Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespell

diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/child_sa.c b/src/libcharon/sa/child_sa.c
index c33398beeb5d3d4df46ba3a21dc22da07a03b6ed..bdc96a4bc2491c44a317819f974f9b0c45b744a4 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libcharon/sa/child_sa.c
+++ b/src/libcharon/sa/child_sa.c
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ static void prepare_sa_cfg(private_child_sa_t *this, ipsec_sa_cfg_t *my_sa,
 }
 
 /**
- * Install inbound policie(s): in, fwd
+ * Install inbound policies: in, fwd
  */
 static status_t install_policies_inbound(private_child_sa_t *this,
        host_t *my_addr, host_t *other_addr, traffic_selector_t *my_ts,
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ static status_t install_policies_inbound(private_child_sa_t *this,
 }
 
 /**
- * Install outbound policie(s): out, [fwd]
+ * Install outbound policies: out, [fwd]
  */
 static status_t install_policies_outbound(private_child_sa_t *this,
        host_t *my_addr, host_t *other_addr, traffic_selector_t *my_ts,

diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/crypto/mac.h b/src/libstrongswan/crypto/mac.h
index 50dc4c73a34aaea121d14e39e3d8203a4039265f..97cb7e352c6a8e29e3d4417c2567d83321362b0b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libstrongswan/crypto/mac.h
+++ b/src/libstrongswan/crypto/mac.h
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ struct mac_t {
         *
         * If out is NULL, no result is given back.  A next call will
         * append the data to already supplied data.  If out is not NULL,
-        * the mac of all apended data is calculated, written to out and the
+        * the MAC of all appended data is calculated, written to out and the
         * internal state is reset.
         *
         * @param data          chunk of data to authenticate
         * @param out           pointer where the generated bytes will be written
-        * @return                      TRUE if mac generated successfully
+        * @return                      TRUE if MAC generated successfully
         */
        bool (*get_mac)(mac_t *this, chunk_t data,
                                        uint8_t *out) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_rng.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_rng.c
index 9514ca9166542eb2c7b8bf27de3fea1a3976490c..d3993749fd172d9ce60fc828e09158ce02b71949 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_rng.c
+++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/openssl/openssl_rng.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ METHOD(rng_t, get_bytes, bool,
 {
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010100fL
        if (this->quality > RNG_WEAK)
-       {       /* use a separate DRBG for data we wan't to keep private, compared
+       {       /* use a separate DRBG for data we want to keep private, compared
                 * to e.g. nonces */
                return RAND_priv_bytes((char*)buffer, bytes) == 1;
        }

diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/utils/chunk.h b/src/libstrongswan/utils/chunk.h
index e60cd8ad05fb7deba515de5ea323b8934409e08e..0dbe9dc806045a4565693575c3c25f5ce8633f72 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libstrongswan/utils/chunk.h
+++ b/src/libstrongswan/utils/chunk.h
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static inline bool chunk_equals_ptr(chunk_t *a, chunk_t *b)
 }
 
 /**
- * Increment a chunk, as it would reprensent a network order integer.
+ * Increment a chunk, as it would represent a network order integer.
  *
  * @param chunk                        chunk to increment
  * @return                             TRUE if an overflow occurred