return cipher_ctx_final(ctx, dst, dst_len);
}
-void
-cipher_des_encrypt_ecb(const unsigned char key[DES_KEY_LENGTH],
- unsigned char src[DES_KEY_LENGTH],
- unsigned char dst[DES_KEY_LENGTH])
-{
- /* We are using 3DES here with three times the same key to cheat
- * and emulate DES as 3DES is better supported than DES */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (!ctx)
- {
- crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "%s: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed", __func__);
- }
-
- unsigned char key3[DES_KEY_LENGTH*3];
- for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++)
- {
- memcpy(key3 + (i * DES_KEY_LENGTH), key, DES_KEY_LENGTH);
- }
-
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_ecb(), NULL, key3, NULL))
- {
- crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "%s: EVP_EncryptInit_ex() failed", __func__);
- }
-
- int len;
-
- /* The EVP_EncryptFinal method will write to the dst+len pointer even
- * though there is nothing to encrypt anymore, provide space for that to
- * not overflow the stack */
- unsigned char dst2[DES_KEY_LENGTH * 2];
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, dst2, &len, src, DES_KEY_LENGTH))
- {
- crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "%s: EVP_EncryptUpdate() failed", __func__);
- }
-
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, dst2 + len, &len))
- {
- crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "%s: EVP_EncryptFinal() failed", __func__);
- }
-
- memcpy(dst, dst2, DES_KEY_LENGTH);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
/*
*
-static void
-create_des_keys(const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *key)
-{
- key[0] = hash[0];
- key[1] = ((hash[0] & 1) << 7) | (hash[1] >> 1);
- key[2] = ((hash[1] & 3) << 6) | (hash[2] >> 2);
- key[3] = ((hash[2] & 7) << 5) | (hash[3] >> 3);
- key[4] = ((hash[3] & 15) << 4) | (hash[4] >> 4);
- key[5] = ((hash[4] & 31) << 3) | (hash[5] >> 5);
- key[6] = ((hash[5] & 63) << 2) | (hash[6] >> 6);
- key[7] = ((hash[6] & 127) << 1);
-}
-
static void
gen_md4_hash(const uint8_t *data, int data_len, uint8_t *result)
{
uint8_t phase3[464];
uint8_t md4_hash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH + 5];
- uint8_t challenge[8], ntlm_response[24];
+ uint8_t challenge[8];
int i, ret_val;
uint8_t ntlmv2_response[144];
char username[128];
char *separator;
- bool ntlmv2_enabled = (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2);
-
ASSERT(strlen(p->up.username) > 0);
ASSERT(strlen(p->up.password) > 0);
challenge[i] = buf2[i+24];
}
- if (ntlmv2_enabled) /* Generate NTLMv2 response */
- {
- int tib_len;
+ /* Generate NTLMv2 response */
+ int tib_len;
- /* NTLMv2 hash */
- strcpy(userdomain, username);
- my_strupr(userdomain);
- if (strlen(username) + strlen(domain) < sizeof(userdomain))
- {
- strcat(userdomain, domain);
- }
- else
+ /* NTLMv2 hash */
+ strcpy(userdomain, username);
+ my_strupr(userdomain);
+ if (strlen(username) + strlen(domain) < sizeof(userdomain))
+ {
+ strcat(userdomain, domain);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ msg(M_INFO, "Warning: Username or domain too long");
+ }
+ unicodize(userdomain_u, userdomain);
+ gen_hmac_md5((uint8_t *)userdomain_u, 2 * strlen(userdomain), md4_hash,
+ ntlmv2_hash);
+
+ /* NTLMv2 Blob */
+ memset(ntlmv2_blob, 0, 128); /* Clear blob buffer */
+ ntlmv2_blob[0x00] = 1; /* Signature */
+ ntlmv2_blob[0x01] = 1; /* Signature */
+ ntlmv2_blob[0x04] = 0; /* Reserved */
+ gen_timestamp(&ntlmv2_blob[0x08]); /* 64-bit Timestamp */
+ gen_nonce(&ntlmv2_blob[0x10]); /* 64-bit Client Nonce */
+ ntlmv2_blob[0x18] = 0; /* Unknown, zero should work */
+
+ /* Add target information block to the blob */
+
+ /* Check for Target Information block */
+ /* The NTLM spec instructs to interpret these 4 consecutive bytes as a
+ * 32bit long integer. However, no endianness is specified.
+ * The code here and that found in other NTLM implementations point
+ * towards the assumption that the byte order on the wire has to
+ * match the order on the sending and receiving hosts. Probably NTLM has
+ * been thought to be always running on x86_64/i386 machine thus
+ * implying Little-Endian everywhere.
+ *
+ * This said, in case of future changes, we should keep in mind that the
+ * byte order on the wire for the NTLM header is LE.
+ */
+ const size_t hoff = 0x14;
+ unsigned long flags = buf2[hoff] | (buf2[hoff + 1] << 8)
+ |(buf2[hoff + 2] << 16) | (buf2[hoff + 3] << 24);
+ if ((flags & 0x00800000) == 0x00800000)
+ {
+ tib_len = buf2[0x28]; /* Get Target Information block size */
+ if (tib_len > 96)
{
- msg(M_INFO, "Warning: Username or domain too long");
+ tib_len = 96;
}
- unicodize(userdomain_u, userdomain);
- gen_hmac_md5((uint8_t *)userdomain_u, 2 * strlen(userdomain), md4_hash,
- ntlmv2_hash);
-
- /* NTLMv2 Blob */
- memset(ntlmv2_blob, 0, 128); /* Clear blob buffer */
- ntlmv2_blob[0x00] = 1; /* Signature */
- ntlmv2_blob[0x01] = 1; /* Signature */
- ntlmv2_blob[0x04] = 0; /* Reserved */
- gen_timestamp(&ntlmv2_blob[0x08]); /* 64-bit Timestamp */
- gen_nonce(&ntlmv2_blob[0x10]); /* 64-bit Client Nonce */
- ntlmv2_blob[0x18] = 0; /* Unknown, zero should work */
-
- /* Add target information block to the blob */
-
- /* Check for Target Information block */
- /* The NTLM spec instructs to interpret these 4 consecutive bytes as a
- * 32bit long integer. However, no endianness is specified.
- * The code here and that found in other NTLM implementations point
- * towards the assumption that the byte order on the wire has to
- * match the order on the sending and receiving hosts. Probably NTLM has
- * been thought to be always running on x86_64/i386 machine thus
- * implying Little-Endian everywhere.
- *
- * This said, in case of future changes, we should keep in mind that the
- * byte order on the wire for the NTLM header is LE.
- */
- const size_t hoff = 0x14;
- unsigned long flags = buf2[hoff] | (buf2[hoff + 1] << 8)
- |(buf2[hoff + 2] << 16) | (buf2[hoff + 3] << 24);
- if ((flags & 0x00800000) == 0x00800000)
- {
- tib_len = buf2[0x28]; /* Get Target Information block size */
- if (tib_len > 96)
- {
- tib_len = 96;
- }
+ {
+ uint8_t *tib_ptr;
+ uint8_t tib_pos = buf2[0x2c];
+ if (tib_pos + tib_len > sizeof(buf2))
{
- uint8_t *tib_ptr;
- uint8_t tib_pos = buf2[0x2c];
- if (tib_pos + tib_len > sizeof(buf2))
- {
- return NULL;
- }
- /* Get Target Information block pointer */
- tib_ptr = buf2 + tib_pos;
- /* Copy Target Information block into the blob */
- memcpy(&ntlmv2_blob[0x1c], tib_ptr, tib_len);
+ return NULL;
}
+ /* Get Target Information block pointer */
+ tib_ptr = buf2 + tib_pos;
+ /* Copy Target Information block into the blob */
+ memcpy(&ntlmv2_blob[0x1c], tib_ptr, tib_len);
}
- else
- {
- tib_len = 0;
- }
-
- /* Unknown, zero works */
- ntlmv2_blob[0x1c + tib_len] = 0;
-
- /* Get blob length */
- ntlmv2_blob_size = 0x20 + tib_len;
-
- /* Add challenge from message 2 */
- memcpy(&ntlmv2_response[8], challenge, 8);
-
- /* hmac-md5 */
- gen_hmac_md5(&ntlmv2_response[8], ntlmv2_blob_size + 8, ntlmv2_hash,
- ntlmv2_hmacmd5);
-
- /* Add hmac-md5 result to the blob.
- * Note: This overwrites challenge previously written at
- * ntlmv2_response[8..15] */
- memcpy(ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_hmacmd5, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
- else /* Generate NTLM response */
+ else
{
- unsigned char key1[DES_KEY_LENGTH], key2[DES_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key3[DES_KEY_LENGTH];
+ tib_len = 0;
+ }
- create_des_keys(md4_hash, key1);
- cipher_des_encrypt_ecb(key1, challenge, ntlm_response);
+ /* Unknown, zero works */
+ ntlmv2_blob[0x1c + tib_len] = 0;
- create_des_keys(&md4_hash[DES_KEY_LENGTH - 1], key2);
- cipher_des_encrypt_ecb(key2, challenge, &ntlm_response[DES_KEY_LENGTH]);
+ /* Get blob length */
+ ntlmv2_blob_size = 0x20 + tib_len;
- create_des_keys(&md4_hash[2 * (DES_KEY_LENGTH - 1)], key3);
- cipher_des_encrypt_ecb(key3, challenge,
- &ntlm_response[DES_KEY_LENGTH * 2]);
- }
+ /* Add challenge from message 2 */
+ memcpy(&ntlmv2_response[8], challenge, 8);
+
+ /* hmac-md5 */
+ gen_hmac_md5(&ntlmv2_response[8], ntlmv2_blob_size + 8, ntlmv2_hash,
+ ntlmv2_hmacmd5);
+ /* Add hmac-md5 result to the blob.
+ * Note: This overwrites challenge previously written at
+ * ntlmv2_response[8..15] */
+ memcpy(ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_hmacmd5, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
memset(phase3, 0, sizeof(phase3)); /* clear reply */
strcpy((char *)phase3, "NTLMSSP\0"); /* signature */
phase3[8] = 3; /* type 3 */
- if (ntlmv2_enabled) /* NTLMv2 response */
- {
- add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_blob_size + 16,
- phase3, &phase3_bufpos);
- }
- else /* NTLM response */
- {
- add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlm_response, 24, phase3, &phase3_bufpos);
- }
+ /* NTLMv2 response */
+ add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_blob_size + 16,
+ phase3, &phase3_bufpos);
/* username in ascii */
add_security_buffer(0x24, username, strlen(username), phase3,