2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_locl.h"
18 #include "../packet_locl.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
38 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
49 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
50 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
72 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
86 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
87 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
89 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
92 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
97 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
103 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
108 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
115 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
118 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
122 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
130 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
140 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
188 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
198 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
211 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
224 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
225 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
230 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
236 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
237 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
238 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
247 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
249 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
271 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
272 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
273 /* ignore max parameter */
278 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
279 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
293 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
294 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
295 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
296 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
301 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
307 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
309 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
314 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
315 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
316 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
320 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
324 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
327 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
328 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
334 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
335 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
337 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
340 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
342 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
343 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
346 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
350 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
351 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
354 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
359 * report the error in a way the user will notice
361 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
362 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
363 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
368 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
369 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
377 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
378 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
381 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
382 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
383 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
384 /* SSLfatal() already called */
393 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
394 * will happen with non blocking IO
397 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
398 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
401 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
402 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
405 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
407 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
409 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
410 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
411 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
412 * compromise is considered worthy.
414 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
415 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)) &&
416 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
417 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
418 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
419 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
420 unsigned char aad
[13];
421 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
425 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
426 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
427 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
429 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
430 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
432 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
433 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
434 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
436 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
441 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
445 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
446 /* free jumbo buffer */
447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
454 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
455 /* free jumbo buffer */
456 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
460 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
461 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
463 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
464 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
469 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
470 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
472 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
474 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
476 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
477 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
484 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
486 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
487 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
488 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
489 /* free jumbo buffer */
490 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
494 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
495 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
498 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
499 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
500 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
503 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
504 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
506 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
512 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
513 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
514 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
515 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
517 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
519 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
520 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
521 /* free jumbo buffer */
522 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
524 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
528 /* free jumbo buffer */
529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
530 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
537 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
538 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
539 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
540 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
548 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
549 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
551 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
552 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
553 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
556 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
557 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
559 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
562 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
567 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
568 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
569 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
570 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
572 if (max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
== 0
573 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
575 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
576 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
578 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
584 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
590 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
591 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
594 if (n
/ numpipes
>= max_send_fragment
) {
596 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
599 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
600 pipelens
[j
] = max_send_fragment
;
603 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
604 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
605 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
606 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
607 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
613 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
616 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
617 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
618 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
623 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
624 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
626 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
627 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
629 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
631 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
633 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
635 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
644 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
645 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
646 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
648 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
649 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
652 unsigned char *recordstart
;
653 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
654 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
659 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
662 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
663 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
665 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
666 * will happen with non blocking IO
668 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
669 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
670 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
673 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
674 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
675 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
677 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
680 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
683 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
) {
684 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0)) {
685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
695 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
696 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
697 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
700 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
701 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
710 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
712 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
714 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
715 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
718 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
720 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
721 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
722 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
725 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
728 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
735 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
736 /* insufficient space */
737 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
743 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
746 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
747 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
748 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
750 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
751 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
752 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
754 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
755 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
757 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
758 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
759 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
760 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
761 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
766 } else if (prefix_len
) {
767 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
768 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
769 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
770 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
771 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
772 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
779 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
782 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
783 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
784 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
785 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
787 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
788 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
789 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
790 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
799 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
800 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
801 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
802 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
803 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
804 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
807 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
808 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
809 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
810 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
811 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
816 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
817 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof(wr
));
818 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
819 unsigned int version
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
821 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
823 unsigned int rectype
;
829 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
832 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
833 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
834 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
835 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
836 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
839 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, rectype
);
842 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
843 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
845 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
847 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
848 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
849 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
850 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr
, version
);
852 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
853 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
854 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
856 /* write the header */
857 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
858 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
859 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
861 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
863 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
865 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
871 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
872 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
873 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
874 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
877 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
881 /* first we compress */
882 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
883 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
884 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
885 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
886 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
890 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
891 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
895 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
898 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
899 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
900 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
901 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
902 size_t rlen
, max_send_fragment
;
904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
905 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
909 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
911 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
912 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
913 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
914 if (rlen
< max_send_fragment
) {
916 size_t max_padding
= max_send_fragment
- rlen
;
917 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
918 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
919 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
920 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
923 /* optimize for power of 2 */
924 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
925 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
927 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
928 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
932 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
935 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
936 if (padding
> max_padding
)
937 padding
= max_padding
;
938 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
943 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
949 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
950 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
954 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
957 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
958 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
966 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
967 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
968 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
970 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
973 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
976 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
977 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
982 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
983 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
985 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
986 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
987 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
990 if (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
== ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
) {
992 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
993 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
995 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1) {
996 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1003 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1) {
1004 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1005 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1012 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
1018 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1019 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
1020 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1021 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
1022 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
1023 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
1024 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
1025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1029 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1032 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
1033 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1038 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
1041 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
1042 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
1043 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1048 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
1049 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
1050 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1051 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
1052 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1053 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1055 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
1056 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1058 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1059 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1063 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1064 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1065 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1070 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1071 * is thiswr->length long
1073 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1075 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1077 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1079 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1083 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1084 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1088 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1092 /* now let's set up wb */
1093 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1094 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1098 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1101 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1102 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1103 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1104 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1106 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1107 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1109 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1110 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1114 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1116 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1118 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1122 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1126 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1127 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
1128 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
1129 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1130 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1131 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1136 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1137 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1138 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1143 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1144 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1145 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1146 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1147 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1148 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1149 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1157 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1158 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1159 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1160 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1162 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1163 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1165 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1166 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1168 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1169 * using a datagram service
1171 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1175 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1176 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1181 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1182 * 'type' is one of the following:
1184 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1185 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1186 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1188 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1189 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1191 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1192 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1193 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1194 * argument is non NULL.
1195 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1196 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1197 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1198 * Change cipher spec protocol
1199 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1201 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1202 * Handshake protocol
1203 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1204 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1205 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1206 * Application data protocol
1207 * none of our business
1209 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1210 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1213 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1216 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1217 int is_tls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
);
1219 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1221 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1222 /* Not initialized yet */
1223 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
1224 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1229 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1230 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1232 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1238 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1239 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1241 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1242 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1247 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1250 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1253 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1254 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1255 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1257 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1258 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1265 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1268 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1269 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1270 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1278 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1281 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1282 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1283 * rr[i].data, - data
1284 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1285 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1287 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1288 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1291 /* get new records if necessary */
1292 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1293 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1295 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1298 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1299 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1300 /* Shouldn't happen */
1301 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1302 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1306 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1308 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1310 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1311 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1315 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1319 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1320 * record that isn't an alert.
1322 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1323 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1324 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1326 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1328 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1329 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1330 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1332 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1337 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1340 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1341 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1342 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1346 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1347 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1348 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1351 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1352 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1353 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1356 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1357 * doing a handshake for the first time
1359 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1360 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1362 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1366 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1367 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1368 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1369 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1370 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1374 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1375 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1379 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1380 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1381 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1383 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1384 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1390 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1391 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1393 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1395 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1398 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1399 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1400 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1402 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1403 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1404 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1405 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1406 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1407 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1410 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1411 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1416 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1417 && totalbytes
< len
);
1418 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1419 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1422 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1423 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1424 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1425 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1426 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1431 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1432 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1433 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1437 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1439 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1441 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1442 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1443 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1444 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1447 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1451 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1452 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1454 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1455 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1456 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1457 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1459 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1460 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1461 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1466 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1467 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1470 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1471 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1472 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1473 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1476 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1477 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1478 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1479 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1480 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1481 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1485 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1486 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1487 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1489 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1490 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1491 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1492 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1495 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1496 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1499 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
1500 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
1501 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1502 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1504 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1505 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1507 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1513 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1514 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1516 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1518 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1519 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
1520 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1522 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
1525 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1526 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1528 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1529 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1530 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1531 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1532 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1533 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1535 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1537 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1538 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1539 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1540 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1541 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1542 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1545 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1547 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1548 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1552 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1553 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1557 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
1558 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1562 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1563 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1564 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1565 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1566 * sent close_notify.
1568 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1569 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1570 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1572 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
1575 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1576 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1577 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
1578 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
1583 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1584 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1585 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1587 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1589 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1590 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1592 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
1598 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1599 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1600 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1601 * that we're just going to discard.
1603 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1604 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
1605 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1606 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1608 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1609 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1610 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1612 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1613 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1614 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1615 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1616 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1618 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1619 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1621 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1622 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1625 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1626 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1627 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1632 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1633 * protocol violation)
1635 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1636 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1637 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1639 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1640 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1642 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1643 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1651 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1652 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1653 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1658 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1659 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1660 /* no read-ahead left? */
1663 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1664 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1665 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1666 * problems in the blocking world
1668 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1669 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1670 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1671 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1678 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1681 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1682 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1683 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1684 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1685 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1687 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1688 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1690 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1692 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1694 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1695 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1696 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1698 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1701 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1703 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1704 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1705 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1706 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1707 * started), we will indulge it.
1709 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1710 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1712 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1714 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1715 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1716 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1717 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1718 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1719 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1722 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1723 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1724 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1727 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1730 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1731 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1737 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1741 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1749 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1750 * format and false otherwise.
1752 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1754 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1758 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1760 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1762 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);