Add checks for the EVP_MD_get_size() to avoid integer overflow and then explicitly cast from int to size_t.
Fixes: 6e624a6453 ("KMAC implementation using EVP_MAC")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23946)
static void *kmac_fetch_new(void *provctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params)
{
struct kmac_data_st *kctx = kmac_new(provctx);
+ int md_size;
if (kctx == NULL)
return 0;
return 0;
}
- kctx->out_len = EVP_MD_get_size(ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest));
+ md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest));
+ if (md_size <= 0) {
+ kmac_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kctx->out_len = (size_t)md_size;
return kctx;
}