2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include "internal/nelem.h"
25 #include "ssl_local.h"
26 #include <openssl/ct.h>
28 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
29 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
31 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
35 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
36 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
37 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
38 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
39 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
41 tls1_export_keying_material
,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
44 tls_close_construct_packet
,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
52 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
58 tls1_export_keying_material
,
59 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
60 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
61 tls_close_construct_packet
,
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
69 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
70 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
71 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
72 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
73 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
75 tls1_export_keying_material
,
76 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
77 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
78 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
79 tls_close_construct_packet
,
83 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
86 tls13_setup_key_block
,
87 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
88 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
89 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
90 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
91 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
93 tls13_export_keying_material
,
94 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
95 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
96 tls_close_construct_packet
,
100 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
103 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
104 * http, the cache would over fill
106 return (60 * 60 * 2);
113 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
119 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
121 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
125 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
130 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
131 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
133 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
139 * Table of group information.
141 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
142 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
143 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
144 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
145 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
146 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
147 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
148 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
149 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
150 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
151 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
152 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
153 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
154 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
155 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
156 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
157 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
158 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
159 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
160 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
161 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
163 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
164 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
165 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
167 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
168 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM
, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM
, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
174 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
175 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
176 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
177 {NID_ffdhe2048
, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
178 {NID_ffdhe3072
, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
179 {NID_ffdhe4096
, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
180 {NID_ffdhe6144
, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
181 {NID_ffdhe8192
, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
182 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
187 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
188 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
192 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
194 /* The default curves */
195 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
196 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
197 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
198 29, /* X25519 (29) */
199 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
205 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
206 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
207 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
208 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
209 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
212 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
215 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
221 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id
)
223 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
227 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
228 if (nid_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
231 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
235 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
236 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
)
238 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id
);
240 return ginf
== NULL
? NID_undef
: ginf
->nid
;
243 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
247 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
248 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
249 return nid_list
[i
].group_id
;
253 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
256 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
257 * the number of groups supported.
259 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
262 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
263 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
264 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
265 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
266 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
267 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
268 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
271 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
272 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
277 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
283 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
284 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
285 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
287 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
288 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
295 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
298 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int version
)
300 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id
);
302 if (version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
303 if ((ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3
) != 0)
309 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
310 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
312 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group
);
313 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
317 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 if (ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
)
322 if (ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_FFDHE
)
325 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
326 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
327 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
, ginfo
->nid
, (void *)gtmp
);
330 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
331 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
334 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
341 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
342 * if there is no match.
343 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
344 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
345 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
347 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
349 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
350 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
353 /* Can't do anything on client side */
357 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
359 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
360 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
362 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
364 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
365 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
366 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
367 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
368 /* Should never happen */
371 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
375 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
376 * otherwise peer decides.
378 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
379 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
380 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
382 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
383 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
386 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
387 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
389 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
390 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
398 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
402 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
403 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
405 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
409 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
410 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
412 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
413 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
414 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
420 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
424 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
425 unsigned long idmask
;
427 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
428 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
430 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
431 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
432 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
446 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
449 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
450 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
454 int nid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
457 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
459 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
465 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
467 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
469 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
471 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
472 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
474 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
475 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
476 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
477 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
478 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
480 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
481 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
483 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
486 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
488 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
489 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
491 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
494 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
498 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
504 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
505 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
507 const uint16_t *groups
;
513 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
514 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
515 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
517 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
518 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
520 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
521 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
524 /* Should never happen */
529 if (check_own_groups
) {
530 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
531 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
532 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
536 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
539 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
543 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
544 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
547 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
548 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
549 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
550 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
554 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
558 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
562 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
564 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
565 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
566 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
568 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
569 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
571 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
573 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
577 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
578 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
582 unsigned char comp_id
;
585 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
586 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
588 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
589 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
591 /* Get required compression id */
592 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
593 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
594 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
596 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
601 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
603 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
604 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
605 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
606 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
611 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
612 * supported (see RFC4492).
614 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
617 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
618 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
624 /* Return group id of a key */
625 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
627 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
632 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
633 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
637 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
638 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
640 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
644 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
647 /* If not EC nothing to do */
648 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
650 /* Check compression */
651 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
653 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
655 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
658 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
661 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
664 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
668 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
669 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
670 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
671 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
672 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
674 return 0; /* Should never happen */
675 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
676 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
685 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
687 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
689 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
690 * is compatible with the client extensions.
692 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
694 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
696 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
698 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
700 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
703 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
704 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
705 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
706 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
713 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
718 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
720 /* Default sigalg schemes */
721 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
723 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
724 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
733 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
737 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
743 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
746 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
748 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
749 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
753 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
756 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
757 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
758 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
763 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
764 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
765 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
769 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
771 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
772 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
773 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
774 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
775 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
776 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
777 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
778 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
779 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
780 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
781 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
782 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
783 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
784 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
785 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
786 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
787 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
788 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
789 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
790 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
791 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
793 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
794 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
795 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
796 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
797 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
798 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
799 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
800 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
801 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
802 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
803 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
804 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
805 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
806 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
807 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
808 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
809 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
810 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
811 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
812 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
813 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
814 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
815 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
816 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
817 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
818 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
819 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
820 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
821 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
822 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
823 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
824 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
825 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
827 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
828 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
829 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
830 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
831 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
832 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
833 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
834 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
835 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
836 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
837 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
838 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
839 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
840 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
841 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
844 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
845 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
846 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
847 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
848 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
849 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
850 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
851 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
852 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
853 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
854 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
855 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
858 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
859 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
860 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
861 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
862 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
867 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
868 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
870 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
871 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
872 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
873 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
874 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
875 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
876 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
877 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
878 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
879 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
882 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
883 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
886 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
888 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
890 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
895 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
896 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
901 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
902 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
905 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
915 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
917 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
918 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
919 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
921 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
922 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA
*rsa
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
928 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
930 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
936 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
937 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
938 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
939 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
940 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
942 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
948 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
949 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
950 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
952 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
959 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
961 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
964 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
966 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
973 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
976 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
978 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
979 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
981 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
983 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
987 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
989 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
991 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
992 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
995 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
997 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
999 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1002 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1006 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1009 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1013 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1014 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1015 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1016 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1018 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1019 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1022 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1023 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1028 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1029 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1030 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1032 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1033 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1034 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1035 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1036 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1037 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1039 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1040 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1046 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1047 * specified EC curve.
1049 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1051 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1054 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1055 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1056 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1058 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1059 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1062 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1063 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs
[i
]);
1067 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1068 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1069 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1078 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1079 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1082 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1084 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1085 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1087 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1088 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1089 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1091 /* Should never happen */
1094 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1095 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1096 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1098 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1101 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1102 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1103 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1105 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
1107 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1108 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1111 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1112 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1113 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1115 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1118 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1119 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1120 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1121 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1122 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1127 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1129 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1130 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1132 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1133 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1137 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1138 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1139 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
1140 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
1142 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1144 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1148 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1149 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1150 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1152 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1155 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1156 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1157 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1158 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1160 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1161 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1166 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1167 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1168 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1173 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1174 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1175 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1176 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1179 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1180 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1181 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1183 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1186 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1187 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1188 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1193 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1194 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1196 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1197 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1198 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1199 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1200 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1202 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1206 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1207 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1211 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1213 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1215 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1219 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1221 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1223 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1228 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1229 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1230 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1232 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1235 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1237 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1239 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1240 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1241 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1242 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1243 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1246 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1247 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1248 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1249 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1251 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1253 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1254 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1255 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1262 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1263 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1264 * @c: cipher to check
1265 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1266 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1268 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1270 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1272 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1273 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1275 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1277 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1278 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1281 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1282 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1284 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1285 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1286 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1288 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1291 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1292 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1295 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1298 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1300 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1302 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1305 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1309 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1310 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1311 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1312 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1313 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1314 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1315 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1317 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1318 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1320 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1321 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1322 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1323 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1325 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1326 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1331 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1332 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1333 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1334 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1342 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1343 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1344 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1347 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1350 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1352 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1357 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1359 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1360 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1361 * point to the resulting session.
1363 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1367 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1370 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1373 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1374 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1377 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1378 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1380 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1381 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1382 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1384 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1386 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1387 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1391 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1393 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1394 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1395 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1396 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1399 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1400 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1401 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1402 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1403 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1404 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1406 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1407 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1408 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1409 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1410 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1411 * point to the resulting session.
1413 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1414 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1415 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1417 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1418 unsigned char *sdec
;
1419 const unsigned char *p
;
1420 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1421 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1423 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1424 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1426 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1428 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1430 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1431 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1433 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1436 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1438 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1439 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1440 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1441 * calculate the master secret later.
1443 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1447 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1448 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1449 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1453 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1454 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1456 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1459 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1461 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1465 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1467 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1470 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1473 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1474 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1475 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1477 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1480 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1481 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1482 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1483 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1484 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1487 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1491 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1497 /* Check key name matches */
1498 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1499 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1500 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1503 if (ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1504 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1506 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1507 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1508 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1509 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1516 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1519 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1521 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1525 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1527 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1528 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1532 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1533 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1534 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1535 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1539 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1540 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1543 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1544 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1545 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1546 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1547 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1548 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1549 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1551 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1554 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1556 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1562 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1566 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1568 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1570 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1574 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1575 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1576 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1580 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1581 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1584 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1586 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1591 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1593 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1596 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1597 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1600 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1601 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1602 * performs any action
1604 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1605 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1606 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1607 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1608 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1609 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1612 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1613 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1614 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1616 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1618 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1619 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1622 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1623 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1624 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1628 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1629 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1630 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1631 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1632 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1636 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1637 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1638 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1639 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
1640 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1641 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
1642 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1644 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1648 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1652 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1654 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1655 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1656 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
1657 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1666 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1667 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1669 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1672 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1673 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1675 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1676 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1678 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1679 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1680 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1681 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1682 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1685 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1686 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1689 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1690 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1691 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
1692 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1693 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1696 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1697 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1699 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1702 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1703 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1704 * ciphersuites enabled.
1707 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1710 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1711 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
1712 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
1713 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1715 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1716 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1717 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
1720 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kGOST
) != 0)
1728 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1730 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1731 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1732 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1733 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1734 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1735 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1739 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1740 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1744 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1746 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1747 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1748 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1750 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1753 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1754 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1755 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1756 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1761 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1765 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1766 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1767 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1768 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1770 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1773 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1774 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1779 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1780 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1782 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1784 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1787 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1788 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1790 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1791 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1792 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1793 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1801 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1802 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1803 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1804 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1806 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1807 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1808 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1809 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1811 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1812 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1814 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1815 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1826 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1827 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1829 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1830 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1832 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1834 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1836 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1837 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1838 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1839 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1840 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1841 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1842 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1843 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1844 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1845 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1847 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1848 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1851 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1852 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1856 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1857 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1859 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1861 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1865 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1869 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1870 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1874 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1880 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1882 /* Invalid data length */
1883 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1888 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1892 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1900 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1907 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
1909 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1910 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1912 /* Should never happen */
1913 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1917 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
1918 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
1920 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1921 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1925 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1927 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1930 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
1932 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1935 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1938 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1939 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1940 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1942 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1943 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1945 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1946 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1947 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1952 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1953 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1954 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1956 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1957 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1958 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1961 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1963 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1967 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1969 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1970 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1972 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1974 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1975 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1976 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1978 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1981 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1982 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1983 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1985 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1986 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1988 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
1989 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1991 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1993 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1995 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1996 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1997 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1999 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2001 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2002 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2005 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2006 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2010 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2011 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2014 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2016 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2017 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2018 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2019 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2020 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2021 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2022 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2023 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2025 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2026 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2027 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2030 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2031 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2033 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2035 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2037 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2038 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2039 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2042 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2044 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2046 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2048 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2050 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2051 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2052 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2053 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2054 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2055 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2059 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2061 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2062 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2066 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2073 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2074 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2075 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2077 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2079 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2080 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2084 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2088 /* Reject duplicates */
2089 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2090 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2099 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2100 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2102 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2106 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2110 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2113 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2118 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2122 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2125 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2126 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2127 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2129 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2130 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2131 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2137 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2139 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2144 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2148 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2150 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2151 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2152 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2154 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2156 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2157 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2162 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2167 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2168 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2169 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2171 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2172 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2173 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2179 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2183 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2185 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2187 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2189 if (default_nid
== -1)
2191 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2193 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2195 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2197 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2198 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2199 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2201 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2204 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2206 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2207 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2208 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2209 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2210 if (sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2216 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2217 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2221 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2222 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2223 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2230 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2231 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2232 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2233 * attempting to use them.
2236 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2238 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2239 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2240 /* Strict mode flags */
2241 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2242 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2243 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2245 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2250 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2251 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2254 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2255 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2257 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2260 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2262 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2263 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2265 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2267 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2268 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2277 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2280 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2282 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2283 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2285 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2292 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2293 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2294 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2295 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2296 else if (!check_flags
)
2301 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2302 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2304 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2307 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2308 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2310 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2314 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2315 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2318 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2319 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2320 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2324 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2325 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2328 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2329 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2330 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2333 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2334 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2335 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2338 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2339 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2340 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2349 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2350 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2352 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2354 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2355 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2356 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
2358 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2361 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2368 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2369 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2371 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2372 * so check_flags is always set.
2374 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2375 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2376 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2380 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2381 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2382 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2383 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2385 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2392 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2393 else if (check_flags
)
2394 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2396 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2397 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2398 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2399 else if (!check_flags
)
2402 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2403 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2404 else if (strict_mode
) {
2405 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2406 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2407 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2408 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2410 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2417 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2418 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2420 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2422 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2425 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2428 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2432 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2435 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2436 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2437 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2441 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2444 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2447 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2449 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2450 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2452 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2453 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2454 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2456 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2457 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2458 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2459 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2460 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2465 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2468 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2470 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2471 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2475 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2476 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2478 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2481 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2485 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2488 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2489 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2496 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2497 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2499 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2500 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2501 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2502 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2503 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2504 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2505 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2506 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2507 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2510 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2511 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2513 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2517 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2519 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2520 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2521 return DH_get_1024_160();
2522 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2523 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2528 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2530 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2533 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2539 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2544 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2545 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2547 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2548 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2556 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2557 return DH_get_2048_224();
2558 return DH_get_1024_160();
2562 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2565 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2568 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2569 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2570 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2571 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2573 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2576 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2578 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2581 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2583 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2584 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2585 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2586 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2588 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2590 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2591 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2594 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2596 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2599 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2602 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2604 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2605 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2607 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2608 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2610 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2611 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2616 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2617 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2618 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2621 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2623 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2625 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2630 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2634 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2635 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2636 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2644 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2645 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2648 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2650 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2651 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2653 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2655 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
2656 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2657 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
2660 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2664 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2665 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2667 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2669 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
2672 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2673 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
2677 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2678 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2681 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
2687 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2688 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2690 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2691 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
2693 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2694 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
2699 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2700 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2701 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2702 * signing certificate.
2704 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
2711 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2712 * a viable public key is permitted.
2718 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2719 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2720 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2721 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2722 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2724 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
2726 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2729 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
2732 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
2733 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
2737 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2738 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2740 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
2745 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
2748 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2749 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
2752 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
2756 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2757 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2758 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2760 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
2762 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2769 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2770 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2771 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2773 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2774 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2775 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2776 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2777 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2779 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2780 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
2782 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
2783 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
2786 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
2787 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2789 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2792 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey
);
2793 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2795 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
2800 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2801 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2802 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey
), lu
))
2808 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
2815 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2816 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2818 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2819 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2821 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2822 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2823 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2825 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
2827 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2830 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2831 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2833 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2834 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
2838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2839 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2843 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2844 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2846 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2849 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2851 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2855 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2856 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2857 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2858 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2865 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2868 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2869 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2872 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2875 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2877 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2878 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
2881 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2882 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
2884 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2885 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2886 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2888 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2892 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2898 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2899 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2900 * we have to assume GOST support.
2902 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
2903 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2907 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2908 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2912 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2916 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2920 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2921 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2926 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2928 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2929 size_t sent_sigslen
;
2931 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2935 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2939 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2940 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2941 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2942 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
2943 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2946 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2950 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2951 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2956 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2966 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2967 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2968 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2969 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2973 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
2975 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2976 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2978 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2982 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2986 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
2988 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2989 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2991 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2995 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2999 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3001 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3005 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3007 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3009 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3010 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3015 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3016 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3017 ret
->old_ctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3018 if (ret
->old_ctx
== NULL
)
3023 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", NULL
);
3024 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3029 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3035 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3038 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3040 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx
->old_ctx
);
3046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3047 HMAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3049 return ctx
->old_ctx
;
3053 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3058 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3060 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3062 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3063 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3064 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY
, key
, len
);
3065 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3066 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx
->ctx
, params
) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
))
3069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3070 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3071 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx
->old_ctx
, key
, len
,
3072 EVP_get_digestbyname(md
), NULL
);
3077 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3079 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3080 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3082 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3083 return HMAC_Update(ctx
->old_ctx
, data
, len
);
3088 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3091 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3092 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3094 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
) {
3097 if (HMAC_Final(ctx
->old_ctx
, md
, &l
) > 0) {
3107 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3109 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3110 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3112 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3113 return HMAC_size(ctx
->old_ctx
);