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Merge pull request #11682 from topimiettinen/private-utsname
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / execute.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <fcntl.h>
5 #include <glob.h>
6 #include <grp.h>
7 #include <poll.h>
8 #include <signal.h>
9 #include <string.h>
10 #include <sys/capability.h>
11 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
12 #include <sys/mman.h>
13 #include <sys/personality.h>
14 #include <sys/prctl.h>
15 #include <sys/shm.h>
16 #include <sys/socket.h>
17 #include <sys/stat.h>
18 #include <sys/types.h>
19 #include <sys/un.h>
20 #include <unistd.h>
21 #include <utmpx.h>
22
23 #if HAVE_PAM
24 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
25 #endif
26
27 #if HAVE_SELINUX
28 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
29 #endif
30
31 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
32 #include <seccomp.h>
33 #endif
34
35 #if HAVE_APPARMOR
36 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
37 #endif
38
39 #include "sd-messages.h"
40
41 #include "af-list.h"
42 #include "alloc-util.h"
43 #if HAVE_APPARMOR
44 #include "apparmor-util.h"
45 #endif
46 #include "async.h"
47 #include "barrier.h"
48 #include "cap-list.h"
49 #include "capability-util.h"
50 #include "chown-recursive.h"
51 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
52 #include "def.h"
53 #include "env-file.h"
54 #include "env-util.h"
55 #include "errno-list.h"
56 #include "execute.h"
57 #include "exit-status.h"
58 #include "fd-util.h"
59 #include "format-util.h"
60 #include "fs-util.h"
61 #include "glob-util.h"
62 #include "io-util.h"
63 #include "ioprio.h"
64 #include "label.h"
65 #include "log.h"
66 #include "macro.h"
67 #include "manager.h"
68 #include "missing.h"
69 #include "mkdir.h"
70 #include "namespace.h"
71 #include "parse-util.h"
72 #include "path-util.h"
73 #include "process-util.h"
74 #include "rlimit-util.h"
75 #include "rm-rf.h"
76 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
77 #include "seccomp-util.h"
78 #endif
79 #include "securebits-util.h"
80 #include "selinux-util.h"
81 #include "signal-util.h"
82 #include "smack-util.h"
83 #include "socket-util.h"
84 #include "special.h"
85 #include "stat-util.h"
86 #include "string-table.h"
87 #include "string-util.h"
88 #include "strv.h"
89 #include "syslog-util.h"
90 #include "terminal-util.h"
91 #include "umask-util.h"
92 #include "unit.h"
93 #include "user-util.h"
94 #include "util.h"
95 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
96
97 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
98 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
99
100 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
101 #define TTY_MODE 0620
102
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
104
105 static int shift_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) {
106 int start, restart_from;
107
108 if (n_fds <= 0)
109 return 0;
110
111 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
112
113 assert(fds);
114
115 start = 0;
116 for (;;) {
117 int i;
118
119 restart_from = -1;
120
121 for (i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) {
122 int nfd;
123
124 /* Already at right index? */
125 if (fds[i] == i+3)
126 continue;
127
128 nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3);
129 if (nfd < 0)
130 return -errno;
131
132 safe_close(fds[i]);
133 fds[i] = nfd;
134
135 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
136 * let's remember that and try again from here */
137 if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0)
138 restart_from = i;
139 }
140
141 if (restart_from < 0)
142 break;
143
144 start = restart_from;
145 }
146
147 return 0;
148 }
149
150 static int flags_fds(const int fds[], size_t n_socket_fds, size_t n_storage_fds, bool nonblock) {
151 size_t i, n_fds;
152 int r;
153
154 n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds;
155 if (n_fds <= 0)
156 return 0;
157
158 assert(fds);
159
160 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
161 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
162
163 for (i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) {
164
165 if (i < n_socket_fds) {
166 r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock);
167 if (r < 0)
168 return r;
169 }
170
171 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
172 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
173 * children */
174
175 r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false);
176 if (r < 0)
177 return r;
178 }
179
180 return 0;
181 }
182
183 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) {
184 assert(context);
185
186 if (context->stdio_as_fds)
187 return NULL;
188
189 if (context->tty_path)
190 return context->tty_path;
191
192 return "/dev/console";
193 }
194
195 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) {
196 const char *path;
197
198 assert(context);
199
200 path = exec_context_tty_path(context);
201
202 if (context->tty_vhangup) {
203 if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0)
204 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd);
205 else if (path)
206 (void) terminal_vhangup(path);
207 }
208
209 if (context->tty_reset) {
210 if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0)
211 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true);
212 else if (path)
213 (void) reset_terminal(path);
214 }
215
216 if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path)
217 (void) vt_disallocate(path);
218 }
219
220 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) {
221 return IN_SET(i,
222 EXEC_INPUT_TTY,
223 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE,
224 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL);
225 }
226
227 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) {
228 return IN_SET(o,
229 EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY,
230 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
231 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE);
233 }
234
235 static bool is_syslog_output(ExecOutput o) {
236 return IN_SET(o,
237 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG,
238 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE);
239 }
240
241 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o) {
242 return IN_SET(o,
243 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG,
244 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE);
245 }
246
247 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) {
248 assert(c);
249
250 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
251
252 if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input))
253 return true;
254
255 if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output))
256 return true;
257
258 if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error))
259 return true;
260
261 return !!c->tty_path;
262 }
263
264 static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) {
265 int fd;
266
267 assert(nfd >= 0);
268
269 fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY);
270 if (fd < 0)
271 return -errno;
272
273 return move_fd(fd, nfd, false);
274 }
275
276 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
277 static const union sockaddr_union sa = {
278 .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
279 .un.sun_path = "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
280 };
281 uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID;
282 gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID;
283 int r;
284
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid)) {
286 oldgid = getgid();
287
288 if (setegid(gid) < 0)
289 return -errno;
290 }
291
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid)) {
293 olduid = getuid();
294
295 if (seteuid(uid) < 0) {
296 r = -errno;
297 goto restore_gid;
298 }
299 }
300
301 r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa.un)) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
302
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
305
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid);
308
309 restore_gid:
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid);
312
313 return r;
314 }
315
316 static int connect_logger_as(
317 const Unit *unit,
318 const ExecContext *context,
319 const ExecParameters *params,
320 ExecOutput output,
321 const char *ident,
322 int nfd,
323 uid_t uid,
324 gid_t gid) {
325
326 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
327 int r;
328
329 assert(context);
330 assert(params);
331 assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX);
332 assert(ident);
333 assert(nfd >= 0);
334
335 fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
336 if (fd < 0)
337 return -errno;
338
339 r = connect_journal_socket(fd, uid, gid);
340 if (r < 0)
341 return r;
342
343 if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0)
344 return -errno;
345
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE);
347
348 if (dprintf(fd,
349 "%s\n"
350 "%s\n"
351 "%i\n"
352 "%i\n"
353 "%i\n"
354 "%i\n"
355 "%i\n",
356 context->syslog_identifier ?: ident,
357 params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? unit->id : "",
358 context->syslog_priority,
359 !!context->syslog_level_prefix,
360 is_syslog_output(output),
361 is_kmsg_output(output),
362 is_terminal_output(output)) < 0)
363 return -errno;
364
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd), nfd, false);
366 }
367
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, int flags, int nfd) {
369 int fd;
370
371 assert(path);
372 assert(nfd >= 0);
373
374 fd = open_terminal(path, flags | O_NOCTTY);
375 if (fd < 0)
376 return fd;
377
378 return move_fd(fd, nfd, false);
379 }
380
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa = {};
383 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
384 int r, salen;
385
386 assert(path);
387
388 if (IN_SET(flags & O_ACCMODE, O_WRONLY, O_RDWR))
389 flags |= O_CREAT;
390
391 fd = open(path, flags|O_NOCTTY, mode);
392 if (fd >= 0)
393 return TAKE_FD(fd);
394
395 if (errno != ENXIO) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
396 return -errno;
397 if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(sa.un.sun_path)) /* Too long, can't be a UNIX socket */
398 return -ENXIO;
399
400 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
401
402 fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
403 if (fd < 0)
404 return -errno;
405
406 salen = sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa.un, path);
407 if (salen < 0)
408 return salen;
409
410 if (connect(fd, &sa.sa, salen) < 0)
411 return errno == EINVAL ? -ENXIO : -errno; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
413
414 if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
415 r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR);
416 else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
417 r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD);
418 else
419 return TAKE_FD(fd);
420 if (r < 0)
421 return -errno;
422
423 return TAKE_FD(fd);
424 }
425
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext *context,
428 int socket_fd,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin) {
430
431 ExecInput std_input;
432
433 assert(context);
434
435 std_input = context->std_input;
436
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
439
440 if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
442
443 if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_DATA && context->stdin_data_size == 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
445
446 return std_input;
447 }
448
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) {
450
451 if (std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT;
453
454 return std_output;
455 }
456
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext *context,
459 const ExecParameters *params,
460 int socket_fd,
461 int named_iofds[3]) {
462
463 ExecInput i;
464
465 assert(context);
466 assert(params);
467
468 if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) {
469 if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
470 return -errno;
471
472 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
473 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
474 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE);
475 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true);
476 }
477
478 return STDIN_FILENO;
479 }
480
481 i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN);
482
483 switch (i) {
484
485 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL:
486 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO);
487
488 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY:
489 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE:
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: {
491 int fd;
492
493 fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context),
494 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY :
495 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE :
496 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT,
497 USEC_INFINITY);
498 if (fd < 0)
499 return fd;
500
501 return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false);
502 }
503
504 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET:
505 assert(socket_fd >= 0);
506
507 return dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
508
509 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD:
510 assert(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] >= 0);
511
512 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], false);
513 return dup2(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
514
515 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA: {
516 int fd;
517
518 fd = acquire_data_fd(context->stdin_data, context->stdin_data_size, 0);
519 if (fd < 0)
520 return fd;
521
522 return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false);
523 }
524
525 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: {
526 bool rw;
527 int fd;
528
529 assert(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]);
530
531 rw = (context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO])) ||
532 (context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]));
533
534 fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], rw ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY, 0666 & ~context->umask);
535 if (fd < 0)
536 return fd;
537
538 return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false);
539 }
540
541 default:
542 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
543 }
544 }
545
546 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
547 const ExecContext *context,
548 ExecOutput o,
549 ExecOutput e) {
550
551 assert(context);
552
553 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
554 * stderr fd */
555
556 if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT)
557 return true;
558 if (e != o)
559 return false;
560
561 if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD)
562 return streq_ptr(context->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]);
563
564 if (IN_SET(e, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND))
565 return streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]);
566
567 return true;
568 }
569
570 static int setup_output(
571 const Unit *unit,
572 const ExecContext *context,
573 const ExecParameters *params,
574 int fileno,
575 int socket_fd,
576 int named_iofds[3],
577 const char *ident,
578 uid_t uid,
579 gid_t gid,
580 dev_t *journal_stream_dev,
581 ino_t *journal_stream_ino) {
582
583 ExecOutput o;
584 ExecInput i;
585 int r;
586
587 assert(unit);
588 assert(context);
589 assert(params);
590 assert(ident);
591 assert(journal_stream_dev);
592 assert(journal_stream_ino);
593
594 if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) {
595
596 if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
597 return -errno;
598
599 return STDOUT_FILENO;
600 }
601
602 if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) {
603 if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0)
604 return -errno;
605
606 return STDERR_FILENO;
607 }
608
609 i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN);
610 o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd);
611
612 if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) {
613 ExecOutput e;
614 e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd);
615
616 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
617
618 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
619 * the way and are not on a tty */
620 if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
621 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
622 i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL &&
623 !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) &&
624 getppid () != 1)
625 return fileno;
626
627 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
628 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context, o, e))
629 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
630
631 o = e;
632
633 } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) {
634 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
635 if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input))
636 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
637
638 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
639 if (!IN_SET(i, EXEC_INPUT_NULL, EXEC_INPUT_DATA))
640 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
641
642 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
643 if (getppid() != 1)
644 return fileno;
645
646 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
647 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
648 }
649
650 switch (o) {
651
652 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL:
653 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
654
655 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY:
656 if (is_terminal_input(i))
657 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
658
659 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
660 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
661
662 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG:
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL:
667 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE:
668 r = connect_logger_as(unit, context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid);
669 if (r < 0) {
670 log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr");
671 r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
672 } else {
673 struct stat st;
674
675 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
676 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
677 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
678 *
679 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
680 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
681
682 if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0 &&
683 (*journal_stream_ino == 0 || fileno == STDERR_FILENO)) {
684 *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev;
685 *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino;
686 }
687 }
688 return r;
689
690 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET:
691 assert(socket_fd >= 0);
692
693 return dup2(socket_fd, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
694
695 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD:
696 assert(named_iofds[fileno] >= 0);
697
698 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[fileno], false);
699 return dup2(named_iofds[fileno], fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
700
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: {
703 bool rw;
704 int fd, flags;
705
706 assert(context->stdio_file[fileno]);
707
708 rw = context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE &&
709 streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[fileno], context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]);
710
711 if (rw)
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
713
714 flags = O_WRONLY;
715 if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND)
716 flags |= O_APPEND;
717
718 fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[fileno], flags, 0666 & ~context->umask);
719 if (fd < 0)
720 return fd;
721
722 return move_fd(fd, fileno, 0);
723 }
724
725 default:
726 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
727 }
728 }
729
730 static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) {
731 struct stat st;
732
733 assert(fd >= 0);
734
735 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
736 if (isatty(fd) < 1)
737 return 0;
738
739 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
740 (void) fchown(fd, uid, -1);
741 (void) fchmod(fd, TTY_MODE);
742
743 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
744 return -errno;
745
746 if (st.st_uid != uid || (st.st_mode & 0777) != TTY_MODE)
747 return -EPERM;
748
749 return 0;
750 }
751
752 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc, int *_saved_stdin, int *_saved_stdout) {
753 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, saved_stdin = -1, saved_stdout = -1;
754 int r;
755
756 assert(_saved_stdin);
757 assert(_saved_stdout);
758
759 saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
760 if (saved_stdin < 0)
761 return -errno;
762
763 saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
764 if (saved_stdout < 0)
765 return -errno;
766
767 fd = acquire_terminal(vc, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC);
768 if (fd < 0)
769 return fd;
770
771 r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid());
772 if (r < 0)
773 return r;
774
775 r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true);
776 if (r < 0)
777 return r;
778
779 r = rearrange_stdio(fd, fd, STDERR_FILENO);
780 fd = -1;
781 if (r < 0)
782 return r;
783
784 *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin;
785 *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout;
786
787 saved_stdin = saved_stdout = -1;
788
789 return 0;
790 }
791
792 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const Unit *u) {
793 assert(err < 0);
794
795 if (err == -ETIMEDOUT)
796 dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u->id);
797 else {
798 errno = -err;
799 dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u->id);
800 }
801 }
802
803 static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const Unit *u) {
804 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
805
806 assert(vc);
807
808 fd = open_terminal(vc, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
809 if (fd < 0)
810 return;
811
812 write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, u);
813 }
814
815 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) {
816 int r = 0;
817
818 assert(saved_stdin);
819 assert(saved_stdout);
820
821 release_terminal();
822
823 if (*saved_stdin >= 0)
824 if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
825 r = -errno;
826
827 if (*saved_stdout >= 0)
828 if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
829 r = -errno;
830
831 *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin);
832 *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout);
833
834 return r;
835 }
836
837 enum {
838 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE = -1,
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS = 0,
840 CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1,
841 };
842
843 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc, Unit *u, const char *cmdline) {
844 int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r;
845 _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL;
846 char c;
847
848 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
849 r = setup_confirm_stdio(vc, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
850 if (r < 0) {
851 write_confirm_error(r, vc, u);
852 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE;
853 }
854
855 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
856 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u->manager)) {
857 r = 1;
858 goto restore_stdio;
859 }
860
861 e = ellipsize(cmdline, 60, 100);
862 if (!e) {
863 log_oom();
864 r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE;
865 goto restore_stdio;
866 }
867
868 for (;;) {
869 r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e);
870 if (r < 0) {
871 write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, u);
872 r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE;
873 goto restore_stdio;
874 }
875
876 switch (c) {
877 case 'c':
878 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
879 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
880 r = 1;
881 break;
882 case 'D':
883 unit_dump(u, stdout, " ");
884 continue; /* ask again */
885 case 'f':
886 printf("Failing execution.\n");
887 r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE;
888 break;
889 case 'h':
890 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
891 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
892 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
893 " h - help\n"
894 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
895 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
896 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
897 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
898 continue; /* ask again */
899 case 'i':
900 printf(" Description: %s\n"
901 " Unit: %s\n"
902 " Command: %s\n",
903 u->id, u->description, cmdline);
904 continue; /* ask again */
905 case 'j':
906 manager_dump_jobs(u->manager, stdout, " ");
907 continue; /* ask again */
908 case 'n':
909 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
910 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
911 continue; /* ask again */
912 case 's':
913 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
914 r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS;
915 break;
916 case 'y':
917 r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE;
918 break;
919 default:
920 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
921 }
922 break;
923 }
924
925 restore_stdio:
926 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
927 return r;
928 }
929
930 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext *c, const char **user,
931 uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid,
932 const char **home, const char **shell) {
933 int r;
934 const char *name;
935
936 assert(c);
937
938 if (!c->user)
939 return 0;
940
941 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
942 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
943
944 name = c->user;
945 r = get_user_creds(&name, uid, gid, home, shell, USER_CREDS_CLEAN);
946 if (r < 0)
947 return r;
948
949 *user = name;
950 return 0;
951 }
952
953 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext *c, const char **group, gid_t *gid) {
954 int r;
955 const char *name;
956
957 assert(c);
958
959 if (!c->group)
960 return 0;
961
962 name = c->group;
963 r = get_group_creds(&name, gid, 0);
964 if (r < 0)
965 return r;
966
967 *group = name;
968 return 0;
969 }
970
971 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c, const char *user,
972 const char *group, gid_t gid,
973 gid_t **supplementary_gids, int *ngids) {
974 char **i;
975 int r, k = 0;
976 int ngroups_max;
977 bool keep_groups = false;
978 gid_t *groups = NULL;
979 _cleanup_free_ gid_t *l_gids = NULL;
980
981 assert(c);
982
983 /*
984 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
985 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
986 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
987 * groups of the caller.
988 */
989 if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) {
990 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
991 if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0)
992 return -errno;
993
994 keep_groups = true;
995 }
996
997 if (strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups))
998 return 0;
999
1000 /*
1001 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1002 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1003 */
1004 errno = 0;
1005 ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX);
1006 if (ngroups_max <= 0) {
1007 if (errno > 0)
1008 return -errno;
1009 else
1010 return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* For all other values */
1011 }
1012
1013 l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max);
1014 if (!l_gids)
1015 return -ENOMEM;
1016
1017 if (keep_groups) {
1018 /*
1019 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1020 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1021 */
1022 k = ngroups_max;
1023 if (getgrouplist(user, gid, l_gids, &k) < 0)
1024 return -EINVAL;
1025 } else
1026 k = 0;
1027
1028 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->supplementary_groups) {
1029 const char *g;
1030
1031 if (k >= ngroups_max)
1032 return -E2BIG;
1033
1034 g = *i;
1035 r = get_group_creds(&g, l_gids+k, 0);
1036 if (r < 0)
1037 return r;
1038
1039 k++;
1040 }
1041
1042 /*
1043 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1044 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1045 */
1046 if (k == 0) {
1047 *ngids = 0;
1048 return 0;
1049 }
1050
1051 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1052 groups = memdup(l_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * k);
1053 if (!groups)
1054 return -ENOMEM;
1055
1056 *supplementary_gids = groups;
1057 *ngids = k;
1058
1059 groups = NULL;
1060
1061 return 0;
1062 }
1063
1064 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, int ngids) {
1065 int r;
1066
1067 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1068 if (ngids > 0) {
1069 r = maybe_setgroups(ngids, supplementary_gids);
1070 if (r < 0)
1071 return r;
1072 }
1073
1074 if (gid_is_valid(gid)) {
1075 /* Then set our gids */
1076 if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
1077 return -errno;
1078 }
1079
1080 return 0;
1081 }
1082
1083 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
1084 assert(context);
1085
1086 if (!uid_is_valid(uid))
1087 return 0;
1088
1089 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1090 * capabilities while doing so. */
1091
1092 if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
1093
1094 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1095 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1096 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1097 if (uid != 0) {
1098 int sb = context->secure_bits | 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
1099
1100 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != sb)
1101 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0)
1102 return -errno;
1103 }
1104 }
1105
1106 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1107 if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
1108 return -errno;
1109
1110 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1111 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1112 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1113 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1114
1115 return 0;
1116 }
1117
1118 #if HAVE_PAM
1119
1120 static int null_conv(
1121 int num_msg,
1122 const struct pam_message **msg,
1123 struct pam_response **resp,
1124 void *appdata_ptr) {
1125
1126 /* We don't support conversations */
1127
1128 return PAM_CONV_ERR;
1129 }
1130
1131 #endif
1132
1133 static int setup_pam(
1134 const char *name,
1135 const char *user,
1136 uid_t uid,
1137 gid_t gid,
1138 const char *tty,
1139 char ***env,
1140 int fds[], size_t n_fds) {
1141
1142 #if HAVE_PAM
1143
1144 static const struct pam_conv conv = {
1145 .conv = null_conv,
1146 .appdata_ptr = NULL
1147 };
1148
1149 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL;
1150 pam_handle_t *handle = NULL;
1151 sigset_t old_ss;
1152 int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r;
1153 char **nv, **e = NULL;
1154 bool close_session = false;
1155 pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid;
1156 int flags = 0;
1157
1158 assert(name);
1159 assert(user);
1160 assert(env);
1161
1162 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1163 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1164 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1165 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1166 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1167 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1168
1169 r = barrier_create(&barrier);
1170 if (r < 0)
1171 goto fail;
1172
1173 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG)
1174 flags |= PAM_SILENT;
1175
1176 pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle);
1177 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
1178 handle = NULL;
1179 goto fail;
1180 }
1181
1182 if (!tty) {
1183 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
1184
1185 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1186 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1187
1188 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO, &q) >= 0)
1189 tty = strjoina("/dev/", q);
1190 }
1191
1192 if (tty) {
1193 pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
1194 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
1195 goto fail;
1196 }
1197
1198 STRV_FOREACH(nv, *env) {
1199 pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *nv);
1200 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
1201 goto fail;
1202 }
1203
1204 pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags);
1205 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
1206 goto fail;
1207
1208 pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags);
1209 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
1210 goto fail;
1211
1212 close_session = true;
1213
1214 e = pam_getenvlist(handle);
1215 if (!e) {
1216 pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR;
1217 goto fail;
1218 }
1219
1220 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1221 * the child */
1222
1223 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0);
1224
1225 parent_pid = getpid_cached();
1226
1227 r = safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid);
1228 if (r < 0)
1229 goto fail;
1230 if (r == 0) {
1231 int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM;
1232
1233 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1234 * termination */
1235 barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD);
1236
1237 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
1238 * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1239 (void) close_many(fds, n_fds);
1240
1241 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1242 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1243 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1244 * to fail to exit normally */
1245
1246 r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL);
1247 if (r < 0)
1248 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1249 if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
1250 log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1251 if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
1252 log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1253
1254 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
1255
1256 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1257 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1258 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1259 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1260 * to do the rest for us. */
1261 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0)
1262 goto child_finish;
1263
1264 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1265 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1266 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1267 *
1268 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1269 * return failure here. */
1270 (void) barrier_place(&barrier);
1271
1272 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1273 if (getppid() == parent_pid) {
1274 sigset_t ss;
1275
1276 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0);
1277 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0);
1278
1279 for (;;) {
1280 if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) {
1281 if (errno == EINTR)
1282 continue;
1283
1284 goto child_finish;
1285 }
1286
1287 assert(sig == SIGTERM);
1288 break;
1289 }
1290 }
1291
1292 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1293 if (getppid() != parent_pid) {
1294 pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
1295 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
1296 goto child_finish;
1297 }
1298
1299 ret = 0;
1300
1301 child_finish:
1302 pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
1303 _exit(ret);
1304 }
1305
1306 barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT);
1307
1308 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1309 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1310 handle = NULL;
1311
1312 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1313 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0);
1314
1315 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1316 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1317 closelog();
1318
1319 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1320 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1321 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier))
1322 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1323
1324 return strv_free_and_replace(*env, e);
1325
1326 fail:
1327 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
1328 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code));
1329 r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1330 } else
1331 log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m");
1332
1333 if (handle) {
1334 if (close_session)
1335 pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
1336
1337 pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
1338 }
1339
1340 strv_free(e);
1341 closelog();
1342
1343 return r;
1344 #else
1345 return 0;
1346 #endif
1347 }
1348
1349 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
1350 char process_name[11];
1351 const char *p;
1352 size_t l;
1353
1354 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1355 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1356
1357 p = basename(path);
1358 if (isempty(p)) {
1359 rename_process("(...)");
1360 return;
1361 }
1362
1363 l = strlen(p);
1364 if (l > 8) {
1365 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1366 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1367 * "systemd-" */
1368 p = p + l - 8;
1369 l = 8;
1370 }
1371
1372 process_name[0] = '(';
1373 memcpy(process_name+1, p, l);
1374 process_name[1+l] = ')';
1375 process_name[1+l+1] = 0;
1376
1377 rename_process(process_name);
1378 }
1379
1380 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
1381 assert(c);
1382
1383 return c->address_families_whitelist ||
1384 !set_isempty(c->address_families);
1385 }
1386
1387 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) {
1388 assert(c);
1389
1390 return c->syscall_whitelist ||
1391 !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter);
1392 }
1393
1394 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
1395 assert(c);
1396
1397 if (c->no_new_privileges)
1398 return true;
1399
1400 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1401 return false;
1402
1403 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1404 return context_has_address_families(c) ||
1405 c->memory_deny_write_execute ||
1406 c->restrict_realtime ||
1407 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) ||
1408 c->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1409 c->protect_kernel_modules ||
1410 c->private_devices ||
1411 context_has_syscall_filters(c) ||
1412 !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) ||
1413 c->lock_personality ||
1414 c->protect_hostname;
1415 }
1416
1417 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
1418
1419 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) {
1420
1421 if (is_seccomp_available())
1422 return false;
1423
1424 log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg);
1425 return true;
1426 }
1427
1428 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ambient_hack) {
1429 uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action;
1430 int r;
1431
1432 assert(u);
1433 assert(c);
1434
1435 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c))
1436 return 0;
1437
1438 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallFilter="))
1439 return 0;
1440
1441 negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno);
1442
1443 if (c->syscall_whitelist) {
1444 default_action = negative_action;
1445 action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW;
1446 } else {
1447 default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW;
1448 action = negative_action;
1449 }
1450
1451 if (needs_ambient_hack) {
1452 r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_whitelist, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID);
1453 if (r < 0)
1454 return r;
1455 }
1456
1457 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false);
1458 }
1459
1460 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
1461 assert(u);
1462 assert(c);
1463
1464 if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs))
1465 return 0;
1466
1467 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1468 return 0;
1469
1470 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs);
1471 }
1472
1473 static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
1474 assert(u);
1475 assert(c);
1476
1477 if (!context_has_address_families(c))
1478 return 0;
1479
1480 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1481 return 0;
1482
1483 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_whitelist);
1484 }
1485
1486 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
1487 assert(u);
1488 assert(c);
1489
1490 if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute)
1491 return 0;
1492
1493 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1494 return 0;
1495
1496 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1497 }
1498
1499 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
1500 assert(u);
1501 assert(c);
1502
1503 if (!c->restrict_realtime)
1504 return 0;
1505
1506 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime="))
1507 return 0;
1508
1509 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1510 }
1511
1512 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
1513 assert(u);
1514 assert(c);
1515
1516 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1517 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1518
1519 if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables)
1520 return 0;
1521
1522 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1523 return 0;
1524
1525 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1526 }
1527
1528 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
1529 assert(u);
1530 assert(c);
1531
1532 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1533
1534 if (!c->protect_kernel_modules)
1535 return 0;
1536
1537 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1538 return 0;
1539
1540 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false);
1541 }
1542
1543 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
1544 assert(u);
1545 assert(c);
1546
1547 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1548
1549 if (!c->private_devices)
1550 return 0;
1551
1552 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices="))
1553 return 0;
1554
1555 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false);
1556 }
1557
1558 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
1559 assert(u);
1560 assert(c);
1561
1562 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c))
1563 return 0;
1564
1565 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1566 return 0;
1567
1568 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces);
1569 }
1570
1571 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
1572 unsigned long personality;
1573 int r;
1574
1575 assert(u);
1576 assert(c);
1577
1578 if (!c->lock_personality)
1579 return 0;
1580
1581 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "LockPersonality="))
1582 return 0;
1583
1584 personality = c->personality;
1585
1586 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1587 if (personality == PERSONALITY_INVALID) {
1588
1589 r = opinionated_personality(&personality);
1590 if (r < 0)
1591 return r;
1592 }
1593
1594 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality);
1595 }
1596
1597 #endif
1598
1599 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) {
1600 assert(idle_pipe);
1601
1602 idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
1603 idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
1604
1605 if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) {
1606 int r;
1607
1608 r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC);
1609
1610 if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) {
1611 ssize_t n;
1612
1613 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1614 n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1);
1615 if (n > 0)
1616 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1617 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC);
1618 }
1619
1620 idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]);
1621
1622 }
1623
1624 idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]);
1625 }
1626
1627 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t);
1628
1629 static int build_environment(
1630 const Unit *u,
1631 const ExecContext *c,
1632 const ExecParameters *p,
1633 size_t n_fds,
1634 const char *home,
1635 const char *username,
1636 const char *shell,
1637 dev_t journal_stream_dev,
1638 ino_t journal_stream_ino,
1639 char ***ret) {
1640
1641 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL;
1642 ExecDirectoryType t;
1643 size_t n_env = 0;
1644 char *x;
1645
1646 assert(u);
1647 assert(c);
1648 assert(p);
1649 assert(ret);
1650
1651 our_env = new0(char*, 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX);
1652 if (!our_env)
1653 return -ENOMEM;
1654
1655 if (n_fds > 0) {
1656 _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL;
1657
1658 if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1659 return -ENOMEM;
1660 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1661
1662 if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds) < 0)
1663 return -ENOMEM;
1664 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1665
1666 joined = strv_join(p->fd_names, ":");
1667 if (!joined)
1668 return -ENOMEM;
1669
1670 x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined);
1671 if (!x)
1672 return -ENOMEM;
1673 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1674 }
1675
1676 if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) {
1677 if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1678 return -ENOMEM;
1679 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1680
1681 if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0)
1682 return -ENOMEM;
1683 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1684 }
1685
1686 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1687 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1688 * check the database directly. */
1689 if (p->flags & EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS) {
1690 x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1691 if (!x)
1692 return -ENOMEM;
1693 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1694 }
1695
1696 if (home) {
1697 x = strappend("HOME=", home);
1698 if (!x)
1699 return -ENOMEM;
1700 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1701 }
1702
1703 if (username) {
1704 x = strappend("LOGNAME=", username);
1705 if (!x)
1706 return -ENOMEM;
1707 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1708
1709 x = strappend("USER=", username);
1710 if (!x)
1711 return -ENOMEM;
1712 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1713 }
1714
1715 if (shell) {
1716 x = strappend("SHELL=", shell);
1717 if (!x)
1718 return -ENOMEM;
1719 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1720 }
1721
1722 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) {
1723 if (asprintf(&x, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u->invocation_id)) < 0)
1724 return -ENOMEM;
1725
1726 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1727 }
1728
1729 if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) {
1730 const char *tty_path, *term = NULL;
1731
1732 tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c);
1733
1734 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1735 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1736 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1737
1738 if (path_equal(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1739 term = getenv("TERM");
1740 if (!term)
1741 term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path);
1742
1743 x = strappend("TERM=", term);
1744 if (!x)
1745 return -ENOMEM;
1746 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1747 }
1748
1749 if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) {
1750 if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0)
1751 return -ENOMEM;
1752
1753 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1754 }
1755
1756 for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) {
1757 _cleanup_free_ char *pre = NULL, *joined = NULL;
1758 const char *n;
1759
1760 if (!p->prefix[t])
1761 continue;
1762
1763 if (strv_isempty(c->directories[t].paths))
1764 continue;
1765
1766 n = exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t);
1767 if (!n)
1768 continue;
1769
1770 pre = strjoin(p->prefix[t], "/");
1771 if (!pre)
1772 return -ENOMEM;
1773
1774 joined = strv_join_prefix(c->directories[t].paths, ":", pre);
1775 if (!joined)
1776 return -ENOMEM;
1777
1778 x = strjoin(n, "=", joined);
1779 if (!x)
1780 return -ENOMEM;
1781
1782 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1783 }
1784
1785 our_env[n_env++] = NULL;
1786 assert(n_env <= 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX);
1787
1788 *ret = TAKE_PTR(our_env);
1789
1790 return 0;
1791 }
1792
1793 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) {
1794 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL;
1795 size_t n_env = 0, n_bufsize = 0;
1796 char **i;
1797
1798 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) {
1799 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
1800 char *v;
1801
1802 v = getenv(*i);
1803 if (!v)
1804 continue;
1805 x = strjoin(*i, "=", v);
1806 if (!x)
1807 return -ENOMEM;
1808
1809 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_bufsize, n_env + 2))
1810 return -ENOMEM;
1811
1812 pass_env[n_env++] = TAKE_PTR(x);
1813 pass_env[n_env] = NULL;
1814 }
1815
1816 *ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env);
1817
1818 return 0;
1819 }
1820
1821 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1822 const ExecContext *context,
1823 const ExecParameters *params,
1824 const ExecRuntime *runtime) {
1825
1826 assert(context);
1827 assert(params);
1828
1829 if (context->root_image)
1830 return true;
1831
1832 if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) ||
1833 !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) ||
1834 !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths))
1835 return true;
1836
1837 if (context->n_bind_mounts > 0)
1838 return true;
1839
1840 if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0)
1841 return true;
1842
1843 if (!IN_SET(context->mount_flags, 0, MS_SHARED))
1844 return true;
1845
1846 if (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir))
1847 return true;
1848
1849 if (context->private_devices ||
1850 context->private_mounts ||
1851 context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
1852 context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO ||
1853 context->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1854 context->protect_kernel_modules ||
1855 context->protect_control_groups)
1856 return true;
1857
1858 if (context->root_directory) {
1859 ExecDirectoryType t;
1860
1861 if (context->mount_apivfs)
1862 return true;
1863
1864 for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) {
1865 if (!params->prefix[t])
1866 continue;
1867
1868 if (!strv_isempty(context->directories[t].paths))
1869 return true;
1870 }
1871 }
1872
1873 if (context->dynamic_user &&
1874 (!strv_isempty(context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE].paths) ||
1875 !strv_isempty(context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE].paths) ||
1876 !strv_isempty(context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].paths)))
1877 return true;
1878
1879 return false;
1880 }
1881
1882 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
1883 _cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL;
1884 _cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = { -1, -1 };
1885 _cleanup_close_ int unshare_ready_fd = -1;
1886 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0;
1887 uint64_t c = 1;
1888 ssize_t n;
1889 int r;
1890
1891 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1892 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1893 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1894 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1895 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1896 * continues execution normally. */
1897
1898 if (uid != 0 && uid_is_valid(uid)) {
1899 r = asprintf(&uid_map,
1900 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1901 UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1902 uid, uid);
1903 if (r < 0)
1904 return -ENOMEM;
1905 } else {
1906 uid_map = strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1907 if (!uid_map)
1908 return -ENOMEM;
1909 }
1910
1911 if (gid != 0 && gid_is_valid(gid)) {
1912 r = asprintf(&gid_map,
1913 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1914 GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1915 gid, gid);
1916 if (r < 0)
1917 return -ENOMEM;
1918 } else {
1919 gid_map = strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1920 if (!gid_map)
1921 return -ENOMEM;
1922 }
1923
1924 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1925 * namespace. */
1926 unshare_ready_fd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
1927 if (unshare_ready_fd < 0)
1928 return -errno;
1929
1930 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1931 * failed. */
1932 if (pipe2(errno_pipe, O_CLOEXEC) < 0)
1933 return -errno;
1934
1935 r = safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_DEATHSIG, &pid);
1936 if (r < 0)
1937 return r;
1938 if (r == 0) {
1939 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
1940 const char *a;
1941 pid_t ppid;
1942
1943 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1944 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1945
1946 ppid = getppid();
1947 errno_pipe[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe[0]);
1948
1949 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1950 if (read(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) {
1951 r = -errno;
1952 goto child_fail;
1953 }
1954
1955 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1956 a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "setgroups");
1957 fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
1958 if (fd < 0) {
1959 if (errno != ENOENT) {
1960 r = -errno;
1961 goto child_fail;
1962 }
1963
1964 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1965 } else {
1966 if (write(fd, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1967 r = -errno;
1968 goto child_fail;
1969 }
1970
1971 fd = safe_close(fd);
1972 }
1973
1974 /* First write the GID map */
1975 a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "gid_map");
1976 fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
1977 if (fd < 0) {
1978 r = -errno;
1979 goto child_fail;
1980 }
1981 if (write(fd, gid_map, strlen(gid_map)) < 0) {
1982 r = -errno;
1983 goto child_fail;
1984 }
1985 fd = safe_close(fd);
1986
1987 /* The write the UID map */
1988 a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "uid_map");
1989 fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
1990 if (fd < 0) {
1991 r = -errno;
1992 goto child_fail;
1993 }
1994 if (write(fd, uid_map, strlen(uid_map)) < 0) {
1995 r = -errno;
1996 goto child_fail;
1997 }
1998
1999 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
2000
2001 child_fail:
2002 (void) write(errno_pipe[1], &r, sizeof(r));
2003 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
2004 }
2005
2006 errno_pipe[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe[1]);
2007
2008 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0)
2009 return -errno;
2010
2011 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2012 if (write(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0)
2013 return -errno;
2014
2015 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2016 n = read(errno_pipe[0], &r, sizeof(r));
2017 if (n < 0)
2018 return -errno;
2019 if (n == sizeof(r)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2020 if (r < 0)
2021 return r;
2022 return -EIO;
2023 }
2024 if (n != 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2025 return -EIO;
2026
2027 r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid, 0);
2028 pid = 0;
2029 if (r < 0)
2030 return r;
2031 if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2032 return -EIO;
2033
2034 return 0;
2035 }
2036
2037 static int setup_exec_directory(
2038 const ExecContext *context,
2039 const ExecParameters *params,
2040 uid_t uid,
2041 gid_t gid,
2042 ExecDirectoryType type,
2043 int *exit_status) {
2044
2045 static const int exit_status_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = {
2046 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY,
2047 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY,
2048 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY,
2049 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY,
2050 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY,
2051 };
2052 char **rt;
2053 int r;
2054
2055 assert(context);
2056 assert(params);
2057 assert(type >= 0 && type < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX);
2058 assert(exit_status);
2059
2060 if (!params->prefix[type])
2061 return 0;
2062
2063 if (params->flags & EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES) {
2064 if (!uid_is_valid(uid))
2065 uid = 0;
2066 if (!gid_is_valid(gid))
2067 gid = 0;
2068 }
2069
2070 STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->directories[type].paths) {
2071 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL;
2072
2073 p = strjoin(params->prefix[type], "/", *rt);
2074 if (!p) {
2075 r = -ENOMEM;
2076 goto fail;
2077 }
2078
2079 r = mkdir_parents_label(p, 0755);
2080 if (r < 0)
2081 goto fail;
2082
2083 if (context->dynamic_user &&
2084 !IN_SET(type, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION)) {
2085 _cleanup_free_ char *private_root = NULL;
2086
2087 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that case we
2088 * want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by a dynamic user
2089 * whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same trick used by container
2090 * managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of the same UID in containers: we
2091 * place everything inside a directory that has an access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root,
2092 * so that it acts as security boundary for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing
2093 * to make this directory permeable for the service itself.
2094 *
2095 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create a
2096 * directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place "foo" inside of
2097 * that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to "private/foo". This way,
2098 * privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but unprivileged host users can't look
2099 * into it. Inside of the namespaceof the container "private/" is replaced by a more liberally
2100 * accessible tmpfs, into which the host's "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus
2101 * disabling the access boundary for the service and making sure it only gets access to the
2102 * dirs it needs but no others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2103 *
2104 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not to be
2105 * owned by the service itself.
2106 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used for sharing
2107 * files or sockets with other services. */
2108
2109 private_root = strjoin(params->prefix[type], "/private");
2110 if (!private_root) {
2111 r = -ENOMEM;
2112 goto fail;
2113 }
2114
2115 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2116 r = mkdir_safe_label(private_root, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE);
2117 if (r < 0)
2118 goto fail;
2119
2120 pp = strjoin(private_root, "/", *rt);
2121 if (!pp) {
2122 r = -ENOMEM;
2123 goto fail;
2124 }
2125
2126 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2127 r = mkdir_parents_label(pp, 0755);
2128 if (r < 0)
2129 goto fail;
2130
2131 if (is_dir(p, false) > 0 &&
2132 (laccess(pp, F_OK) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)) {
2133
2134 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2135 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2136 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2137
2138 if (rename(p, pp) < 0) {
2139 r = -errno;
2140 goto fail;
2141 }
2142 } else {
2143 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2144
2145 r = mkdir_label(pp, context->directories[type].mode);
2146 if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
2147 goto fail;
2148 }
2149
2150 /* And link it up from the original place */
2151 r = symlink_idempotent(pp, p, true);
2152 if (r < 0)
2153 goto fail;
2154
2155 /* Lock down the access mode */
2156 if (chmod(pp, context->directories[type].mode) < 0) {
2157 r = -errno;
2158 goto fail;
2159 }
2160 } else {
2161 r = mkdir_label(p, context->directories[type].mode);
2162 if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
2163 goto fail;
2164 if (r == -EEXIST) {
2165 struct stat st;
2166
2167 if (stat(p, &st) < 0) {
2168 r = -errno;
2169 goto fail;
2170 }
2171 if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0)
2172 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2173 "(filesystem: %o %sMode: %o)",
2174 exec_directory_type_to_string(type), *rt,
2175 st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777);
2176 if (!context->dynamic_user)
2177 continue;
2178 }
2179 }
2180
2181 /* Don't change the owner of the configuration directory, as in the common case it is not written to by
2182 * a service, and shall not be writable. */
2183 if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION)
2184 continue;
2185
2186 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary */
2187 r = path_chown_recursive(pp ?: p, uid, gid);
2188 if (r < 0)
2189 goto fail;
2190 }
2191
2192 return 0;
2193
2194 fail:
2195 *exit_status = exit_status_table[type];
2196 return r;
2197 }
2198
2199 #if ENABLE_SMACK
2200 static int setup_smack(
2201 const ExecContext *context,
2202 const ExecCommand *command) {
2203
2204 int r;
2205
2206 assert(context);
2207 assert(command);
2208
2209 if (context->smack_process_label) {
2210 r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
2211 if (r < 0)
2212 return r;
2213 }
2214 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2215 else {
2216 _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
2217
2218 r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
2219 if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(r, -ENODATA, -EOPNOTSUPP))
2220 return r;
2221
2222 r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
2223 if (r < 0)
2224 return r;
2225 }
2226 #endif
2227
2228 return 0;
2229 }
2230 #endif
2231
2232 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2233 const ExecContext *context,
2234 const ExecParameters *params,
2235 BindMount **ret_bind_mounts,
2236 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts,
2237 char ***ret_empty_directories) {
2238
2239 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL;
2240 BindMount *bind_mounts;
2241 size_t n, h = 0, i;
2242 ExecDirectoryType t;
2243 int r;
2244
2245 assert(context);
2246 assert(params);
2247 assert(ret_bind_mounts);
2248 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts);
2249 assert(ret_empty_directories);
2250
2251 n = context->n_bind_mounts;
2252 for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) {
2253 if (!params->prefix[t])
2254 continue;
2255
2256 n += strv_length(context->directories[t].paths);
2257 }
2258
2259 if (n <= 0) {
2260 *ret_bind_mounts = NULL;
2261 *ret_n_bind_mounts = 0;
2262 *ret_empty_directories = NULL;
2263 return 0;
2264 }
2265
2266 bind_mounts = new(BindMount, n);
2267 if (!bind_mounts)
2268 return -ENOMEM;
2269
2270 for (i = 0; i < context->n_bind_mounts; i++) {
2271 BindMount *item = context->bind_mounts + i;
2272 char *s, *d;
2273
2274 s = strdup(item->source);
2275 if (!s) {
2276 r = -ENOMEM;
2277 goto finish;
2278 }
2279
2280 d = strdup(item->destination);
2281 if (!d) {
2282 free(s);
2283 r = -ENOMEM;
2284 goto finish;
2285 }
2286
2287 bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) {
2288 .source = s,
2289 .destination = d,
2290 .read_only = item->read_only,
2291 .recursive = item->recursive,
2292 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2293 };
2294 }
2295
2296 for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) {
2297 char **suffix;
2298
2299 if (!params->prefix[t])
2300 continue;
2301
2302 if (strv_isempty(context->directories[t].paths))
2303 continue;
2304
2305 if (context->dynamic_user &&
2306 !IN_SET(t, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) &&
2307 !(context->root_directory || context->root_image)) {
2308 char *private_root;
2309
2310 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
2311 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
2312 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
2313
2314 private_root = strjoin(params->prefix[t], "/private");
2315 if (!private_root) {
2316 r = -ENOMEM;
2317 goto finish;
2318 }
2319
2320 r = strv_consume(&empty_directories, private_root);
2321 if (r < 0)
2322 goto finish;
2323 }
2324
2325 STRV_FOREACH(suffix, context->directories[t].paths) {
2326 char *s, *d;
2327
2328 if (context->dynamic_user &&
2329 !IN_SET(t, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION))
2330 s = strjoin(params->prefix[t], "/private/", *suffix);
2331 else
2332 s = strjoin(params->prefix[t], "/", *suffix);
2333 if (!s) {
2334 r = -ENOMEM;
2335 goto finish;
2336 }
2337
2338 if (context->dynamic_user &&
2339 !IN_SET(t, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) &&
2340 (context->root_directory || context->root_image))
2341 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
2342 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
2343 * on the 'non-private' place. */
2344 d = strjoin(params->prefix[t], "/", *suffix);
2345 else
2346 d = strdup(s);
2347 if (!d) {
2348 free(s);
2349 r = -ENOMEM;
2350 goto finish;
2351 }
2352
2353 bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) {
2354 .source = s,
2355 .destination = d,
2356 .read_only = false,
2357 .recursive = true,
2358 .ignore_enoent = false,
2359 };
2360 }
2361 }
2362
2363 assert(h == n);
2364
2365 *ret_bind_mounts = bind_mounts;
2366 *ret_n_bind_mounts = n;
2367 *ret_empty_directories = TAKE_PTR(empty_directories);
2368
2369 return (int) n;
2370
2371 finish:
2372 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts, h);
2373 return r;
2374 }
2375
2376 static int apply_mount_namespace(
2377 const Unit *u,
2378 const ExecCommand *command,
2379 const ExecContext *context,
2380 const ExecParameters *params,
2381 const ExecRuntime *runtime) {
2382
2383 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL;
2384 char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
2385 const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL;
2386 NamespaceInfo ns_info;
2387 bool needs_sandboxing;
2388 BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL;
2389 size_t n_bind_mounts = 0;
2390 int r;
2391
2392 assert(context);
2393
2394 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2395 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2396 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
2397
2398 if (context->private_tmp && runtime) {
2399 if (runtime->tmp_dir)
2400 tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp");
2401 if (runtime->var_tmp_dir)
2402 var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
2403 }
2404
2405 if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) {
2406 root_image = context->root_image;
2407
2408 if (!root_image)
2409 root_dir = context->root_directory;
2410 }
2411
2412 r = compile_bind_mounts(context, params, &bind_mounts, &n_bind_mounts, &empty_directories);
2413 if (r < 0)
2414 return r;
2415
2416 needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED);
2417 if (needs_sandboxing)
2418 ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {
2419 .ignore_protect_paths = false,
2420 .private_dev = context->private_devices,
2421 .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
2422 .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
2423 .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
2424 .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname,
2425 .mount_apivfs = context->mount_apivfs,
2426 .private_mounts = context->private_mounts,
2427 };
2428 else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir)
2429 /*
2430 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2431 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2432 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2433 */
2434 ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {
2435 .ignore_protect_paths = true,
2436 };
2437 else
2438 ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {};
2439
2440 if (context->mount_flags == MS_SHARED)
2441 log_unit_debug(u, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
2442
2443 r = setup_namespace(root_dir, root_image,
2444 &ns_info, context->read_write_paths,
2445 needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL,
2446 needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL,
2447 empty_directories,
2448 bind_mounts,
2449 n_bind_mounts,
2450 context->temporary_filesystems,
2451 context->n_temporary_filesystems,
2452 tmp,
2453 var,
2454 needs_sandboxing ? context->protect_home : PROTECT_HOME_NO,
2455 needs_sandboxing ? context->protect_system : PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO,
2456 context->mount_flags,
2457 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP);
2458
2459 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
2460
2461 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
2462 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceeed, but only if exclusively
2463 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
2464 * completely different execution environment. */
2465 if (r == -ENOANO) {
2466 if (n_bind_mounts == 0 &&
2467 context->n_temporary_filesystems == 0 &&
2468 !root_dir && !root_image &&
2469 !context->dynamic_user) {
2470 log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
2471 return 0;
2472 }
2473
2474 log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
2475 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
2476 n_bind_mounts, context->n_temporary_filesystems, yes_no(root_dir), yes_no(root_image), yes_no(context->dynamic_user));
2477
2478 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2479 }
2480
2481 return r;
2482 }
2483
2484 static int apply_working_directory(
2485 const ExecContext *context,
2486 const ExecParameters *params,
2487 const char *home,
2488 const bool needs_mount_ns,
2489 int *exit_status) {
2490
2491 const char *d, *wd;
2492
2493 assert(context);
2494 assert(exit_status);
2495
2496 if (context->working_directory_home) {
2497
2498 if (!home) {
2499 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
2500 return -ENXIO;
2501 }
2502
2503 wd = home;
2504
2505 } else if (context->working_directory)
2506 wd = context->working_directory;
2507 else
2508 wd = "/";
2509
2510 if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) {
2511 if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory)
2512 if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
2513 *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
2514 return -errno;
2515 }
2516
2517 d = wd;
2518 } else
2519 d = prefix_roota(context->root_directory, wd);
2520
2521 if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
2522 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
2523 return -errno;
2524 }
2525
2526 return 0;
2527 }
2528
2529 static int setup_keyring(
2530 const Unit *u,
2531 const ExecContext *context,
2532 const ExecParameters *p,
2533 uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
2534
2535 key_serial_t keyring;
2536 int r = 0;
2537 uid_t saved_uid;
2538 gid_t saved_gid;
2539
2540 assert(u);
2541 assert(context);
2542 assert(p);
2543
2544 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
2545 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
2546 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
2547 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
2548 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
2549 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
2550
2551 if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT)
2552 return 0;
2553
2554 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
2555 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
2556 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
2557 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
2558
2559 saved_uid = getuid();
2560 saved_gid = getgid();
2561
2562 if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) {
2563 if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0)
2564 return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
2565 }
2566
2567 if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) {
2568 if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) {
2569 r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
2570 goto out;
2571 }
2572 }
2573
2574 keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2575 if (keyring == -1) {
2576 if (errno == ENOSYS)
2577 log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
2578 else if (IN_SET(errno, EACCES, EPERM))
2579 log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
2580 else if (errno == EDQUOT)
2581 log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
2582 else
2583 r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
2584
2585 goto out;
2586 }
2587
2588 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
2589 if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) {
2590
2591 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK,
2592 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING,
2593 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) {
2594 r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
2595 goto out;
2596 }
2597 }
2598
2599 /* Restore uid/gid back */
2600 if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) {
2601 if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) {
2602 r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
2603 goto out;
2604 }
2605 }
2606
2607 if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) {
2608 if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0)
2609 return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
2610 }
2611
2612 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
2613 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) {
2614 key_serial_t key;
2615
2616 key = add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u->invocation_id, sizeof(u->invocation_id), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
2617 if (key == -1)
2618 log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
2619 else {
2620 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key,
2621 KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH|
2622 KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0)
2623 r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
2624 }
2625 }
2626
2627 out:
2628 /* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */
2629 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
2630 if (getuid() != saved_uid)
2631 (void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1);
2632
2633 if (getgid() != saved_gid)
2634 (void) setregid(saved_gid, -1);
2635
2636 return r;
2637 }
2638
2639 static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) {
2640 assert(array);
2641 assert(n);
2642
2643 if (!pair)
2644 return;
2645
2646 if (pair[0] >= 0)
2647 array[(*n)++] = pair[0];
2648 if (pair[1] >= 0)
2649 array[(*n)++] = pair[1];
2650 }
2651
2652 static int close_remaining_fds(
2653 const ExecParameters *params,
2654 const ExecRuntime *runtime,
2655 const DynamicCreds *dcreds,
2656 int user_lookup_fd,
2657 int socket_fd,
2658 int exec_fd,
2659 int *fds, size_t n_fds) {
2660
2661 size_t n_dont_close = 0;
2662 int dont_close[n_fds + 12];
2663
2664 assert(params);
2665
2666 if (params->stdin_fd >= 0)
2667 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd;
2668 if (params->stdout_fd >= 0)
2669 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd;
2670 if (params->stderr_fd >= 0)
2671 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd;
2672
2673 if (socket_fd >= 0)
2674 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
2675 if (exec_fd >= 0)
2676 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = exec_fd;
2677 if (n_fds > 0) {
2678 memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
2679 n_dont_close += n_fds;
2680 }
2681
2682 if (runtime)
2683 append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->netns_storage_socket);
2684
2685 if (dcreds) {
2686 if (dcreds->user)
2687 append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, dcreds->user->storage_socket);
2688 if (dcreds->group)
2689 append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, dcreds->group->storage_socket);
2690 }
2691
2692 if (user_lookup_fd >= 0)
2693 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = user_lookup_fd;
2694
2695 return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
2696 }
2697
2698 static int send_user_lookup(
2699 Unit *unit,
2700 int user_lookup_fd,
2701 uid_t uid,
2702 gid_t gid) {
2703
2704 assert(unit);
2705
2706 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2707 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2708 * specified. */
2709
2710 if (user_lookup_fd < 0)
2711 return 0;
2712
2713 if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid))
2714 return 0;
2715
2716 if (writev(user_lookup_fd,
2717 (struct iovec[]) {
2718 IOVEC_INIT(&uid, sizeof(uid)),
2719 IOVEC_INIT(&gid, sizeof(gid)),
2720 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit->id) }, 3) < 0)
2721 return -errno;
2722
2723 return 0;
2724 }
2725
2726 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext *c, uid_t uid, const char** home, char **buf) {
2727 int r;
2728
2729 assert(c);
2730 assert(home);
2731 assert(buf);
2732
2733 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
2734
2735 if (*home)
2736 return 0;
2737
2738 if (!c->working_directory_home)
2739 return 0;
2740
2741 if (uid == 0) {
2742 /* Hardcode /root as home directory for UID 0 */
2743 *home = "/root";
2744 return 1;
2745 }
2746
2747 r = get_home_dir(buf);
2748 if (r < 0)
2749 return r;
2750
2751 *home = *buf;
2752 return 1;
2753 }
2754
2755 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, char ***ret) {
2756 _cleanup_strv_free_ char ** list = NULL;
2757 ExecDirectoryType t;
2758 int r;
2759
2760 assert(c);
2761 assert(p);
2762 assert(ret);
2763
2764 assert(c->dynamic_user);
2765
2766 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
2767 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
2768 * directories. */
2769
2770 for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) {
2771 char **i;
2772
2773 if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION)
2774 continue;
2775
2776 if (!p->prefix[t])
2777 continue;
2778
2779 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->directories[t].paths) {
2780 char *e;
2781
2782 if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)
2783 e = strjoin(p->prefix[t], "/", *i);
2784 else
2785 e = strjoin(p->prefix[t], "/private/", *i);
2786 if (!e)
2787 return -ENOMEM;
2788
2789 r = strv_consume(&list, e);
2790 if (r < 0)
2791 return r;
2792 }
2793 }
2794
2795 *ret = TAKE_PTR(list);
2796
2797 return 0;
2798 }
2799
2800 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv);
2801
2802 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters *params, char **ret) {
2803 bool using_subcgroup;
2804 char *p;
2805
2806 assert(params);
2807 assert(ret);
2808
2809 if (!params->cgroup_path)
2810 return -EINVAL;
2811
2812 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
2813 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
2814 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
2815 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
2816 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
2817 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
2818 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
2819 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
2820
2821 using_subcgroup = FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE|EXEC_IS_CONTROL);
2822 if (using_subcgroup)
2823 p = strjoin(params->cgroup_path, "/.control");
2824 else
2825 p = strdup(params->cgroup_path);
2826 if (!p)
2827 return -ENOMEM;
2828
2829 *ret = p;
2830 return using_subcgroup;
2831 }
2832
2833 static int exec_child(
2834 Unit *unit,
2835 const ExecCommand *command,
2836 const ExecContext *context,
2837 const ExecParameters *params,
2838 ExecRuntime *runtime,
2839 DynamicCreds *dcreds,
2840 int socket_fd,
2841 int named_iofds[3],
2842 int *fds,
2843 size_t n_socket_fds,
2844 size_t n_storage_fds,
2845 char **files_env,
2846 int user_lookup_fd,
2847 int *exit_status) {
2848
2849 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
2850 int *fds_with_exec_fd, n_fds_with_exec_fd, r, ngids = 0, exec_fd = -1;
2851 _cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL;
2852 const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL;
2853 _cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL;
2854 const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
2855 dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0;
2856 ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0;
2857 bool needs_sandboxing, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
2858 needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
2859 needs_mount_namespace, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
2860 needs_ambient_hack; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
2861 #if HAVE_SELINUX
2862 _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
2863 bool use_selinux = false;
2864 #endif
2865 #if ENABLE_SMACK
2866 bool use_smack = false;
2867 #endif
2868 #if HAVE_APPARMOR
2869 bool use_apparmor = false;
2870 #endif
2871 uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
2872 gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
2873 size_t n_fds;
2874 ExecDirectoryType dt;
2875 int secure_bits;
2876
2877 assert(unit);
2878 assert(command);
2879 assert(context);
2880 assert(params);
2881 assert(exit_status);
2882
2883 rename_process_from_path(command->path);
2884
2885 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
2886 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
2887 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
2888 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
2889 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
2890 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER,
2891 SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1);
2892
2893 if (context->ignore_sigpipe)
2894 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
2895
2896 r = reset_signal_mask();
2897 if (r < 0) {
2898 *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK;
2899 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
2900 }
2901
2902 if (params->idle_pipe)
2903 do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe);
2904
2905 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
2906 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
2907 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
2908 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
2909
2910 log_forget_fds();
2911 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
2912
2913 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
2914 closelog();
2915
2916 n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds;
2917 r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, dcreds, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, params->exec_fd, fds, n_fds);
2918 if (r < 0) {
2919 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
2920 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
2921 }
2922
2923 if (!context->same_pgrp)
2924 if (setsid() < 0) {
2925 *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID;
2926 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
2927 }
2928
2929 exec_context_tty_reset(context, params);
2930
2931 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) {
2932 const char *vc = params->confirm_spawn;
2933 _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL;
2934
2935 cmdline = exec_command_line(command->argv);
2936 if (!cmdline) {
2937 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
2938 return log_oom();
2939 }
2940
2941 r = ask_for_confirmation(vc, unit, cmdline);
2942 if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) {
2943 if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) {
2944 *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS;
2945 return 0;
2946 }
2947 *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM;
2948 log_unit_error(unit, "Execution cancelled by the user");
2949 return -ECANCELED;
2950 }
2951 }
2952
2953 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
2954 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
2955 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
2956 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
2957 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
2958 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit->id, true) != 0 ||
2959 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit->manager) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
2960 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
2961 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2962 }
2963
2964 if (context->dynamic_user && dcreds) {
2965 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL;
2966
2967 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
2968 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
2969 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
2970 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
2971 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2972 }
2973
2974 r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths);
2975 if (r < 0) {
2976 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
2977 return log_oom();
2978 }
2979
2980 r = dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds, suggested_paths, &uid, &gid);
2981 if (r < 0) {
2982 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
2983 if (r == -EILSEQ) {
2984 log_unit_error(unit, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
2985 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2986 }
2987 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
2988 }
2989
2990 if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) {
2991 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
2992 log_unit_error(unit, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid);
2993 return -ESRCH;
2994 }
2995
2996 if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) {
2997 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
2998 log_unit_error(unit, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid);
2999 return -ESRCH;
3000 }
3001
3002 if (dcreds->user)
3003 username = dcreds->user->name;
3004
3005 } else {
3006 r = get_fixed_user(context, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell);
3007 if (r < 0) {
3008 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
3009 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3010 }
3011
3012 r = get_fixed_group(context, &groupname, &gid);
3013 if (r < 0) {
3014 *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
3015 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3016 }
3017 }
3018
3019 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3020 r = get_supplementary_groups(context, username, groupname, gid,
3021 &supplementary_gids, &ngids);
3022 if (r < 0) {
3023 *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
3024 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3025 }
3026
3027 r = send_user_lookup(unit, user_lookup_fd, uid, gid);
3028 if (r < 0) {
3029 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
3030 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3031 }
3032
3033 user_lookup_fd = safe_close(user_lookup_fd);
3034
3035 r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer);
3036 if (r < 0) {
3037 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
3038 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3039 }
3040
3041 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3042 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3043 if (socket_fd >= 0)
3044 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false);
3045
3046 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3047 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3048 if (params->cgroup_path) {
3049 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
3050
3051 r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, &p);
3052 if (r < 0) {
3053 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
3054 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3055 }
3056
3057 r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL);
3058 if (r < 0) {
3059 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
3060 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p);
3061 }
3062 }
3063
3064 r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds);
3065 if (r < 0) {
3066 *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
3067 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3068 }
3069
3070 r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino);
3071 if (r < 0) {
3072 *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT;
3073 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3074 }
3075
3076 r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino);
3077 if (r < 0) {
3078 *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR;
3079 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3080 }
3081
3082 if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) {
3083 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3084 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3085 r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust);
3086 if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES))
3087 log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3088 else if (r < 0) {
3089 *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST;
3090 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3091 }
3092 }
3093
3094 if (context->nice_set)
3095 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) {
3096 *exit_status = EXIT_NICE;
3097 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3098 }
3099
3100 if (context->cpu_sched_set) {
3101 struct sched_param param = {
3102 .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority,
3103 };
3104
3105 r = sched_setscheduler(0,
3106 context->cpu_sched_policy |
3107 (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ?
3108 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0),
3109 &param);
3110 if (r < 0) {
3111 *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER;
3112 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3113 }
3114 }
3115
3116 if (context->cpuset)
3117 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) {
3118 *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY;
3119 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3120 }
3121
3122 if (context->ioprio_set)
3123 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) {
3124 *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO;
3125 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3126 }
3127
3128 if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
3129 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) {
3130 *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK;
3131 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3132 }
3133
3134 if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) {
3135 r = safe_personality(context->personality);
3136 if (r < 0) {
3137 *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY;
3138 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
3139 }
3140 }
3141
3142 if (context->utmp_id)
3143 utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
3144 context->tty_path,
3145 context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS :
3146 context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS :
3147 USER_PROCESS,
3148 username);
3149
3150 if (context->user) {
3151 r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid);
3152 if (r < 0) {
3153 *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
3154 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
3155 }
3156 }
3157
3158 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
3159 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
3160 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
3161 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
3162 if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && (params->flags & EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE)) {
3163 r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid);
3164 if (r < 0) {
3165 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
3166 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
3167 }
3168 }
3169
3170 for (dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) {
3171 r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, exit_status);
3172 if (r < 0)
3173 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]);
3174 }
3175
3176 r = build_environment(
3177 unit,
3178 context,
3179 params,
3180 n_fds,
3181 home,
3182 username,
3183 shell,
3184 journal_stream_dev,
3185 journal_stream_ino,
3186 &our_env);
3187 if (r < 0) {
3188 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
3189 return log_oom();
3190 }
3191
3192 r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env);
3193 if (r < 0) {
3194 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
3195 return log_oom();
3196 }
3197
3198 accum_env = strv_env_merge(5,
3199 params->environment,
3200 our_env,
3201 pass_env,
3202 context->environment,
3203 files_env,
3204 NULL);
3205 if (!accum_env) {
3206 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
3207 return log_oom();
3208 }
3209 accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env);
3210
3211 (void) umask(context->umask);
3212
3213 r = setup_keyring(unit, context, params, uid, gid);
3214 if (r < 0) {
3215 *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING;
3216 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
3217 }
3218
3219 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
3220 needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED);
3221
3222 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
3223 needs_ambient_hack = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
3224
3225 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
3226 if (needs_ambient_hack)
3227 needs_setuid = false;
3228 else
3229 needs_setuid = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID));
3230
3231 if (needs_sandboxing) {
3232 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
3233 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
3234 * impacting our own code paths. */
3235
3236 #if HAVE_SELINUX
3237 use_selinux = mac_selinux_use();
3238 #endif
3239 #if ENABLE_SMACK
3240 use_smack = mac_smack_use();
3241 #endif
3242 #if HAVE_APPARMOR
3243 use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use();
3244 #endif
3245 }
3246
3247 if (needs_sandboxing) {
3248 int which_failed;
3249
3250 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
3251 * is set here. (See below.) */
3252
3253 r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed);
3254 if (r < 0) {
3255 *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS;
3256 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed));
3257 }
3258 }
3259
3260 if (needs_setuid) {
3261
3262 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
3263 * wins here. (See above.) */
3264
3265 if (context->pam_name && username) {
3266 r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds);
3267 if (r < 0) {
3268 *exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
3269 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
3270 }
3271 }
3272 }
3273
3274 if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
3275 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET)) {
3276 r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket);
3277 if (r < 0) {
3278 *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK;
3279 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
3280 }
3281 } else
3282 log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
3283 }
3284
3285 needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime);
3286 if (needs_mount_namespace) {
3287 r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command, context, params, runtime);
3288 if (r < 0) {
3289 *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
3290 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing: %m");
3291 }
3292 }
3293
3294 if (context->protect_hostname) {
3295 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) {
3296 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) {
3297 *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
3298 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
3299 }
3300 } else
3301 log_unit_warning(unit, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
3302 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
3303 r = seccomp_protect_hostname();
3304 if (r < 0) {
3305 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3306 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
3307 }
3308 #endif
3309 }
3310
3311 /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
3312 if (needs_setuid) {
3313 r = enforce_groups(gid, supplementary_gids, ngids);
3314 if (r < 0) {
3315 *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
3316 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
3317 }
3318 }
3319
3320 if (needs_sandboxing) {
3321 #if HAVE_SELINUX
3322 if (use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) {
3323 r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
3324 if (r < 0) {
3325 *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
3326 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
3327 }
3328 }
3329 #endif
3330
3331 if (context->private_users) {
3332 r = setup_private_users(uid, gid);
3333 if (r < 0) {
3334 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
3335 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
3336 }
3337 }
3338 }
3339
3340 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
3341 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
3342 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
3343
3344 if (params->exec_fd >= 0) {
3345 exec_fd = params->exec_fd;
3346
3347 if (exec_fd < 3 + (int) n_fds) {
3348 int moved_fd;
3349
3350 /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
3351 * process we are about to execute. */
3352
3353 moved_fd = fcntl(exec_fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) n_fds);
3354 if (moved_fd < 0) {
3355 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
3356 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
3357 }
3358
3359 safe_close(exec_fd);
3360 exec_fd = moved_fd;
3361 } else {
3362 /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
3363 r = fd_cloexec(exec_fd, true);
3364 if (r < 0) {
3365 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
3366 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3367 }
3368 }
3369
3370 fds_with_exec_fd = newa(int, n_fds + 1);
3371 memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int));
3372 fds_with_exec_fd[n_fds] = exec_fd;
3373 n_fds_with_exec_fd = n_fds + 1;
3374 } else {
3375 fds_with_exec_fd = fds;
3376 n_fds_with_exec_fd = n_fds;
3377 }
3378
3379 r = close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd, n_fds_with_exec_fd);
3380 if (r >= 0)
3381 r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
3382 if (r >= 0)
3383 r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_storage_fds, context->non_blocking);
3384 if (r < 0) {
3385 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
3386 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
3387 }
3388
3389 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
3390 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
3391 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
3392 * came this far. */
3393
3394 secure_bits = context->secure_bits;
3395
3396 if (needs_sandboxing) {
3397 uint64_t bset;
3398
3399 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
3400 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
3401 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
3402 if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) {
3403 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
3404 *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS;
3405 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
3406 }
3407 }
3408
3409 #if ENABLE_SMACK
3410 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
3411 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
3412 if (use_smack) {
3413 r = setup_smack(context, command);
3414 if (r < 0) {
3415 *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
3416 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
3417 }
3418 }
3419 #endif
3420
3421 bset = context->capability_bounding_set;
3422 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
3423 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
3424 * instead of us doing that */
3425 if (needs_ambient_hack)
3426 bset |= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP) |
3427 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID) |
3428 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID);
3429
3430 if (!cap_test_all(bset)) {
3431 r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, false);
3432 if (r < 0) {
3433 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
3434 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
3435 }
3436 }
3437
3438 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
3439 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
3440 if (!needs_ambient_hack &&
3441 context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
3442 r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, true);
3443 if (r < 0) {
3444 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
3445 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
3446 }
3447 }
3448 }
3449
3450 if (needs_setuid) {
3451 if (context->user) {
3452 r = enforce_user(context, uid);
3453 if (r < 0) {
3454 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
3455 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid);
3456 }
3457
3458 if (!needs_ambient_hack &&
3459 context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
3460
3461 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
3462 r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, false);
3463 if (r < 0) {
3464 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
3465 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
3466 }
3467
3468 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
3469 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
3470 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
3471 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
3472 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
3473 * drop the bit away next. */
3474
3475 secure_bits |= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
3476 }
3477 }
3478 }
3479
3480 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
3481 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
3482 r = apply_working_directory(context, params, home, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status);
3483 if (r < 0)
3484 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
3485
3486 if (needs_sandboxing) {
3487 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
3488 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
3489 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
3490 * are restricted. */
3491
3492 #if HAVE_SELINUX
3493 if (use_selinux) {
3494 char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
3495
3496 if (exec_context) {
3497 r = setexeccon(exec_context);
3498 if (r < 0) {
3499 *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
3500 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context);
3501 }
3502 }
3503 }
3504 #endif
3505
3506 #if HAVE_APPARMOR
3507 if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) {
3508 r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
3509 if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
3510 *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
3511 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context->apparmor_profile);
3512 }
3513 }
3514 #endif
3515
3516 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
3517 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
3518 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits)
3519 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) {
3520 *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS;
3521 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
3522 }
3523
3524 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context))
3525 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
3526 *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES;
3527 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
3528 }
3529
3530 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
3531 r = apply_address_families(unit, context);
3532 if (r < 0) {
3533 *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES;
3534 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
3535 }
3536
3537 r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit, context);
3538 if (r < 0) {
3539 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3540 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
3541 }
3542
3543 r = apply_restrict_realtime(unit, context);
3544 if (r < 0) {
3545 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3546 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
3547 }
3548
3549 r = apply_restrict_namespaces(unit, context);
3550 if (r < 0) {
3551 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3552 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
3553 }
3554
3555 r = apply_protect_sysctl(unit, context);
3556 if (r < 0) {
3557 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3558 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
3559 }
3560
3561 r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context);
3562 if (r < 0) {
3563 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3564 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
3565 }
3566
3567 r = apply_private_devices(unit, context);
3568 if (r < 0) {
3569 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3570 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
3571 }
3572
3573 r = apply_syscall_archs(unit, context);
3574 if (r < 0) {
3575 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3576 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
3577 }
3578
3579 r = apply_lock_personality(unit, context);
3580 if (r < 0) {
3581 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3582 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
3583 }
3584
3585 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
3586 * by the filter as little as possible. */
3587 r = apply_syscall_filter(unit, context, needs_ambient_hack);
3588 if (r < 0) {
3589 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
3590 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
3591 }
3592 #endif
3593 }
3594
3595 if (!strv_isempty(context->unset_environment)) {
3596 char **ee = NULL;
3597
3598 ee = strv_env_delete(accum_env, 1, context->unset_environment);
3599 if (!ee) {
3600 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
3601 return log_oom();
3602 }
3603
3604 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env, ee);
3605 }
3606
3607 final_argv = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env);
3608 if (!final_argv) {
3609 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
3610 return log_oom();
3611 }
3612
3613 if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
3614 _cleanup_free_ char *line;
3615
3616 line = exec_command_line(final_argv);
3617 if (line)
3618 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
3619 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
3620 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executing: %s", line),
3621 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
3622 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit));
3623 }
3624
3625 if (exec_fd >= 0) {
3626 uint8_t hot = 1;
3627
3628 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
3629 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
3630
3631 if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) {
3632 *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC;
3633 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
3634 }
3635 }
3636
3637 execve(command->path, final_argv, accum_env);
3638 r = -errno;
3639
3640 if (exec_fd >= 0) {
3641 uint8_t hot = 0;
3642
3643 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
3644 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
3645
3646 if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) {
3647 *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC;
3648 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
3649 }
3650 }
3651
3652 if (r == -ENOENT && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) {
3653 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO, r,
3654 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR,
3655 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
3656 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit),
3657 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
3658 command->path),
3659 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path);
3660 return 0;
3661 }
3662
3663 *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC;
3664 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to execute command: %m");
3665 }
3666
3667 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l);
3668 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[3]);
3669
3670 int exec_spawn(Unit *unit,
3671 ExecCommand *command,
3672 const ExecContext *context,
3673 const ExecParameters *params,
3674 ExecRuntime *runtime,
3675 DynamicCreds *dcreds,
3676 pid_t *ret) {
3677
3678 int socket_fd, r, named_iofds[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds = NULL;
3679 _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL;
3680 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL;
3681 size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0;
3682 _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
3683 pid_t pid;
3684
3685 assert(unit);
3686 assert(command);
3687 assert(context);
3688 assert(ret);
3689 assert(params);
3690 assert(params->fds || (params->n_socket_fds + params->n_storage_fds <= 0));
3691
3692 if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET ||
3693 context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET ||
3694 context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) {
3695
3696 if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) {
3697 log_unit_error(unit, "Got more than one socket.");
3698 return -EINVAL;
3699 }
3700
3701 if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) {
3702 log_unit_error(unit, "Got no socket.");
3703 return -EINVAL;
3704 }
3705
3706 socket_fd = params->fds[0];
3707 } else {
3708 socket_fd = -1;
3709 fds = params->fds;
3710 n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds;
3711 n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds;
3712 }
3713
3714 r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds);
3715 if (r < 0)
3716 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
3717
3718 r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env);
3719 if (r < 0)
3720 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
3721
3722 line = exec_command_line(command->argv);
3723 if (!line)
3724 return log_oom();
3725
3726 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
3727 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "About to execute: %s", line),
3728 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
3729 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
3730 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit));
3731
3732 if (params->cgroup_path) {
3733 r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, &subcgroup_path);
3734 if (r < 0)
3735 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
3736 if (r > 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
3737 r = cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path);
3738 if (r < 0)
3739 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path);
3740 }
3741 }
3742
3743 pid = fork();
3744 if (pid < 0)
3745 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m");
3746
3747 if (pid == 0) {
3748 int exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS;
3749
3750 r = exec_child(unit,
3751 command,
3752 context,
3753 params,
3754 runtime,
3755 dcreds,
3756 socket_fd,
3757 named_iofds,
3758 fds,
3759 n_socket_fds,
3760 n_storage_fds,
3761 files_env,
3762 unit->manager->user_lookup_fds[1],
3763 &exit_status);
3764
3765 if (r < 0)
3766 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR, r,
3767 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR,
3768 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
3769 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit),
3770 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
3771 exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD),
3772 command->path),
3773 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path);
3774
3775 _exit(exit_status);
3776 }
3777
3778 log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid);
3779
3780 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
3781 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
3782 * process will be killed too). */
3783 if (subcgroup_path)
3784 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path, pid);
3785
3786 exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid);
3787
3788 *ret = pid;
3789 return 0;
3790 }
3791
3792 void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) {
3793 ExecDirectoryType i;
3794
3795 assert(c);
3796
3797 c->umask = 0022;
3798 c->ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 0);
3799 c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER;
3800 c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO;
3801 c->syslog_level_prefix = true;
3802 c->ignore_sigpipe = true;
3803 c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY;
3804 c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
3805 for (i = 0; i < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; i++)
3806 c->directories[i].mode = 0755;
3807 c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_ALL;
3808 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL != NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL);
3809 c->restrict_namespaces = NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL;
3810 c->log_level_max = -1;
3811 }
3812
3813 void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
3814 ExecDirectoryType i;
3815 size_t l;
3816
3817 assert(c);
3818
3819 c->environment = strv_free(c->environment);
3820 c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files);
3821 c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment);
3822 c->unset_environment = strv_free(c->unset_environment);
3823
3824 rlimit_free_all(c->rlimit);
3825
3826 for (l = 0; l < 3; l++) {
3827 c->stdio_fdname[l] = mfree(c->stdio_fdname[l]);
3828 c->stdio_file[l] = mfree(c->stdio_file[l]);
3829 }
3830
3831 c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory);
3832 c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory);
3833 c->root_image = mfree(c->root_image);
3834 c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path);
3835 c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier);
3836 c->user = mfree(c->user);
3837 c->group = mfree(c->group);
3838
3839 c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups);
3840
3841 c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name);
3842
3843 c->read_only_paths = strv_free(c->read_only_paths);
3844 c->read_write_paths = strv_free(c->read_write_paths);
3845 c->inaccessible_paths = strv_free(c->inaccessible_paths);
3846
3847 bind_mount_free_many(c->bind_mounts, c->n_bind_mounts);
3848 c->bind_mounts = NULL;
3849 c->n_bind_mounts = 0;
3850 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c->temporary_filesystems, c->n_temporary_filesystems);
3851 c->temporary_filesystems = NULL;
3852 c->n_temporary_filesystems = 0;
3853
3854 c->cpuset = cpu_set_mfree(c->cpuset);
3855
3856 c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id);
3857 c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context);
3858 c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile);
3859 c->smack_process_label = mfree(c->smack_process_label);
3860
3861 c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter);
3862 c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs);
3863 c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families);
3864
3865 for (i = 0; i < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; i++)
3866 c->directories[i].paths = strv_free(c->directories[i].paths);
3867
3868 c->log_level_max = -1;
3869
3870 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c);
3871
3872 c->log_rate_limit_interval_usec = 0;
3873 c->log_rate_limit_burst = 0;
3874
3875 c->stdin_data = mfree(c->stdin_data);
3876 c->stdin_data_size = 0;
3877 }
3878
3879 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) {
3880 char **i;
3881
3882 assert(c);
3883
3884 if (!runtime_prefix)
3885 return 0;
3886
3887 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].paths) {
3888 _cleanup_free_ char *p;
3889
3890 p = strjoin(runtime_prefix, "/", *i);
3891 if (!p)
3892 return -ENOMEM;
3893
3894 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the service
3895 * next. */
3896 (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT);
3897 }
3898
3899 return 0;
3900 }
3901
3902 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) {
3903 assert(c);
3904
3905 c->path = mfree(c->path);
3906 c->argv = strv_free(c->argv);
3907 }
3908
3909 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) {
3910 size_t i;
3911
3912 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
3913 exec_command_done(c+i);
3914 }
3915
3916 ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) {
3917 ExecCommand *i;
3918
3919 while ((i = c)) {
3920 LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i);
3921 exec_command_done(i);
3922 free(i);
3923 }
3924
3925 return NULL;
3926 }
3927
3928 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) {
3929 size_t i;
3930
3931 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
3932 c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]);
3933 }
3934
3935 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) {
3936 size_t i;
3937
3938 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
3939 exec_status_reset(&c[i].exec_status);
3940 }
3941
3942 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) {
3943 size_t i;
3944
3945 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
3946 ExecCommand *z;
3947
3948 LIST_FOREACH(command, z, c[i])
3949 exec_status_reset(&z->exec_status);
3950 }
3951 }
3952
3953 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo {
3954 const Unit *unit;
3955 const char *path;
3956 } InvalidEnvInfo;
3957
3958 static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) {
3959 InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata;
3960
3961 log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path);
3962 }
3963
3964 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext *c, int fd_index) {
3965 assert(c);
3966
3967 switch (fd_index) {
3968
3969 case STDIN_FILENO:
3970 if (c->std_input != EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD)
3971 return NULL;
3972
3973 return c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] ?: "stdin";
3974
3975 case STDOUT_FILENO:
3976 if (c->std_output != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD)
3977 return NULL;
3978
3979 return c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] ?: "stdout";
3980
3981 case STDERR_FILENO:
3982 if (c->std_error != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD)
3983 return NULL;
3984
3985 return c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] ?: "stderr";
3986
3987 default:
3988 return NULL;
3989 }
3990 }
3991
3992 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]) {
3993 size_t i, targets;
3994 const char* stdio_fdname[3];
3995 size_t n_fds;
3996
3997 assert(c);
3998 assert(p);
3999
4000 targets = (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) +
4001 (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) +
4002 (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD);
4003
4004 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
4005 stdio_fdname[i] = exec_context_fdname(c, i);
4006
4007 n_fds = p->n_storage_fds + p->n_socket_fds;
4008
4009 for (i = 0; i < n_fds && targets > 0; i++)
4010 if (named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] < 0 &&
4011 c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD &&
4012 stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] &&
4013 streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO])) {
4014
4015 named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] = p->fds[i];
4016 targets--;
4017
4018 } else if (named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] < 0 &&
4019 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD &&
4020 stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] &&
4021 streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO])) {
4022
4023 named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] = p->fds[i];
4024 targets--;
4025
4026 } else if (named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] < 0 &&
4027 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD &&
4028 stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] &&
4029 streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO])) {
4030
4031 named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] = p->fds[i];
4032 targets--;
4033 }
4034
4035 return targets == 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT;
4036 }
4037
4038 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
4039 char **i, **r = NULL;
4040
4041 assert(c);
4042 assert(l);
4043
4044 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) {
4045 char *fn;
4046 int k;
4047 unsigned n;
4048 bool ignore = false;
4049 char **p;
4050 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {};
4051
4052 fn = *i;
4053
4054 if (fn[0] == '-') {
4055 ignore = true;
4056 fn++;
4057 }
4058
4059 if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) {
4060 if (ignore)
4061 continue;
4062
4063 strv_free(r);
4064 return -EINVAL;
4065 }
4066
4067 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
4068 k = safe_glob(fn, 0, &pglob);
4069 if (k < 0) {
4070 if (ignore)
4071 continue;
4072
4073 strv_free(r);
4074 return k;
4075 }
4076
4077 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
4078 assert(pglob.gl_pathc > 0);
4079
4080 for (n = 0; n < pglob.gl_pathc; n++) {
4081 k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], &p);
4082 if (k < 0) {
4083 if (ignore)
4084 continue;
4085
4086 strv_free(r);
4087 return k;
4088 }
4089 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
4090 if (p) {
4091 InvalidEnvInfo info = {
4092 .unit = unit,
4093 .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n]
4094 };
4095
4096 p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info);
4097 }
4098
4099 if (!r)
4100 r = p;
4101 else {
4102 char **m;
4103
4104 m = strv_env_merge(2, r, p);
4105 strv_free(r);
4106 strv_free(p);
4107 if (!m)
4108 return -ENOMEM;
4109
4110 r = m;
4111 }
4112 }
4113 }
4114
4115 *l = r;
4116
4117 return 0;
4118 }
4119
4120 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) {
4121 _cleanup_free_ char *resolved = NULL;
4122
4123 if (!tty)
4124 return true;
4125
4126 tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty);
4127
4128 /* trivial identity? */
4129 if (streq(tty, "console"))
4130 return true;
4131
4132 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved) < 0)
4133 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
4134
4135 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
4136 return streq(resolved, tty) || (streq(resolved, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty));
4137 }
4138
4139 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext *ec) {
4140
4141 return (ec->tty_reset ||
4142 ec->tty_vhangup ||
4143 ec->tty_vt_disallocate ||
4144 is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) ||
4145 is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) ||
4146 is_terminal_output(ec->std_error)) &&
4147 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec));
4148 }
4149
4150 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) {
4151 char **g;
4152
4153 assert(f);
4154
4155 STRV_FOREACH(g, l)
4156 fprintf(f, " %s", *g);
4157 }
4158
4159 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
4160 ExecDirectoryType dt;
4161 char **e, **d;
4162 unsigned i;
4163 int r;
4164
4165 assert(c);
4166 assert(f);
4167
4168 prefix = strempty(prefix);
4169
4170 fprintf(f,
4171 "%sUMask: %04o\n"
4172 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
4173 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
4174 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
4175 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
4176 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
4177 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
4178 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
4179 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
4180 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
4181 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
4182 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
4183 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
4184 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
4185 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
4186 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
4187 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
4188 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
4189 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
4190 prefix, c->umask,
4191 prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/",
4192 prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/",
4193 prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking),
4194 prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp),
4195 prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
4196 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables),
4197 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules),
4198 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups),
4199 prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
4200 prefix, yes_no(c->private_users),
4201 prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home),
4202 prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system),
4203 prefix, yes_no(c->mount_apivfs),
4204 prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe),
4205 prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute),
4206 prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime),
4207 prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode),
4208 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname));
4209
4210 if (c->root_image)
4211 fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image);
4212
4213 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment)
4214 fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
4215
4216 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files)
4217 fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e);
4218
4219 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment)
4220 fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
4221
4222 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->unset_environment)
4223 fprintf(f, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
4224
4225 fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode));
4226
4227 for (dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) {
4228 fprintf(f, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].mode);
4229
4230 STRV_FOREACH(d, c->directories[dt].paths)
4231 fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), *d);
4232 }
4233
4234 if (c->nice_set)
4235 fprintf(f,
4236 "%sNice: %i\n",
4237 prefix, c->nice);
4238
4239 if (c->oom_score_adjust_set)
4240 fprintf(f,
4241 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
4242 prefix, c->oom_score_adjust);
4243
4244 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++)
4245 if (c->rlimit[i]) {
4246 fprintf(f, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
4247 prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max);
4248 fprintf(f, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
4249 prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur);
4250 }
4251
4252 if (c->ioprio_set) {
4253 _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL;
4254
4255 r = ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str);
4256 if (r >= 0)
4257 fprintf(f, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix, class_str);
4258
4259 fprintf(f, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio));
4260 }
4261
4262 if (c->cpu_sched_set) {
4263 _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL;
4264
4265 r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str);
4266 if (r >= 0)
4267 fprintf(f, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix, policy_str);
4268
4269 fprintf(f,
4270 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
4271 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
4272 prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority,
4273 prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork));
4274 }
4275
4276 if (c->cpuset) {
4277 fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix);
4278 for (i = 0; i < c->cpuset_ncpus; i++)
4279 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c->cpuset_ncpus), c->cpuset))
4280 fprintf(f, " %u", i);
4281 fputs("\n", f);
4282 }
4283
4284 if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
4285 fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec);
4286
4287 fprintf(f,
4288 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
4289 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
4290 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
4291 prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input),
4292 prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output),
4293 prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error));
4294
4295 if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD)
4296 fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO]);
4297 if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD)
4298 fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO]);
4299 if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD)
4300 fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]);
4301
4302 if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE)
4303 fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]);
4304 if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE)
4305 fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]);
4306 if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND)
4307 fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]);
4308 if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE)
4309 fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]);
4310 if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND)
4311 fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]);
4312
4313 if (c->tty_path)
4314 fprintf(f,
4315 "%sTTYPath: %s\n"
4316 "%sTTYReset: %s\n"
4317 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
4318 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
4319 prefix, c->tty_path,
4320 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset),
4321 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup),
4322 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate));
4323
4324 if (IN_SET(c->std_output,
4325 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG,
4326 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG,
4327 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL,
4328 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
4329 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
4330 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) ||
4331 IN_SET(c->std_error,
4332 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG,
4333 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG,
4334 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL,
4335 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
4336 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
4337 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE)) {
4338
4339 _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL;
4340
4341 r = log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str);
4342 if (r >= 0)
4343 fprintf(f, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix, fac_str);
4344
4345 r = log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str);
4346 if (r >= 0)
4347 fprintf(f, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix, lvl_str);
4348 }
4349
4350 if (c->log_level_max >= 0) {
4351 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
4352
4353 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c->log_level_max, &t);
4354
4355 fprintf(f, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix, strna(t));
4356 }
4357
4358 if (c->log_rate_limit_interval_usec > 0) {
4359 char buf_timespan[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX];
4360
4361 fprintf(f,
4362 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
4363 prefix, format_timespan(buf_timespan, sizeof(buf_timespan), c->log_rate_limit_interval_usec, USEC_PER_SEC));
4364 }
4365
4366 if (c->log_rate_limit_burst > 0)
4367 fprintf(f, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix, c->log_rate_limit_burst);
4368
4369 if (c->n_log_extra_fields > 0) {
4370 size_t j;
4371
4372 for (j = 0; j < c->n_log_extra_fields; j++) {
4373 fprintf(f, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix);
4374 fwrite(c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_base,
4375 1, c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_len,
4376 f);
4377 fputc('\n', f);
4378 }
4379 }
4380
4381 if (c->secure_bits) {
4382 _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL;
4383
4384 r = secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c->secure_bits, &str);
4385 if (r >= 0)
4386 fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix, str);
4387 }
4388
4389 if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_ALL) {
4390 _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL;
4391
4392 r = capability_set_to_string_alloc(c->capability_bounding_set, &str);
4393 if (r >= 0)
4394 fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix, str);
4395 }
4396
4397 if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
4398 _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL;
4399
4400 r = capability_set_to_string_alloc(c->capability_ambient_set, &str);
4401 if (r >= 0)
4402 fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, str);
4403 }
4404
4405 if (c->user)
4406 fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user);
4407 if (c->group)
4408 fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group);
4409
4410 fprintf(f, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->dynamic_user));
4411
4412 if (!strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) {
4413 fprintf(f, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix);
4414 strv_fprintf(f, c->supplementary_groups);
4415 fputs("\n", f);
4416 }
4417
4418 if (c->pam_name)
4419 fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name);
4420
4421 if (!strv_isempty(c->read_write_paths)) {
4422 fprintf(f, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix);
4423 strv_fprintf(f, c->read_write_paths);
4424 fputs("\n", f);
4425 }
4426
4427 if (!strv_isempty(c->read_only_paths)) {
4428 fprintf(f, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix);
4429 strv_fprintf(f, c->read_only_paths);
4430 fputs("\n", f);
4431 }
4432
4433 if (!strv_isempty(c->inaccessible_paths)) {
4434 fprintf(f, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix);
4435 strv_fprintf(f, c->inaccessible_paths);
4436 fputs("\n", f);
4437 }
4438
4439 if (c->n_bind_mounts > 0)
4440 for (i = 0; i < c->n_bind_mounts; i++)
4441 fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix,
4442 c->bind_mounts[i].read_only ? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
4443 c->bind_mounts[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "",
4444 c->bind_mounts[i].source,
4445 c->bind_mounts[i].destination,
4446 c->bind_mounts[i].recursive ? "rbind" : "norbind");
4447
4448 if (c->n_temporary_filesystems > 0)
4449 for (i = 0; i < c->n_temporary_filesystems; i++) {
4450 TemporaryFileSystem *t = c->temporary_filesystems + i;
4451
4452 fprintf(f, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix,
4453 t->path,
4454 isempty(t->options) ? "" : ":",
4455 strempty(t->options));
4456 }
4457
4458 if (c->utmp_id)
4459 fprintf(f,
4460 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
4461 prefix, c->utmp_id);
4462
4463 if (c->selinux_context)
4464 fprintf(f,
4465 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
4466 prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context);
4467
4468 if (c->apparmor_profile)
4469 fprintf(f,
4470 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4471 prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile);
4472
4473 if (c->smack_process_label)
4474 fprintf(f,
4475 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
4476 prefix, c->smack_process_label_ignore ? "-" : "", c->smack_process_label);
4477
4478 if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID)
4479 fprintf(f,
4480 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
4481 prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality)));
4482
4483 fprintf(f,
4484 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
4485 prefix, yes_no(c->lock_personality));
4486
4487 if (c->syscall_filter) {
4488 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
4489 Iterator j;
4490 void *id, *val;
4491 bool first = true;
4492 #endif
4493
4494 fprintf(f,
4495 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
4496 prefix);
4497
4498 if (!c->syscall_whitelist)
4499 fputc('~', f);
4500
4501 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
4502 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_filter, j) {
4503 _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
4504 const char *errno_name = NULL;
4505 int num = PTR_TO_INT(val);
4506
4507 if (first)
4508 first = false;
4509 else
4510 fputc(' ', f);
4511
4512 name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1);
4513 fputs(strna(name), f);
4514
4515 if (num >= 0) {
4516 errno_name = errno_to_name(num);
4517 if (errno_name)
4518 fprintf(f, ":%s", errno_name);
4519 else
4520 fprintf(f, ":%d", num);
4521 }
4522 }
4523 #endif
4524
4525 fputc('\n', f);
4526 }
4527
4528 if (c->syscall_archs) {
4529 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
4530 Iterator j;
4531 void *id;
4532 #endif
4533
4534 fprintf(f,
4535 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
4536 prefix);
4537
4538 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
4539 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j)
4540 fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1)));
4541 #endif
4542 fputc('\n', f);
4543 }
4544
4545 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) {
4546 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
4547
4548 r = namespace_flags_to_string(c->restrict_namespaces, &s);
4549 if (r >= 0)
4550 fprintf(f, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
4551 prefix, s);
4552 }
4553
4554 if (c->syscall_errno > 0) {
4555 const char *errno_name;
4556
4557 fprintf(f, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix);
4558
4559 errno_name = errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno);
4560 if (errno_name)
4561 fprintf(f, "%s\n", errno_name);
4562 else
4563 fprintf(f, "%d\n", c->syscall_errno);
4564 }
4565
4566 if (c->apparmor_profile)
4567 fprintf(f,
4568 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4569 prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile);
4570 }
4571
4572 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
4573 assert(c);
4574
4575 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
4576 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
4577
4578 if (!c->user)
4579 return true;
4580
4581 if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0"))
4582 return true;
4583
4584 return false;
4585 }
4586
4587 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext *c) {
4588 int p;
4589
4590 assert(c);
4591
4592 if (c->ioprio_set)
4593 return c->ioprio;
4594
4595 p = ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0);
4596 if (p < 0)
4597 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 4);
4598
4599 return p;
4600 }
4601
4602 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext *c) {
4603 size_t l;
4604
4605 assert(c);
4606
4607 for (l = 0; l < c->n_log_extra_fields; l++)
4608 free(c->log_extra_fields[l].iov_base);
4609 c->log_extra_fields = mfree(c->log_extra_fields);
4610 c->n_log_extra_fields = 0;
4611 }
4612
4613 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) {
4614 assert(s);
4615
4616 *s = (ExecStatus) {
4617 .pid = pid,
4618 };
4619
4620 dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp);
4621 }
4622
4623 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, const ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) {
4624 assert(s);
4625
4626 if (s->pid != pid) {
4627 *s = (ExecStatus) {
4628 .pid = pid,
4629 };
4630 }
4631
4632 dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp);
4633
4634 s->code = code;
4635 s->status = status;
4636
4637 if (context) {
4638 if (context->utmp_id)
4639 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status);
4640
4641 exec_context_tty_reset(context, NULL);
4642 }
4643 }
4644
4645 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus *s) {
4646 assert(s);
4647
4648 *s = (ExecStatus) {};
4649 }
4650
4651 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
4652 char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX];
4653
4654 assert(s);
4655 assert(f);
4656
4657 if (s->pid <= 0)
4658 return;
4659
4660 prefix = strempty(prefix);
4661
4662 fprintf(f,
4663 "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n",
4664 prefix, s->pid);
4665
4666 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->start_timestamp))
4667 fprintf(f,
4668 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
4669 prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime));
4670
4671 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->exit_timestamp))
4672 fprintf(f,
4673 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
4674 "%sExit Code: %s\n"
4675 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
4676 prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->exit_timestamp.realtime),
4677 prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code),
4678 prefix, s->status);
4679 }
4680
4681 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv) {
4682 size_t k;
4683 char *n, *p, **a;
4684 bool first = true;
4685
4686 assert(argv);
4687
4688 k = 1;
4689 STRV_FOREACH(a, argv)
4690 k += strlen(*a)+3;
4691
4692 n = new(char, k);
4693 if (!n)
4694 return NULL;
4695
4696 p = n;
4697 STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) {
4698
4699 if (!first)
4700 *(p++) = ' ';
4701 else
4702 first = false;
4703
4704 if (strpbrk(*a, WHITESPACE)) {
4705 *(p++) = '\'';
4706 p = stpcpy(p, *a);
4707 *(p++) = '\'';
4708 } else
4709 p = stpcpy(p, *a);
4710
4711 }
4712
4713 *p = 0;
4714
4715 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
4716 * spaces and ticks in them */
4717
4718 return n;
4719 }
4720
4721 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
4722 _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL;
4723 const char *prefix2;
4724
4725 assert(c);
4726 assert(f);
4727
4728 prefix = strempty(prefix);
4729 prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t");
4730
4731 cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv);
4732 fprintf(f,
4733 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
4734 prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror(ENOMEM));
4735
4736 exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2);
4737 }
4738
4739 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
4740 assert(f);
4741
4742 prefix = strempty(prefix);
4743
4744 LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c)
4745 exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix);
4746 }
4747
4748 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) {
4749 ExecCommand *end;
4750
4751 assert(l);
4752 assert(e);
4753
4754 if (*l) {
4755 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
4756 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l, end);
4757 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e);
4758 } else
4759 *l = e;
4760 }
4761
4762 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
4763 va_list ap;
4764 char **l, *p;
4765
4766 assert(c);
4767 assert(path);
4768
4769 va_start(ap, path);
4770 l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
4771 va_end(ap);
4772
4773 if (!l)
4774 return -ENOMEM;
4775
4776 p = strdup(path);
4777 if (!p) {
4778 strv_free(l);
4779 return -ENOMEM;
4780 }
4781
4782 free_and_replace(c->path, p);
4783
4784 return strv_free_and_replace(c->argv, l);
4785 }
4786
4787 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
4788 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
4789 va_list ap;
4790 int r;
4791
4792 assert(c);
4793 assert(path);
4794
4795 va_start(ap, path);
4796 l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
4797 va_end(ap);
4798
4799 if (!l)
4800 return -ENOMEM;
4801
4802 r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false);
4803 if (r < 0)
4804 return r;
4805
4806 return 0;
4807 }
4808
4809 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) {
4810 _cleanup_free_ char *path = p;
4811
4812 (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL);
4813 return NULL;
4814 }
4815
4816 static ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime *rt, bool destroy) {
4817 int r;
4818
4819 if (!rt)
4820 return NULL;
4821
4822 if (rt->manager)
4823 (void) hashmap_remove(rt->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, rt->id);
4824
4825 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
4826 if (destroy && rt->tmp_dir) {
4827 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir);
4828
4829 r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir);
4830 if (r < 0) {
4831 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir);
4832 free(rt->tmp_dir);
4833 }
4834
4835 rt->tmp_dir = NULL;
4836 }
4837
4838 if (destroy && rt->var_tmp_dir) {
4839 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir);
4840
4841 r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir);
4842 if (r < 0) {
4843 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir);
4844 free(rt->var_tmp_dir);
4845 }
4846
4847 rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL;
4848 }
4849
4850 rt->id = mfree(rt->id);
4851 rt->tmp_dir = mfree(rt->tmp_dir);
4852 rt->var_tmp_dir = mfree(rt->var_tmp_dir);
4853 safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket);
4854 return mfree(rt);
4855 }
4856
4857 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime **rt) {
4858 if (*rt)
4859 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt, false);
4860 }
4861
4862 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) {
4863 assert(rt);
4864
4865 *rt = new0(ExecRuntime, 1);
4866 if (!*rt)
4867 return -ENOMEM;
4868
4869 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = -1;
4870 return 0;
4871 }
4872
4873 static int exec_runtime_add(
4874 Manager *m,
4875 const char *id,
4876 const char *tmp_dir,
4877 const char *var_tmp_dir,
4878 const int netns_storage_socket[2],
4879 ExecRuntime **ret) {
4880
4881 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt = NULL;
4882 int r;
4883
4884 assert(m);
4885 assert(id);
4886
4887 r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m->exec_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops);
4888 if (r < 0)
4889 return r;
4890
4891 r = exec_runtime_allocate(&rt);
4892 if (r < 0)
4893 return r;
4894
4895 rt->id = strdup(id);
4896 if (!rt->id)
4897 return -ENOMEM;
4898
4899 if (tmp_dir) {
4900 rt->tmp_dir = strdup(tmp_dir);
4901 if (!rt->tmp_dir)
4902 return -ENOMEM;
4903
4904 /* When tmp_dir is set, then we require var_tmp_dir is also set. */
4905 assert(var_tmp_dir);
4906 rt->var_tmp_dir = strdup(var_tmp_dir);
4907 if (!rt->var_tmp_dir)
4908 return -ENOMEM;
4909 }
4910
4911 if (netns_storage_socket) {
4912 rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = netns_storage_socket[0];
4913 rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = netns_storage_socket[1];
4914 }
4915
4916 r = hashmap_put(m->exec_runtime_by_id, rt->id, rt);
4917 if (r < 0)
4918 return r;
4919
4920 rt->manager = m;
4921
4922 if (ret)
4923 *ret = rt;
4924
4925 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
4926 rt = NULL;
4927 return 0;
4928 }
4929
4930 static int exec_runtime_make(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, ExecRuntime **ret) {
4931 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL;
4932 _cleanup_close_pair_ int netns_storage_socket[2] = {-1, -1};
4933 int r;
4934
4935 assert(m);
4936 assert(c);
4937 assert(id);
4938
4939 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4940 if (!c->private_network && !c->private_tmp)
4941 return 0;
4942
4943 if (c->private_tmp) {
4944 r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir);
4945 if (r < 0)
4946 return r;
4947 }
4948
4949 if (c->private_network) {
4950 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, netns_storage_socket) < 0)
4951 return -errno;
4952 }
4953
4954 r = exec_runtime_add(m, id, tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket, ret);
4955 if (r < 0)
4956 return r;
4957
4958 /* Avoid cleanup */
4959 netns_storage_socket[0] = -1;
4960 netns_storage_socket[1] = -1;
4961 return 1;
4962 }
4963
4964 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, bool create, ExecRuntime **ret) {
4965 ExecRuntime *rt;
4966 int r;
4967
4968 assert(m);
4969 assert(id);
4970 assert(ret);
4971
4972 rt = hashmap_get(m->exec_runtime_by_id, id);
4973 if (rt)
4974 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
4975 goto ref;
4976
4977 if (!create)
4978 return 0;
4979
4980 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
4981 r = exec_runtime_make(m, c, id, &rt);
4982 if (r <= 0)
4983 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4984 return r;
4985
4986 ref:
4987 /* increment reference counter. */
4988 rt->n_ref++;
4989 *ret = rt;
4990 return 1;
4991 }
4992
4993 ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *rt, bool destroy) {
4994 if (!rt)
4995 return NULL;
4996
4997 assert(rt->n_ref > 0);
4998
4999 rt->n_ref--;
5000 if (rt->n_ref > 0)
5001 return NULL;
5002
5003 return exec_runtime_free(rt, destroy);
5004 }
5005
5006 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
5007 ExecRuntime *rt;
5008 Iterator i;
5009
5010 assert(m);
5011 assert(f);
5012 assert(fds);
5013
5014 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_runtime_by_id, i) {
5015 fprintf(f, "exec-runtime=%s", rt->id);
5016
5017 if (rt->tmp_dir)
5018 fprintf(f, " tmp-dir=%s", rt->tmp_dir);
5019
5020 if (rt->var_tmp_dir)
5021 fprintf(f, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt->var_tmp_dir);
5022
5023 if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
5024 int copy;
5025
5026 copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]);
5027 if (copy < 0)
5028 return copy;
5029
5030 fprintf(f, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy);
5031 }
5032
5033 if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) {
5034 int copy;
5035
5036 copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]);
5037 if (copy < 0)
5038 return copy;
5039
5040 fprintf(f, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy);
5041 }
5042
5043 fputc('\n', f);
5044 }
5045
5046 return 0;
5047 }
5048
5049 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) {
5050 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt_create = NULL;
5051 ExecRuntime *rt;
5052 int r;
5053
5054 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
5055 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
5056 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
5057 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
5058
5059 assert(u);
5060 assert(key);
5061 assert(value);
5062
5063 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
5064 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
5065 if (isempty(u->id)) {
5066 log_unit_debug(u, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
5067 return 0;
5068 }
5069
5070 r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops);
5071 if (r < 0) {
5072 log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
5073 return 0;
5074 }
5075
5076 rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, u->id);
5077 if (!rt) {
5078 r = exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create);
5079 if (r < 0)
5080 return log_oom();
5081
5082 rt_create->id = strdup(u->id);
5083 if (!rt_create->id)
5084 return log_oom();
5085
5086 rt = rt_create;
5087 }
5088
5089 if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) {
5090 char *copy;
5091
5092 copy = strdup(value);
5093 if (!copy)
5094 return log_oom();
5095
5096 free_and_replace(rt->tmp_dir, copy);
5097
5098 } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) {
5099 char *copy;
5100
5101 copy = strdup(value);
5102 if (!copy)
5103 return log_oom();
5104
5105 free_and_replace(rt->var_tmp_dir, copy);
5106
5107 } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) {
5108 int fd;
5109
5110 if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) {
5111 log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value);
5112 return 0;
5113 }
5114
5115 safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[0]);
5116 rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
5117
5118 } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) {
5119 int fd;
5120
5121 if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) {
5122 log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value);
5123 return 0;
5124 }
5125
5126 safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[1]);
5127 rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
5128 } else
5129 return 0;
5130
5131 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
5132 if (rt_create) {
5133 r = hashmap_put(u->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, rt_create->id, rt_create);
5134 if (r < 0) {
5135 log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
5136 return 0;
5137 }
5138
5139 rt_create->manager = u->manager;
5140
5141 /* Avoid cleanup */
5142 rt_create = NULL;
5143 }
5144
5145 return 1;
5146 }
5147
5148 void exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) {
5149 char *id = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL;
5150 int r, fd0 = -1, fd1 = -1;
5151 const char *p, *v = value;
5152 size_t n;
5153
5154 assert(m);
5155 assert(value);
5156 assert(fds);
5157
5158 n = strcspn(v, " ");
5159 id = strndupa(v, n);
5160 if (v[n] != ' ')
5161 goto finalize;
5162 p = v + n + 1;
5163
5164 v = startswith(p, "tmp-dir=");
5165 if (v) {
5166 n = strcspn(v, " ");
5167 tmp_dir = strndupa(v, n);
5168 if (v[n] != ' ')
5169 goto finalize;
5170 p = v + n + 1;
5171 }
5172
5173 v = startswith(p, "var-tmp-dir=");
5174 if (v) {
5175 n = strcspn(v, " ");
5176 var_tmp_dir = strndupa(v, n);
5177 if (v[n] != ' ')
5178 goto finalize;
5179 p = v + n + 1;
5180 }
5181
5182 v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-0=");
5183 if (v) {
5184 char *buf;
5185
5186 n = strcspn(v, " ");
5187 buf = strndupa(v, n);
5188 if (safe_atoi(buf, &fd0) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd0)) {
5189 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5190 return;
5191 }
5192 fd0 = fdset_remove(fds, fd0);
5193 if (v[n] != ' ')
5194 goto finalize;
5195 p = v + n + 1;
5196 }
5197
5198 v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-1=");
5199 if (v) {
5200 char *buf;
5201
5202 n = strcspn(v, " ");
5203 buf = strndupa(v, n);
5204 if (safe_atoi(buf, &fd1) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd1)) {
5205 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5206 return;
5207 }
5208 fd1 = fdset_remove(fds, fd1);
5209 }
5210
5211 finalize:
5212
5213 r = exec_runtime_add(m, id, tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, (int[]) { fd0, fd1 }, NULL);
5214 if (r < 0)
5215 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
5216 }
5217
5218 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager *m) {
5219 ExecRuntime *rt;
5220 Iterator i;
5221
5222 assert(m);
5223
5224 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
5225
5226 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_runtime_by_id, i) {
5227 if (rt->n_ref > 0)
5228 continue;
5229
5230 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt, false);
5231 }
5232 }
5233
5234 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) {
5235 if (!p)
5236 return;
5237
5238 strv_free(p->environment);
5239 }
5240
5241 static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = {
5242 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null",
5243 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty",
5244 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force",
5245 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail",
5246 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket",
5247 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd",
5248 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA] = "data",
5249 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE] = "file",
5250 };
5251
5252 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput);
5253
5254 static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = {
5255 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit",
5256 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null",
5257 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty",
5258 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG] = "syslog",
5259 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE] = "syslog+console",
5260 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg",
5261 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console",
5262 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal",
5263 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console",
5264 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket",
5265 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd",
5266 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE] = "file",
5267 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND] = "append",
5268 };
5269
5270 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput);
5271
5272 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = {
5273 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init",
5274 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login",
5275 [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user",
5276 };
5277
5278 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode);
5279
5280 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX] = {
5281 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO] = "no",
5282 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES] = "yes",
5283 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART] = "restart",
5284 };
5285
5286 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES);
5287
5288 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = {
5289 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectory",
5290 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectory",
5291 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectory",
5292 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectory",
5293 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
5294 };
5295
5296 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type, ExecDirectoryType);
5297
5298 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = {
5299 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
5300 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
5301 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
5302 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
5303 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
5304 };
5305
5306 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name, ExecDirectoryType);
5307
5308 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = {
5309 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT] = "inherit",
5310 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE] = "private",
5311 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED] = "shared",
5312 };
5313
5314 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode);