a new ticket | |
1092 | */ | |
1093 | tickerr: | |
1094 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
1095 | return 0; | |
1096 | } | |
865a90eb DSH |
1097 | |
1098 | #endif |