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Added references to RFC 7027
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52
DSH		 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119#include <openssl/dh.h>
120#include <openssl/bn.h>
121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
42182852 124const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf
DSH		 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
161e0a61 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
58964a49
RE		 135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
e0af0405 146 tls1_export_keying_material,
173e72e6
DSH		 147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
161e0a61 153SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
173e72e6
DSH		 154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
161e0a61 172SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173e72e6
DSH		 173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
4221c0dd
DSH		 185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
173e72e6
DSH		 187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
58964a49
RE		 190 };
191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
58964a49
RE		 193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
6b691a5c 199int tls1_new(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
6b691a5c 206void tls1_free(SSL *s)
58964a49 207 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 208#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
58964a49
RE		 214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
6b691a5c 217void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
637f374a 220 s->version = s->method->version;
58964a49
RE		 221 }
222
525de5d3 223#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 224
b362ccab
DSH		 225typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
f756fb43 235static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
525de5d3 236 {
b362ccab
DSH		 237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
525de5d3 265 };
eda3766b 266
d0595f17
DSH		 267
268static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
eda3766b 269 {
d0595f17
DSH		 270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
c2c76a4d 280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
d0595f17
DSH		 281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
c2c76a4d 283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
d0595f17
DSH		 284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
c2c76a4d 287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
d0595f17
DSH		 288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
eda3766b
DSH		 305 };
306
2ea80354
DSH		 307static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
525de5d3
DSH		 313int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
bcb245a7 315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
1e26a8ba
GT		 316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
b362ccab 319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
525de5d3
DSH		 320 }
321
322int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
bcb245a7 324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
525de5d3
DSH		 325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
6699cb84
DSH		 377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
525de5d3
DSH		 383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 387/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
388 * preferred list
389 */
390static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
392 size_t *pcurveslen)
393 {
394 if (sess)
395 {
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
2ea80354 398 return;
fd2b65ce 399 }
2ea80354
DSH		 400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
fd2b65ce 402 {
2ea80354 403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
2ea80354 404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
d372d365 405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
2ea80354
DSH		 406 break;
407
b34aa49c
DSH		 408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
410 *pcurveslen = 2;
411 break;
412
2ea80354
DSH		 413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
415 *pcurveslen = 2;
416 break;
417 default:
fd2b65ce
DSH		 418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 421 if (!*pcurves)
422 {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
b362ccab
DSH		 427
428/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
430 {
f756fb43 431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
b362ccab
DSH		 432 if (curve[0])
433 return 1;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
436 return 0;
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
1a14b47e
DSH		 438#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
439 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
440 return 0;
441#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 442 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
443 }
444
d18b716d
DSH		 445/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
446int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
447 {
448 const unsigned char *curves;
449 size_t curveslen, i;
2ea80354 450 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
d18b716d
DSH		 451 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
452 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 453 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
454 if (suiteb_flags)
455 {
456 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
457 if (p[1])
458 return 0;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 {
461 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
462 return 0;
463 }
464 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
465 {
466 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
467 return 0;
468 }
469 else /* Should never happen */
470 return 0;
471 }
d18b716d
DSH		 472 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
473 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
474 {
475 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
b362ccab 476 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
d18b716d
DSH		 477 }
478 return 0;
479 }
d0595f17 480
a4352630 481/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
2ea80354
DSH		 482 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
483 * an EC tmp key.
d0595f17 484 */
a4352630
DSH		 485
486int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
d0595f17
DSH		 487 {
488 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
489 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
490 int k;
a4352630
DSH		 491 /* Can't do anything on client side */
492 if (s->server == 0)
493 return -1;
2ea80354
DSH		 494 if (nmatch == -2)
495 {
496 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
497 {
498 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
499 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
500 * checks.
501 */
502 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
503 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
504 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
505 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
506 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
507 /* Should never happen */
508 return NID_undef;
509 }
510 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
511 nmatch = 0;
512 }
a4352630
DSH		 513 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
514 &supp, &supplen);
515 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 &pref, &preflen);
517 preflen /= 2;
518 supplen /= 2;
d0595f17
DSH		 519 k = 0;
520 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
521 {
522 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
523 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
524 {
525 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
526 {
b362ccab
DSH		 527 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
528 continue;
d0595f17 529 if (nmatch == k)
a4352630
DSH		 530 {
531 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
532 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
533 }
d0595f17
DSH		 534 k++;
535 }
536 }
537 }
d0595f17 538 if (nmatch == -1)
a4352630
DSH		 539 return k;
540 return 0;
d0595f17
DSH		 541 }
542
543int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
544 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
545 {
546 unsigned char *clist, *p;
547 size_t i;
548 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
549 * while curve ids < 32
550 */
551 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
552 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
553 if (!clist)
554 return 0;
555 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
556 {
557 unsigned long idmask;
558 int id;
559 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
560 idmask = 1L << id;
561 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
562 {
563 OPENSSL_free(clist);
564 return 0;
565 }
566 dup_list |= idmask;
567 s2n(id, p);
568 }
569 if (*pext)
570 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
571 *pext = clist;
572 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
573 return 1;
574 }
575
f6dfbeed 576#define MAX_CURVELIST 28
d0595f17
DSH		 577
578typedef struct
579 {
580 size_t nidcnt;
581 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
582 } nid_cb_st;
583
584static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
585 {
586 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
587 size_t i;
588 int nid;
589 char etmp[20];
590 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
591 return 0;
592 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
593 return 0;
594 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
595 etmp[len] = 0;
596 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
599 if (nid == NID_undef)
600 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
601 if (nid == NID_undef)
602 return 0;
603 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
604 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
605 return 0;
606 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
607 return 1;
608 }
609/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
610int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 const char *str)
612 {
613 nid_cb_st ncb;
614 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
615 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
616 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 617 if (pext == NULL)
618 return 1;
d0595f17
DSH		 619 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
620 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 621/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
622static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 EC_KEY *ec)
624 {
625 int is_prime, id;
626 const EC_GROUP *grp;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 627 const EC_METHOD *meth;
628 if (!ec)
629 return 0;
630 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
631 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
29b490a4 632 if (!grp)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 633 return 0;
634 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
635 if (!meth)
636 return 0;
637 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
638 is_prime = 1;
639 else
640 is_prime = 0;
641 /* Determine curve ID */
642 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
643 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
644 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
645 if (id)
646 {
647 curve_id[0] = 0;
648 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
649 }
650 else
651 {
652 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
653 if (is_prime)
654 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
655 else
656 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
657 }
658 if (comp_id)
659 {
29b490a4
PS		 660 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
661 return 0;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 662 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
663 {
664 if (is_prime)
665 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
666 else
667 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
668 }
669 else
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
671 }
672 return 1;
673 }
674/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
675static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
676 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
677 {
678 const unsigned char *p;
679 size_t plen, i;
a4352630 680 int j;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 681 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
682 * is supported (see RFC4492).
683 */
684 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
685 {
686 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
687 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
688 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
689 {
690 if (*comp_id == *p)
691 break;
692 }
693 if (i == plen)
694 return 0;
695 }
2ea80354
DSH		 696 if (!curve_id)
697 return 1;
a4352630
DSH		 698 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
699 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
fd2b65ce 700 {
a4352630 701 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 702 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
703 {
704 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
a4352630 705 break;
fd2b65ce 706 }
a4352630
DSH		 707 if (i == plen)
708 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 709 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
710 if (!s->server)
b362ccab 711 break;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 712 }
713 return 1;
714 }
d61ff83b 715
5087afa1
DSH		 716static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
717 size_t *pformatslen)
718 {
719 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
720 * use default */
721 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
722 {
723 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
724 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
725 }
726 else
727 {
728 *pformats = ecformats_default;
729 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
730 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
731 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
732 else
733 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
734 }
735 }
736
d61ff83b
DSH		 737/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
738 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
739 */
2ea80354 740static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
fd2b65ce 741 {
fd2b65ce 742 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
d61ff83b
DSH		 743 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
744 int rv;
745 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 746 if (!pkey)
747 return 0;
d61ff83b
DSH		 748 /* If not EC nothing to do */
749 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 {
751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
752 return 1;
753 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 754 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
755 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
756 if (!rv)
757 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 758 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
759 * supported curves extension.
760 */
761 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
762 if (!rv)
763 return 0;
764 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
765 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
766 */
767 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
768 {
769 int check_md;
770 size_t i;
771 CERT *c = s->cert;
772 if (curve_id[0])
773 return 0;
774 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
775 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
776 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
777 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
778 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
779 else
780 return 0; /* Should never happen */
781 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
782 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
783 break;
784 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
785 return 0;
786 if (set_ee_md == 2)
787 {
788 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
789 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
790 else
791 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 }
793 }
794 return rv;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 795 }
796/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 797int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 798 {
799 unsigned char curve_id[2];
800 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
ed83ba53
DSH		 801#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
802 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
ddd13d67 803 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 804 return 1;
805#endif
2ea80354
DSH		 806 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
807 * no other curves permitted.
808 */
809 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
810 {
811 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
812 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
813 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
814 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
815 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
816 else
817 return 0;
818 curve_id[0] = 0;
819 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
820 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
821 return 0;
822 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
823 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
824 return 1;
825 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
826 else
827 {
828 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
829 if (!ec)
830 return 0;
831 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
832 return 0;
833 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
834 return 1;
835 return 0;
836 }
837
838 }
a4352630
DSH		 839 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
840 {
841 /* Need a shared curve */
842 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
843 return 1;
844 else return 0;
845 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 846 if (!ec)
847 {
848 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 return 1;
850 else
851 return 0;
852 }
853 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
1e4cb467 854 return 0;
d18b716d
DSH		 855/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
856#if 0
857 return 1;
858#else
fd2b65ce 859 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
d18b716d 860#endif
fd2b65ce 861 }
d0595f17 862
14536c8c
DSH		 863#else
864
865static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 {
867 return 1;
868 }
869
525de5d3 870#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 871
ed3883d2 872#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88
DSH		 873
874/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
875 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
876 */
877
878#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
879#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
880#else
881#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
882#endif
883
884#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
885#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
886#else
887#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
888#endif
889
890#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
891#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
892#else
654ac273 893#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
fc101f88
DSH		 894#endif
895
896#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
897 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
898 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
899 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
900
901static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
902#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
905#endif
906#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
908 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
909#endif
910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
912#endif
fc101f88 913};
14536c8c 914#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2ea80354
DSH		 915static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
916 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
917 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
918};
14536c8c 919#endif
b7bfe69b 920size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
f37f20ff 921 {
2ea80354
DSH		 922 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
923 * preferences.
924 */
14536c8c 925#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 926 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
927 {
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
931
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
934 return 2;
935
936 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
937 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
938 return 2;
939 }
14536c8c 940#endif
3dbc46df
DSH		 941 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
942 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
943 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 944 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
945 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df
DSH		 946 }
947 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
948 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 949 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
950 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 951 }
4453cd8c 952 else
0f229cce 953 {
b7bfe69b 954 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
45473632 955 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 956 }
b7bfe69b 957 }
ec4a50b3
DSH		 958/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
959 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
960 */
961int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
962 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
963 {
964 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
965 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
966 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
967 /* Should never happen */
968 if (sigalg == -1)
969 return -1;
970 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
971 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
972 {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
974 return 0;
975 }
14536c8c 976#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 977 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
978 {
979 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
980 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
981 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
982 return 0;
983 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
ed83ba53
DSH		 984 {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2ea80354 986 return 0;
ed83ba53 987 }
2ea80354
DSH		 988 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
990 {
991 if (curve_id[0])
992 return 0;
993 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
994 {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
996 {
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
998 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
999 return 0;
1000 }
1001 }
1002 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1003 {
1004 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1005 {
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1007 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 }
1011 else
1012 return 0;
1013 }
1014 }
1015 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1016 return 0;
14536c8c 1017#endif
2ea80354 1018
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1019 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1020 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1021 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1022 {
1023 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1024 break;
1025 }
1026 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
2ea80354 1027 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1028 {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1030 return 0;
1031 }
1032 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1033 if (*pmd == NULL)
1034 {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1036 return 0;
1037 }
b362ccab
DSH		 1038 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1039 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1040 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1041 (void *)sig))
1042 {
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1044 return 0;
1045 }
319354eb
DSH		 1046 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1047 * wish.
1048 */
1049 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1050 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1051 return 1;
1052 }
b362ccab 1053
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1054/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1055 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1056 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1057 * session and not global settings.
1058 *
1059 */
1060void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 {
1062 CERT *c = s->cert;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1063 c->mask_a = 0;
1064 c->mask_k = 0;
4221c0dd 1065 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1e2d4cb0 1066 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1067 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1068 else
1069 c->mask_ssl = 0;
b362ccab
DSH		 1070 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1071 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1072 * signature algorithms.
1073 */
b362ccab 1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
b7bfe69b 1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
b362ccab 1076 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
b7bfe69b 1077 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
b362ccab 1078 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
b7bfe69b 1079 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1080#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1081 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1082 {
1083 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1084 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1085 }
1086#endif
1087#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1088 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1089 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1090 {
1091 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1092 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1093 }
1094#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
80bd7b41
DSH		 1095#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1096 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1097 {
1098 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1099 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1100 }
1101#endif
b7bfe69b 1102 c->valid = 1;
f37f20ff 1103 }
fc101f88 1104
b362ccab 1105int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1106 {
1107 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1108 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1109 return 1;
b362ccab
DSH		 1110 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1111 }
1112
1113static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1114 {
1115 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1116 return 0;
1117 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1118 }
1119
22a10c89 1120unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1121 {
ed3883d2 1122 int extdatalen=0;
22a10c89
BL		 1123 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1124 unsigned char *ret = buf;
d0595f17
DSH		 1125#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1126 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1127 int using_ecc = 0;
874a18cf 1128 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
d0595f17
DSH		 1129 {
1130 int i;
1131 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1132 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1133
1134 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1135 {
1136 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1137
1138 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1139 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1140 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
d0595f17
DSH		 1141 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1142 {
1143 using_ecc = 1;
1144 break;
1145 }
1146 }
1147 }
1148#endif
ed3883d2 1149
13f6d57b
DSH		 1150 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1151 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1152 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
22a10c89 1153 return orig;
5f8f94a6 1154
ed3883d2
BM		 1155 ret+=2;
1156
1157 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
6434abbf 1158
a70183bc 1159 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1160 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1161 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1162 unsigned long size_str;
1163 long lenmax;
1164
a70183bc 1165 /* check for enough space.
52b8dad8
BM		 1166 4 for the servername type and entension length
1167 2 for servernamelist length
1168 1 for the hostname type
1169 2 for hostname length
1170 + hostname length
a70183bc 1171 */
52b8dad8 1172
761772d7
BM		 1173 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1174 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
a70183bc
BM		 1175 return NULL;
1176
1177 /* extension type and length */
1178 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1179 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
f1fd4544 1180
a70183bc 1181 /* length of servername list */
ed3883d2 1182 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
a70183bc
BM		 1183
1184 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
f1fd4544 1185 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
ed3883d2 1186 s2n(size_str,ret);
ed3883d2
BM		 1187 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1188 ret+=size_str;
f1fd4544 1189 }
761772d7 1190
423c66f1 1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
bdd53508 1192 if (s->renegotiate)
423c66f1 1193 {
860c3dd1
DSH		 1194 int el;
1195
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1197 {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 return NULL;
1200 }
1201
22a10c89 1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1203
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1205 s2n(el,ret);
1206
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1208 {
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 return NULL;
1211 }
1212
1213 ret += el;
1214 }
1215
edc032b5 1216#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1df80b65 1217 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
edc032b5 1218 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1df80b65 1219 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
edc032b5 1220
1df80b65
DSH		 1221 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1222 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
edc032b5
BL		 1223 {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 return NULL;
1df80b65
DSH		 1226 }
1227
1228 /* check for enough space.
1229 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1230 1 for the srp user identity
1231 + srp user identity length
1232 */
1233 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1234
1235 /* fill in the extension */
edc032b5
BL		 1236 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1237 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1df80b65
DSH		 1238 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1239 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
edc032b5
BL		 1240 ret+=login_len;
1241 }
1242#endif
1243
36ca4ba6 1244#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0595f17 1245 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1246 {
1247 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1248 long lenmax;
d0595f17
DSH		 1249 const unsigned char *plist;
1250 size_t plistlen;
b362ccab
DSH		 1251 size_t i;
1252 unsigned char *etmp;
5087afa1
DSH		 1253
1254 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
36ca4ba6 1255
761772d7 1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1257 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1258 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1259 {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 return NULL;
1262 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1263
1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
d0595f17
DSH		 1265 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1266 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1267 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1268 ret+=plistlen;
1269
33273721 1270 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
d0595f17 1271 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
fd2b65ce 1272 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
33273721 1273
761772d7 1274 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1275 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1276 if (plistlen > 65532)
33273721
BM		 1277 {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 return NULL;
1280 }
b362ccab 1281
33273721
BM		 1282
1283 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1284 etmp = ret + 4;
1285 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1286 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1287 {
1288 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1289 {
1290 *etmp++ = plist[0];
1291 *etmp++ = plist[1];
1292 }
1293 }
1294
1295 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
a4974de9 1296
b362ccab 1297 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
d0595f17 1298 s2n(plistlen, ret);
d0595f17 1299 ret+=plistlen;
33273721 1300 }
36ca4ba6 1301#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d3442bc7 1302
b362ccab 1303 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf
DSH		 1304 {
1305 int ticklen;
7ba3838a 1306 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
6434abbf 1307 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1308 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1310 {
1311 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1312 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1313 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1314 return NULL;
1315 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1317 ticklen);
1318 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1319 }
6434abbf
DSH		 1320 else
1321 ticklen = 0;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1322 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1323 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1324 goto skip_ext;
6434abbf
DSH		 1325 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1326 * rest for ticket
1327 */
761772d7 1328 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1329 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1330 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1331 if (ticklen)
1332 {
1333 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1334 ret += ticklen;
1335 }
1336 }
12bf56c0 1337 skip_ext:
6434abbf 1338
cbd64894 1339 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
a2f9200f 1340 {
0f229cce 1341 size_t salglen;
b7bfe69b 1342 const unsigned char *salg;
b362ccab 1343 unsigned char *etmp;
b7bfe69b 1344 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
0f229cce 1345 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
a2f9200f
DSH		 1346 return NULL;
1347 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1348 etmp = ret;
1349 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1350 ret += 4;
deffd89a 1351 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
b362ccab
DSH		 1352 /* Fill in lengths */
1353 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1354 s2n(salglen, etmp);
0f229cce 1355 ret += salglen;
a2f9200f
DSH		 1356 }
1357
761772d7 1358#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1359 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1360 {
1361 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1362
487dac87 1363 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
761772d7
BM		 1364 return NULL;
1365 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1366 return NULL;
1367
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1369 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1370 s2n(col, ret);
1371 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1372 ret += col;
1373 }
1374#endif
1375
874a18cf 1376 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1377 {
1378 int i;
1379 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1380 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1381
1382 idlen = 0;
1383 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1384 {
1385 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1386 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1387 if (itmp <= 0)
1388 return NULL;
1389 idlen += itmp + 2;
1390 }
1391
1392 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1393 {
1394 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1395 if (extlen < 0)
1396 return NULL;
1397 }
1398 else
1399 extlen = 0;
1400
1401 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1403 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1404 return NULL;
1405 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1406 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1407 s2n(idlen, ret);
1408 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1409 {
1410 /* save position of id len */
1411 unsigned char *q = ret;
1412 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1413 /* skip over id len */
1414 ret += 2;
1415 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1416 /* write id len */
1417 s2n(itmp, q);
1418 }
1419 s2n(extlen, ret);
1420 if (extlen > 0)
1421 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1422 }
1423
4817504d
DSH		 1424#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1425 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
c7f26739
DB		 1426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1427 return NULL;
4817504d
DSH		 1428 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1429 s2n(1,ret);
1430 /* Set mode:
1431 * 1: peer may send requests
1432 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1433 */
1434 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1435 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1436 else
1437 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1438#endif
1439
bf48836c 1440#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1441 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1442 {
1443 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1444 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1445 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1446 return NULL;
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1448 s2n(0,ret);
1449 }
1450#endif
1451
6f017a8f
AL		 1452 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1453 {
1454 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1455 return NULL;
1456 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1457 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1458 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1460 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1461 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1462 }
1463
e659eff2 1464 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
333f926d
BL		 1465 {
1466 int el;
1467
1468 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1469
22a10c89 1470 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333f926d
BL		 1471
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1473 s2n(el,ret);
1474
1475 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1476 {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 return NULL;
1479 }
1480 ret += el;
1481 }
28ea0a0c 1482 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
a398f821 1483 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
ecf4d660
DSH		 1484 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1485 return NULL;
5e3ff62c 1486#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
f3014206
DSH		 1487 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
1488 {
1489 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1490 s2n(0,ret);
1491 }
5e3ff62c 1492#endif
01f2f18f 1493
4fcdd66f 1494 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
cd6bd5ff 1495 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
4fcdd66f
DSH		 1496 *
1497 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1498 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
0467ea68 1499 */
01f2f18f 1500 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
0467ea68 1501 {
01f2f18f
DSH		 1502 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1503 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1504 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1505 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1506 */
1507 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1508 hlen -= 5;
1509 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1510 {
1511 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1512 if (hlen >= 4)
1513 hlen -= 4;
1514 else
1515 hlen = 0;
4fcdd66f 1516
01f2f18f
DSH		 1517 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1518 s2n(hlen, ret);
1519 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1520 ret += hlen;
1521 }
0467ea68 1522 }
a398f821 1523
22a10c89
BL		 1524 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1525 return orig;
ed3883d2 1526
22a10c89 1527 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
ed3883d2 1528 return ret;
52b8dad8 1529 }
ed3883d2 1530
22a10c89 1531unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1532 {
ed3883d2 1533 int extdatalen=0;
22a10c89
BL		 1534 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1535 unsigned char *ret = buf;
bf48836c
BL		 1536#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1537 int next_proto_neg_seen;
ee2ffc27 1538#endif
14536c8c 1539#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
5087afa1
DSH		 1540 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1541 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1542 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
5087afa1 1543 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
14536c8c 1544#endif
13f6d57b
DSH		 1545 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1546 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
22a10c89 1547 return orig;
5f8f94a6 1548
a13c20f6 1549 ret+=2;
ed3883d2
BM		 1550 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1551
a13c20f6 1552 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1553 {
761772d7 1554 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
ed3883d2
BM		 1555
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1557 s2n(0,ret);
f1fd4544 1558 }
860c3dd1 1559
8025e251 1560 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
860c3dd1
DSH		 1561 {
1562 int el;
1563
1564 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1565 {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 return NULL;
1568 }
1569
22a10c89 1570 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1571
1572 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1573 s2n(el,ret);
1574
1575 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1576 {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 return NULL;
1579 }
1580
1581 ret += el;
1582 }
1583
36ca4ba6 1584#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 1585 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6 1586 {
5087afa1
DSH		 1587 const unsigned char *plist;
1588 size_t plistlen;
36ca4ba6
BM		 1589 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1590 long lenmax;
1591
5087afa1
DSH		 1592 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1593
761772d7 1594 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
5087afa1
DSH		 1595 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1596 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1597 {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 return NULL;
1600 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1601
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
5087afa1
DSH		 1603 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1604 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1605 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1606 ret+=plistlen;
a70183bc 1607
36ca4ba6 1608 }
33273721 1609 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
36ca4ba6 1610#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
67c8e7f4 1611
b362ccab 1612 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf 1613 {
761772d7 1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1615 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1616 s2n(0,ret);
1617 }
761772d7 1618
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1619 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1620 {
1621 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1623 s2n(0,ret);
1624 }
1625
761772d7 1626#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1627 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1628 {
1629 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
6434abbf 1630
761772d7
BM		 1631 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1632 return NULL;
1633 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1634 return NULL;
1635
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1637 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1638 s2n(sol, ret);
1639 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1640 ret += sol;
1641 }
1642#endif
333f926d 1643
e659eff2 1644 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
333f926d
BL		 1645 {
1646 int el;
1647
1648 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1649
22a10c89 1650 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333f926d
BL		 1651
1652 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1653 s2n(el,ret);
1654
1655 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1656 {
7a236261 1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333f926d
BL		 1658 return NULL;
1659 }
1660 ret+=el;
1661 }
1662
0e1dba93
DSH		 1663 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1664 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1665 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1666 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1667 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1668 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1669 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1670 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1671 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1672 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1673 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1674 ret+=36;
1675
1676 }
761772d7 1677
4817504d 1678#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
5733919d
DSH		 1679 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1680 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1681 {
c7f26739
DB		 1682 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1683 return NULL;
5733919d
DSH		 1684 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1685 s2n(1,ret);
1686 /* Set mode:
1687 * 1: peer may send requests
1688 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1689 */
1690 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1691 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1692 else
1693 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
192540b5 1694
5733919d 1695 }
4817504d
DSH		 1696#endif
1697
bf48836c 1698#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1699 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1700 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1701 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1702 {
1703 const unsigned char *npa;
1704 unsigned int npalen;
1705 int r;
1706
1707 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1708 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1709 {
1710 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1712 s2n(npalen,ret);
1713 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1714 ret += npalen;
1715 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1716 }
1717 }
1718#endif
ecf4d660
DSH		 1719 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1720 return NULL;
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1721#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1722 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1723 {
f3014206
DSH		 1724 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD, RC4 or SSL 3.0:
1725 * might want to disable for other cases too.
5e3ff62c 1726 */
f3014206
DSH		 1727 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1728 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1729 || s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1730 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1731 else
1732 {
1733 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1734 s2n(0,ret);
1735 }
1736 }
1737#endif
a398f821 1738
6f017a8f
AL		 1739 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1740 {
1741 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1742 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1743
1744 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1745 return NULL;
1746 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1747 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1748 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1749 *ret++ = len;
1750 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1751 ret += len;
1752 }
1753
22a10c89
BL		 1754 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1755 return orig;
ed3883d2 1756
22a10c89 1757 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
ed3883d2 1758 return ret;
52b8dad8 1759 }
ed3883d2 1760
6f017a8f
AL		 1761/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1762 * ClientHello.
1763 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1764 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1765 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1766 * return.
1767 *
1768 * returns: 0 on success. */
1769static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1770 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1771 {
1772 unsigned i;
1773 unsigned proto_len;
1774 const unsigned char *selected;
1775 unsigned char selected_len;
1776 int r;
1777
1778 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1779 return 0;
1780
1781 if (data_len < 2)
1782 goto parse_error;
1783
1784 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1785 * length-prefixed strings. */
1786 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1787 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1788 data_len -= 2;
1789 data += 2;
1790 if (data_len != i)
1791 goto parse_error;
1792
1793 if (data_len < 2)
1794 goto parse_error;
1795
1796 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1797 {
1798 proto_len = data[i];
1799 i++;
1800
1801 if (proto_len == 0)
1802 goto parse_error;
1803
1804 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1805 goto parse_error;
1806
1807 i += proto_len;
1808 }
1809
1810 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1811 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1812 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1813 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1814 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1815 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1816 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1817 {
1818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 return -1;
1820 }
1821 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1822 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1823 }
1824 return 0;
1825
1826parse_error:
1827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1828 return -1;
1829 }
1830
dece3209
RS		 1831#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1832/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1833 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1834 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * SNI,
1836 * elliptic_curves
1837 * ec_point_formats
1838 *
1839 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1840 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1841 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1842 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1843 */
1844static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1845 unsigned short type, size;
1846 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1847 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1848 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1849 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1850 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1851 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1852 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1853
1854 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1855 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1856 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1857 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1858 };
1859
1860 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1861 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1862 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1863 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1864 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1865 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1866 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1867 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1868 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1869 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1870 };
1871
1872 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1873 return;
1874 data += 2;
1875
1876 if (data > (d+n-4))
1877 return;
1878 n2s(data,type);
1879 n2s(data,size);
1880
1881 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1882 return;
1883
1884 if (data+size > d+n)
1885 return;
1886 data += size;
1887
378341e1 1888 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
dece3209
RS		 1889 {
1890 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1891 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1892
1893 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1894 return;
1895 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1896 return;
1897 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1898 return;
1899 }
1900 else
1901 {
1902 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1903
1904 if (data + len != d+n)
1905 return;
1906 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1907 return;
1908 }
1909
1910 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1911}
cbf81235 1912#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1913
ecf4d660 1914
b2284ed3
DSH		 1915static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1916 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1917 unsigned short type;
1918 unsigned short size;
1919 unsigned short len;
f1fd4544 1920 unsigned char *data = *p;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1921 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1922
a13c20f6 1923 s->servername_done = 0;
67c8e7f4 1924 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
6f31dd72
BM		 1925#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1926 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1927#endif
ed3883d2 1928
6f017a8f
AL		 1929 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1930 {
1931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1932 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1933 }
1934
4817504d
DSH		 1935#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1936 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1937 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1938#endif
dece3209
RS		 1939
1940#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1941 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1942 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
cbf81235 1943#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1944
4453cd8c
DSH		 1945 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1946 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1947 {
1948 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1949 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1950 }
4817504d 1951
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1952#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1953 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1954#endif
1955
ed3883d2 1956 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 1957 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2
BM		 1958 n2s(data,len);
1959
52b8dad8 1960 if (data > (d+n-len))
c27c9cb4 1961 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 1962
f1fd4544
BM		 1963 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1964 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1965 n2s(data,type);
1966 n2s(data,size);
1967
1968 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 1969 goto ri_check;
8e3b2dbb 1970#if 0
0e1dba93 1971 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
8e3b2dbb 1972#endif
6434abbf
DSH		 1973 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1974 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1975 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
a13c20f6
BM		 1976/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1977
1978 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1979 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1980 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1981 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1982 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1983 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1984 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1985 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1986 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1987 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1988 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1989 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1990 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1991 the value of the Host: field.
1992 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1993 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1994 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1995 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1996
1997*/
1998
f1fd4544
BM		 1999 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2000 {
a70183bc 2001 unsigned char *sdata;
ed3883d2 2002 int servname_type;
a70183bc
BM		 2003 int dsize;
2004
2005 if (size < 2)
2006 {
2007 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 return 0;
2009 }
2010 n2s(data,dsize);
52b8dad8 2011 size -= 2;
a70183bc 2012 if (dsize > size )
f1fd4544 2013 {
a70183bc
BM		 2014 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 return 0;
2016 }
2017
2018 sdata = data;
2019 while (dsize > 3)
2020 {
2021 servname_type = *(sdata++);
ed3883d2 2022 n2s(sdata,len);
a70183bc
BM		 2023 dsize -= 3;
2024
2025 if (len > dsize)
f1fd4544
BM		 2026 {
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 return 0;
2029 }
a70183bc 2030 if (s->servername_done == 0)
f1fd4544
BM		 2031 switch (servname_type)
2032 {
2033 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
732d31be 2034 if (!s->hit)
f1fd4544 2035 {
732d31be
DSH		 2036 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2037 {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 return 0;
2040 }
2041 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
f1fd4544
BM		 2042 {
2043 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2044 return 0;
2045 }
732d31be
DSH		 2046 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2047 {
2048 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2049 return 0;
2050 }
ed3883d2 2051 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
a13c20f6
BM		 2052 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2053 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2054 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
40a70628 2055 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
a13c20f6
BM		 2056 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2057 return 0;
f1fd4544 2058 }
a13c20f6
BM		 2059 s->servername_done = 1;
2060
a13c20f6
BM		 2061 }
2062 else
732d31be
DSH		 2063 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2064 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
6b9e941e 2065 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
a13c20f6 2066
ed3883d2 2067 break;
f1fd4544 2068
ed3883d2
BM		 2069 default:
2070 break;
f1fd4544 2071 }
52b8dad8 2072
a70183bc 2073 dsize -= len;
f1fd4544 2074 }
a70183bc
BM		 2075 if (dsize != 0)
2076 {
2077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 return 0;
2079 }
2080
ed3883d2 2081 }
edc032b5
BL		 2082#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2083 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2084 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2085 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2086 {
2087 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 return 0;
2089 }
2090 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
edc032b5 2091 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2092 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 return 0;
2094 }
2095 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2096 return -1;
2097 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2098 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2099
2100 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2101 {
2102 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2103 return 0;
edc032b5
BL		 2104 }
2105 }
2106#endif
ed3883d2 2107
36ca4ba6 2108#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2109 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2110 {
2111 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2112 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6 2113
e83aefb3
DSH		 2114 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2115 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2116 {
2117 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 return 0;
2119 }
732d31be 2120 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2121 {
732d31be
DSH		 2122 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2123 {
7d5686d3
DSH		 2124 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2125 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
732d31be
DSH		 2126 }
2127 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2128 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2129 {
2130 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2131 return 0;
2132 }
2133 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2134 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2135 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2136#if 0
2137 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2138 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2139 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2140 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2141 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
33273721
BM		 2142#endif
2143 }
874a18cf 2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
33273721
BM		 2145 {
2146 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2147 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2148 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2149
e83aefb3
DSH		 2150 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2151 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
33273721
BM		 2152 {
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 return 0;
2155 }
732d31be 2156 if (!s->hit)
33273721 2157 {
732d31be
DSH		 2158 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2159 {
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 return 0;
2162 }
2163 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2164 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2165 {
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2167 return 0;
2168 }
2169 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2170 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
33273721 2171 }
33273721
BM		 2172#if 0
2173 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2176 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2177 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
36ca4ba6
BM		 2178#endif
2179 }
c6a27f01 2180#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
761772d7 2181#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2183 {
2184 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2185
2186 if (size < 2)
2187 {
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 return 0;
2190 }
2191 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2192 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2193 {
2194 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 return 0;
2196 }
2197
2198 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2199 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2200 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2201 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2202 else
2203 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2204 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2205 {
2206 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 return 0;
2208 }
2209 }
2210#endif
12bf56c0
DSH		 2211 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2212 {
2213 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2214 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2215 {
2216 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 return 0;
2218 }
2219 }
860c3dd1
DSH		 2220 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2221 {
2222 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2223 return 0;
2224 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2225 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2227 {
2228 int dsize;
4453cd8c 2229 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
6b7be581
DSH		 2230 {
2231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 return 0;
2233 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2234 n2s(data,dsize);
2235 size -= 2;
4453cd8c 2236 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
6b7be581
DSH		 2237 {
2238 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 return 0;
2240 }
c800c27a 2241 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
6b7be581
DSH		 2242 {
2243 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2244 return 0;
2245 }
2246 }
d0b039d4 2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2248 {
2249
2250 if (size < 5)
2251 {
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 return 0;
2254 }
2255
2256 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2257 size--;
2258 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2259 {
2260 const unsigned char *sdata;
2261 int dsize;
2262 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2263 n2s(data,dsize);
2264 size -= 2;
2265 if (dsize > size )
2266 {
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2268 return 0;
2269 }
2270 while (dsize > 0)
2271 {
2272 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2273 int idsize;
2274 if (dsize < 4)
2275 {
2276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 return 0;
2278 }
2279 n2s(data, idsize);
2280 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
9770924f 2281 size -= 2 + idsize;
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2282 if (dsize < 0)
2283 {
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 return 0;
2286 }
2287 sdata = data;
2288 data += idsize;
2289 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2290 &sdata, idsize);
2291 if (!id)
2292 {
2293 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 return 0;
2295 }
2296 if (data != sdata)
2297 {
2298 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 return 0;
2301 }
2302 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2303 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2304 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2305 {
2306 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2307 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2308 return 0;
2309 }
2310 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2311 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2312 {
2313 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2314 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2315 return 0;
2316 }
2317 }
2318
2319 /* Read in request_extensions */
9770924f
BM		 2320 if (size < 2)
2321 {
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2323 return 0;
2324 }
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2325 n2s(data,dsize);
2326 size -= 2;
9770924f 2327 if (dsize != size)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2328 {
2329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2330 return 0;
2331 }
2332 sdata = data;
2333 if (dsize > 0)
2334 {
25536ea6
DSH		 2335 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2336 {
2337 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2338 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2339 }
2340
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2341 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2342 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2343 &sdata, dsize);
2344 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2345 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2346 {
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 return 0;
2349 }
2350 }
2351 }
2352 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2353 * so ignore it.
2354 */
2355 else
2356 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2357 }
4817504d
DSH		 2358#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2359 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2360 {
2361 switch(data[0])
2362 {
2363 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2364 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2365 break;
2366 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2367 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2368 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2369 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2370 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2371 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2372 }
2373 }
2374#endif
bf48836c 2375#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27 2376 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
6f017a8f
AL		 2377 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2378 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2379 {
2380 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2381 * renegotiation.
2382 *
2383 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2384 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2385 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2386 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2387 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2388 * anything like that, but this might change).
2389
2390 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2391 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2392 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2393 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2394 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2395 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2396 }
2397#endif
761772d7 2398
6f017a8f
AL		 2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2400 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2402 {
2403 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2404 return 0;
2911575c 2405#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f017a8f
AL		 2406 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2407 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2911575c 2408#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2409 }
2410
6434abbf 2411 /* session ticket processed earlier */
e659eff2
MC		 2412 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2413 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
333f926d
BL		 2414 {
2415 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2416 al))
2417 return 0;
2418 }
4b6dee2b
DSH		 2419#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2420 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
f3014206
DSH		 2421 {
2422 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2423 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2424 }
4b6dee2b 2425#endif
a398f821
T		 2426 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2427 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2428 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2429 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2430 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2431 */
ecf4d660 2432 else if (!s->hit)
a398f821 2433 {
33f653ad 2434 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
ecf4d660 2435 return 0;
a398f821
T		 2436 }
2437
6434abbf 2438 data+=size;
f1fd4544 2439 }
a9e1c50b 2440
f1fd4544 2441 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2442
2443 ri_check:
2444
2445 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2446
bdd53508 2447 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2448 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2449 {
fbed9f81 2450 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
aa09c2c6 2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2452 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2453 return 0;
2454 }
2455
f1fd4544 2456 return 1;
52b8dad8 2457 }
f1fd4544 2458
b2284ed3
DSH		 2459int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2460 {
2461 int al = -1;
28ea0a0c 2462 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2463 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2464 {
2465 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2466 return 0;
2467 }
2468
2daceb03 2469 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
b2284ed3 2470 {
aa09c2c6 2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2472 return 0;
2473 }
2474 return 1;
2475}
2476
bf48836c 2477#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 2478/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2479 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2480 * the length of the block. */
71fa4513 2481static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2482 {
2483 unsigned int off = 0;
2484
2485 while (off < len)
2486 {
2487 if (d[off] == 0)
2488 return 0;
2489 off += d[off];
2490 off++;
2491 }
2492
2493 return off == len;
2494 }
2495#endif
2496
09e4e4b9 2497static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
f1fd4544 2498 {
c8bbd98a 2499 unsigned short length;
ed3883d2
BM		 2500 unsigned short type;
2501 unsigned short size;
ed3883d2 2502 unsigned char *data = *p;
ed3883d2 2503 int tlsext_servername = 0;
860c3dd1 2504 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
ed3883d2 2505
6f31dd72
BM		 2506#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2507 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2508#endif
2509
6f017a8f
AL		 2510 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2511 {
2512 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2513 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2514 }
2515
4817504d
DSH		 2516#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2517 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2518 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2519#endif
2520
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2521#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2522 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2523#endif
2524
ed3883d2 2525 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2526 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2527
c8bbd98a
BL		 2528 n2s(data,length);
2529 if (data+length != d+n)
2530 {
2531 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 return 0;
2533 }
ed3883d2 2534
f1fd4544
BM		 2535 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2536 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2537 n2s(data,type);
2538 n2s(data,size);
2539
2540 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2541 goto ri_check;
f1fd4544 2542
6434abbf
DSH		 2543 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2544 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2545 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2546
f1fd4544
BM		 2547 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2548 {
2549 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2550 {
2551 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2552 return 0;
2553 }
ed3883d2 2554 tlsext_servername = 1;
f1fd4544 2555 }
ed3883d2 2556
36ca4ba6 2557#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2559 {
2560 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2561 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2562
2563 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2564 {
2565 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2566 return 0;
2567 }
fb0bc2b2 2568 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2569 {
fb0bc2b2
GT		 2570 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2571 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2572 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2573 {
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2575 return 0;
2576 }
2577 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2578 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2579 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2580#if 0
2581 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2582 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2583 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2584 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2585 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2586#endif
2587 }
c6a27f01 2588#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
6434abbf
DSH		 2589
2590 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2591 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 2592 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2593 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2594 {
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 return 0;
2597 }
b362ccab 2598 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
6434abbf
DSH		 2599 {
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2601 return 0;
2602 }
2603 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2604 }
761772d7 2605#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2606 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2607 {
2608 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2609
2610 if (size < 2)
2611 {
2612 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2613 return 0;
2614 }
2615 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2617 {
2618 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2619 return 0;
2620 }
2621
2622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2623 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2624 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2625 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2626 else
2627 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2628
2629 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2630 {
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2632 return 0;
2633 }
2634 }
2635#endif
874a18cf 2636 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2637 {
2638 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2639 * a status request message.
2640 */
2641 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2642 {
2643 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2644 return 0;
2645 }
2646 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2647 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2648 }
bf48836c 2649#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f31dd72
BM		 2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2651 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2652 {
2653 unsigned char *selected;
2654 unsigned char selected_len;
2655
2656 /* We must have requested it. */
eef69354 2657 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2658 {
2659 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2660 return 0;
2661 }
2662 /* The data must be valid */
2663 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2664 {
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2666 return 0;
2667 }
2668 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2669 {
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2671 return 0;
2672 }
2673 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2674 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2675 {
2676 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 return 0;
2678 }
2679 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2680 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
6f31dd72 2681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
ee2ffc27
BL		 2682 }
2683#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2684
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2686 {
2687 unsigned len;
2688
2689 /* We must have requested it. */
2690 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2691 {
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2693 return 0;
2694 }
2695 if (size < 4)
2696 {
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2698 return 0;
2699 }
2700 /* The extension data consists of:
2701 * uint16 list_length
2702 * uint8 proto_length;
2703 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2704 len = data[0];
2705 len <<= 8;
2706 len |= data[1];
2707 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2708 {
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2710 return 0;
2711 }
2712 len = data[2];
2713 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2714 {
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 return 0;
2717 }
2718 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2719 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2720 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2721 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2722 {
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2724 return 0;
2725 }
2726 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2727 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2728 }
2729
860c3dd1
DSH		 2730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2731 {
2732 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2733 return 0;
2734 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2735 }
4817504d
DSH		 2736#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2737 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2738 {
2739 switch(data[0])
2740 {
2741 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2742 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2743 break;
2744 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2745 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2746 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2747 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2748 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2749 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2750 }
2751 }
2752#endif
e659eff2 2753 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
333f926d
BL		 2754 {
2755 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2756 al))
2757 return 0;
2758 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2759#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2760 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2761 {
f3014206
DSH		 2762 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite or SSL 3.0 */
2763 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2764 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
2765 && s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2766 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2767 }
2768#endif
4b6dee2b
DSH		 2769 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2770 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2771 * callback */
2772 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2773 return 0;
a9e1c50b
BL		 2774
2775 data += size;
f1fd4544 2776 }
ed3883d2
BM		 2777
2778 if (data != d+n)
f1fd4544
BM		 2779 {
2780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2781 return 0;
2782 }
ed3883d2 2783
f1fd4544
BM		 2784 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2785 {
2786 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2787 {
2788 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2789 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2790 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2791 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
f1fd4544
BM		 2792 {
2793 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2794 return 0;
2795 }
2796 }
2797 else
2798 {
2799 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2800 return 0;
2801 }
ed3883d2 2802 }
f1fd4544 2803 }
ed3883d2 2804
f1fd4544 2805 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2806
2807 ri_check:
2808
2809 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2810 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2811 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2812 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2813 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2814 * absence on initial connect only.
2815 */
c2c49969
DSH		 2816 if (!renegotiate_seen
2817 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
ef51b4b9 2818 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
c27c9cb4 2819 {
fbed9f81 2820 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
09e4e4b9 2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2822 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2823 return 0;
2824 }
2825
f1fd4544 2826 return 1;
52b8dad8 2827 }
ed3883d2 2828
b2172f4f 2829
36ca4ba6
BM		 2830int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2831 {
761772d7
BM		 2832
2833#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2834 {
2835 int r = 1;
2836
2837 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2838 {
2839 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2840 if (!r)
2841 return -1;
2842 }
2843
2844 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2845 {
2846 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2847 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2848
02c27b11
BM		 2849 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2850 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2851 else
2852 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2853 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2854 {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2856 return -1;
2857 }
2858 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2859 }
2860
2861 if (r == 2)
2862 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2863 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2864 }
2865#endif
2866
36ca4ba6 2867 return 1;
52b8dad8 2868 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2869
2870int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2871 {
36ca4ba6 2872 return 1;
52b8dad8 2873 }
36ca4ba6 2874
2daceb03 2875static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
f1fd4544 2876 {
241520e6 2877 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2878 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2879
2880#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
33273721
BM		 2881 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2882 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2883 */
2884 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2885 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
36ca4ba6
BM		 2886 */
2887#endif
2888
2889 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2890 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2891 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2892 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2893
761772d7
BM		 2894#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2895 {
2896 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2897 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2daceb03
BL		 2898 * so this has to happen here in
2899 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
761772d7
BM		 2900
2901 int r = 1;
2902
2903 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2904 {
2905 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2906 if (!r)
2907 {
2908 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2909 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2910 goto err;
2911 }
2912 }
2913
2914 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2915 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2916 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2917
2918 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2919 {
2920 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2921 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2922 {
2923 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2924 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2925
02c27b11
BM		 2926 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2927 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2928 else
2929 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2930 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2931 {
2932 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2934 goto err;
2935 }
2936 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2937 }
2938 }
2939
2940 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2941 {
2942 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2943 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2944 * abort the handshake.
2945 */
2946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2947 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2948 }
2949 }
761772d7
BM		 2950
2951 err:
2daceb03 2952#endif
52b8dad8
BM		 2953 switch (ret)
2954 {
36ca4ba6
BM		 2955 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2956 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2957 return -1;
2958
2959 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2960 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2961 return 1;
2962
2963 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2964 s->servername_done=0;
2965 default:
2966 return 1;
52b8dad8 2967 }
36ca4ba6 2968 }
f1fd4544 2969
2daceb03
BL		 2970int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2971 {
2972 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2973 int al;
c800c27a 2974 size_t i;
2daceb03
BL		 2975
2976 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2977 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2978 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2979 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2980 */
2981 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2982 {
2983 int r;
e5db9c3b
DSH		 2984 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2985 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2986 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2987 if (certpkey == NULL)
2988 {
2989 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2990 return 1;
2991 }
2992 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2993 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2994 */
2995 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2daceb03
BL		 2996 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2997 switch (r)
2998 {
2999 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3000 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3001 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3002 break;
3003 /* status request response should be sent */
3004 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3005 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3006 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3007 else
3008 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3009 break;
3010 /* something bad happened */
3011 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3012 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3013 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3014 goto err;
3015 }
3016 }
3017 else
3018 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3019
c800c27a
DSH		 3020 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3021 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3022 {
3023 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3024 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3025 }
3026 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3027 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3028 {
3029 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3030 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3031 }
3032
3033 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3034 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3035 {
3036 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3037 {
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3039 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3040 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3041 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3042 goto err;
3043 }
3044 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3045 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3046 {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3048 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3049 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3050 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3051 goto err;
3052 }
3053 }
3054 else
3055 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3056
2daceb03
BL		 3057 err:
3058 switch (ret)
3059 {
3060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3061 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3062 return -1;
3063
3064 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3065 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3066 return 1;
3067
3068 default:
3069 return 1;
3070 }
3071 }
3072
36ca4ba6
BM		 3073int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3074 {
3075 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
58ece833 3076 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
241520e6 3077
36ca4ba6 3078#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0205686
DSH		 3079 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3080 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3081 * it must contain uncompressed.
36ca4ba6 3082 */
52b8dad8
BM		 3083 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3084 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
36ca4ba6 3085 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
d0205686 3086 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
4082fea8 3087 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
36ca4ba6
BM		 3088 {
3089 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
90bdfd97 3090 size_t i;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3091 unsigned char *list;
3092 int found_uncompressed = 0;
b9865f11 3093 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3094 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3095 {
3096 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3097 {
3098 found_uncompressed = 1;
3099 break;
3100 }
3101 }
3102 if (!found_uncompressed)
3103 {
a291745e 3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
36ca4ba6
BM		 3105 return -1;
3106 }
3107 }
3108 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3109#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3110
241520e6 3111 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3112 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3113 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3114 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3115
761772d7
BM		 3116#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3117 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3118 {
3119 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3120 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3121
3122 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3123 {
3124 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3125 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3126 }
3127
3128 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3129 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3130 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3131 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3132 {
3133 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3134 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3135 }
3136 }
3137#endif
3138
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3139 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3140 * tell the callback
3141 */
3142 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
121f9e74 3143 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3144 {
3145 int r;
3146 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3147 * there is no response.
3148 */
3149 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3150 {
3151 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3152 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3153 }
3154 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3155 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3156 if (r == 0)
3157 {
3158 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3159 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3160 }
3161 if (r < 0)
3162 {
3163 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3164 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3165 }
3166 }
3167
52b8dad8
BM		 3168 switch (ret)
3169 {
58ece833
BM		 3170 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3171 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3172 return -1;
3173
3174 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3175 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3176 return 1;
3177
3178 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3179 s->servername_done=0;
3180 default:
3181 return 1;
52b8dad8 3182 }
f1fd4544 3183 }
33273721 3184
09e4e4b9
DSH		 3185int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3186 {
3187 int al = -1;
3188 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3189 return 1;
3190 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3191 {
3192 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3193 return 0;
3194 }
3195
3196 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3197 {
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3199 return 0;
3200 }
3201 return 1;
3202}
3203
c519e89f
BM		 3204/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3205 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3206 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3207 *
3208 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3209 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3210 * extension, if any.
3211 * len: the length of the session ID.
3212 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3213 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3214 * point to the resulting session.
3215 *
3216 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3217 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3218 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3219 *
3220 * Returns:
3221 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3222 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3223 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3224 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3225 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3226 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3227 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3228 *
3229 * Side effects:
3230 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3231 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3232 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3233 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3234 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3235 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 3236 */
6434abbf 3237int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
c519e89f 3238 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
6434abbf
DSH		 3239 {
3240 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3241 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3242 unsigned short i;
e8da6a1d 3243
c519e89f
BM		 3244 *ret = NULL;
3245 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3246
e8da6a1d 3247 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
c519e89f
BM		 3248 * to permit stateful resumption.
3249 */
b362ccab 3250 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
c519e89f 3251 return 0;
6434abbf 3252 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
c519e89f 3253 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3254 if (p >= limit)
3255 return -1;
07a9d1a2 3256 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
cbd64894 3257 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
07a9d1a2
DSH		 3258 {
3259 i = *(p++);
3260 p+= i;
3261 if (p >= limit)
3262 return -1;
3263 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3264 /* Skip past cipher list */
3265 n2s(p, i);
3266 p+= i;
3267 if (p >= limit)
3268 return -1;
3269 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3270 i = *(p++);
3271 p += i;
3272 if (p > limit)
3273 return -1;
3274 /* Now at start of extensions */
3275 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
c519e89f 3276 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3277 n2s(p, i);
3278 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3279 {
3280 unsigned short type, size;
3281 n2s(p, type);
3282 n2s(p, size);
3283 if (p + size > limit)
c519e89f 3284 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3285 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3286 {
c519e89f 3287 int r;
6434abbf
DSH		 3288 if (size == 0)
3289 {
c519e89f
BM		 3290 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3291 * currently have one. */
6434abbf 3292 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
c519e89f 3293 return 1;
6434abbf 3294 }
12bf56c0
DSH		 3295 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3296 {
c519e89f
BM		 3297 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3298 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3299 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3300 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3301 * calculate the master secret later. */
3302 return 2;
3303 }
3304 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3305 switch (r)
3306 {
3307 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3308 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3309 return 2;
3310 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3311 return r;
3312 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3313 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3314 return 3;
3315 default: /* fatal error */
3316 return -1;
12bf56c0 3317 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3318 }
3319 p += size;
3320 }
c519e89f 3321 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3322 }
3323
c519e89f
BM		 3324/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3325 *
3326 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3327 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3328 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3329 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3330 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3331 * point to the resulting session.
3332 *
3333 * Returns:
3334 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3335 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3336 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3337 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3338 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3339static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3340 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3341 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3342 {
3343 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3344 unsigned char *sdec;
3345 const unsigned char *p;
8a2062fe 3346 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3347 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3348 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3349 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
661dc143 3350 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3351 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3352 if (eticklen < 48)
c519e89f 3353 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3354 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3355 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3356 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
661dc143 3357 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
8a2062fe
DSH		 3358 {
3359 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
661dc143 3360 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3361 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3362 if (rv < 0)
3363 return -1;
3364 if (rv == 0)
c519e89f 3365 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3366 if (rv == 2)
3367 renew_ticket = 1;
3368 }
3369 else
3370 {
3371 /* Check key name matches */
661dc143 3372 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
c519e89f 3373 return 2;
661dc143 3374 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3375 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3376 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
661dc143 3377 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
8a2062fe 3378 }
6434abbf 3379 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
c519e89f
BM		 3380 * integrity checks on ticket.
3381 */
8a2062fe 3382 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
0eab41fb
BL		 3383 if (mlen < 0)
3384 {
3385 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3386 return -1;
3387 }
6434abbf 3388 eticklen -= mlen;
6434abbf 3389 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
6434abbf
DSH		 3390 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3391 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3392 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
7c770d57 3393 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
74827055
DSH		 3394 {
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
c519e89f 3396 return 2;
74827055 3397 }
6434abbf 3398 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
6434abbf 3399 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
8a2062fe
DSH		 3400 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3401 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
6434abbf
DSH		 3402 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3403 if (!sdec)
3404 {
3405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3406 return -1;
3407 }
3408 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3409 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
44724bee
DSH		 3410 {
3411 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3412 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
c519e89f 3413 return 2;
44724bee 3414 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3415 slen += mlen;
3416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3417 p = sdec;
c519e89f 3418
6434abbf
DSH		 3419 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3420 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3421 if (sess)
3422 {
c519e89f
BM		 3423 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3424 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3425 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3426 * as required by standard.
3427 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3428 if (sesslen)
3429 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3430 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3431 *psess = sess;
c519e89f
BM		 3432 if (renew_ticket)
3433 return 4;
3434 else
3435 return 3;
6434abbf 3436 }
c519e89f
BM		 3437 ERR_clear_error();
3438 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3439 * ticket. */
3440 return 2;
6434abbf 3441 }
6434abbf 3442
6b7be581
DSH		 3443/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3444
3445typedef struct
3446 {
3447 int nid;
3448 int id;
3449 } tls12_lookup;
3450
3451static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
6b7be581 3452 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
6b7be581 3453 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
6b7be581
DSH		 3454 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3455 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
6b7be581
DSH		 3456 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3457 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3458};
3459
3460static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
6b7be581 3461 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
6b7be581 3462 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
6b7be581 3463 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3464};
3465
3466static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3467 {
3468 size_t i;
3469 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3470 {
3471 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3472 return table[i].id;
3473 }
3474 return -1;
3475 }
e7f8ff43 3476
6b7be581
DSH		 3477static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3478 {
3479 size_t i;
3480 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3481 {
e7f8ff43 3482 if ((table[i].id) == id)
6b7be581
DSH		 3483 return table[i].nid;
3484 }
e7f8ff43 3485 return NID_undef;
6b7be581 3486 }
a2f9200f
DSH		 3487
3488int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
6b7be581
DSH		 3489 {
3490 int sig_id, md_id;
1db5f356
DSH		 3491 if (!md)
3492 return 0;
6b7be581
DSH		 3493 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3494 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3495 if (md_id == -1)
3496 return 0;
a2f9200f 3497 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
6b7be581
DSH		 3498 if (sig_id == -1)
3499 return 0;
3500 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3501 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3502 return 1;
3503 }
3504
a2f9200f
DSH		 3505int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3506 {
3507 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3508 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3509 }
3510
b362ccab 3511typedef struct
a2f9200f 3512 {
b362ccab
DSH		 3513 int nid;
3514 int secbits;
3515 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3516 } tls12_hash_info;
3517
3518static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3519#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3520 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3521#else
3522 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
ebc5e72f 3523#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3524#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3525 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3526#else
3527 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
a2f9200f 3528#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3529#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3530 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3531 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3532#else
3533 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3534 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
a2f9200f 3535#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3536#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3537 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3538 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3539#else
3540 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3541 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
a2f9200f 3542#endif
b362ccab 3543};
a2f9200f 3544
b362ccab
DSH		 3545static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3546 {
3547 if (hash_alg == 0)
3548 return NULL;
3549 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
a2f9200f 3550 return NULL;
b362ccab
DSH		 3551 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3552 }
a2f9200f 3553
b362ccab
DSH		 3554const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3555 {
3556 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3557#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3558 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3559 return NULL;
3560#endif
3561 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3562 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3563 return NULL;
3564 return inf->mfunc();
a2f9200f
DSH		 3565 }
3566
4453cd8c
DSH		 3567static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3568 {
3569 switch(sig_alg)
3570 {
3571#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3572 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3573 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3574#endif
3575#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3576 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3577 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3578#endif
3579#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3580 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3581 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3582#endif
3583 }
3584 return -1;
3585 }
3586
3587/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3588static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3589 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3590 {
8e2a06bf 3591 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3592 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3593 return;
3594 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3595 {
3596 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3597 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3598 if (phash_nid)
3599 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3600 }
3601 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3602 {
3603 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3604 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3605 if (psign_nid)
3606 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3607 }
3608 if (psignhash_nid)
3609 {
3610 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3611 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3612 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3613 else
3614 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3615 }
3616 }
b362ccab
DSH		 3617/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3618static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3619 {
3620 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3621 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3622 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3623 return 0;
3624 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3625 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3626 return 0;
3627 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3628 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3629 }
3630
3631/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3632 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3633 * then RSA is disabled.
3634 */
3635
3636void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3637 {
3638 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3639 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3640 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3641 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3642 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3643 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3644 * if we have to.
3645 */
3646 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3647 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3648 {
3649 switch(sigalgs[1])
3650 {
3651#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3652 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3653 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3654 have_rsa = 1;
3655 break;
3656#endif
3657#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3658 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3659 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3660 have_dsa = 1;
3661 break;
3662#endif
3663#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3664 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3665 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3666 have_ecdsa = 1;
3667 break;
3668#endif
3669 }
3670 }
3671 if (!have_rsa)
3672 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3673 if (!have_dsa)
3674 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3675 if (!have_ecdsa)
3676 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3677 }
3678
3679size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3680 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3681 {
3682 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3683 size_t i;
3684 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3685 {
3686 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3687 {
3688 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3689 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3690 }
3691 }
3692 return tmpout - out;
3693 }
3694
4453cd8c 3695/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3696static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
4453cd8c
DSH		 3697 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3698 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3699 {
3700 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3701 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3702 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3703 {
3704 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
b362ccab 3705 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
4453cd8c
DSH		 3706 continue;
3707 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3708 {
3709 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3710 {
3711 nmatch++;
3712 if (shsig)
3713 {
3714 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3715 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3716 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3717 &shsig->sign_nid,
3718 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3719 ptmp);
3720 shsig++;
3721 }
3722 break;
3723 }
3724 }
3725 }
3726 return nmatch;
3727 }
3728
3729/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3730static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3731 {
3732 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3733 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3734 size_t nmatch;
3735 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3736 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354 3737 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
4563da1d
DSH		 3738 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3739 {
3740 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3741 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3742 }
3dbc46df 3743 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2ea80354 3744 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3745 {
3746 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3747 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3748 }
2ea80354 3749 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3750 {
3751 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
4453cd8c 3752 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 3753 }
4453cd8c 3754 else
2ea80354
DSH		 3755 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3756 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3757 {
3758 pref = conf;
3759 preflen = conflen;
3760 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3761 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3762 }
3763 else
3764 {
3765 allow = conf;
3766 allowlen = conflen;
3767 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3768 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3769 }
b362ccab 3770 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3771 if (!nmatch)
3772 return 1;
3773 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3774 if (!salgs)
3775 return 0;
b362ccab 3776 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3777 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3778 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3779 return 1;
3780 }
3781
3782
6b7be581
DSH		 3783/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3784
c800c27a 3785int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
6b7be581 3786 {
6b7be581 3787 CERT *c = s->cert;
cbd64894
DSH		 3788 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3789 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
6b7be581 3790 return 1;
8f829124
DSH		 3791 /* Should never happen */
3792 if (!c)
3793 return 0;
6b7be581 3794
4563da1d
DSH		 3795 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3796 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 3797 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
0f229cce 3798 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
e7f8ff43 3799 return 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3800 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3801 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
c800c27a
DSH		 3802 return 1;
3803 }
6b7be581 3804
c800c27a
DSH		 3805int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3806 {
3807 int idx;
3808 size_t i;
3809 const EVP_MD *md;
3810 CERT *c = s->cert;
3811 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3812 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3813 return 0;
6b7be581 3814
ed83ba53 3815#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
ddd13d67 3816 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 3817 {
3818 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3819 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3820 */
3821 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3822 if (s->server)
3823 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3824 else
3825 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3826 if (sigs)
3827 {
3828 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3829 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3830 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3831 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3832 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3833 {
3834 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3835 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3836 }
3837 }
3838 }
3839#endif
3840
4453cd8c
DSH		 3841 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3842 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3843 {
3844 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3845 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
6b7be581 3846 {
e7f8ff43 3847 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
4453cd8c 3848 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3849 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3850 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3851 {
3852 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3853 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3854 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3855 }
3856
6b7be581 3857 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3858 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3859 * use the certificate for signing.
6b7be581 3860 */
2ea80354 3861 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
d61ff83b
DSH		 3862 {
3863 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3864 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3865 */
6b7be581 3866#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3867 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3868 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581
DSH		 3869#endif
3870#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3871 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3872 {
3873 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3874 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3875 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3876#endif
3877#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3878 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3879 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581 3880#endif
d61ff83b 3881 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3882 return 1;
3883 }
3884
4817504d 3885
e7f8ff43 3886int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4453cd8c 3887 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3888 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3889 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3890 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3891 if (psig == NULL)
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3892 return 0;
3893 if (idx >= 0)
3894 {
4453cd8c 3895 idx <<= 1;
0f229cce 3896 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
e7f8ff43 3897 return 0;
4453cd8c 3898 psig += idx;
e7f8ff43 3899 if (rhash)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3900 *rhash = psig[0];
3901 if (rsig)
3902 *rsig = psig[1];
3903 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
e7f8ff43 3904 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 3905 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3906 }
3907
3908int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3909 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3910 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3911 {
3912 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3913 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3914 return 0;
3915 shsigalgs += idx;
3916 if (phash)
3917 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3918 if (psign)
3919 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3920 if (psignhash)
3921 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3922 if (rsig)
3923 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3924 if (rhash)
3925 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3926 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3927 }
3928
3929
4817504d
DSH		 3930#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3931int
3932tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3933 {
3934 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3935 unsigned short hbtype;
3936 unsigned int payload;
3937 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3938
4817504d
DSH		 3939 if (s->msg_callback)
3940 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3941 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3942 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3943
731f4314
DSH		 3944 /* Read type and payload length first */
3945 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3946 return 0; /* silently discard */
3947 hbtype = *p++;
3948 n2s(p, payload);
3949 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3950 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3951 pl = p;
3952
4817504d
DSH		 3953 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3954 {
3955 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3956 int r;
3957
3958 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3959 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3960 * payload, plus padding
3961 */
3962 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3963 bp = buffer;
3964
3965 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3966 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3967 s2n(payload, bp);
3968 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
57cb030c
DSH		 3969 bp += payload;
3970 /* Random padding */
3971 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3972
4817504d
DSH		 3973 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3974
3975 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3976 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3977 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3978 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3979
3980 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3981
3982 if (r < 0)
3983 return r;
3984 }
3985 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3986 {
3987 unsigned int seq;
3988
3989 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3990 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3991 * sequence number */
3992 n2s(pl, seq);
3993
3994 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3995 {
3996 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3997 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3998 }
3999 }
4000
4001 return 0;
4002 }
4003
4004int
4005tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4006 {
4007 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4008 int ret;
4009 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4010 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4011
4012 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4013 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4014 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4015 {
4016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4017 return -1;
4018 }
4019
4020 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4021 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4022 {
4023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4024 return -1;
4025 }
4026
4027 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4028 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4029 {
4030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4031 return -1;
4032 }
4033
4034 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4035 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4036 */
4037 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4038
4039 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4040 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4041 * some random stuff.
4042 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4043 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4044 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4045 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4046 * - Padding
4047 */
4048 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4049 p = buf;
4050 /* Message Type */
4051 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4052 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4053 s2n(payload, p);
4054 /* Sequence number */
4055 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4056 /* 16 random bytes */
4057 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4058 p += 16;
4059 /* Random padding */
4060 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4061
4062 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4063 if (ret >= 0)
4064 {
4065 if (s->msg_callback)
4066 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4067 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4068 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4069
4070 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4071 }
4072
4073 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4074
4075 return ret;
4076 }
4077#endif
0f229cce 4078
4453cd8c 4079#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce
DSH		 4080
4081typedef struct
4082 {
4083 size_t sigalgcnt;
4084 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4085 } sig_cb_st;
4086
4087static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4088 {
4089 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4090 size_t i;
4091 char etmp[20], *p;
4092 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4093 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4094 return 0;
4095 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4096 return 0;
4097 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4098 etmp[len] = 0;
4099 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4100 if (!p)
4101 return 0;
4102 *p = 0;
4103 p++;
4104 if (!*p)
4105 return 0;
4106
4107 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4108 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4109 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4110 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4111 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4112 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4113 else return 0;
4114
4115 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4116 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4117 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4118 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4119 return 0;
4120
4121 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4122 {
4123 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4124 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4125 return 0;
4126 }
4127 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4128 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4129 return 1;
4130 }
4131
4132/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4133 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3dbc46df 4134int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f229cce
DSH		 4135 {
4136 sig_cb_st sig;
4137 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4138 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4139 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 4140 if (c == NULL)
4141 return 1;
3dbc46df 4142 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
0f229cce
DSH		 4143 }
4144
3dbc46df 4145int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f229cce 4146 {
4453cd8c 4147 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
0f229cce
DSH		 4148 int rhash, rsign;
4149 size_t i;
4150 if (salglen & 1)
4151 return 0;
4453cd8c 4152 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
0f229cce
DSH		 4153 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4154 return 0;
4453cd8c 4155 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
0f229cce 4156 {
4453cd8c 4157 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
0f229cce 4158 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4453cd8c 4159 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
0f229cce
DSH		 4160 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4161
4162 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4163 goto err;
4453cd8c
DSH		 4164 *sptr++ = rhash;
4165 *sptr++ = rsign;
0f229cce
DSH		 4166 }
4167
3dbc46df
DSH		 4168 if (client)
4169 {
4170 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4171 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4172 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4173 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4174 }
4175 else
4176 {
4177 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4178 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4179 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4180 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4181 }
0f229cce 4182
0f229cce
DSH		 4183 return 1;
4184
4185 err:
4186 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4187 return 0;
4188 }
4453cd8c 4189
d61ff83b
DSH		 4190static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4191 {
4192 int sig_nid;
4193 size_t i;
4194 if (default_nid == -1)
4195 return 1;
4196 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4197 if (default_nid)
4198 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4199 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4200 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4201 return 1;
4202 return 0;
4203 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4204/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4205static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4206 {
4207 X509_NAME *nm;
4208 int i;
4209 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4210 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4211 {
4212 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4213 return 1;
4214 }
4215 return 0;
4216 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4217
4218/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
6dbb6219
DSH		 4219 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4220 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4221 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 4222 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 4223
4224/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4225
4226#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4227 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4228/* Strict mode flags */
4229#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4230 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4231 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4232
d61ff83b
DSH		 4233int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4234 int idx)
4235 {
4236 int i;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4237 int rv = 0;
4238 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4239 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4240 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354
DSH		 4241 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4242 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
d61ff83b
DSH		 4243 if (idx != -1)
4244 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4245 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4246 if (idx == -2)
4247 {
4248 cpk = c->key;
4249 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4250 }
4251 else
4252 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4253 x = cpk->x509;
4254 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4255 chain = cpk->chain;
2ea80354 4256 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4257 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4258 if (!x || !pk)
4259 goto end;
ed83ba53
DSH		 4260#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4261 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
ddd13d67 4262 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 4263 {
4264 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4265 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4266 return rv;
4267 }
4268#endif
d61ff83b
DSH		 4269 }
4270 else
4271 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4272 if (!x || !pk)
4273 goto end;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4274 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4275 if (idx == -1)
4276 goto end;
6dbb6219 4277 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2ea80354 4278 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4279 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4280 else
4281 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4282 strict_mode = 1;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4283 }
4284
2ea80354
DSH		 4285 if (suiteb_flags)
4286 {
4287 int ok;
4288 if (check_flags)
4289 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4290 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4291 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4292 {
4293 if (check_flags)
4294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4295 else
4296 goto end;
4297 }
4298 }
6dbb6219 4299
d61ff83b
DSH		 4300 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4301 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4302 * and strict mode.
4303 */
6dbb6219 4304 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4305 {
4306 int default_nid;
4307 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4308 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4309 default_nid = 0;
4310 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4311 else
4312 {
4313 switch(idx)
4314 {
4315 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4316 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4317 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4318 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4319 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4320 break;
4321
4322 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4323 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4324 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4325 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4326 break;
4327
4328 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4329 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4330 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4331 break;
4332
4333 default:
4334 default_nid = -1;
4335 break;
4336 }
4337 }
4338 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4339 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4340 * sha1.
4341 */
15a70fe5 4342 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4343 {
4344 size_t j;
4345 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4346 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4347 {
4348 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4349 break;
4350 }
4351 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4352 {
4353 if (check_flags)
4354 goto skip_sigs;
4355 else
4356 goto end;
4357 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4358 }
4359 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4360 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4361 {
4362 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4363 }
4364 else
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4367 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4368 {
4369 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4370 default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4371 {
4372 if (check_flags)
4373 {
4374 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4375 break;
4376 }
4377 else
4378 goto end;
4379 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4380 }
4381 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4382 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4383 else if(check_flags)
4384 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4385 skip_sigs:
2ea80354
DSH		 4386 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4387 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4388 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4389 else if (!check_flags)
d61ff83b 4390 goto end;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4391 if (!s->server)
4392 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b 4393 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
6dbb6219 4394 else if (strict_mode)
d61ff83b 4395 {
6dbb6219 4396 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4397 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4398 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4399 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4400 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4401 {
4402 if (check_flags)
4403 {
4404 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4405 break;
4406 }
4407 else
4408 goto end;
4409 }
4410 }
4411 }
4412 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4413 {
4414 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4415 int check_type = 0;
4416 switch (pk->type)
4417 {
4418 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4419 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4420 break;
4421 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4422 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4423 break;
4424 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4425 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4426 break;
4427 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4428 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4429 {
4430 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4431 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4432 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4433 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4434 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4435 }
4436 }
4437 if (check_type)
4438 {
4439 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4440 int ctypelen;
4441 if (c->ctypes)
4442 {
4443 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4444 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4445 }
4446 else
4447 {
4448 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4449 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4450 }
4451 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4452 {
4453 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4454 {
4455 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4456 break;
4457 }
4458 }
4459 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4460 goto end;
4461 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4462 else
4463 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4464
4465
4466 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4467
4468 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4469 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4470
4471 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4472 {
4473 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4474 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4475 }
4476 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4477 {
4478 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4479 {
4480 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4481 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4482 {
4483 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4484 break;
4485 }
4486 }
4487 }
4488 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4489 goto end;
d61ff83b 4490 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4491 else
4492 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4493
4494 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4495 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4496
4497 end:
6dbb6219
DSH		 4498
4499 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
d61ff83b 4500 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4501 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4502 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4503 else if (cpk->digest)
d61ff83b 4504 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4505 }
4506 else
4507 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4508
4509 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4510 * if the chain is invalid.
4511 */
4512 if (!check_flags)
4513 {
4514 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4515 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4516 else
2ea80354
DSH		 4517 {
4518 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4519 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4520 return 0;
4521 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4522 }
4523 return rv;
4524 }
4525
4526/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4527void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4528 {
4529 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4530 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4531 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4532 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4533 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4534 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4535 }
18d71588
DSH		 4536/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4537int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4538 {
4539 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4540 }
d61ff83b 4541
4453cd8c 4542#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4543
4544#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4545DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4546 {
4547 int dh_secbits = 80;
4548 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4549 return DH_get_1024_160();
4550 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4551 {
4552 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4553 dh_secbits = 128;
4554 else
4555 dh_secbits = 80;
4556 }
4557 else
4558 {
4559 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4560 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4561 }
4562
4563 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4564 {
4565 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4566 if (!dhp)
4567 return NULL;
4568 dhp->g = BN_new();
4569 if (dhp->g)
4570 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4571 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4572 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4573 else
4574 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4575 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4576 {
4577 DH_free(dhp);
4578 return NULL;
4579 }
4580 return dhp;
4581 }
4582 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4583 return DH_get_2048_224();
4584 return DH_get_1024_160();
4585 }
4586#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4587
4588static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4589 {
4590 int secbits;
4591 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4592 if (pkey)
4593 {
4594 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4595 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4596 }
4597 else
4598 secbits = -1;
4599 if (s)
4600 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4601 else
4602 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4603 }
4604
4605static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4606 {
4607 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4608 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4609 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4610 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4611 {
4612 const EVP_MD *md;
4613 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4614 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4615 }
4616 if (s)
4617 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4618 else
4619 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4620 }
4621
4622int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4623 {
4624 if (vfy)
4625 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4626 if (is_ee)
4627 {
4628 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4629 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4630 }
4631 else
4632 {
4633 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4634 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4635 }
4636 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4637 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4638 return 1;
4639 }
4640
4641/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4642 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4643 * not sending one to the peer.
4644 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4645 */
4646
4647int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4648 {
4649 int rv, start_idx, i;
4650 if (x == NULL)
4651 {
4652 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4653 start_idx = 1;
4654 }
4655 else
4656 start_idx = 0;
4657
4658 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4659 if (rv != 1)
4660 return rv;
4661
4662 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4663 {
4664 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4665 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4666 if (rv != 1)
4667 return rv;
4668 }
4669 return 1;
4670 }
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