1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
10 #include <sys/capability.h>
11 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
13 #include <sys/personality.h>
14 #include <sys/prctl.h>
16 #include <sys/socket.h>
18 #include <sys/types.h>
24 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
28 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
36 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
39 #include "sd-messages.h"
42 #include "alloc-util.h"
44 #include "apparmor-util.h"
49 #include "capability-util.h"
50 #include "chown-recursive.h"
51 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
55 #include "errno-list.h"
57 #include "exit-status.h"
59 #include "format-util.h"
61 #include "glob-util.h"
70 #include "namespace.h"
71 #include "parse-util.h"
72 #include "path-util.h"
73 #include "process-util.h"
74 #include "rlimit-util.h"
77 #include "seccomp-util.h"
79 #include "securebits-util.h"
80 #include "selinux-util.h"
81 #include "signal-util.h"
82 #include "smack-util.h"
83 #include "socket-util.h"
85 #include "stat-util.h"
86 #include "string-table.h"
87 #include "string-util.h"
89 #include "syslog-util.h"
90 #include "terminal-util.h"
91 #include "umask-util.h"
93 #include "user-util.h"
95 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
97 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
98 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
100 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
101 #define TTY_MODE 0620
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
106 int start
, restart_from
;
111 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
121 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
124 /* Already at right index? */
128 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
135 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
136 * let's remember that and try again from here */
137 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
141 if (restart_from
< 0)
144 start
= restart_from
;
150 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
154 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
160 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
161 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
163 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
165 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
166 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
171 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
172 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
175 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
183 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
186 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
189 if (context
->tty_path
)
190 return context
->tty_path
;
192 return "/dev/console";
195 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
200 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
202 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
203 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
204 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
206 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
209 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
210 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
211 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
213 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
216 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
217 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
220 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
223 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
224 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
227 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
230 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
231 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool is_syslog_output(ExecOutput o
) {
238 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
);
241 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
244 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
247 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
250 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
252 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
255 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
258 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
261 return !!c
->tty_path
;
264 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
269 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
273 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
276 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
277 static const union sockaddr_union sa
= {
278 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
279 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
281 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
282 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
)) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
360 is_syslog_output(output
),
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
= {};
383 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
388 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
391 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
395 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
397 if (strlen(path
) >= sizeof(sa
.un
.sun_path
)) /* Too long, can't be a UNIX socket */
400 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
402 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
406 salen
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, salen
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 int named_iofds
[3]) {
468 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
469 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
472 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
473 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
474 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
475 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
481 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
485 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
486 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
489 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
493 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
494 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
496 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
501 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
504 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
505 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
507 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
509 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
510 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
512 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
513 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
515 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
518 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
522 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
525 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
529 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
531 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
532 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
534 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
538 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
542 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
546 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
547 const ExecContext
*context
,
553 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
556 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
561 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
562 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
564 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
))
565 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
570 static int setup_output(
572 const ExecContext
*context
,
573 const ExecParameters
*params
,
580 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
581 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
591 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
592 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
594 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
596 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
599 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
602 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
603 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
606 return STDERR_FILENO
;
609 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
610 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
612 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
614 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
616 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
618 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
619 * the way and are not on a tty */
620 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
621 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
623 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
627 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
628 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
629 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
633 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
634 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
635 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
636 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
638 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
639 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
640 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
642 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
646 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
647 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
652 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
653 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
655 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
656 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
657 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
659 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
660 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
662 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
667 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
668 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
670 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
671 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
675 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
676 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
677 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
679 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
680 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
682 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
683 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
684 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
685 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
690 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
691 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
693 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
695 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
696 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
698 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
699 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
: {
706 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
708 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
709 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
715 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
718 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
722 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
726 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
730 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
735 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
739 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
740 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
741 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
743 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
746 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
752 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
753 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
756 assert(_saved_stdin
);
757 assert(_saved_stdout
);
759 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
763 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
764 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
767 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
771 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
775 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
779 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
784 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
785 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
787 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
792 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
795 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
796 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
799 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
803 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
804 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
808 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
812 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
815 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
819 assert(saved_stdout
);
823 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
824 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
827 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
828 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
831 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
832 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
838 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
843 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
844 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
845 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
848 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
849 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
851 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
852 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
855 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
856 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
861 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
869 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
871 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
878 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
879 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
883 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
884 continue; /* ask again */
886 printf("Failing execution.\n");
887 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
890 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
891 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
892 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
894 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
895 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
896 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
897 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
898 continue; /* ask again */
900 printf(" Description: %s\n"
903 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
904 continue; /* ask again */
906 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
907 continue; /* ask again */
909 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
910 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
911 continue; /* ask again */
913 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
914 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
920 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
926 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
930 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
931 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
932 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
941 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
942 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
945 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
953 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
963 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
971 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
972 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
973 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
977 bool keep_groups
= false;
978 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
979 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
984 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
985 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
986 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
987 * groups of the caller.
989 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
990 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
991 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
997 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
1001 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1002 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1005 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1006 if (ngroups_max
<= 0) {
1010 return -EOPNOTSUPP
; /* For all other values */
1013 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1019 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1020 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1023 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1028 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1031 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1035 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1043 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1044 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1051 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1052 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1056 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1064 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1067 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1069 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1074 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1075 /* Then set our gids */
1076 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1083 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1086 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1089 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1090 * capabilities while doing so. */
1092 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1094 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1095 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1096 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1098 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
1100 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
1101 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
1106 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1107 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1110 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1111 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1112 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1113 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1120 static int null_conv(
1122 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1123 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1124 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1126 /* We don't support conversations */
1128 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1133 static int setup_pam(
1140 int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1144 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1149 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1150 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1152 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1153 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1154 bool close_session
= false;
1155 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1162 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1163 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1164 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1165 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1166 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1167 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1169 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1173 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1174 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1176 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1177 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1183 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1185 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1186 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1188 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1189 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1193 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1194 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1198 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1199 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1200 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1204 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1205 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1208 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1209 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1212 close_session
= true;
1214 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1216 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1220 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1223 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1225 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1227 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1231 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1233 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1235 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1237 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
1238 * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1239 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1241 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1242 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1243 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1244 * to fail to exit normally */
1246 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1248 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1249 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1250 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1251 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1252 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1254 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1256 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1257 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1258 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1259 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1260 * to do the rest for us. */
1261 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1264 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1265 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1266 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1268 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1269 * return failure here. */
1270 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1272 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1273 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1276 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1277 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1280 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1287 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1292 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1293 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1294 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1295 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1302 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1306 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1308 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1309 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1312 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1313 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1315 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1316 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1319 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1320 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1321 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1322 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1324 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1327 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1328 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1329 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1331 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1335 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1337 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1349 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1350 char process_name
[11];
1354 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1355 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1359 rename_process("(...)");
1365 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1366 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1372 process_name
[0] = '(';
1373 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1374 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1375 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1377 rename_process(process_name
);
1380 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1383 return c
->address_families_whitelist
||
1384 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1387 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1390 return c
->syscall_whitelist
||
1391 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1394 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1397 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1400 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1403 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1404 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1405 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1406 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1407 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1408 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1409 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1410 c
->private_devices
||
1411 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1412 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1413 c
->lock_personality
||
1414 c
->protect_hostname
;
1419 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1421 if (is_seccomp_available())
1424 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1428 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1429 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1435 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1438 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1441 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1443 if (c
->syscall_whitelist
) {
1444 default_action
= negative_action
;
1445 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1447 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1448 action
= negative_action
;
1451 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1452 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_whitelist
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1457 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1460 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1464 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1467 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1470 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1473 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1477 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1480 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1483 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_whitelist
);
1486 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1490 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1493 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1496 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1499 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1503 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1506 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1509 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1512 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1516 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1517 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1519 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1522 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1525 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1528 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1532 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1534 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1537 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1540 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1543 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1547 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1549 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1552 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1555 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1558 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1562 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1565 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1568 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1571 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1572 unsigned long personality
;
1578 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1581 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1584 personality
= c
->personality
;
1586 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1587 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1589 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1594 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1599 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1602 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1603 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1605 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1608 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1610 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1613 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1614 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1616 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1617 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1620 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1624 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1627 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1629 static int build_environment(
1631 const ExecContext
*c
,
1632 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1635 const char *username
,
1637 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1638 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1641 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1642 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1651 our_env
= new0(char*, 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1656 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1658 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1660 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1662 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1664 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1666 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1670 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1673 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1676 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1677 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1679 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1681 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1683 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1686 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1687 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1688 * check the database directly. */
1689 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1690 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1693 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1697 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1700 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1704 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1707 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1709 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1712 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1716 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1719 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1722 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1723 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1726 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1729 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1730 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1732 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1734 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1735 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1736 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1738 if (path_equal(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1739 term
= getenv("TERM");
1741 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1743 x
= strappend("TERM=", term
);
1746 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1749 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1750 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1753 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1756 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1757 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1763 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1766 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1770 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1774 joined
= strv_join_prefix(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
);
1778 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1782 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1785 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1786 assert(n_env
<= 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1788 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1793 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1794 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1795 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1798 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1799 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1805 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1809 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1812 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1813 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1816 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1821 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1822 const ExecContext
*context
,
1823 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1824 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1829 if (context
->root_image
)
1832 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1833 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1834 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1837 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
1840 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
1843 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
1846 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1849 if (context
->private_devices
||
1850 context
->private_mounts
||
1851 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1852 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
1853 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1854 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1855 context
->protect_control_groups
)
1858 if (context
->root_directory
) {
1859 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1861 if (context
->mount_apivfs
)
1864 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1865 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
1868 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1873 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
1874 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
1875 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
1876 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
1882 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1883 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1884 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1885 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1886 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1891 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1892 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1893 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1894 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1895 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1896 * continues execution normally. */
1898 if (uid
!= 0 && uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
1899 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
1900 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1901 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1906 uid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1911 if (gid
!= 0 && gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1912 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
1913 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1914 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1919 gid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1924 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1926 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
1927 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
1930 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1932 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
1935 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
1939 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
1943 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1944 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1947 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
1949 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1950 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
1955 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1956 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
1957 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1959 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
1964 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1966 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1971 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1974 /* First write the GID map */
1975 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
1976 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1981 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
1985 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1987 /* The write the UID map */
1988 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
1989 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1994 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
1999 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2002 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2003 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2006 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2008 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2011 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2012 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2015 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2016 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2019 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2024 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2027 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2031 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2037 static int setup_exec_directory(
2038 const ExecContext
*context
,
2039 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2042 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2045 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2046 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2047 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2048 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2049 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2050 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2057 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2058 assert(exit_status
);
2060 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2063 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2064 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2066 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2070 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2071 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2073 p
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[type
], "/", *rt
);
2079 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2083 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2084 !IN_SET(type
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)) {
2085 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2087 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that case we
2088 * want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by a dynamic user
2089 * whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same trick used by container
2090 * managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of the same UID in containers: we
2091 * place everything inside a directory that has an access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root,
2092 * so that it acts as security boundary for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing
2093 * to make this directory permeable for the service itself.
2095 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create a
2096 * directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place "foo" inside of
2097 * that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to "private/foo". This way,
2098 * privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but unprivileged host users can't look
2099 * into it. Inside of the namespaceof the container "private/" is replaced by a more liberally
2100 * accessible tmpfs, into which the host's "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus
2101 * disabling the access boundary for the service and making sure it only gets access to the
2102 * dirs it needs but no others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2104 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not to be
2105 * owned by the service itself.
2106 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used for sharing
2107 * files or sockets with other services. */
2109 private_root
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[type
], "/private");
2110 if (!private_root
) {
2115 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2116 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2120 pp
= strjoin(private_root
, "/", *rt
);
2126 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2127 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2131 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2132 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2134 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2135 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2136 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2138 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2143 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2145 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2146 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2150 /* And link it up from the original place */
2151 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2155 /* Lock down the access mode */
2156 if (chmod(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
) < 0) {
2161 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2162 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2167 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2171 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2172 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2173 "(filesystem: %o %sMode: %o)",
2174 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2175 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2176 if (!context
->dynamic_user
)
2181 /* Don't change the owner of the configuration directory, as in the common case it is not written to by
2182 * a service, and shall not be writable. */
2183 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2186 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary */
2187 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
);
2195 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2200 static int setup_smack(
2201 const ExecContext
*context
,
2202 const ExecCommand
*command
) {
2209 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2210 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2214 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2216 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2218 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2219 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2222 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2232 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2233 const ExecContext
*context
,
2234 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2235 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2236 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2237 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2239 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2240 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2242 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2247 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2248 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2249 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2251 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2252 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2253 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2256 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2260 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2261 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2262 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2266 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2270 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2271 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2274 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2280 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2287 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2290 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2291 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2292 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2296 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2299 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2302 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2305 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2306 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2307 !(context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
)) {
2310 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
2311 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
2312 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
2314 private_root
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private");
2315 if (!private_root
) {
2320 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
2325 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2328 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2329 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
))
2330 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *suffix
);
2332 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2338 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2339 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2340 (context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
))
2341 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
2342 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
2343 * on the 'non-private' place. */
2344 d
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2353 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2358 .ignore_enoent
= false,
2365 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
2366 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
2367 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
2372 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
2376 static int apply_mount_namespace(
2378 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2379 const ExecContext
*context
,
2380 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2381 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
2383 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2384 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
2385 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
2386 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
2387 bool needs_sandboxing
;
2388 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2389 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2394 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2395 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2396 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
2398 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2399 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2400 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2401 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
2402 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2405 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2406 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
2409 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
2412 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
2416 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
2417 if (needs_sandboxing
)
2418 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2419 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
2420 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
2421 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
2422 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
2423 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
2424 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
2425 .mount_apivfs
= context
->mount_apivfs
,
2426 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
2428 else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
2430 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2431 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2432 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2434 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2435 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
2438 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
2440 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
2441 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
2443 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
,
2444 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
2445 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
2446 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
2450 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
2451 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
2454 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_home
: PROTECT_HOME_NO
,
2455 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_system
: PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
,
2456 context
->mount_flags
,
2457 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
);
2459 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
2461 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
2462 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceeed, but only if exclusively
2463 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
2464 * completely different execution environment. */
2466 if (n_bind_mounts
== 0 &&
2467 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
== 0 &&
2468 !root_dir
&& !root_image
&&
2469 !context
->dynamic_user
) {
2470 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
2474 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
2475 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
2476 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
2484 static int apply_working_directory(
2485 const ExecContext
*context
,
2486 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2488 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
2494 assert(exit_status
);
2496 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
2499 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2505 } else if (context
->working_directory
)
2506 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2510 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2511 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
2512 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
2513 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2519 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
2521 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2522 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2529 static int setup_keyring(
2531 const ExecContext
*context
,
2532 const ExecParameters
*p
,
2533 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2535 key_serial_t keyring
;
2544 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
2545 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
2546 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
2547 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
2548 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
2549 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
2551 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
2554 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
2555 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
2556 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
2557 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
2559 saved_uid
= getuid();
2560 saved_gid
= getgid();
2562 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2563 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
2564 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
2567 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2568 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
2569 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
2574 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2575 if (keyring
== -1) {
2576 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
2577 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
2578 else if (IN_SET(errno
, EACCES
, EPERM
))
2579 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
2580 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
2581 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
2583 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
2588 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
2589 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
2591 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
2592 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
2593 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
2594 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
2599 /* Restore uid/gid back */
2600 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2601 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
2602 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
2607 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2608 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
2609 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
2612 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
2613 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
2616 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
2618 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
2620 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
2621 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
2622 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
2623 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
2628 /* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */
2629 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
2630 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
2631 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
2633 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
2634 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
2639 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
2647 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
2649 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
2652 static int close_remaining_fds(
2653 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2654 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2655 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2659 int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
2661 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
2662 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
2666 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
2667 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
2668 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
2669 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
2670 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
2671 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
2674 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
2676 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = exec_fd
;
2678 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
2679 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
2683 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2687 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
2689 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
2692 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
2693 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
2695 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
2698 static int send_user_lookup(
2706 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2707 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2710 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
2713 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
2716 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
2718 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
2719 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
2720 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
2726 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
2733 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
2738 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
2742 /* Hardcode /root as home directory for UID 0 */
2747 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
2755 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
2756 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
2757 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2764 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
2766 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
2767 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
2770 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2773 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2779 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2782 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
)
2783 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/", *i
);
2785 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *i
);
2789 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
2795 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
2800 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
2802 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
2803 bool using_subcgroup
;
2809 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
2812 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
2813 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
2814 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
2815 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
2816 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
2817 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
2818 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
2819 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
2821 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
2822 if (using_subcgroup
)
2823 p
= strjoin(params
->cgroup_path
, "/.control");
2825 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
2830 return using_subcgroup
;
2833 static int exec_child(
2835 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2836 const ExecContext
*context
,
2837 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2838 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2839 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2843 size_t n_socket_fds
,
2844 size_t n_storage_fds
,
2849 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
2850 int *fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
, r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
= -1;
2851 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
2852 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
2853 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
2854 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
2855 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
2856 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
2857 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
2858 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
2859 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
2860 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
2861 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
2863 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
2864 bool use_selinux
= false;
2867 bool use_smack
= false;
2870 bool use_apparmor
= false;
2872 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
2873 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
2875 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
2882 assert(exit_status
);
2884 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
2886 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
2887 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
2888 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
2889 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
2890 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
2891 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
2892 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
2894 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
2895 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
2897 r
= reset_signal_mask();
2899 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
2900 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
2903 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
2904 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
2906 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
2907 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
2908 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
2909 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
2912 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
2914 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
2917 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
2918 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, params
->exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
2920 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2921 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
2924 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
2926 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
2927 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
2930 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
2932 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
2933 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
2934 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
2936 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
2938 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2942 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
2943 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
2944 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
2945 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
2948 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
2949 log_unit_error(unit
, "Execution cancelled by the user");
2954 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
2955 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
2956 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
2957 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
2958 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
2959 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
2960 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
2961 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2962 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2965 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
2966 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
2968 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
2969 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
2970 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
2971 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2972 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2975 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
2977 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2981 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
2983 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2985 log_unit_error(unit
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
2988 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
2991 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
2992 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2993 log_unit_error(unit
, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
2997 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
2998 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2999 log_unit_error(unit
, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3004 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3007 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3009 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3010 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3013 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3015 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3016 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3020 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3021 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3022 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3024 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3025 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3028 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3030 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3031 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3034 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3036 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3038 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3039 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3042 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3043 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3045 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3047 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3048 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3049 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3050 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3052 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3054 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3055 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3058 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3060 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3061 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3065 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3067 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3068 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3071 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3073 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3074 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3077 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3079 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3080 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3083 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3084 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3085 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3086 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3087 if (IN_SET(r
, -EPERM
, -EACCES
))
3088 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3090 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3091 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3095 if (context
->nice_set
)
3096 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
3097 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
3098 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3101 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3102 struct sched_param param
= {
3103 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3106 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3107 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3108 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3109 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3112 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3113 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3117 if (context
->cpuset
)
3118 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
3119 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3120 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3123 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3124 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3125 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3126 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3129 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3130 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3131 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3132 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3135 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
3136 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
3138 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
3139 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
3143 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3144 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
3146 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
3147 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
3151 if (context
->user
) {
3152 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
3154 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3155 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
3159 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
3160 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
3161 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
3162 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
3163 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
3164 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
3166 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3167 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
3171 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
3172 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
3174 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
3177 r
= build_environment(
3189 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3193 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
3195 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3199 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
3200 params
->environment
,
3203 context
->environment
,
3207 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3210 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
3212 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
3214 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
3216 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
3217 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
3220 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
3221 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3223 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
3224 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
3226 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
3227 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3228 needs_setuid
= false;
3230 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
3232 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3233 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
3234 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
3235 * impacting our own code paths. */
3238 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
3241 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
3244 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
3248 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3251 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
3252 * is set here. (See below.) */
3254 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
3256 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3257 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
3263 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
3264 * wins here. (See above.) */
3266 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
3267 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
3269 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
3270 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
3275 if (context
->private_network
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3276 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
3277 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3279 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3280 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
3283 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
3286 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
3287 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
3288 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
, context
, params
, runtime
);
3290 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3291 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing: %m");
3295 if (context
->protect_hostname
) {
3296 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
3297 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
3298 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3299 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
3302 log_unit_warning(unit
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
3304 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
3306 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3307 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
3312 /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
3314 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, supplementary_gids
, ngids
);
3316 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3317 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
3321 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3323 if (use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
3324 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
3326 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3327 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
3332 if (context
->private_users
) {
3333 r
= setup_private_users(uid
, gid
);
3335 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3336 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
3341 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
3342 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
3343 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
3345 if (params
->exec_fd
>= 0) {
3346 exec_fd
= params
->exec_fd
;
3348 if (exec_fd
< 3 + (int) n_fds
) {
3351 /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
3352 * process we are about to execute. */
3354 moved_fd
= fcntl(exec_fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) n_fds
);
3356 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3357 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
3360 safe_close(exec_fd
);
3363 /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
3364 r
= fd_cloexec(exec_fd
, true);
3366 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3367 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3371 fds_with_exec_fd
= newa(int, n_fds
+ 1);
3372 memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3373 fds_with_exec_fd
[n_fds
] = exec_fd
;
3374 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
+ 1;
3376 fds_with_exec_fd
= fds
;
3377 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
;
3380 r
= close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
);
3382 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
3384 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
3386 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3387 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
3390 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
3391 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
3392 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
3395 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
3397 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3400 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
3401 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
3402 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
3403 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
3404 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
3405 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3406 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
3411 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
3412 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
3414 r
= setup_smack(context
, command
);
3416 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
3417 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
3422 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
3423 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
3424 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
3425 * instead of us doing that */
3426 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3427 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
3428 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
3429 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
3431 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
3432 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
3434 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3435 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
3439 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
3440 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
3441 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3442 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3443 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
3445 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3446 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
3452 if (context
->user
) {
3453 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
3455 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3456 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
3459 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3460 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3462 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
3463 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
3465 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3466 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
3469 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
3470 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
3471 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
3472 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
3473 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
3474 * drop the bit away next. */
3476 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
3481 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
3482 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
3483 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
3485 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
3487 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3488 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
3489 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
3490 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
3491 * are restricted. */
3495 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
3498 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
3500 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3501 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
3508 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
3509 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
3510 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
3511 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
3512 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
3517 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
3518 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
3519 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
3520 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
3521 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
3522 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
3525 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
3526 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
3527 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
3528 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
3532 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
3534 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
3535 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
3538 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
3540 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3541 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
3544 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
3546 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3547 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
3550 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
3552 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3553 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
3556 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
3558 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3559 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
3562 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
3564 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3565 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
3568 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
3570 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3571 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
3574 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
3576 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3577 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
3580 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
3582 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3583 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
3586 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
3587 * by the filter as little as possible. */
3588 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
3590 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3591 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
3596 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
3599 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
3601 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3605 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
3608 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
3609 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
3610 if (!replaced_argv
) {
3611 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3614 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
3616 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
3618 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
3619 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
3621 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
3623 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3624 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3625 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
3627 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3633 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
3634 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
3636 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3637 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3638 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
3642 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
3648 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
3649 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
3651 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3652 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3653 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
3657 if (r
== -ENOENT
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
3658 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
3659 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3661 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3662 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
3664 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3668 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3669 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute command: %m");
3672 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
3673 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[3]);
3675 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
3676 ExecCommand
*command
,
3677 const ExecContext
*context
,
3678 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3679 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3680 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3683 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
3684 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
3685 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
3686 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
3687 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
3695 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
3697 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
3698 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
3699 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
3701 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1) {
3702 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
3706 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0) {
3707 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got no socket.");
3711 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
3715 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
3716 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
3719 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
3721 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
3723 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
3725 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
3727 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3731 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3732 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
3733 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3735 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3737 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3738 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
3740 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
3741 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
3742 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
3744 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
3750 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
3753 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3755 r
= exec_child(unit
,
3767 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
3771 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
3772 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3774 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3775 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
3776 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
3778 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3783 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
3785 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
3786 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
3787 * process will be killed too). */
3789 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
3791 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
3797 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
3798 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3803 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
3804 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
3805 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
3806 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
3807 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
3808 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
3809 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
3810 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3811 c
->directories
[i
].mode
= 0755;
3812 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
3813 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
3814 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
3815 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3818 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
3819 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3824 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
3825 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
3826 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
3827 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
3829 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
3831 for (l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
3832 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
3833 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
3836 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
3837 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
3838 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
3839 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
3840 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
3841 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
3842 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
3844 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
3846 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
3848 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
3849 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
3850 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3852 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
3853 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3854 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3855 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
3856 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
3857 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
3859 c
->cpuset
= cpu_set_mfree(c
->cpuset
);
3861 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
3862 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
3863 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
3864 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
3866 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
3867 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
3868 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
3870 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3871 c
->directories
[i
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[i
].paths
);
3873 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3875 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
3877 c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
= 0;
3878 c
->log_rate_limit_burst
= 0;
3880 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
3881 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
3884 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
3889 if (!runtime_prefix
)
3892 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
3893 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
3895 p
= strjoin(runtime_prefix
, "/", *i
);
3899 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the service
3901 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
3907 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3910 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
3911 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
3914 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3917 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3918 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
3921 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3925 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
3926 exec_command_done(i
);
3933 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3936 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3937 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
3940 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3943 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3944 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
3947 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3950 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
3953 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
3954 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
3958 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
3963 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
3964 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
3966 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
3969 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
3975 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3978 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
3981 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3984 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
3987 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3990 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
3997 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
3999 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4005 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4006 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4007 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
4009 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
4010 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
4012 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
4014 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
4015 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4016 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4017 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
4018 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
4020 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4023 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4024 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4025 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
4026 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
4028 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4031 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4032 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4033 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
4034 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
4036 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4040 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
4043 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
4044 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
4049 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
4053 bool ignore
= false;
4055 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
4064 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
4072 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
4073 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
4082 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
4083 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
4085 for (n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
4086 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
4094 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
4096 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
4098 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
4101 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
4109 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
4125 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
4126 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
4131 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
4133 /* trivial identity? */
4134 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
4137 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
4138 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
4140 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
4141 return streq(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
4144 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4146 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
4148 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
4149 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
4150 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
4151 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
4152 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
4155 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
4161 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
4164 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
4165 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
4173 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4177 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
4178 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
4179 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
4180 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
4181 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
4182 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
4183 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
4184 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
4185 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
4186 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
4187 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
4188 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
4189 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
4190 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
4191 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
4192 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
4193 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
4194 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
4196 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
4197 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
4198 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
4199 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
4200 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
4201 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
4202 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
4203 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
4204 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
4205 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
4206 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
4207 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
4208 prefix
, yes_no(c
->mount_apivfs
),
4209 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
4210 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
4211 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
4212 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
4213 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
));
4216 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
4218 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
4219 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4221 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
4222 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4224 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
4225 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4227 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
4228 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4230 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
4232 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4233 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
4235 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
4236 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
4244 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
4246 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
4247 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
4249 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
4251 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4252 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
4253 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4254 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
4257 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
4258 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
4260 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
4262 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
4264 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
4267 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
4268 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
4270 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
4272 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
4275 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
4276 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
4277 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
4278 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
4282 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
4283 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
4284 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
4285 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
4289 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
4290 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
4293 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
4294 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
4295 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
4296 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
4297 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
4298 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
4300 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4301 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4302 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4303 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4304 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4305 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4307 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
4308 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4309 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4310 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4311 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4312 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4313 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4314 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4315 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4316 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4322 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
4323 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
4324 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
4325 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
4326 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
4327 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
4329 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
4332 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4333 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4334 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4335 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
4336 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
4339 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4340 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4341 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4342 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
4344 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
4346 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
4348 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
4350 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
4352 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
4355 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
4356 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
4358 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
4360 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
4363 if (c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
> 0) {
4364 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
4367 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
4368 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
4371 if (c
->log_rate_limit_burst
> 0)
4372 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_rate_limit_burst
);
4374 if (c
->n_log_extra_fields
> 0) {
4377 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
4378 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
4379 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
4380 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
4386 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
4387 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4389 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
4391 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4394 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
4395 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4397 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
4399 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4402 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4403 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4405 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
4407 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4411 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
4413 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
4415 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
4417 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
4418 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
4419 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
4424 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
4426 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
4427 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
4428 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
4432 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
4433 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
4434 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
4438 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
4439 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
4440 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4444 if (c
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
4445 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
4446 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
4447 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
4448 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
4449 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
4450 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
4451 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
4453 if (c
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
4454 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
4455 TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
4457 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
4459 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
4460 strempty(t
->options
));
4465 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
4466 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
4468 if (c
->selinux_context
)
4470 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
4471 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
4473 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4475 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4476 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4478 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
4480 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
4481 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
4483 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
4485 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
4486 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
4489 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
4490 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
4492 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
4500 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
4503 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
4507 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
4508 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
4509 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
4510 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
4517 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
4518 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
4521 errno_name
= errno_to_name(num
);
4523 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
4525 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
4533 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
4540 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
4544 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
4545 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
4550 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
4551 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
4553 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
4555 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
4559 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
4560 const char *errno_name
;
4562 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
4564 errno_name
= errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
);
4566 fprintf(f
, "%s\n", errno_name
);
4568 fprintf(f
, "%d\n", c
->syscall_errno
);
4571 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4573 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4574 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4577 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4580 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
4581 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
4586 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
4592 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4600 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
4602 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
4607 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
4612 for (l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
4613 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
4614 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
4615 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
4618 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
4625 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
4628 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
4631 if (s
->pid
!= pid
) {
4637 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
4643 if (context
->utmp_id
)
4644 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
4646 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
4650 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
4653 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
4656 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4657 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
4665 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4668 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
4671 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
4673 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
4674 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
4676 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
4678 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
4680 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
4681 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
4682 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
4686 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
4694 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
4702 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
4709 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
4720 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
4721 * spaces and ticks in them */
4726 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4727 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
4728 const char *prefix2
;
4733 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4734 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
4736 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
4738 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
4739 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
4741 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
4744 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4747 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4749 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
4750 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
4753 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
4760 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
4761 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
4762 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
4767 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4775 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4787 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
4789 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
4792 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4793 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
4801 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4807 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
4814 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
4815 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
4817 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
4821 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
4828 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
4830 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
4831 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
) {
4832 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4834 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
4836 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4843 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
4844 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4846 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4848 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4849 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4852 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4855 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
4856 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
4857 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4858 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
4862 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
4864 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
4867 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
4870 *rt
= new0(ExecRuntime
, 1);
4874 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
4878 static int exec_runtime_add(
4881 const char *tmp_dir
,
4882 const char *var_tmp_dir
,
4883 const int netns_storage_socket
[2],
4884 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4886 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
4892 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
4896 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
);
4900 rt
->id
= strdup(id
);
4905 rt
->tmp_dir
= strdup(tmp_dir
);
4909 /* When tmp_dir is set, then we require var_tmp_dir is also set. */
4910 assert(var_tmp_dir
);
4911 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= strdup(var_tmp_dir
);
4912 if (!rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
4916 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
4917 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = netns_storage_socket
[0];
4918 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = netns_storage_socket
[1];
4921 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
4930 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
4935 static int exec_runtime_make(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4936 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4937 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = {-1, -1};
4944 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4945 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
)
4948 if (c
->private_tmp
) {
4949 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
4954 if (c
->private_network
) {
4955 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
4959 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
4964 netns_storage_socket
[0] = -1;
4965 netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
4969 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4977 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
4979 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
4985 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
4986 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
4988 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4992 /* increment reference counter. */
4998 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5002 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
5008 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
5011 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5019 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5020 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
5023 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5025 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
5026 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5028 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
5031 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5035 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
5038 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
5041 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5045 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
5054 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5055 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
5059 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
5060 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
5061 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
5062 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
5068 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
5069 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
5070 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
5071 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
5075 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
5077 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
5081 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
5083 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
);
5087 rt_create
->id
= strdup(u
->id
);
5094 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
5097 copy
= strdup(value
);
5101 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
5103 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
5106 copy
= strdup(value
);
5110 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
5112 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
5115 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5116 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5120 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5121 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5123 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
5126 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5127 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5131 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5132 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5136 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
5138 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
5140 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
5144 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
5153 void exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5154 char *id
= NULL
, *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5155 int r
, fd0
= -1, fd1
= -1;
5156 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
5163 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5164 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5169 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
5171 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5172 tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5178 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
5180 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5181 var_tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5187 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
5191 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5192 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5193 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd0
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd0
)) {
5194 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5197 fd0
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd0
);
5203 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
5207 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5208 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5209 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd1
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd1
)) {
5210 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5213 fd1
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd1
);
5218 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, (int[]) { fd0
, fd1
}, NULL
);
5220 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
5223 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
5229 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
5231 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5235 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
5239 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
5243 strv_free(p
->environment
);
5246 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
5247 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5248 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5249 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
5250 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
5251 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5252 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5253 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
5254 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5257 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
5259 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
5260 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5261 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5262 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5263 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
5264 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
5265 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
5266 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
5267 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
5268 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
5269 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5270 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5271 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5272 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
5275 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
5277 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
5278 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
5279 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
5280 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
5283 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
5285 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
5286 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
5287 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
5288 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
5291 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
5293 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5294 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
5295 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
5296 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
5297 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
5298 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
5301 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5303 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5304 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
5305 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
5306 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
5307 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
5308 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
5311 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5313 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
5314 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5315 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
5316 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
5319 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);