1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
3 #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
17 # include <sys/auxv.h>
21 # include <sys/random.h>
23 # include <linux/random.h>
26 #include "alloc-util.h"
30 #include "random-util.h"
31 #include "siphash24.h"
32 #include "time-util.h"
34 int rdrand(unsigned long *ret
) {
36 #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
37 static int have_rdrand
= -1;
40 if (have_rdrand
< 0) {
41 uint32_t eax
, ebx
, ecx
, edx
;
43 /* Check if RDRAND is supported by the CPU */
44 if (__get_cpuid(1, &eax
, &ebx
, &ecx
, &edx
) == 0) {
49 /* Compat with old gcc where bit_RDRND didn't exist yet */
51 #define bit_RDRND (1U << 30)
54 have_rdrand
= !!(ecx
& bit_RDRND
);
60 asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
64 msan_unpoison(&success
, sizeof(sucess
));
74 int genuine_random_bytes(void *p
, size_t n
, RandomFlags flags
) {
75 static int have_syscall
= -1;
76 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
77 bool got_some
= false;
80 /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This
81 * call won't block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, an error is
82 * returned if the random pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the
83 * kernel, regardless of whether the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
88 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND
))
89 /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is
90 * not required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of
91 * RDRAND here, even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10
92 * invocations or so. That's because we don't really care about the quality here. We
93 * generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller allows us to, since this way we won't upset
94 * the kernel's random subsystem by accessing it before the pool is initialized (after all it
95 * will kmsg log about every attempt to do so)..*/
100 if (rdrand(&u
) < 0) {
101 if (got_some
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO
)) {
102 /* Fill in the remaining bytes using pseudo-random values */
103 pseudo_random_bytes(p
, n
);
107 /* OK, this didn't work, let's go to getrandom() + /dev/urandom instead */
111 m
= MIN(sizeof(u
), n
);
114 p
= (uint8_t*) p
+ m
;
118 return 0; /* Yay, success! */
123 /* Use the getrandom() syscall unless we know we don't have it. */
124 if (have_syscall
!= 0 && !HAS_FEATURE_MEMORY_SANITIZER
) {
127 r
= getrandom(p
, n
, FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_BLOCK
) ? 0 : GRND_NONBLOCK
);
132 return 0; /* Yay, success! */
134 assert((size_t) r
< n
);
135 p
= (uint8_t*) p
+ r
;
138 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO
)) {
139 /* Fill in the remaining bytes using pseudo-random values */
140 pseudo_random_bytes(p
, n
);
146 /* Hmm, we didn't get enough good data but the caller insists on good data? Then try again */
147 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_BLOCK
))
150 /* Fill in the rest with /dev/urandom */
157 } else if (errno
== ENOSYS
) {
158 /* We lack the syscall, continue with reading from /dev/urandom. */
159 have_syscall
= false;
162 } else if (errno
== EAGAIN
) {
163 /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall
164 * the next time again though.
166 * If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can
167 * produce some pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to
168 * /dev/urandom, which we know is empty, but the kernel will produce some
169 * bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
172 if (got_some
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO
)) {
173 /* Fill in the remaining bytes using pseudorandom values */
174 pseudo_random_bytes(p
, n
);
178 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, RANDOM_MAY_FAIL
))
181 /* Use /dev/urandom instead */
188 fd
= open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
);
190 return errno
== ENOENT
? -ENOSYS
: -errno
;
192 return loop_read_exact(fd
, p
, n
, true);
195 void initialize_srand(void) {
196 static bool srand_called
= false;
207 /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's try to make use of that to seed
208 * the pseudo-random generator. It's better than nothing... But let's first hash it to make it harder
209 * to recover the original value by watching any pseudo-random bits we generate. After all the
210 * AT_RANDOM data might be used by other stuff too (in particular: ASLR), and we probably shouldn't
211 * leak the seed for that. */
213 auxv
= ULONG_TO_PTR(getauxval(AT_RANDOM
));
215 static const uint8_t auxval_hash_key
[16] = {
216 0x92, 0x6e, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x00, 0x52, 0x9c, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x81, 0x0f
219 x
= (unsigned) siphash24(auxv
, 16, auxval_hash_key
);
224 x
^= (unsigned) now(CLOCK_REALTIME
);
225 x
^= (unsigned) gettid();
234 /* INT_MAX gives us only 31 bits, so use 24 out of that. */
235 #if RAND_MAX >= INT_MAX
238 /* SHORT_INT_MAX or lower gives at most 15 bits, we just just 8 out of that. */
242 void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p
, size_t n
) {
247 for (q
= p
; q
< (uint8_t*) p
+ n
; q
+= RAND_STEP
) {
250 rr
= (unsigned) rand();
253 if ((size_t) (q
- (uint8_t*) p
+ 2) < n
)
257 if ((size_t) (q
- (uint8_t*) p
+ 1) < n
)
264 void random_bytes(void *p
, size_t n
) {
266 if (genuine_random_bytes(p
, n
, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO
|RANDOM_MAY_FAIL
|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND
) >= 0)
269 /* If for some reason some user made /dev/urandom unavailable to us, or the kernel has no entropy, use a PRNG instead. */
270 pseudo_random_bytes(p
, n
);