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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / providers / implementations / signature / rsa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16 #include <string.h>
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
32
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
56
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
65 { 0, NULL }
66 };
67
68 /*
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
72 */
73
74 typedef struct {
75 OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
76 char *propq;
77 RSA *rsa;
78 int operation;
79
80 /*
81 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
82 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
83 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
84 * by their Final function.
85 */
86 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
87
88 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
89 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
90 unsigned char *aid;
91 size_t aid_len;
92
93 /* main digest */
94 EVP_MD *md;
95 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
96 int mdnid;
97 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
98
99 /* RSA padding mode */
100 int pad_mode;
101 /* message digest for MGF1 */
102 EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
103 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
104 /* PSS salt length */
105 int saltlen;
106 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
107 int min_saltlen;
108
109 /* Temp buffer */
110 unsigned char *tbuf;
111
112 } PROV_RSA_CTX;
113
114 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
115 {
116 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
117 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
118 return 0;
119 }
120
121 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
122 {
123 /*
124 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
125 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
126 * map.
127 */
128 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
129 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
130 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
131 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
132 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
133 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
134 { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
135 { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
136 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
137 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
138 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
139 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
140 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
141 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
142 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
143 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
144 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
145 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
146 };
147 size_t i;
148 int mdnid = NID_undef;
149
150 if (md == NULL)
151 goto end;
152
153 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
154 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
155 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
156 break;
157 }
158 }
159
160 end:
161 return mdnid;
162 }
163
164 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
165 {
166 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
167 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
168 return 0;
169 }
170
171 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
172 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
173 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
174 return 0;
175 }
176 }
177
178 return 1;
179 }
180
181 static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
182 {
183 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
184 int max_saltlen;
185
186 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
187 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
188 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
189 max_saltlen--;
190 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
191 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
192 return 0;
193 }
194 }
195 return 1;
196 }
197
198 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
199 {
200 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
201 char *propq_copy = NULL;
202
203 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
204 || (propq != NULL
205 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
206 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
207 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
208 return NULL;
209 }
210
211 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
212 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
213 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
214 return prsactx;
215 }
216
217 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
218 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
219
220 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
221 const char *mdprops)
222 {
223 if (mdprops == NULL)
224 mdprops = ctx->propq;
225
226 if (mdname != NULL) {
227 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
228 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
229 WPACKET pkt;
230
231 if (md == NULL
232 || md_nid == NID_undef
233 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
234 || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)) {
235 if (md == NULL)
236 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
237 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
238 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
239 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
240 "digest=%s", mdname);
241 EVP_MD_free(md);
242 return 0;
243 }
244
245 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
246 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
247
248 /*
249 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
250 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
251 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
252 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
253 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
254 */
255 ctx->aid_len = 0;
256 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
257 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
258 md_nid)
259 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
260 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
261 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
262 }
263 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
264
265 ctx->mdctx = NULL;
266 ctx->md = md;
267 ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
268 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
269 }
270
271 return 1;
272 }
273
274 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
275 const char *mdprops)
276 {
277 if (mdprops == NULL)
278 mdprops = ctx->propq;
279
280 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
281 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
282
283 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
284 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
285 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
286 return 0;
287 }
288 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
289
290 return 1;
291 }
292
293 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
294 {
295 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
296
297 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
298 return 0;
299
300 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
301 prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
302 prsactx->operation = operation;
303
304 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
305 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
306 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
307
308 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
309 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
310 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
311 break;
312 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
313 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
314
315 {
316 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
317 rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
318
319 if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
320 int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
321 int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
322 int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
323 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
324
325 mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
326 mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
327 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
328
329 if (mdname == NULL) {
330 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
331 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
332 return 0;
333 }
334 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
335 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
336 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
337 return 0;
338 }
339
340 strncpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
341 strncpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
342 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
343 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
344
345 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
346 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq);
347 }
348 }
349
350 break;
351 default:
352 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
353 return 0;
354 }
355
356 return 1;
357 }
358
359 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
360 {
361 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
362 return 1;
363 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
364 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
365 return 0;
366 }
367 return 1;
368 }
369
370 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
371 {
372 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
373 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
374 }
375
376 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
377 {
378 clean_tbuf(ctx);
379 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
380 ctx->tbuf = NULL;
381 }
382
383 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
384 {
385 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
386 }
387
388 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
389 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
390 {
391 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
392 int ret;
393 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
394 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
395
396 if (sig == NULL) {
397 *siglen = rsasize;
398 return 1;
399 }
400
401 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
402 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
403 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
404 return 0;
405 }
406
407 if (mdsize != 0) {
408 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
409 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
410 return 0;
411 }
412
413 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
414 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
415 unsigned int sltmp;
416
417 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
418 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
419 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
420 return 0;
421 }
422 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
423 prsactx->rsa);
424
425 if (ret <= 0) {
426 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
427 return 0;
428 }
429 ret = sltmp;
430 goto end;
431 }
432 #endif
433 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
434 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
435 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
436 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
437 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
438 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
439 return 0;
440 }
441 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
442 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
443 return 0;
444 }
445 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
446 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
447 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
448 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
449 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
450 break;
451
452 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
453 {
454 unsigned int sltmp;
455
456 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
457 prsactx->rsa);
458 if (ret <= 0) {
459 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
460 return 0;
461 }
462 ret = sltmp;
463 }
464 break;
465
466 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
467 /* Check PSS restrictions */
468 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
469 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
470 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
471 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
472 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
473 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
474 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
475 "but the digest only gives %d",
476 prsactx->min_saltlen,
477 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
478 return 0;
479 }
480 /* FALLTHRU */
481 default:
482 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
483 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
484 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
485 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
486 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
487 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
488 prsactx->min_saltlen,
489 prsactx->saltlen);
490 return 0;
491 }
492 break;
493 }
494 }
495 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
496 return 0;
497 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
498 prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
499 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
500 prsactx->saltlen)) {
501 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
502 return 0;
503 }
504 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
505 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
506 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
507 break;
508
509 default:
510 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
511 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
512 return 0;
513 }
514 } else {
515 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
516 prsactx->pad_mode);
517 }
518
519 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
520 end:
521 #endif
522 if (ret <= 0) {
523 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
524 return 0;
525 }
526
527 *siglen = ret;
528 return 1;
529 }
530
531 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
532 {
533 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
534 }
535
536 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
537 unsigned char *rout,
538 size_t *routlen,
539 size_t routsize,
540 const unsigned char *sig,
541 size_t siglen)
542 {
543 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
544 int ret;
545
546 if (rout == NULL) {
547 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
548 return 1;
549 }
550
551 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
552 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
553 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
554 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
555 return 0;
556 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
557 RSA_X931_PADDING);
558 if (ret < 1) {
559 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 ret--;
563 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
564 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
565 return 0;
566 }
567 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
568 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
569 "Should be %d, but got %d",
570 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
571 return 0;
572 }
573
574 *routlen = ret;
575 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
576 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
577 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
578 routsize, ret);
579 return 0;
580 }
581 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
582 break;
583
584 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
585 {
586 size_t sltmp;
587
588 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
589 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
590 if (ret <= 0) {
591 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
592 return 0;
593 }
594 ret = sltmp;
595 }
596 break;
597
598 default:
599 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
600 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
601 return 0;
602 }
603 } else {
604 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
605 prsactx->pad_mode);
606 if (ret < 0) {
607 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
608 return 0;
609 }
610 }
611 *routlen = ret;
612 return 1;
613 }
614
615 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
616 {
617 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
618 }
619
620 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
621 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
622 {
623 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
624 size_t rslen;
625
626 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
627 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
628 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
629 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
630 prsactx->rsa)) {
631 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
632 return 0;
633 }
634 return 1;
635 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
636 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
637 return 0;
638 break;
639 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
640 {
641 int ret;
642 size_t mdsize;
643
644 /*
645 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
646 * call
647 */
648 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
649 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
650 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
651 "Should be %d, but got %d",
652 mdsize, tbslen);
653 return 0;
654 }
655
656 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
657 return 0;
658 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
659 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
660 if (ret <= 0) {
661 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
662 return 0;
663 }
664 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
665 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
666 prsactx->tbuf,
667 prsactx->saltlen);
668 if (ret <= 0) {
669 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
670 return 0;
671 }
672 return 1;
673 }
674 default:
675 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
676 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
677 return 0;
678 }
679 } else {
680 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
681 return 0;
682 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
683 prsactx->pad_mode);
684 if (rslen == 0) {
685 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
686 return 0;
687 }
688 }
689
690 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
691 return 0;
692
693 return 1;
694 }
695
696 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
697 void *vrsa, int operation)
698 {
699 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
700
701 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
702 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
703 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
704 return 0;
705
706 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
707 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
708 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
709 goto error;
710 }
711
712 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
713 goto error;
714
715 return 1;
716
717 error:
718 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
719 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
720 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
721 prsactx->md = NULL;
722 return 0;
723 }
724
725 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
726 const unsigned char *data,
727 size_t datalen)
728 {
729 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
730
731 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
732 return 0;
733
734 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
735 }
736
737 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
738 void *vrsa)
739 {
740 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
741 EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
742 }
743
744 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
745 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
746 {
747 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
748 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
749 unsigned int dlen = 0;
750
751 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
752 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
753 return 0;
754
755 /*
756 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
757 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
758 */
759 if (sig != NULL) {
760 /*
761 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
762 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
763 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
764 */
765 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
766 return 0;
767 }
768
769 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
770 }
771
772 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
773 void *vrsa)
774 {
775 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
776 EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
777 }
778
779 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
780 size_t siglen)
781 {
782 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
783 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
784 unsigned int dlen = 0;
785
786 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
787 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
788 return 0;
789
790 /*
791 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
792 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
793 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
794 */
795 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
796 return 0;
797
798 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
799 }
800
801 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
802 {
803 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
804
805 if (prsactx == NULL)
806 return;
807
808 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
809 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
810 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
811 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
812 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
813 free_tbuf(prsactx);
814
815 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
816 }
817
818 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
819 {
820 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
821 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
822
823 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
824 if (dstctx == NULL) {
825 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
826 return NULL;
827 }
828
829 *dstctx = *srcctx;
830 dstctx->rsa = NULL;
831 dstctx->md = NULL;
832 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
833 dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
834
835 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
836 goto err;
837 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
838
839 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
840 goto err;
841 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
842
843 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
844 goto err;
845 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
846
847 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
848 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
849 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
850 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
851 goto err;
852 }
853
854 return dstctx;
855 err:
856 rsa_freectx(dstctx);
857 return NULL;
858 }
859
860 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
861 {
862 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
863 OSSL_PARAM *p;
864
865 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
866 return 0;
867
868 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
869 if (p != NULL
870 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
871 return 0;
872
873 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
874 if (p != NULL)
875 switch (p->data_type) {
876 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
877 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
878 return 0;
879 break;
880 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
881 {
882 int i;
883 const char *word = NULL;
884
885 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
886 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
887 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
888 break;
889 }
890 }
891
892 if (word != NULL) {
893 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
894 return 0;
895 } else {
896 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
897 }
898 }
899 break;
900 default:
901 return 0;
902 }
903
904 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
905 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
906 return 0;
907
908 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
909 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
910 return 0;
911
912 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
913 if (p != NULL) {
914 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
915 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
916 return 0;
917 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
918 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
919 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
920 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
921 return 0;
922 break;
923 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
924 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
925 return 0;
926 break;
927 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
928 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
929 return 0;
930 break;
931 default:
932 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
933 <= 0)
934 return 0;
935 break;
936 }
937 }
938 }
939
940 return 1;
941 }
942
943 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
944 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
945 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
946 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
947 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
948 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
949 OSSL_PARAM_END
950 };
951
952 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
953 {
954 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
955 }
956
957 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
958 {
959 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
960 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
961
962 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
963 return 0;
964
965 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
966 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
967 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
968 return 0;
969 if (p != NULL) {
970 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
971 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
972 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
973 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
974 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
975
976 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
977 return 0;
978
979 if (propsp == NULL)
980 pmdprops = NULL;
981 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
982 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
983 return 0;
984
985 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
986 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
987 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
988 return 1;
989 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
990 return 0;
991 }
992
993 /* non-PSS code follows */
994 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
995 return 0;
996 }
997
998 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
999 if (p != NULL) {
1000 int pad_mode = 0;
1001 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
1002
1003 switch (p->data_type) {
1004 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1005 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1006 return 0;
1007 break;
1008 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1009 {
1010 int i;
1011
1012 if (p->data == NULL)
1013 return 0;
1014
1015 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1016 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1017 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1018 break;
1019 }
1020 }
1021 }
1022 break;
1023 default:
1024 return 0;
1025 }
1026
1027 switch (pad_mode) {
1028 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1029 /*
1030 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1031 * with signature use.
1032 */
1033 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1034 goto bad_pad;
1035 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
1036 if ((prsactx->operation
1037 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1038 err_extra_text =
1039 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1040 goto bad_pad;
1041 }
1042 if (prsactx->md == NULL
1043 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
1044 return 0;
1045 }
1046 break;
1047 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
1048 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1049 goto cont;
1050 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
1051 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1052 goto cont;
1053 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
1054 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1055 goto cont;
1056 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
1057 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1058 cont:
1059 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1060 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
1061 break;
1062 /* FALLTHRU */
1063 default:
1064 bad_pad:
1065 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1066 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1067 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1068 else
1069 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1070 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1071 err_extra_text);
1072 return 0;
1073 }
1074 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1075 return 0;
1076 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1077 }
1078
1079 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1080 if (p != NULL) {
1081 int saltlen;
1082
1083 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1084 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1085 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1086 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1087 return 0;
1088 }
1089
1090 switch (p->data_type) {
1091 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1092 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1093 return 0;
1094 break;
1095 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1096 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
1097 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1098 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
1099 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1100 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
1101 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1102 else
1103 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1104 break;
1105 default:
1106 return 0;
1107 }
1108
1109 /*
1110 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1111 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1112 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1113 */
1114 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1115 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1116 return 0;
1117 }
1118
1119 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1120 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
1121 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1122 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1123 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126 break;
1127 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1128 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1129 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1130 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1131 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1132 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1133 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1134 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1135 return 0;
1136 }
1137 /* FALLTHRU */
1138 default:
1139 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1140 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1141 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1142 "Should be more than %d, "
1143 "but would be set to %d",
1144 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1145 return 0;
1146 }
1147 }
1148 }
1149
1150 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1151 }
1152
1153 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1154 if (p != NULL) {
1155 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1156 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1157 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1158 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1159 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1160
1161 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1162 return 0;
1163
1164 if (propsp == NULL)
1165 pmdprops = NULL;
1166 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1167 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1168 return 0;
1169
1170 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1171 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1172 return 0;
1173 }
1174
1175 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1176 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1177 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1178 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1179 return 1;
1180 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1181 return 0;
1182 }
1183
1184 /* non-PSS code follows */
1185 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1186 return 0;
1187 }
1188
1189 return 1;
1190 }
1191
1192 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1193 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1194 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1195 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1196 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1197 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1198 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1199 OSSL_PARAM_END
1200 };
1201
1202 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1203 {
1204 /*
1205 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1206 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1207 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1208 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1209 */
1210 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1211 }
1212
1213 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1214 {
1215 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1216
1217 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1218 return 0;
1219
1220 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1221 }
1222
1223 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1224 {
1225 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1226
1227 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1228 return 0;
1229
1230 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1231 }
1232
1233 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1234 {
1235 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1236
1237 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1238 return 0;
1239
1240 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1241 }
1242
1243 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1244 {
1245 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1246
1247 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1248 return 0;
1249
1250 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1251 }
1252
1253 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1254 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1255 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1256 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1257 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1258 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1259 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1260 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1261 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1262 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1263 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1264 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1265 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1266 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1267 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1268 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1269 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1270 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1271 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1272 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1273 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1274 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1275 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1276 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1277 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1278 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1279 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1280 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1281 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1282 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1283 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1284 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1285 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1286 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1287 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1288 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1289 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1290 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
1291 { 0, NULL }
1292 };
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