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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / extensions_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
14
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
16
17 /*
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
23 */
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
26
27 /*
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
33 */
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
36 + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)
37
38 /*
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
40 */
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
43 {
44 unsigned int ilen;
45 const unsigned char *data;
46
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
52 return 0;
53 }
54
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
59 return 0;
60 }
61
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
66 return 0;
67 }
68
69 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
70
71 return 1;
72 }
73
74 /*-
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
76 *
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
94 * extension.
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
96 */
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
99 {
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
102
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
108 return 0;
109 }
110
111 /*
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
118 *
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
121 */
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
127 return 0;
128 }
129
130 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
135 return 0;
136 }
137
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
142 return 0;
143 }
144
145 /*
146 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
147 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
148 */
149 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
150 s->ext.hostname = NULL;
151 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
154 return 0;
155 }
156
157 s->servername_done = 1;
158 }
159 if (s->hit) {
160 /*
161 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
162 * fall back to a full handshake.
163 */
164 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
165 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
166 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
167
168 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
169 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
170 }
171
172 return 1;
173 }
174
175 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
176 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
177 {
178 unsigned int value;
179
180 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
182 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
183 return 0;
184 }
185
186 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
187 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
189 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
190 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
191 return 0;
192 }
193
194 /*
195 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
196 * including session resumptions.
197 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
198 */
199 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
201 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
202 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
203 return 0;
204 }
205
206 /*
207 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
208 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
209 */
210 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
211 return 1;
212 }
213
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
215 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
216 size_t chainidx)
217 {
218 PACKET srp_I;
219
220 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
221 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
223 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
224 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
225 return 0;
226 }
227
228 /*
229 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
230 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
231 */
232 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
235 return 0;
236 }
237
238 return 1;
239 }
240 #endif
241
242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
243 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
244 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
245 {
246 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
247
248 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
249 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
251 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
252 return 0;
253 }
254
255 if (!s->hit) {
256 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
257 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
258 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
260 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
261 return 0;
262 }
263 }
264
265 return 1;
266 }
267 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
268
269 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
270 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
271 {
272 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
273 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
274 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
275 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
277 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 return 0;
279 }
280
281 return 1;
282 }
283
284 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
285 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
286 {
287 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
288
289 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
290 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
292 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
293 return 0;
294 }
295
296 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
298 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
299 return 0;
300 }
301
302 return 1;
303 }
304
305 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
306 size_t chainidx)
307 {
308 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
309
310 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
311 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
313 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
314 return 0;
315 }
316
317 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
319 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
320 return 0;
321 }
322
323 return 1;
324 }
325
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
327 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
328 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
329 {
330 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
331
332 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
333 if (s->hit)
334 return 1;
335
336 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
337 if (x != NULL)
338 return 1;
339
340 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
342 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
343 return 0;
344 }
345
346 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
347 /*
348 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
349 */
350 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
351 return 1;
352 }
353
354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
356 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
357 return 0;
358 }
359
360 /*
361 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
362 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
363 */
364 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
365 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
366 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
367 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
369 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
370 return 0;
371 }
372 } else {
373 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
374 }
375
376 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
377 OCSP_RESPID *id;
378 PACKET responder_id;
379 const unsigned char *id_data;
380
381 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
382 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
384 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
385 return 0;
386 }
387
388 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
389 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
390 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
391 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
392 if (id == NULL) {
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
394 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
395 return 0;
396 }
397
398 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
399 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
401 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
402
403 return 0;
404 }
405
406 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
407 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
409 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410
411 return 0;
412 }
413 }
414
415 /* Read in request_extensions */
416 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
418 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
419 return 0;
420 }
421
422 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
423 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
424
425 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
426 X509_EXTENSION_free);
427 s->ext.ocsp.exts =
428 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
429 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
431 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
432 return 0;
433 }
434 }
435
436 return 1;
437 }
438 #endif
439
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
441 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
442 size_t chainidx)
443 {
444 /*
445 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
446 * renegotiation.
447 */
448 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
449 s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
450
451 return 1;
452 }
453 #endif
454
455 /*
456 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
457 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
458 */
459 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
460 size_t chainidx)
461 {
462 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
463
464 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
465 return 1;
466
467 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
468 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
470 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
471 return 0;
472 }
473
474 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
475 do {
476 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
477 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
478 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
480 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
481 return 0;
482 }
483 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
484
485 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
486 s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
487 s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
488 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
489 &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
492 return 0;
493 }
494
495 return 1;
496 }
497
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
499 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
500 size_t chainidx)
501 {
502 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
503 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
504 int i, srtp_pref;
505 PACKET subpkt;
506
507 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
508 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
509 return 1;
510
511 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
512 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
513 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
515 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
516 return 0;
517 }
518
519 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
520 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
521 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
522 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
523
524 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
525 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
527 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
528 return 0;
529 }
530
531 /*
532 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
533 * current match.
534 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
535 * does nothing.
536 */
537 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
538 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
539 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
540
541 if (sprof->id == id) {
542 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
543 srtp_pref = i;
544 break;
545 }
546 }
547 }
548
549 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
550 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
552 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
553 return 0;
554 }
555
556 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
557 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
559 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
560 return 0;
561 }
562
563 return 1;
564 }
565 #endif
566
567 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
568 size_t chainidx)
569 {
570 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
571 s->ext.use_etm = 1;
572
573 return 1;
574 }
575
576 /*
577 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
578 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
579 */
580 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
581 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
582 {
583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
584 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
585 unsigned int mode;
586
587 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
588 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
590 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
591 return 0;
592 }
593
594 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
595 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
596 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
597 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
598 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
599 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
600 }
601 #endif
602
603 return 1;
604 }
605
606 /*
607 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
608 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
609 */
610 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
611 size_t chainidx)
612 {
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
614 unsigned int group_id;
615 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
616 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
617 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
618 int found = 0;
619
620 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
621 return 1;
622
623 /* Sanity check */
624 if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
627 return 0;
628 }
629
630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
632 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
633 return 0;
634 }
635
636 /* Get our list of supported groups */
637 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
638 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
639 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
640 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
641 /*
642 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
643 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
644 * extension.
645 */
646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
647 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
648 return 0;
649 }
650
651 if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
652 /*
653 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
654 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
655 * error
656 */
657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
658 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
659 return 0;
660 }
661
662 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
663 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
664 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
665 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
667 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
668 return 0;
669 }
670
671 /*
672 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
673 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
674 */
675 if (found)
676 continue;
677
678 /*
679 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
680 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
681 */
682 if (s->s3.group_id != 0
683 && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
684 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
686 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
687 return 0;
688 }
689
690 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
691 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
693 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
694 return 0;
695 }
696
697 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
698 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
699 /* Share not suitable */
700 continue;
701 }
702
703 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
705 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
706 return 0;
707 }
708
709 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
710
711 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
712 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
713 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
715 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
716 return 0;
717 }
718
719 found = 1;
720 }
721 #endif
722
723 return 1;
724 }
725
726 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
727 size_t chainidx)
728 {
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
730 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
731 EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
732 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
733 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
734 WPACKET hrrpkt;
735 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
736 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
737 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
738 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
739 unsigned long tm, now;
740
741 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
742 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
743 || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
744 return 1;
745
746 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
748 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
749 return 0;
750 }
751
752 raw = cookie;
753 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
754 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
755 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
756 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
758 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
759 return 0;
760 }
761 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
762
763 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
764 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
765 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
766 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
767 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
768 .cookie_hmac_key));
769 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
770 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
771 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
774 return 0;
775 }
776
777 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
778 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
779 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
780 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
781 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
782 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
783 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
786 return 0;
787 }
788
789 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
790 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
791
792 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
794 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
795 return 0;
796 }
797
798 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
800 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
801 return 0;
802 }
803 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
804 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
805 return 1;
806
807 /*
808 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
809 * HMAC above.
810 */
811
812 /* Check the version number is sane */
813 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
815 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
816 return 0;
817 }
818 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
820 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
821 return 0;
822 }
823
824 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
826 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
827 return 0;
828 }
829
830 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
831 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
833 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
834 return 0;
835 }
836 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
837 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
838 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
839 /*
840 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
841 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
842 */
843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
844 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
845 return 0;
846 }
847
848 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
849 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
850 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
851 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
852 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
854 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
855 return 0;
856 }
857
858 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
859 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
860 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
861 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
862 return 1;
863 }
864
865 /* Verify the app cookie */
866 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
867 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
869 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
870 return 0;
871 }
872
873 /*
874 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
875 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
876 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
877 */
878 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
881 return 0;
882 }
883 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
884 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
885 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
886 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
887 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
888 s->tmp_session_id_len)
889 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
890 &ciphlen)
891 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
892 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
893 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
896 return 0;
897 }
898 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
899 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
900 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
901 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
902 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
905 return 0;
906 }
907 if (key_share) {
908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
909 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
910 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
911 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
912 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
915 return 0;
916 }
917 }
918 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
919 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
920 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
921 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
922 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
923 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
924 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
925 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
926 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
929 return 0;
930 }
931
932 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
933 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
934 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
935 hrrlen)) {
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
937 return 0;
938 }
939
940 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
941 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
942
943 s->ext.cookieok = 1;
944 #endif
945
946 return 1;
947 }
948
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
950 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
951 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
952 {
953 PACKET supported_groups_list;
954
955 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
956 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
957 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
958 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
960 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
961 return 0;
962 }
963
964 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
966 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
967 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
968 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
969 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
970 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
972 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
974 return 0;
975 }
976 }
977
978 return 1;
979 }
980 #endif
981
982 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
983 size_t chainidx)
984 {
985 /* The extension must always be empty */
986 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
988 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
989 return 0;
990 }
991
992 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
993 return 1;
994
995 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
996
997 return 1;
998 }
999
1000
1001 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1002 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1003 {
1004 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1006 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009
1010 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1012 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1013 return 0;
1014 }
1015
1016 return 1;
1017 }
1018
1019 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1020 SSL_SESSION **sess)
1021 {
1022 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1023
1024 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1025
1026 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1027 case 0:
1028 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1029
1030 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1031 break;
1032
1033 default:
1034 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1035 }
1036
1037 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1038 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1039
1040 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1041 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1042
1043 *sess = tmpsess;
1044 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1045 }
1046
1047 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1048 size_t chainidx)
1049 {
1050 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1051 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1052 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1053 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1054 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1055
1056 /*
1057 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1058 * ignore this extension
1059 */
1060 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1061 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1062 return 1;
1063
1064 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1066 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1067 return 0;
1068 }
1069
1070 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1071 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1072 PACKET identity;
1073 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1074 size_t idlen;
1075
1076 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1077 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1079 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1080 return 0;
1081 }
1082
1083 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1084 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1085 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1086 &sess)) {
1087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1088 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1089 return 0;
1090 }
1091
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1093 if(sess == NULL
1094 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1095 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1096 char *pskid = NULL;
1097 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1098 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1099
1100 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1103 return 0;
1104 }
1105 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1106 sizeof(pskdata));
1107 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1108 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 return 0;
1112 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1113 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1114 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1115
1116 /*
1117 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1118 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1119 */
1120 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1121 if (cipher == NULL) {
1122 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127
1128 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1129 if (sess == NULL
1130 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1131 pskdatalen)
1132 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1133 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1134 TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1135 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 goto err;
1139 }
1140 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1141 }
1142 }
1143 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1144
1145 if (sess != NULL) {
1146 /* We found a PSK */
1147 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1148
1149 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1151 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 return 0;
1153 }
1154 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1155 sess = sesstmp;
1156
1157 /*
1158 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1159 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1160 */
1161 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1162 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1163 ext = 1;
1164 if (id == 0)
1165 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1166 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1167 } else {
1168 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1169 int ret;
1170
1171 /*
1172 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1173 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1174 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1175 */
1176 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1177 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1178 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1179 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1180 else
1181 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1182 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1183 &sess);
1184
1185 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1187 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1188 return 0;
1189 }
1190
1191 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1192 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 return 0;
1196 }
1197 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1198 continue;
1199
1200 /* Check for replay */
1201 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1202 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1203 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1204 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1205 sess = NULL;
1206 continue;
1207 }
1208
1209 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1210 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1211 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1212 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1213 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1214
1215 /*
1216 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1217 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1218 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1219 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1220 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1221 * rounding errors.
1222 */
1223 if (id == 0
1224 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1225 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1226 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1227 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1228 /*
1229 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1230 * for early data
1231 */
1232 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1233 }
1234 }
1235
1236 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1237 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1238 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1239 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1240 sess = NULL;
1241 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1242 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1243 continue;
1244 }
1245 break;
1246 }
1247
1248 if (sess == NULL)
1249 return 1;
1250
1251 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1252 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1253
1254 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1256 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1257 goto err;
1258 }
1259
1260 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1261 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1263 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1264 goto err;
1265 }
1266 }
1267
1268 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1270 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1271 goto err;
1272 }
1273 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1274 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1275 ext) != 1) {
1276 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1277 goto err;
1278 }
1279
1280 s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1281
1282 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1283 s->session = sess;
1284 return 1;
1285 err:
1286 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1287 return 0;
1288 }
1289
1290 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1291 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1292 {
1293 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1295 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298
1299 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1300
1301 return 1;
1302 }
1303
1304 /*
1305 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1306 */
1307 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1308 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1309 size_t chainidx)
1310 {
1311 if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
1312 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1313
1314 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1315 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1316 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1318 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1319 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1320 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1321 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1322 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1323 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1327 }
1328
1329 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1330 }
1331
1332 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1333 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1334 size_t chainidx)
1335 {
1336 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
1337 || s->ext.hostname == NULL)
1338 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1339
1340 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1341 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1345 }
1346
1347 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1348 }
1349
1350 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1351 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1352 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1353 size_t chainidx)
1354 {
1355 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1356 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1357
1358 /*-
1359 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1360 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1361 */
1362 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1363 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1365 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1369 }
1370
1371 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1372 }
1373
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1375 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1376 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1377 size_t chainidx)
1378 {
1379 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1380 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1381 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1382 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
1383 const unsigned char *plist;
1384 size_t plistlen;
1385
1386 if (!using_ecc)
1387 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1388
1389 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1390 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1391 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1392 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1393 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1395 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1397 }
1398
1399 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1400 }
1401 #endif
1402
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1404 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1405 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1406 size_t chainidx)
1407 {
1408 const uint16_t *groups;
1409 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1410
1411 /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1412 if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
1413 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1414
1415 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1416 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1417 if (numgroups == 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1419 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1420 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1421 }
1422
1423 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1424 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1425 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1426
1427 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1428 if (first) {
1429 /*
1430 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1431 * so we don't need to add this extension
1432 */
1433 if (s->s3.group_id == group)
1434 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1435
1436 /* Add extension header */
1437 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1438 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1439 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1440 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1442 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1445 }
1446
1447 first = 0;
1448 }
1449 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1454 }
1455 }
1456 }
1457
1458 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1460 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1463 }
1464
1465 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1466 }
1467 #endif
1468
1469 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1470 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1471 size_t chainidx)
1472 {
1473 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1474 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1475 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1476 }
1477
1478 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1481 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1482 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1483 }
1484
1485 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1486 }
1487
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1489 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1490 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1491 size_t chainidx)
1492 {
1493 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1494 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1495
1496 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1497 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1498
1499 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1500 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1504 }
1505
1506 /*
1507 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1508 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1509 * separate message
1510 */
1511 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1512 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1513 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1514 }
1515 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1517 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1519 }
1520
1521 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1522 }
1523 #endif
1524
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1526 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1527 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1528 size_t chainidx)
1529 {
1530 const unsigned char *npa;
1531 unsigned int npalen;
1532 int ret;
1533 int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
1534
1535 s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
1536 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1537 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1538
1539 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1540 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1541 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1542 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1543 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1548 }
1549 s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
1550 }
1551
1552 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1553 }
1554 #endif
1555
1556 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1557 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1558 {
1559 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
1560 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1561
1562 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1563 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1564 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
1567 s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
1568 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1569 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1571 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1573 }
1574
1575 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1576 }
1577
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1579 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1580 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1581 size_t chainidx)
1582 {
1583 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1584 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1585
1586 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1587 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1588 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1589 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1591 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1595 }
1596
1597 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1598 }
1599 #endif
1600
1601 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1602 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1603 {
1604 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1605 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1606
1607 /*
1608 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1609 * for other cases too.
1610 */
1611 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1612 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1613 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1614 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1615 s->ext.use_etm = 0;
1616 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1617 }
1618
1619 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1620 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1624 }
1625
1626 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1627 }
1628
1629 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1630 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1631 {
1632 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1633 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1634
1635 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1636 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1638 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1640 }
1641
1642 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1643 }
1644
1645 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1646 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1647 size_t chainidx)
1648 {
1649 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1651 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1652 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1653 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1654 }
1655
1656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1659 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1664 }
1665
1666 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1667 }
1668
1669 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1670 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1671 size_t chainidx)
1672 {
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1674 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1675 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1676 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1677
1678 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1679 if (ckey != NULL) {
1680 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1681 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1682 }
1683 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1684 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1685 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1686 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1688 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1690 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1691 }
1692
1693 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1694 }
1695
1696 if (ckey == NULL) {
1697 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1698 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1701 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1702 }
1703 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1704 }
1705
1706 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1707 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1708 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
1709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1710 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1711 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1712 }
1713
1714 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1715 if (skey == NULL) {
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1717 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1718 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1719 }
1720
1721 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1722 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1723 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1725 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1726 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1727 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1728 }
1729
1730 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1731 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1734 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1735 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1736 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1737 }
1738 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1739
1740 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1741 s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
1742 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1745 }
1746 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1747 #else
1748 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1749 #endif
1750 }
1751
1752 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1753 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1754 {
1755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1756 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1757 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1758 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1759 EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
1760 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1761 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1762
1763 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1764 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1765
1766 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1768 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1769 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1770 }
1771
1772 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1773 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1774 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1775 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1776 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1777 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1778 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1779 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1780 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1781 &ciphlen)
1782 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1783 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
1784 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1785 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1786 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1789 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1790 }
1791
1792 /*
1793 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1794 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1795 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1796 */
1797 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1798 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1800 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1801 }
1802
1803 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1804 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1805 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1806 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1807 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1809 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1810 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1811 }
1812
1813 /* Generate the application cookie */
1814 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1816 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1817 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1818 }
1819
1820 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1821 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1822 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1823 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1824 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1828 }
1829 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1830
1831 totcookielen -= startlen;
1832 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1835 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1836 }
1837
1838 /* HMAC the cookie */
1839 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1840 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1841 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1842 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1843 .cookie_hmac_key));
1844 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1846 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1847 goto err;
1848 }
1849
1850 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1851 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1852 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857
1858 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1860 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1861 goto err;
1862 }
1863
1864 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1865 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1866 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1867 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1868 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1870 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1871 goto err;
1872 }
1873
1874 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1875
1876 err:
1877 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1878 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1879 return ret;
1880 #else
1881 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1882 #endif
1883 }
1884
1885 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1886 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1887 size_t chainidx)
1888 {
1889 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1890 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1891 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1892 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1893 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1894 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1895 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1896 };
1897
1898 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1899 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1900 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1901 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1902
1903 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1905 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1906 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1907 }
1908
1909 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1910 }
1911
1912 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1913 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1914 size_t chainidx)
1915 {
1916 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1917 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1918 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1919
1920 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1921 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1922 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1923 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1925 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1926 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1927 }
1928
1929 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1930 }
1931
1932 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1933 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1934
1935 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1936 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1937 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1940 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1941 }
1942
1943 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1944 }
1945
1946 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1947 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1948 {
1949 if (!s->hit)
1950 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1951
1952 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1953 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1954 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1955 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1957 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1958 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1959 }
1960
1961 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1962 }
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