]>
git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/systemd.git/blob - src/basic/fs-util.c
ce1f5454c83e1ba5a67d8067a0a2e4fb0ee204d7
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
9 #include <linux/falloc.h>
10 #include <linux/magic.h>
14 #include "alloc-util.h"
15 #include "dirent-util.h"
18 #include "locale-util.h"
23 #include "parse-util.h"
24 #include "path-util.h"
25 #include "process-util.h"
26 #include "stat-util.h"
27 #include "stdio-util.h"
28 #include "string-util.h"
30 #include "time-util.h"
31 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
32 #include "user-util.h"
35 int unlink_noerrno ( const char * path
) {
46 int rmdir_parents ( const char * path
, const char * stop
) {
55 /* Skip trailing slashes */
56 while ( l
> 0 && path
[ l
- 1 ] == '/' )
62 /* Skip last component */
63 while ( l
> 0 && path
[ l
- 1 ] != '/' )
66 /* Skip trailing slashes */
67 while ( l
> 0 && path
[ l
- 1 ] == '/' )
77 if ( path_startswith ( stop
, t
)) {
93 int rename_noreplace ( int olddirfd
, const char * oldpath
, int newdirfd
, const char * newpath
) {
96 /* Try the ideal approach first */
97 if ( renameat2 ( olddirfd
, oldpath
, newdirfd
, newpath
, RENAME_NOREPLACE
) >= 0 )
100 /* renameat2() exists since Linux 3.15, btrfs and FAT added support for it later. If it is not implemented,
101 * fall back to a different method. */
102 if (! IN_SET ( errno
, EINVAL
, ENOSYS
, ENOTTY
))
105 /* Let's try to use linkat()+unlinkat() as fallback. This doesn't work on directories and on some file systems
106 * that do not support hard links (such as FAT, most prominently), but for files it's pretty close to what we
107 * want â though not atomic (i.e. for a short period both the new and the old filename will exist). */
108 if ( linkat ( olddirfd
, oldpath
, newdirfd
, newpath
, 0 ) >= 0 ) {
110 if ( unlinkat ( olddirfd
, oldpath
, 0 ) < 0 ) {
111 r
= - errno
; /* Backup errno before the following unlinkat() alters it */
112 ( void ) unlinkat ( newdirfd
, newpath
, 0 );
119 if (! IN_SET ( errno
, EINVAL
, ENOSYS
, ENOTTY
, EPERM
)) /* FAT returns EPERM on link()âĻ */
122 /* OK, neither RENAME_NOREPLACE nor linkat()+unlinkat() worked. Let's then fallback to the racy TOCTOU
123 * vulnerable accessat(F_OK) check followed by classic, replacing renameat(), we have nothing better. */
125 if ( faccessat ( newdirfd
, newpath
, F_OK
, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
) >= 0 )
130 if ( renameat ( olddirfd
, oldpath
, newdirfd
, newpath
) < 0 )
136 int readlinkat_malloc ( int fd
, const char * p
, char ** ret
) {
137 size_t l
= FILENAME_MAX
+ 1 ;
151 n
= readlinkat ( fd
, p
, c
, l
- 1 );
158 if (( size_t ) n
< l
- 1 ) {
169 int readlink_malloc ( const char * p
, char ** ret
) {
170 return readlinkat_malloc ( AT_FDCWD
, p
, ret
);
173 int readlink_value ( const char * p
, char ** ret
) {
174 _cleanup_free_
char * link
= NULL
;
178 r
= readlink_malloc ( p
, & link
);
182 value
= basename ( link
);
186 value
= strdup ( value
);
195 int readlink_and_make_absolute ( const char * p
, char ** r
) {
196 _cleanup_free_
char * target
= NULL
;
203 j
= readlink_malloc ( p
, & target
);
207 k
= file_in_same_dir ( p
, target
);
215 int chmod_and_chown ( const char * path
, mode_t mode
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
216 char fd_path
[ STRLEN ( "/proc/self/fd/" ) + DECIMAL_STR_MAX ( int ) + 1 ];
217 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= - 1 ;
218 bool st_valid
= false ;
224 /* Under the assumption that we are running privileged we first change the access mode and only then
225 * hand out ownership to avoid a window where access is too open. */
227 fd
= open ( path
, O_PATH
| O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOFOLLOW
); /* Let's acquire an O_PATH fd, as precaution to change
228 * mode/owner on the same file */
232 xsprintf ( fd_path
, "/proc/self/fd/%i" , fd
);
234 if ( mode
!= MODE_INVALID
) {
235 if (( mode
& S_IFMT
) != 0 ) {
237 if ( stat ( fd_path
, & st
) < 0 )
240 if (( mode
& S_IFMT
) != ( st
. st_mode
& S_IFMT
))
246 if ( chmod ( fd_path
, mode
& 07777 ) < 0 ) {
249 if (! st_valid
&& stat ( fd_path
, & st
) < 0 )
252 if (( mode
& 07777 ) != ( st
. st_mode
& 07777 ))
259 if ( uid
!= UID_INVALID
|| gid
!= GID_INVALID
) {
260 if ( chown ( fd_path
, uid
, gid
) < 0 ) {
263 if (! st_valid
&& stat ( fd_path
, & st
) < 0 )
266 if ( uid
!= UID_INVALID
&& st
. st_uid
!= uid
)
268 if ( gid
!= GID_INVALID
&& st
. st_gid
!= gid
)
276 int fchmod_and_chown ( int fd
, mode_t mode
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
277 bool st_valid
= false ;
281 /* Under the assumption that we are running privileged we first change the access mode and only then hand out
282 * ownership to avoid a window where access is too open. */
284 if ( mode
!= MODE_INVALID
) {
285 if (( mode
& S_IFMT
) != 0 ) {
287 if ( fstat ( fd
, & st
) < 0 )
290 if (( mode
& S_IFMT
) != ( st
. st_mode
& S_IFMT
))
296 if ( fchmod ( fd
, mode
& 07777 ) < 0 ) {
299 if (! st_valid
&& fstat ( fd
, & st
) < 0 )
302 if (( mode
& 07777 ) != ( st
. st_mode
& 07777 ))
309 if ( uid
!= UID_INVALID
|| gid
!= GID_INVALID
)
310 if ( fchown ( fd
, uid
, gid
) < 0 ) {
313 if (! st_valid
&& fstat ( fd
, & st
) < 0 )
316 if ( uid
!= UID_INVALID
&& st
. st_uid
!= uid
)
318 if ( gid
!= GID_INVALID
&& st
. st_gid
!= gid
)
325 int fchmod_umask ( int fd
, mode_t m
) {
330 r
= fchmod ( fd
, m
& (~ u
)) < 0 ? - errno
: 0 ;
336 int fchmod_opath ( int fd
, mode_t m
) {
337 char procfs_path
[ STRLEN ( "/proc/self/fd/" ) + DECIMAL_STR_MAX ( int )];
339 /* This function operates also on fd that might have been opened with
340 * O_PATH. Indeed fchmodat() doesn't have the AT_EMPTY_PATH flag like
341 * fchownat() does. */
343 xsprintf ( procfs_path
, "/proc/self/fd/%i" , fd
);
344 if ( chmod ( procfs_path
, m
) < 0 )
350 int fd_warn_permissions ( const char * path
, int fd
) {
353 if ( fstat ( fd
, & st
) < 0 )
356 if ( st
. st_mode
& 0111 )
357 log_warning ( "Configuration file %s is marked executable. Please remove executable permission bits. Proceeding anyway." , path
);
359 if ( st
. st_mode
& 0002 )
360 log_warning ( "Configuration file %s is marked world-writable. Please remove world writability permission bits. Proceeding anyway." , path
);
362 if ( getpid_cached () == 1 && ( st
. st_mode
& 0044 ) != 0044 )
363 log_warning ( "Configuration file %s is marked world-inaccessible. This has no effect as configuration data is accessible via APIs without restrictions. Proceeding anyway." , path
);
368 int touch_file ( const char * path
, bool parents
, usec_t stamp
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, mode_t mode
) {
369 char fdpath
[ STRLEN ( "/proc/self/fd/" ) + DECIMAL_STR_MAX ( int )];
370 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= - 1 ;
375 /* Note that touch_file() does not follow symlinks: if invoked on an existing symlink, then it is the symlink
376 * itself which is updated, not its target
378 * Returns the first error we encounter, but tries to apply as much as possible. */
381 ( void ) mkdir_parents ( path
, 0755 );
383 /* Initially, we try to open the node with O_PATH, so that we get a reference to the node. This is useful in
384 * case the path refers to an existing device or socket node, as we can open it successfully in all cases, and
385 * won't trigger any driver magic or so. */
386 fd
= open ( path
, O_PATH
| O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOFOLLOW
);
391 /* if the node doesn't exist yet, we create it, but with O_EXCL, so that we only create a regular file
392 * here, and nothing else */
393 fd
= open ( path
, O_WRONLY
| O_CREAT
| O_EXCL
| O_CLOEXEC
, IN_SET ( mode
, 0 , MODE_INVALID
) ? 0644 : mode
);
398 /* Let's make a path from the fd, and operate on that. With this logic, we can adjust the access mode,
399 * ownership and time of the file node in all cases, even if the fd refers to an O_PATH object â which is
400 * something fchown(), fchmod(), futimensat() don't allow. */
401 xsprintf ( fdpath
, "/proc/self/fd/%i" , fd
);
403 if ( mode
!= MODE_INVALID
)
404 if ( chmod ( fdpath
, mode
) < 0 )
407 if ( uid_is_valid ( uid
) || gid_is_valid ( gid
))
408 if ( chown ( fdpath
, uid
, gid
) < 0 && ret
>= 0 )
411 if ( stamp
!= USEC_INFINITY
) {
412 struct timespec ts
[ 2 ];
414 timespec_store (& ts
[ 0 ], stamp
);
416 r
= utimensat ( AT_FDCWD
, fdpath
, ts
, 0 );
418 r
= utimensat ( AT_FDCWD
, fdpath
, NULL
, 0 );
419 if ( r
< 0 && ret
>= 0 )
425 int touch ( const char * path
) {
426 return touch_file ( path
, false , USEC_INFINITY
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
, MODE_INVALID
);
429 int symlink_idempotent ( const char * from
, const char * to
, bool make_relative
) {
430 _cleanup_free_
char * relpath
= NULL
;
437 _cleanup_free_
char * parent
= NULL
;
439 parent
= dirname_malloc ( to
);
443 r
= path_make_relative ( parent
, from
, & relpath
);
450 if ( symlink ( from
, to
) < 0 ) {
451 _cleanup_free_
char * p
= NULL
;
456 r
= readlink_malloc ( to
, & p
);
457 if ( r
== - EINVAL
) /* Not a symlink? In that case return the original error we encountered: -EEXIST */
459 if ( r
< 0 ) /* Any other error? In that case propagate it as is */
462 if (! streq ( p
, from
)) /* Not the symlink we want it to be? In that case, propagate the original -EEXIST */
469 int symlink_atomic ( const char * from
, const char * to
) {
470 _cleanup_free_
char * t
= NULL
;
476 r
= tempfn_random ( to
, NULL
, & t
);
480 if ( symlink ( from
, t
) < 0 )
483 if ( rename ( t
, to
) < 0 ) {
491 int mknod_atomic ( const char * path
, mode_t mode
, dev_t dev
) {
492 _cleanup_free_
char * t
= NULL
;
497 r
= tempfn_random ( path
, NULL
, & t
);
501 if ( mknod ( t
, mode
, dev
) < 0 )
504 if ( rename ( t
, path
) < 0 ) {
512 int mkfifo_atomic ( const char * path
, mode_t mode
) {
513 _cleanup_free_
char * t
= NULL
;
518 r
= tempfn_random ( path
, NULL
, & t
);
522 if ( mkfifo ( t
, mode
) < 0 )
525 if ( rename ( t
, path
) < 0 ) {
533 int mkfifoat_atomic ( int dirfd
, const char * path
, mode_t mode
) {
534 _cleanup_free_
char * t
= NULL
;
539 if ( path_is_absolute ( path
))
540 return mkfifo_atomic ( path
, mode
);
542 /* We're only interested in the (random) filename. */
543 r
= tempfn_random_child ( "" , NULL
, & t
);
547 if ( mkfifoat ( dirfd
, t
, mode
) < 0 )
550 if ( renameat ( dirfd
, t
, dirfd
, path
) < 0 ) {
558 int get_files_in_directory ( const char * path
, char *** list
) {
559 _cleanup_closedir_
DIR * d
= NULL
;
561 size_t bufsize
= 0 , n
= 0 ;
562 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** l
= NULL
;
566 /* Returns all files in a directory in *list, and the number
567 * of files as return value. If list is NULL returns only the
574 FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL ( de
, d
, return - errno
) {
575 dirent_ensure_type ( d
, de
);
577 if (! dirent_is_file ( de
))
581 /* one extra slot is needed for the terminating NULL */
582 if (! GREEDY_REALLOC ( l
, bufsize
, n
+ 2 ))
585 l
[ n
] = strdup ( de
-> d_name
);
600 static int getenv_tmp_dir ( const char ** ret_path
) {
606 /* We use the same order of environment variables python uses in tempfile.gettempdir():
607 * https://docs.python.org/3/library/tempfile.html#tempfile.gettempdir */
608 FOREACH_STRING ( n
, "TMPDIR" , "TEMP" , "TMP" ) {
611 e
= secure_getenv ( n
);
614 if (! path_is_absolute ( e
)) {
618 if (! path_is_normalized ( e
)) {
635 /* Remember first error, to make this more debuggable */
647 static int tmp_dir_internal ( const char * def
, const char ** ret
) {
654 r
= getenv_tmp_dir (& e
);
660 k
= is_dir ( def
, true );
664 return r
< 0 ? r
: k
;
670 int var_tmp_dir ( const char ** ret
) {
672 /* Returns the location for "larger" temporary files, that is backed by physical storage if available, and thus
673 * even might survive a boot: /var/tmp. If $TMPDIR (or related environment variables) are set, its value is
674 * returned preferably however. Note that both this function and tmp_dir() below are affected by $TMPDIR,
675 * making it a variable that overrides all temporary file storage locations. */
677 return tmp_dir_internal ( "/var/tmp" , ret
);
680 int tmp_dir ( const char ** ret
) {
682 /* Similar to var_tmp_dir() above, but returns the location for "smaller" temporary files, which is usually
683 * backed by an in-memory file system: /tmp. */
685 return tmp_dir_internal ( "/tmp" , ret
);
688 int unlink_or_warn ( const char * filename
) {
689 if ( unlink ( filename
) < 0 && errno
!= ENOENT
)
690 /* If the file doesn't exist and the fs simply was read-only (in which
691 * case unlink() returns EROFS even if the file doesn't exist), don't
693 if ( errno
!= EROFS
|| access ( filename
, F_OK
) >= 0 )
694 return log_error_errno ( errno
, "Failed to remove \" %s \" : %m" , filename
);
699 int inotify_add_watch_fd ( int fd
, int what
, uint32_t mask
) {
700 char path
[ STRLEN ( "/proc/self/fd/" ) + DECIMAL_STR_MAX ( int ) + 1 ];
703 /* This is like inotify_add_watch(), except that the file to watch is not referenced by a path, but by an fd */
704 xsprintf ( path
, "/proc/self/fd/%i" , what
);
706 r
= inotify_add_watch ( fd
, path
, mask
);
713 static bool unsafe_transition ( const struct stat
* a
, const struct stat
* b
) {
714 /* Returns true if the transition from a to b is safe, i.e. that we never transition from unprivileged to
715 * privileged files or directories. Why bother? So that unprivileged code can't symlink to privileged files
716 * making us believe we read something safe even though it isn't safe in the specific context we open it in. */
718 if ( a
-> st_uid
== 0 ) /* Transitioning from privileged to unprivileged is always fine */
721 return a
-> st_uid
!= b
-> st_uid
; /* Otherwise we need to stay within the same UID */
724 static int log_unsafe_transition ( int a
, int b
, const char * path
, unsigned flags
) {
725 _cleanup_free_
char * n1
= NULL
, * n2
= NULL
;
727 if (! FLAGS_SET ( flags
, CHASE_WARN
))
730 ( void ) fd_get_path ( a
, & n1
);
731 ( void ) fd_get_path ( b
, & n2
);
733 return log_warning_errno ( SYNTHETIC_ERRNO ( ENOLINK
),
734 "Detected unsafe path transition %s %s %s during canonicalization of %s." ,
735 n1
, special_glyph ( SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW
), n2
, path
);
738 static int log_autofs_mount_point ( int fd
, const char * path
, unsigned flags
) {
739 _cleanup_free_
char * n1
= NULL
;
741 if (! FLAGS_SET ( flags
, CHASE_WARN
))
744 ( void ) fd_get_path ( fd
, & n1
);
746 return log_warning_errno ( SYNTHETIC_ERRNO ( EREMOTE
),
747 "Detected autofs mount point %s during canonicalization of %s." ,
751 int chase_symlinks ( const char * path
, const char * original_root
, unsigned flags
, char ** ret
) {
752 _cleanup_free_
char * buffer
= NULL
, * done
= NULL
, * root
= NULL
;
753 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= - 1 ;
754 unsigned max_follow
= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX
; /* how many symlinks to follow before giving up and returning ELOOP */
755 struct stat previous_stat
;
762 /* Either the file may be missing, or we return an fd to the final object, but both make no sense */
763 if ( FLAGS_SET ( flags
, CHASE_NONEXISTENT
| CHASE_OPEN
))
766 if ( FLAGS_SET ( flags
, CHASE_STEP
| CHASE_OPEN
))
772 /* This is a lot like canonicalize_file_name(), but takes an additional "root" parameter, that allows following
773 * symlinks relative to a root directory, instead of the root of the host.
775 * Note that "root" primarily matters if we encounter an absolute symlink. It is also used when following
776 * relative symlinks to ensure they cannot be used to "escape" the root directory. The path parameter passed is
777 * assumed to be already prefixed by it, except if the CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT flag is set, in which case it is first
778 * prefixed accordingly.
780 * Algorithmically this operates on two path buffers: "done" are the components of the path we already
781 * processed and resolved symlinks, "." and ".." of. "todo" are the components of the path we still need to
782 * process. On each iteration, we move one component from "todo" to "done", processing it's special meaning
783 * each time. The "todo" path always starts with at least one slash, the "done" path always ends in no
784 * slash. We always keep an O_PATH fd to the component we are currently processing, thus keeping lookup races
787 * Suggested usage: whenever you want to canonicalize a path, use this function. Pass the absolute path you got
788 * as-is: fully qualified and relative to your host's root. Optionally, specify the root parameter to tell this
789 * function what to do when encountering a symlink with an absolute path as directory: prefix it by the
792 * There are three ways to invoke this function:
794 * 1. Without CHASE_STEP or CHASE_OPEN: in this case the path is resolved and the normalized path is returned
795 * in `ret`. The return value is < 0 on error. If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is also set 0 is returned if the file
796 * doesn't exist, > 0 otherwise. If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is not set >= 0 is returned if the destination was
797 * found, -ENOENT if it doesn't.
799 * 2. With CHASE_OPEN: in this case the destination is opened after chasing it as O_PATH and this file
800 * descriptor is returned as return value. This is useful to open files relative to some root
801 * directory. Note that the returned O_PATH file descriptors must be converted into a regular one (using
802 * fd_reopen() or such) before it can be used for reading/writing. CHASE_OPEN may not be combined with
805 * 3. With CHASE_STEP: in this case only a single step of the normalization is executed, i.e. only the first
806 * symlink or ".." component of the path is resolved, and the resulting path is returned. This is useful if
807 * a caller wants to trace the a path through the file system verbosely. Returns < 0 on error, > 0 if the
808 * path is fully normalized, and == 0 for each normalization step. This may be combined with
809 * CHASE_NONEXISTENT, in which case 1 is returned when a component is not found.
811 * 4. With CHASE_SAFE: in this case the path must not contain unsafe transitions, i.e. transitions from
812 * unprivileged to privileged files or directories. In such cases the return value is -ENOLINK. If
813 * CHASE_WARN is also set a warning describing the unsafe transition is emitted.
815 * 5. With CHASE_NO_AUTOFS: in this case if an autofs mount point is encountered, the path normalization is
816 * aborted and -EREMOTE is returned. If CHASE_WARN is also set a warning showing the path of the mount point
821 /* A root directory of "/" or "" is identical to none */
822 if ( empty_or_root ( original_root
))
823 original_root
= NULL
;
825 if (! original_root
&& ! ret
&& ( flags
& ( CHASE_NONEXISTENT
| CHASE_NO_AUTOFS
| CHASE_SAFE
| CHASE_OPEN
| CHASE_STEP
)) == CHASE_OPEN
) {
826 /* Shortcut the CHASE_OPEN case if the caller isn't interested in the actual path and has no root set
827 * and doesn't care about any of the other special features we provide either. */
828 r
= open ( path
, O_PATH
| O_CLOEXEC
|(( flags
& CHASE_NOFOLLOW
) ? O_NOFOLLOW
: 0 ));
836 r
= path_make_absolute_cwd ( original_root
, & root
);
840 if ( flags
& CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT
) {
842 /* We don't support relative paths in combination with a root directory */
843 if (! path_is_absolute ( path
))
846 path
= prefix_roota ( root
, path
);
850 r
= path_make_absolute_cwd ( path
, & buffer
);
854 fd
= open ( "/" , O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOFOLLOW
| O_PATH
);
858 if ( flags
& CHASE_SAFE
) {
859 if ( fstat ( fd
, & previous_stat
) < 0 )
865 _cleanup_free_
char * first
= NULL
;
866 _cleanup_close_
int child
= - 1 ;
870 /* Determine length of first component in the path */
871 n
= strspn ( todo
, "/" ); /* The slashes */
872 m
= n
+ strcspn ( todo
+ n
, "/" ); /* The entire length of the component */
874 /* Extract the first component. */
875 first
= strndup ( todo
, m
);
881 /* Empty? Then we reached the end. */
885 /* Just a single slash? Then we reached the end. */
886 if ( path_equal ( first
, "/" )) {
887 /* Preserve the trailing slash */
889 if ( flags
& CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH
)
890 if (! strextend (& done
, "/" , NULL
))
896 /* Just a dot? Then let's eat this up. */
897 if ( path_equal ( first
, "/." ))
900 /* Two dots? Then chop off the last bit of what we already found out. */
901 if ( path_equal ( first
, "/.." )) {
902 _cleanup_free_
char * parent
= NULL
;
903 _cleanup_close_
int fd_parent
= - 1 ;
905 /* If we already are at the top, then going up will not change anything. This is in-line with
906 * how the kernel handles this. */
907 if ( empty_or_root ( done
))
910 parent
= dirname_malloc ( done
);
914 /* Don't allow this to leave the root dir. */
916 path_startswith ( done
, root
) &&
917 ! path_startswith ( parent
, root
))
920 free_and_replace ( done
, parent
);
922 if ( flags
& CHASE_STEP
)
925 fd_parent
= openat ( fd
, ".." , O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOFOLLOW
| O_PATH
);
929 if ( flags
& CHASE_SAFE
) {
930 if ( fstat ( fd_parent
, & st
) < 0 )
933 if ( unsafe_transition (& previous_stat
, & st
))
934 return log_unsafe_transition ( fd
, fd_parent
, path
, flags
);
940 fd
= TAKE_FD ( fd_parent
);
945 /* Otherwise let's see what this is. */
946 child
= openat ( fd
, first
+ n
, O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOFOLLOW
| O_PATH
);
949 if ( errno
== ENOENT
&&
950 ( flags
& CHASE_NONEXISTENT
) &&
951 ( isempty ( todo
) || path_is_normalized ( todo
))) {
953 /* If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is set, and the path does not exist, then that's OK, return
954 * what we got so far. But don't allow this if the remaining path contains "../ or "./"
955 * or something else weird. */
957 /* If done is "/", as first also contains slash at the head, then remove this redundant slash. */
958 if ( streq_ptr ( done
, "/" ))
961 if (! strextend (& done
, first
, todo
, NULL
))
971 if ( fstat ( child
, & st
) < 0 )
973 if (( flags
& CHASE_SAFE
) &&
974 ( empty_or_root ( root
) || ( size_t )( todo
- buffer
) > strlen ( root
)) &&
975 unsafe_transition (& previous_stat
, & st
))
976 return log_unsafe_transition ( fd
, child
, path
, flags
);
980 if (( flags
& CHASE_NO_AUTOFS
) &&
981 fd_is_fs_type ( child
, AUTOFS_SUPER_MAGIC
) > 0 )
982 return log_autofs_mount_point ( child
, path
, flags
);
984 if ( S_ISLNK ( st
. st_mode
) && !(( flags
& CHASE_NOFOLLOW
) && isempty ( todo
))) {
987 _cleanup_free_
char * destination
= NULL
;
989 /* This is a symlink, in this case read the destination. But let's make sure we don't follow
990 * symlinks without bounds. */
991 if (-- max_follow
<= 0 )
994 r
= readlinkat_malloc ( fd
, first
+ n
, & destination
);
997 if ( isempty ( destination
))
1000 if ( path_is_absolute ( destination
)) {
1002 /* An absolute destination. Start the loop from the beginning, but use the root
1003 * directory as base. */
1006 fd
= open ( root
?: "/" , O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOFOLLOW
| O_PATH
);
1010 if ( flags
& CHASE_SAFE
) {
1011 if ( fstat ( fd
, & st
) < 0 )
1014 if ( unsafe_transition (& previous_stat
, & st
))
1015 return log_unsafe_transition ( child
, fd
, path
, flags
);
1022 /* Note that we do not revalidate the root, we take it as is. */
1026 done
= strdup ( root
);
1031 /* Prefix what's left to do with what we just read, and start the loop again, but
1032 * remain in the current directory. */
1033 joined
= strjoin ( destination
, todo
);
1035 joined
= strjoin ( "/" , destination
, todo
);
1040 todo
= buffer
= joined
;
1042 if ( flags
& CHASE_STEP
)
1048 /* If this is not a symlink, then let's just add the name we read to what we already verified. */
1050 done
= TAKE_PTR ( first
);
1052 /* If done is "/", as first also contains slash at the head, then remove this redundant slash. */
1053 if ( streq ( done
, "/" ))
1056 if (! strextend (& done
, first
, NULL
))
1060 /* And iterate again, but go one directory further down. */
1062 fd
= TAKE_FD ( child
);
1066 /* Special case, turn the empty string into "/", to indicate the root directory. */
1073 * ret
= TAKE_PTR ( done
);
1075 if ( flags
& CHASE_OPEN
) {
1076 /* Return the O_PATH fd we currently are looking to the caller. It can translate it to a proper fd by
1077 * opening /proc/self/fd/xyz. */
1083 if ( flags
& CHASE_STEP
)
1092 c
= strjoin ( strempty ( done
), todo
);
1102 int chase_symlinks_and_open (
1105 unsigned chase_flags
,
1109 _cleanup_close_
int path_fd
= - 1 ;
1110 _cleanup_free_
char * p
= NULL
;
1113 if ( chase_flags
& CHASE_NONEXISTENT
)
1116 if ( empty_or_root ( root
) && ! ret_path
&& ( chase_flags
& ( CHASE_NO_AUTOFS
| CHASE_SAFE
)) == 0 ) {
1117 /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
1118 r
= open ( path
, open_flags
);
1125 path_fd
= chase_symlinks ( path
, root
, chase_flags
| CHASE_OPEN
, ret_path
? & p
: NULL
);
1129 r
= fd_reopen ( path_fd
, open_flags
);
1134 * ret_path
= TAKE_PTR ( p
);
1139 int chase_symlinks_and_opendir (
1142 unsigned chase_flags
,
1146 char procfs_path
[ STRLEN ( "/proc/self/fd/" ) + DECIMAL_STR_MAX ( int )];
1147 _cleanup_close_
int path_fd
= - 1 ;
1148 _cleanup_free_
char * p
= NULL
;
1153 if ( chase_flags
& CHASE_NONEXISTENT
)
1156 if ( empty_or_root ( root
) && ! ret_path
&& ( chase_flags
& ( CHASE_NO_AUTOFS
| CHASE_SAFE
)) == 0 ) {
1157 /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
1166 path_fd
= chase_symlinks ( path
, root
, chase_flags
| CHASE_OPEN
, ret_path
? & p
: NULL
);
1170 xsprintf ( procfs_path
, "/proc/self/fd/%i" , path_fd
);
1171 d
= opendir ( procfs_path
);
1176 * ret_path
= TAKE_PTR ( p
);
1182 int chase_symlinks_and_stat (
1185 unsigned chase_flags
,
1187 struct stat
* ret_stat
) {
1189 _cleanup_close_
int path_fd
= - 1 ;
1190 _cleanup_free_
char * p
= NULL
;
1195 if ( chase_flags
& CHASE_NONEXISTENT
)
1198 if ( empty_or_root ( root
) && ! ret_path
&& ( chase_flags
& ( CHASE_NO_AUTOFS
| CHASE_SAFE
)) == 0 ) {
1199 /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
1200 if ( stat ( path
, ret_stat
) < 0 )
1206 path_fd
= chase_symlinks ( path
, root
, chase_flags
| CHASE_OPEN
, ret_path
? & p
: NULL
);
1210 if ( fstat ( path_fd
, ret_stat
) < 0 )
1214 * ret_path
= TAKE_PTR ( p
);
1216 if ( chase_flags
& CHASE_OPEN
)
1217 return TAKE_FD ( path_fd
);
1222 int access_fd ( int fd
, int mode
) {
1223 char p
[ STRLEN ( "/proc/self/fd/" ) + DECIMAL_STR_MAX ( fd
) + 1 ];
1226 /* Like access() but operates on an already open fd */
1228 xsprintf ( p
, "/proc/self/fd/%i" , fd
);
1229 r
= access ( p
, mode
);
1236 void unlink_tempfilep ( char (* p
)[]) {
1237 /* If the file is created with mkstemp(), it will (almost always)
1238 * change the suffix. Treat this as a sign that the file was
1239 * successfully created. We ignore both the rare case where the
1240 * original suffix is used and unlink failures. */
1241 if (! endswith (* p
, ".XXXXXX" ))
1242 ( void ) unlink_noerrno (* p
);
1245 int unlinkat_deallocate ( int fd
, const char * name
, int flags
) {
1246 _cleanup_close_
int truncate_fd
= - 1 ;
1250 /* Operates like unlinkat() but also deallocates the file contents if it is a regular file and there's no other
1251 * link to it. This is useful to ensure that other processes that might have the file open for reading won't be
1252 * able to keep the data pinned on disk forever. This call is particular useful whenever we execute clean-up
1253 * jobs ("vacuuming"), where we want to make sure the data is really gone and the disk space released and
1254 * returned to the free pool.
1256 * Deallocation is preferably done by FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE|FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE (đ) if supported, which means
1257 * the file won't change size. That's a good thing since we shouldn't needlessly trigger SIGBUS in other
1258 * programs that have mmap()ed the file. (The assumption here is that changing file contents to all zeroes
1259 * underneath those programs is the better choice than simply triggering SIGBUS in them which truncation does.)
1260 * However if hole punching is not implemented in the kernel or file system we'll fall back to normal file
1261 * truncation (đĒ), as our goal of deallocating the data space trumps our goal of being nice to readers (đ).
1263 * Note that we attempt deallocation, but failure to succeed with that is not considered fatal, as long as the
1264 * primary job â to delete the file â is accomplished. */
1266 if (( flags
& AT_REMOVEDIR
) == 0 ) {
1267 truncate_fd
= openat ( fd
, name
, O_WRONLY
| O_CLOEXEC
| O_NOCTTY
| O_NOFOLLOW
| O_NONBLOCK
);
1268 if ( truncate_fd
< 0 ) {
1270 /* If this failed because the file doesn't exist propagate the error right-away. Also,
1271 * AT_REMOVEDIR wasn't set, and we tried to open the file for writing, which means EISDIR is
1272 * returned when this is a directory but we are not supposed to delete those, hence propagate
1273 * the error right-away too. */
1274 if ( IN_SET ( errno
, ENOENT
, EISDIR
))
1277 if ( errno
!= ELOOP
) /* don't complain if this is a symlink */
1278 log_debug_errno ( errno
, "Failed to open file '%s' for deallocation, ignoring: %m" , name
);
1282 if ( unlinkat ( fd
, name
, flags
) < 0 )
1285 if ( truncate_fd
< 0 ) /* Don't have a file handle, can't do more âšī¸ */
1288 if ( fstat ( truncate_fd
, & st
) < 0 ) {
1289 log_debug_errno ( errno
, "Failed to stat file '%s' for deallocation, ignoring: %m" , name
);
1293 if (! S_ISREG ( st
. st_mode
) || st
. st_blocks
== 0 || st
. st_nlink
> 0 )
1296 /* If this is a regular file, it actually took up space on disk and there are no other links it's time to
1297 * punch-hole/truncate this to release the disk space. */
1299 bs
= MAX ( st
. st_blksize
, 512 );
1300 l
= DIV_ROUND_UP ( st
. st_size
, bs
) * bs
; /* Round up to next block size */
1302 if ( fallocate ( truncate_fd
, FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE
| FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE
, 0 , l
) >= 0 )
1303 return 0 ; /* Successfully punched a hole! đ */
1305 /* Fall back to truncation */
1306 if ( ftruncate ( truncate_fd
, 0 ) < 0 ) {
1307 log_debug_errno ( errno
, "Failed to truncate file to 0, ignoring: %m" );
1314 int fsync_directory_of_file ( int fd
) {
1315 _cleanup_free_
char * path
= NULL
;
1316 _cleanup_close_
int dfd
= - 1 ;
1319 r
= fd_verify_regular ( fd
);
1323 r
= fd_get_path ( fd
, & path
);
1325 log_debug_errno ( r
, "Failed to query /proc/self/fd/%d%s: %m" ,
1327 r
== - EOPNOTSUPP
? ", ignoring" : "" );
1329 if ( r
== - EOPNOTSUPP
)
1330 /* If /proc is not available, we're most likely running in some
1331 * chroot environment, and syncing the directory is not very
1332 * important in that case. Let's just silently do nothing. */
1338 if (! path_is_absolute ( path
))
1341 dfd
= open_parent ( path
, O_CLOEXEC
, 0 );
1351 int fsync_path_at ( int at_fd
, const char * path
) {
1352 _cleanup_close_
int opened_fd
= - 1 ;
1355 if ( isempty ( path
)) {
1356 if ( at_fd
== AT_FDCWD
) {
1357 opened_fd
= open ( "." , O_RDONLY
| O_DIRECTORY
| O_CLOEXEC
);
1366 opened_fd
= openat ( at_fd
, path
, O_RDONLY
| O_CLOEXEC
);
1379 int syncfs_path ( int atfd
, const char * path
) {
1380 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= - 1 ;
1384 fd
= openat ( atfd
, path
, O_CLOEXEC
| O_RDONLY
| O_NONBLOCK
);
1394 int open_parent ( const char * path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
1395 _cleanup_free_
char * parent
= NULL
;
1400 if ( path_equal ( path
, "/" )) /* requesting the parent of the root dir is fishy, let's prohibit that */
1403 parent
= dirname_malloc ( path
);
1407 /* Let's insist on O_DIRECTORY since the parent of a file or directory is a directory. Except if we open an
1408 * O_TMPFILE file, because in that case we are actually create a regular file below the parent directory. */
1410 if (( flags
& O_PATH
) == O_PATH
)
1411 flags
|= O_DIRECTORY
;
1412 else if (( flags
& O_TMPFILE
) != O_TMPFILE
)
1413 flags
|= O_DIRECTORY
| O_RDONLY
;
1415 fd
= open ( parent
, flags
, mode
);