1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
6 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
9 #include <sys/personality.h>
10 #include <sys/prctl.h>
12 #include <sys/types.h>
18 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
22 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
30 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
33 #include "sd-messages.h"
36 #include "alloc-util.h"
38 #include "apparmor-util.h"
43 #include "capability-util.h"
44 #include "chown-recursive.h"
45 #include "cgroup-setup.h"
46 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
50 #include "errno-list.h"
52 #include "exit-status.h"
54 #include "format-util.h"
56 #include "glob-util.h"
57 #include "hexdecoct.h"
64 #include "memory-util.h"
65 #include "missing_fs.h"
67 #include "namespace.h"
68 #include "parse-util.h"
69 #include "path-util.h"
70 #include "process-util.h"
71 #include "rlimit-util.h"
74 #include "seccomp-util.h"
76 #include "securebits-util.h"
77 #include "selinux-util.h"
78 #include "signal-util.h"
79 #include "smack-util.h"
80 #include "socket-util.h"
82 #include "stat-util.h"
83 #include "string-table.h"
84 #include "string-util.h"
86 #include "syslog-util.h"
87 #include "terminal-util.h"
88 #include "umask-util.h"
90 #include "user-util.h"
91 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
93 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
94 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
96 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
98 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
99 int start
, restart_from
;
104 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
114 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
117 /* Already at right index? */
121 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
128 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
129 * let's remember that and try again from here */
130 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
134 if (restart_from
< 0)
137 start
= restart_from
;
143 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
147 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
153 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
154 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
156 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
158 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
159 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
164 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
165 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
168 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
176 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
179 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
182 if (context
->tty_path
)
183 return context
->tty_path
;
185 return "/dev/console";
188 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
193 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
195 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
196 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
197 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
199 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
202 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
203 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
204 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
206 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
209 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
210 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
213 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
216 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
217 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
220 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
223 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
224 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
227 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
230 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
233 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
236 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
238 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
241 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
244 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
247 return !!c
->tty_path
;
250 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
255 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
259 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
262 static int connect_journal_socket(
264 const char *log_namespace
,
268 union sockaddr_union sa
;
270 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
271 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
276 strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace
, "/stdout") :
277 "/run/systemd/journal/stdout";
278 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, j
);
283 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
286 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
290 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
293 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
299 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
301 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
302 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
304 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
305 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
308 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
309 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
314 static int connect_logger_as(
316 const ExecContext
*context
,
317 const ExecParameters
*params
,
324 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
329 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
333 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
337 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, context
->log_namespace
, uid
, gid
);
341 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
344 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
354 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
355 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
356 context
->syslog_priority
,
357 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
359 is_kmsg_output(output
),
360 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
363 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
366 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
372 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
376 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
379 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
380 union sockaddr_union sa
;
382 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
387 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
390 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
394 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
397 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
399 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
401 return r
== -EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: r
;
404 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
408 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0)
409 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
410 * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
412 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
413 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
414 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
424 static int fixup_input(
425 const ExecContext
*context
,
427 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
433 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
435 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
436 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
438 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
439 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
441 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
442 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
447 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
449 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
450 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
455 static int setup_input(
456 const ExecContext
*context
,
457 const ExecParameters
*params
,
459 const int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
467 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
468 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
471 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
472 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
473 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
474 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
480 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
484 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
485 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
488 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
489 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
492 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
493 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
494 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
495 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
500 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
503 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
504 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
506 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
508 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
509 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
511 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
512 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
514 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
517 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
521 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
524 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
528 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
530 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
531 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
533 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
537 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
541 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
545 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
546 const ExecContext
*context
,
552 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
555 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
560 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
561 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
563 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
))
564 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
569 static int setup_output(
571 const ExecContext
*context
,
572 const ExecParameters
*params
,
575 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
579 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
580 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
590 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
591 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
593 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
595 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
598 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
601 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
602 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
605 return STDERR_FILENO
;
608 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
609 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
611 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
613 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
615 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
617 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
618 * the way and are not on a tty */
619 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
620 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
621 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
622 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
626 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
627 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
628 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
632 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
633 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
634 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
635 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
637 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
638 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
639 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
641 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
645 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
646 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
651 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
652 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
654 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
655 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
656 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
658 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
659 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
661 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
662 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
665 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
667 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
668 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
672 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
673 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
674 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
676 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
677 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
679 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
680 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
681 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
682 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
687 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
688 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
690 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
692 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
693 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
695 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
696 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
698 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
699 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
: {
703 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
705 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
706 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
709 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
712 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
715 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
719 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
723 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
727 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
732 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
733 if (isatty(fd
) < 1) {
734 if (IN_SET(errno
, EINVAL
, ENOTTY
))
735 return 0; /* not a tty */
740 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
741 r
= fchmod_and_chown(fd
, TTY_MODE
, uid
, -1);
748 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
749 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
752 assert(_saved_stdin
);
753 assert(_saved_stdout
);
755 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
759 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
760 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
763 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
767 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
771 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
775 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
780 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
781 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
783 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
788 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
791 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
792 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
795 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
799 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
800 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
804 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
808 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
811 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
815 assert(saved_stdout
);
819 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
820 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
823 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
824 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
827 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
828 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
834 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
835 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
839 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
840 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
841 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
844 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
845 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
847 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
848 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
851 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
852 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
857 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
865 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
867 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
874 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
875 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
879 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
880 continue; /* ask again */
882 printf("Failing execution.\n");
883 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
886 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
887 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
888 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
890 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
891 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
892 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
893 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
894 continue; /* ask again */
896 printf(" Description: %s\n"
899 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
900 continue; /* ask again */
902 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
903 continue; /* ask again */
905 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
906 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
907 continue; /* ask again */
909 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
910 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
916 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
922 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
926 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
927 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
928 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
937 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
938 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
941 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
949 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
959 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
967 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
968 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
969 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
973 bool keep_groups
= false;
974 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
975 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
980 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
981 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
982 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
983 * groups of the caller.
985 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
986 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
987 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
993 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
997 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
998 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1001 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1002 if (ngroups_max
<= 0)
1003 return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP
);
1005 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1011 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1012 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1015 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1020 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1023 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1027 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1035 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1036 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1043 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1044 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1048 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1056 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1059 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1061 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1066 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1067 /* Then set our gids */
1068 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1075 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1078 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1081 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1082 * capabilities while doing so. */
1084 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1086 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1087 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1088 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1090 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
1092 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
1093 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
1098 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1099 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1102 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1103 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1104 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1105 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1112 static int null_conv(
1114 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1115 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1116 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1118 /* We don't support conversations */
1120 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1125 static int setup_pam(
1132 const int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1136 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1141 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1142 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1144 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1145 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1146 bool close_session
= false;
1147 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1154 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1155 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1156 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1157 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1158 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1159 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1161 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1165 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1166 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1168 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1169 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1175 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1177 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1178 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1180 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1181 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1185 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1186 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1190 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1191 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1192 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1196 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1197 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1200 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED
| flags
);
1201 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1202 log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1204 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1205 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1208 close_session
= true;
1210 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1212 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1216 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1219 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1221 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1223 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1227 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1229 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1231 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1233 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
1234 * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1235 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1237 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1238 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1239 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1240 * to fail to exit normally */
1242 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1244 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1245 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1246 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1247 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1248 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1250 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1252 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1253 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1254 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1255 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1256 * to do the rest for us. */
1257 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1260 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1261 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1262 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1264 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1265 * return failure here. */
1266 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1268 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1269 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1272 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1273 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1276 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1283 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1288 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_DELETE_CRED
| flags
);
1289 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1292 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1293 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1294 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1295 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1302 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1306 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1308 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1309 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1312 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1313 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1315 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1316 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1319 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1320 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1321 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1322 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1324 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1327 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1328 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1329 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1331 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1335 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1337 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1349 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1350 char process_name
[11];
1354 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1355 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1359 rename_process("(...)");
1365 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1366 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1372 process_name
[0] = '(';
1373 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1374 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1375 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1377 rename_process(process_name
);
1380 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1383 return c
->address_families_allow_list
||
1384 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1387 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1390 return c
->syscall_allow_list
||
1391 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1394 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1397 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1400 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1403 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1404 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1405 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1406 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1407 c
->restrict_suid_sgid
||
1408 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1410 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1411 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1412 c
->protect_kernel_logs
||
1413 c
->private_devices
||
1414 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1415 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1416 c
->lock_personality
||
1417 c
->protect_hostname
;
1422 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1424 if (is_seccomp_available())
1427 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1431 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1432 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1438 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1441 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1444 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1446 if (c
->syscall_allow_list
) {
1447 default_action
= negative_action
;
1448 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1450 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1451 action
= negative_action
;
1454 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1455 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_allow_list
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1460 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1463 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1467 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1470 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1473 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1476 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1480 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1483 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1486 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_allow_list
);
1489 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1493 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1496 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1499 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1502 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1506 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1509 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1512 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1515 static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1519 if (!c
->restrict_suid_sgid
)
1522 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictSUIDSGID="))
1525 return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid();
1528 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1532 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1533 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1535 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1538 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1541 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1544 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1548 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1550 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1553 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1556 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1559 static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1563 if (!c
->protect_kernel_logs
)
1566 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelLogs="))
1569 return seccomp_protect_syslog();
1572 static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1576 if (!c
->protect_clock
)
1579 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectClock="))
1582 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1585 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1589 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1591 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1594 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1597 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1600 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1604 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1607 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1610 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1613 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1614 unsigned long personality
;
1620 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1623 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1626 personality
= c
->personality
;
1628 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1629 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1631 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1636 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1641 static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
, int *ret_exit_status
) {
1645 if (!c
->protect_hostname
)
1648 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
1649 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
1650 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
)) {
1651 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
1652 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
1655 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup.");
1658 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
1663 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectHostname="))
1666 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
1668 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
1669 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
1676 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1679 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1680 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1682 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1685 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1687 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1690 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1691 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1693 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1694 (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1697 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1701 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1704 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1706 static int build_environment(
1708 const ExecContext
*c
,
1709 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1712 const char *username
,
1714 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1715 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1718 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1719 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1728 #define N_ENV_VARS 15
1729 our_env
= new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1734 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1736 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1738 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1740 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1742 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1744 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1748 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1751 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1754 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1755 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1757 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1759 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1761 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1764 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1765 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1766 * check the database directly. */
1767 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1768 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1771 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1775 x
= strjoin("HOME=", home
);
1779 path_simplify(x
+ 5, true);
1780 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1784 x
= strjoin("LOGNAME=", username
);
1787 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1789 x
= strjoin("USER=", username
);
1792 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1796 x
= strjoin("SHELL=", shell
);
1800 path_simplify(x
+ 6, true);
1801 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1804 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1805 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1808 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1811 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1812 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1814 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1816 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try
1817 * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the
1818 * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1820 if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1821 term
= getenv("TERM");
1824 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1826 x
= strjoin("TERM=", term
);
1829 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1832 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1833 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1836 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1839 if (c
->log_namespace
) {
1840 x
= strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c
->log_namespace
);
1844 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1847 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1848 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1854 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1857 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1861 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1865 joined
= strv_join_prefix(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
);
1869 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1873 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1876 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1877 assert(n_env
<= N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1880 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1885 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1886 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1887 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1890 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1891 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1897 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1901 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1904 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1905 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1908 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1913 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1914 const ExecContext
*context
,
1915 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1916 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1921 if (context
->root_image
)
1924 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1925 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1926 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1929 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
1932 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
1935 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
1938 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1941 if (context
->private_devices
||
1942 context
->private_mounts
||
1943 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1944 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
1945 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1946 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1947 context
->protect_kernel_logs
||
1948 context
->protect_control_groups
)
1951 if (context
->root_directory
) {
1952 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1954 if (context
->mount_apivfs
)
1957 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1958 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
1961 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1966 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
1967 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
1968 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
1969 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
1972 if (context
->log_namespace
)
1978 static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid
, gid_t ogid
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1979 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1980 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1981 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1982 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1987 /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e.
1988 * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1989 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1990 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1991 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1992 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1993 * continues execution normally.
1994 * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it
1995 * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */
1997 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */
1998 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID
) && uid
!= ouid
&& uid_is_valid(uid
))
1999 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2000 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2001 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
2002 ouid
, ouid
, uid
, uid
);
2004 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2005 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2011 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */
2012 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID
) && gid
!= ogid
&& gid_is_valid(gid
))
2013 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2014 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */
2015 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
2016 ogid
, ogid
, gid
, gid
);
2018 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2019 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */
2025 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
2027 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
2028 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
2031 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
2033 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
2036 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
2040 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2044 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
2045 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
2048 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
2050 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
2051 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
2056 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
2057 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
2058 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2060 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
2065 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
2067 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
2072 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2075 /* First write the GID map */
2076 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
2077 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2082 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
2086 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2088 /* The write the UID map */
2089 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
2090 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2095 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
2100 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2103 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2104 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2107 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2109 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2112 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2113 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2116 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2117 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2120 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2125 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2128 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2132 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2138 static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext
*context
, ExecDirectoryType type
) {
2139 if (!context
->dynamic_user
)
2142 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2145 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
&& context
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
== EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
)
2151 static int setup_exec_directory(
2152 const ExecContext
*context
,
2153 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2156 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2159 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2160 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2161 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2162 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2163 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2164 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2171 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2172 assert(exit_status
);
2174 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2177 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2178 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2180 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2184 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2185 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2187 p
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], *rt
);
2193 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2197 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, type
)) {
2198 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2200 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that
2201 * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by
2202 * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same
2203 * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of
2204 * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an
2205 * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary
2206 * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory
2207 * permeable for the service itself.
2209 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create
2210 * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place
2211 * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to
2212 * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but
2213 * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit
2214 * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's
2215 * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary
2216 * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no
2217 * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2219 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not
2220 * to be owned by the service itself.
2222 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used
2223 * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */
2225 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private");
2226 if (!private_root
) {
2231 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2232 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2236 pp
= path_join(private_root
, *rt
);
2242 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2243 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2247 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2248 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2250 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2251 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2252 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2254 log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2255 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.",
2256 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), p
, pp
);
2258 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2263 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2265 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2266 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2270 /* And link it up from the original place */
2271 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2276 _cleanup_free_
char *target
= NULL
;
2278 if (type
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
&&
2279 readlink_and_make_absolute(p
, &target
) >= 0) {
2280 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
, *q_resolved
= NULL
, *target_resolved
= NULL
;
2282 /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created
2283 * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)?
2285 * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=,
2286 * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some
2287 * configurations, see above. */
2289 r
= chase_symlinks(target
, NULL
, 0, &target_resolved
, NULL
);
2293 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private", *rt
);
2299 /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */
2300 r
= chase_symlinks(q
, NULL
, CHASE_NONEXISTENT
, &q_resolved
, NULL
);
2304 if (path_equal(q_resolved
, target_resolved
)) {
2306 /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service,
2307 * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */
2309 log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2310 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.",
2311 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), q
, p
);
2313 if (unlink(p
) < 0) {
2318 if (rename(q
, p
) < 0) {
2325 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2330 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
2333 /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory,
2334 * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall
2335 * not be writable. */
2337 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2342 /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */
2343 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2344 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2345 "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)",
2346 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2347 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2354 /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't
2355 * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the
2356 * current UID/GID ownership.) */
2357 r
= chmod_and_chown(pp
?: p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
);
2361 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we
2362 * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID
2363 * assignments to exist.*/
2364 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
, context
->dynamic_user
? 01777 : 07777);
2372 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2377 static int setup_smack(
2378 const ExecContext
*context
,
2379 const ExecCommand
*command
) {
2386 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2387 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2391 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2393 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2395 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2396 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2399 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2409 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2410 const ExecContext
*context
,
2411 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2412 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2413 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2414 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2416 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2417 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2419 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2424 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2425 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2426 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2428 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2429 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2430 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2433 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2437 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2438 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2439 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2443 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2447 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2448 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2451 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2457 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2464 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2467 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2468 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2469 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2473 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2476 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2479 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2482 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
2483 !(context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
)) {
2486 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
2487 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
2488 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
2490 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private");
2491 if (!private_root
) {
2496 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
2501 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2504 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
))
2505 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private", *suffix
);
2507 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
2513 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
2514 (context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
))
2515 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
2516 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
2517 * on the 'non-private' place. */
2518 d
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
2527 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2531 .nosuid
= context
->dynamic_user
, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */
2533 .ignore_enoent
= false,
2540 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
2541 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
2542 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
2547 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
2551 static bool insist_on_sandboxing(
2552 const ExecContext
*context
,
2553 const char *root_dir
,
2554 const char *root_image
,
2555 const BindMount
*bind_mounts
,
2556 size_t n_bind_mounts
) {
2561 assert(n_bind_mounts
== 0 || bind_mounts
);
2563 /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that
2564 * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would
2565 * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */
2567 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
2570 if (root_dir
|| root_image
)
2573 if (context
->dynamic_user
)
2576 /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes
2578 for (i
= 0; i
< n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
2579 if (!path_equal(bind_mounts
[i
].source
, bind_mounts
[i
].destination
))
2582 if (context
->log_namespace
)
2588 static int apply_mount_namespace(
2590 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2591 const ExecContext
*context
,
2592 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2593 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2594 char **error_path
) {
2596 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2597 const char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
2598 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
2599 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
2600 bool needs_sandboxing
;
2601 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2602 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2607 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2608 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
2611 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
2614 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
2618 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
2619 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
2620 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2621 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2622 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here.
2623 * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
2625 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2626 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
2627 tmp_dir
= runtime
->tmp_dir
;
2628 else if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2629 tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2631 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
2632 var_tmp_dir
= runtime
->var_tmp_dir
;
2633 else if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2634 var_tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2637 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2638 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
2639 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
2640 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
2641 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
2642 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
2643 .protect_kernel_logs
= context
->protect_kernel_logs
,
2644 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
2645 .mount_apivfs
= context
->mount_apivfs
,
2646 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
2648 } else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
2650 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2651 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2652 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2654 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2655 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
2658 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
2660 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
2661 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
2663 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
,
2664 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
2665 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
2666 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
2670 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
2671 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
2674 context
->log_namespace
,
2675 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_home
: PROTECT_HOME_NO
,
2676 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_system
: PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
,
2677 context
->mount_flags
,
2678 context
->root_hash
, context
->root_hash_size
, context
->root_hash_path
,
2679 context
->root_hash_sig
, context
->root_hash_sig_size
, context
->root_hash_sig_path
,
2680 context
->root_verity
,
2681 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
|DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK
|DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK
,
2684 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
2685 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
2686 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
2687 * completely different execution environment. */
2689 if (insist_on_sandboxing(
2691 root_dir
, root_image
,
2694 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
2695 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
2696 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
2700 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
2705 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
2709 static int apply_working_directory(
2710 const ExecContext
*context
,
2711 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2718 assert(exit_status
);
2720 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
2723 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2729 } else if (context
->working_directory
)
2730 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2734 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
2737 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
2739 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2740 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2747 static int apply_root_directory(
2748 const ExecContext
*context
,
2749 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2750 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
2754 assert(exit_status
);
2756 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2757 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
2758 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
2759 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2767 static int setup_keyring(
2769 const ExecContext
*context
,
2770 const ExecParameters
*p
,
2771 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2773 key_serial_t keyring
;
2782 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
2783 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
2784 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
2785 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
2786 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
2787 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
2789 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
2792 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
2793 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
2794 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
2795 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
2797 saved_uid
= getuid();
2798 saved_gid
= getgid();
2800 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2801 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
2802 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
2805 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2806 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
2807 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
2812 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2813 if (keyring
== -1) {
2814 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
2815 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
2816 else if (IN_SET(errno
, EACCES
, EPERM
))
2817 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
2818 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
2819 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
2821 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
2826 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
2827 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
2829 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
2830 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
2831 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
2832 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
2837 /* Restore uid/gid back */
2838 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2839 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
2840 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
2845 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2846 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
2847 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
2850 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
2851 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
2854 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
2856 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
2858 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
2859 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
2860 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
2861 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
2866 /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */
2867 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
2868 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
2869 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
2871 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
2872 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
2877 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
2883 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
2885 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
2888 static int close_remaining_fds(
2889 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2890 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2891 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2895 const int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
2897 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
2898 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
2902 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
2903 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
2904 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
2905 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
2906 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
2907 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
2910 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
2912 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = exec_fd
;
2914 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
2915 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
2919 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2923 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
2925 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
2928 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
2929 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
2931 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
2934 static int send_user_lookup(
2942 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2943 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2946 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
2949 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
2952 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
2954 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
2955 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
2956 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
2962 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
2969 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
2974 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
2977 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
2985 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
2986 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
2987 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2994 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
2996 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
2997 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
3000 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
3003 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
3009 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3012 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, t
))
3013 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
3015 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], *i
);
3019 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
3025 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
3030 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
3032 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
3033 bool using_subcgroup
;
3039 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
3042 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
3043 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
3044 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
3045 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
3046 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
3047 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
3048 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
3049 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
3051 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
3052 if (using_subcgroup
)
3053 p
= path_join(params
->cgroup_path
, ".control");
3055 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
3060 return using_subcgroup
;
3063 static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
, CPUSet
*ret
) {
3064 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet s
= {};
3070 if (!c
->numa_policy
.nodes
.set
) {
3071 log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring");
3075 r
= numa_to_cpu_set(&c
->numa_policy
, &s
);
3081 return cpu_set_add_all(ret
, &s
);
3084 bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
) {
3087 return c
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
;
3090 static int exec_child(
3092 const ExecCommand
*command
,
3093 const ExecContext
*context
,
3094 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3095 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3096 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3098 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
3100 size_t n_socket_fds
,
3101 size_t n_storage_fds
,
3106 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
3107 int *fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
, r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
= -1;
3108 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
3109 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
3110 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
3111 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
3112 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
3113 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
3114 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
3115 bool userns_set_up
= false;
3116 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
3117 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
3118 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
3119 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
3121 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
3122 bool use_selinux
= false;
3125 bool use_smack
= false;
3128 bool use_apparmor
= false;
3130 uid_t saved_uid
= getuid();
3131 gid_t saved_gid
= getgid();
3132 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
3133 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
3135 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
3137 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_after_pam
= NULL
;
3138 int ngids_after_pam
= 0;
3144 assert(exit_status
);
3146 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
3148 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
3149 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
3150 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
3151 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
3152 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
3153 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
3154 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
3156 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
3157 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
3159 r
= reset_signal_mask();
3161 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
3162 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
3165 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
3166 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
3168 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
3169 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
3170 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
3171 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
3174 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
3176 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
3179 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
3180 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, params
->exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
3182 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3183 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
3186 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
3188 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
3189 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
3192 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
3194 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
3195 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
3196 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
3198 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3200 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3204 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
3205 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
3206 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
3207 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3210 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
3211 log_unit_error(unit
, "Execution cancelled by the user");
3216 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
3217 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
3218 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
3219 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
3220 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
3221 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
3222 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
3223 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3224 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3227 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
3228 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
3230 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
3231 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
3232 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
3233 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3234 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3237 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
3239 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3243 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
3245 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3247 log_unit_error(unit
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
3250 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
3253 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3254 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3255 log_unit_error(unit
, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
3259 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
3260 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3261 log_unit_error(unit
, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3266 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3269 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3271 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3272 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3275 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3277 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3278 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3282 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3283 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3284 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3286 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3287 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3290 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3292 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3293 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3296 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3298 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3300 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3301 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3304 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3305 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3307 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3309 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3310 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3311 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3312 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3314 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3316 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3317 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3320 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3322 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3323 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3327 if (context
->network_namespace_path
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3328 r
= open_netns_path(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
, context
->network_namespace_path
);
3330 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3331 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context
->network_namespace_path
);
3335 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3337 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3338 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3341 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3343 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3344 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3347 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3349 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3350 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3353 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3354 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3355 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3356 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3357 if (IN_SET(r
, -EPERM
, -EACCES
))
3358 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3360 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3361 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3365 if (context
->coredump_filter_set
) {
3366 r
= set_coredump_filter(context
->coredump_filter
);
3367 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3368 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m");
3370 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m");
3373 if (context
->nice_set
) {
3374 r
= setpriority_closest(context
->nice
);
3376 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3379 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3380 struct sched_param param
= {
3381 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3384 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3385 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3386 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3387 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3390 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3391 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3395 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
|| context
->cpu_set
.set
) {
3396 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet converted_cpu_set
= {};
3397 const CPUSet
*cpu_set
;
3399 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
) {
3400 r
= exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context
, &converted_cpu_set
);
3402 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3403 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m");
3406 cpu_set
= &converted_cpu_set
;
3408 cpu_set
= &context
->cpu_set
;
3410 if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set
->allocated
, cpu_set
->set
) < 0) {
3411 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3412 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3416 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context
->numa_policy
))) {
3417 r
= apply_numa_policy(&context
->numa_policy
);
3418 if (r
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
3419 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "NUMA support not available, ignoring.");
3421 *exit_status
= EXIT_NUMA_POLICY
;
3422 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m");
3426 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3427 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3428 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3429 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3432 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3433 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3434 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3435 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3438 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
3439 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
3441 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
3442 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
3446 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3447 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
3449 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
3450 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
3454 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3455 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
3457 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3458 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
3462 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
3463 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
3464 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
3465 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
3466 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
3467 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
3469 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3470 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
3474 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
3475 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
3477 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
3480 r
= build_environment(
3492 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3496 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
3498 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3502 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
3503 params
->environment
,
3506 context
->environment
,
3509 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3512 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
3514 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
3516 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
3518 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
3519 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
3522 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
3523 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3525 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
3526 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
3528 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
3529 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3530 needs_setuid
= false;
3532 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
3534 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3535 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
3536 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
3537 * impacting our own code paths. */
3540 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
3543 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
3546 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
3550 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3553 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
3554 * is set here. (See below.) */
3556 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
3558 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3559 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
3565 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
3566 * wins here. (See above.) */
3568 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
3569 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
3571 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
3572 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
3575 ngids_after_pam
= getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam
);
3576 if (ngids_after_pam
< 0) {
3577 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3578 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, ngids_after_pam
, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m");
3583 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3585 if (use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
3586 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
3588 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3589 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
3594 /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces.
3595 * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to
3596 * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */
3597 if (context
->private_users
&& !have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
3598 userns_set_up
= true;
3599 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
3601 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3602 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m");
3607 if ((context
->private_network
|| context
->network_namespace_path
) && runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3609 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
3610 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3612 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
,
3613 "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m");
3615 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3616 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
3618 } else if (context
->network_namespace_path
) {
3619 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3620 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
3621 "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing.");
3623 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
3626 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
3627 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
3628 _cleanup_free_
char *error_path
= NULL
;
3630 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
, context
, params
, runtime
, &error_path
);
3632 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3633 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m",
3634 error_path
? ": " : "", strempty(error_path
));
3638 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3639 r
= apply_protect_hostname(unit
, context
, exit_status
);
3644 /* Drop groups as early as possible.
3645 * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root.
3646 * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */
3648 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_to_enforce
= NULL
;
3649 int ngids_to_enforce
= 0;
3651 ngids_to_enforce
= merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids
,
3656 if (ngids_to_enforce
< 0) {
3657 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3658 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
,
3660 "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m");
3663 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, gids_to_enforce
, ngids_to_enforce
);
3665 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3666 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
3670 /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now.
3671 * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be
3672 * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namspaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the
3673 * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a
3674 * different user namespace). */
3676 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !userns_set_up
) {
3677 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
3679 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3680 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
3684 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
3685 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
3686 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
3688 if (params
->exec_fd
>= 0) {
3689 exec_fd
= params
->exec_fd
;
3691 if (exec_fd
< 3 + (int) n_fds
) {
3694 /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
3695 * process we are about to execute. */
3697 moved_fd
= fcntl(exec_fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) n_fds
);
3699 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3700 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
3703 safe_close(exec_fd
);
3706 /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
3707 r
= fd_cloexec(exec_fd
, true);
3709 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3710 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3714 fds_with_exec_fd
= newa(int, n_fds
+ 1);
3715 memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3716 fds_with_exec_fd
[n_fds
] = exec_fd
;
3717 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
+ 1;
3719 fds_with_exec_fd
= fds
;
3720 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
;
3723 r
= close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
);
3725 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
3727 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
3729 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3730 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
3733 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
3734 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
3735 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
3738 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
3740 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3743 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
3744 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
3745 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
3746 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
3747 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
3748 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3749 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
3754 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
3755 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
3757 r
= setup_smack(context
, command
);
3759 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
3760 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
3765 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
3766 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
3767 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
3768 * instead of us doing that */
3769 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3770 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
3771 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
3772 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
3774 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
3775 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
3777 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3778 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
3782 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
3783 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
3784 if (!needs_ambient_hack
) {
3785 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
3787 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3788 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
3793 /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */
3794 r
= apply_root_directory(context
, params
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
3796 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m");
3799 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3800 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
3802 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3803 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
3806 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3807 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3809 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
3810 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
3812 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3813 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
3816 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
3817 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
3818 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
3819 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
3820 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
3821 * drop the bit away next. */
3823 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
3828 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
3829 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
3830 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, exit_status
);
3832 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
3834 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3835 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
3836 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
3837 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
3838 * are restricted. */
3842 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
3845 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
3847 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3848 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
3855 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
3856 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
3857 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
3858 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
3859 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
3864 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
3865 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
3866 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
3867 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
3868 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
3869 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
3872 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
3873 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
3874 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
3875 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
3879 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
3881 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
3882 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
3885 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
3887 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3888 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
3891 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
3893 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3894 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
3897 r
= apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit
, context
);
3899 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3900 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m");
3903 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
3905 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3906 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
3909 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
3911 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3912 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
3915 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
3917 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3918 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
3921 r
= apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit
, context
);
3923 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3924 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m");
3927 r
= apply_protect_clock(unit
, context
);
3929 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3930 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m");
3933 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
3935 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3936 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
3939 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
3941 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3942 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
3945 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
3947 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3948 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
3951 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
3952 * by the filter as little as possible. */
3953 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
3955 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3956 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
3961 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
3964 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
3966 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3970 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
3973 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
3974 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
3975 if (!replaced_argv
) {
3976 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3979 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
3981 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
3983 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
3984 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
3986 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
3988 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3989 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3990 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
3992 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3998 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
3999 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
4001 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4002 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4003 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
4007 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
4013 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
4014 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
4016 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4017 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4018 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
4022 if (r
== -ENOENT
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
4023 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4024 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4026 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4027 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
4029 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4033 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4034 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute command: %m");
4037 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
4038 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]);
4040 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
4041 ExecCommand
*command
,
4042 const ExecContext
*context
,
4043 const ExecParameters
*params
,
4044 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
4045 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
4048 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
4049 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
4050 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
4051 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
4052 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
4060 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
4062 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
4063 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
4064 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
4066 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1) {
4067 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
4071 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0) {
4072 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got no socket.");
4076 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
4080 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
4081 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
4084 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
4086 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
4088 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
4090 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
4092 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
4096 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4097 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
4098 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
4100 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4102 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
4103 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
4105 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
4106 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
4107 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
4109 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
4115 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
4118 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
4120 r
= exec_child(unit
,
4132 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
4136 const char *status
=
4137 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
,
4138 EXIT_STATUS_LIBC
| EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
);
4140 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
4141 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4143 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4144 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
4145 status
, command
->path
),
4146 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4152 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
4154 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
4155 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
4156 * process will be killed too). */
4158 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
4160 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
4166 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
4167 ExecDirectoryType i
;
4172 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
4173 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
4174 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
4175 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
4176 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
4177 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
4178 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
4179 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
4180 c
->directories
[i
].mode
= 0755;
4181 c
->timeout_clean_usec
= USEC_INFINITY
;
4182 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
4183 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
4184 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
4185 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4186 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4189 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
4190 ExecDirectoryType i
;
4195 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
4196 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
4197 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
4198 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
4200 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
4202 for (l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
4203 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
4204 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
4207 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
4208 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
4209 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
4210 c
->root_hash
= mfree(c
->root_hash
);
4211 c
->root_hash_size
= 0;
4212 c
->root_hash_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_path
);
4213 c
->root_hash_sig
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig
);
4214 c
->root_hash_sig_size
= 0;
4215 c
->root_hash_sig_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
4216 c
->root_verity
= mfree(c
->root_verity
);
4217 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
4218 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
4219 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
4220 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
4222 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
4224 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
4226 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
4227 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
4228 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4230 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
4231 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
4232 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
4233 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
4234 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
4235 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
4237 cpu_set_reset(&c
->cpu_set
);
4238 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4240 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
4241 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
4242 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
4243 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
4245 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
4246 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
4247 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
4249 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
4250 c
->directories
[i
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[i
].paths
);
4252 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4254 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
4256 c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
= 0;
4257 c
->log_ratelimit_burst
= 0;
4259 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
4260 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
4262 c
->network_namespace_path
= mfree(c
->network_namespace_path
);
4264 c
->log_namespace
= mfree(c
->log_namespace
);
4267 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
4272 if (!runtime_prefix
)
4275 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
4276 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
4278 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
))
4279 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "private", *i
);
4281 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, *i
);
4285 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the
4287 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
4293 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4296 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
4297 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
4300 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4303 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4304 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
4307 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4311 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
4312 exec_command_done(i
);
4319 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4322 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4323 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
4326 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4329 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4330 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
4333 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4336 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
4339 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
4340 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
4344 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
4349 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
4350 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
4352 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
4355 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
4361 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4364 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
4367 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4370 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
4373 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4376 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
4383 static int exec_context_named_iofds(
4384 const ExecContext
*c
,
4385 const ExecParameters
*p
,
4386 int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
4389 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4394 assert(named_iofds
);
4396 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4397 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4398 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
4400 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
4401 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
4403 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
4405 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
4406 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4407 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4408 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
4409 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
4411 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4414 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4415 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4416 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
4417 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
4419 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4422 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4423 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4424 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
4425 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
4427 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4431 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
4434 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
4435 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
4440 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
4444 bool ignore
= false;
4446 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
4455 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
4463 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
4464 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
4473 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
4474 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
4476 for (n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
4477 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
4485 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
4487 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
4489 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
4492 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
4500 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
4516 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
4517 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
4522 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
4524 /* trivial identity? */
4525 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
4528 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
4529 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
4531 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
4532 return path_equal(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
4535 static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4538 return ec
->tty_reset
||
4540 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
4541 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
4542 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
4543 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
);
4546 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4548 return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec
) &&
4549 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
4552 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
4558 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
4561 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
4562 char **e
, **d
, buf_clean
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
4563 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
4570 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4574 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
4575 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
4576 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
4577 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
4578 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
4579 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
4580 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
4581 "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n"
4582 "%sProtectClock: %s\n"
4583 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
4584 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
4585 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
4586 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
4587 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
4588 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
4589 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
4590 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
4591 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
4592 "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n"
4593 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
4594 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
4596 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
4597 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
4598 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
4599 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
4600 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
4601 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
4602 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
4603 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_logs
),
4604 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_clock
),
4605 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
4606 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
4607 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
4608 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
4609 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
4610 prefix
, yes_no(c
->mount_apivfs
),
4611 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
4612 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
4613 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
4614 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_suid_sgid
),
4615 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
4616 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
));
4619 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
4622 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
4623 encoded
= hexmem(c
->root_hash
, c
->root_hash_size
);
4625 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
4628 if (c
->root_hash_path
)
4629 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_path
);
4631 if (c
->root_hash_sig
) {
4632 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
4634 len
= base64mem(c
->root_hash_sig
, c
->root_hash_sig_size
, &encoded
);
4636 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
4639 if (c
->root_hash_sig_path
)
4640 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
4643 fprintf(f
, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_verity
);
4645 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
4646 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4648 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
4649 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4651 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
4652 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4654 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
4655 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4657 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
4659 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4660 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
4662 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
4663 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
4667 "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n",
4668 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_clean
, sizeof(buf_clean
), c
->timeout_clean_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
4675 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
4677 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
4678 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
4680 if (c
->coredump_filter_set
)
4682 "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64
"\n",
4683 prefix
, c
->coredump_filter
);
4685 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
4687 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4688 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
4689 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4690 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
4693 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
4694 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
4696 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
4698 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
4700 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
4703 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
4704 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
4706 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
4708 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
4711 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
4712 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
4713 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
4714 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
4717 if (c
->cpu_set
.set
) {
4718 _cleanup_free_
char *affinity
= NULL
;
4720 affinity
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->cpu_set
);
4721 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix
, affinity
);
4724 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
))) {
4725 _cleanup_free_
char *nodes
= NULL
;
4727 nodes
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->numa_policy
.nodes
);
4728 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
)));
4729 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix
, strnull(nodes
));
4732 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
4733 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
4736 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
4737 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
4738 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
4739 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
4740 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
4741 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
4743 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4744 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4745 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4746 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4747 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4748 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4750 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
4751 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4752 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4753 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4754 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4755 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4756 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4757 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4758 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4759 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4765 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
4766 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
4767 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
4768 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
4769 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
4770 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
4772 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
4774 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4775 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4776 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
4777 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
4779 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4780 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4781 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
4783 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
4785 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
4787 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
4789 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
4791 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
4794 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
4795 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
4797 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
4799 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
4802 if (c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
> 0) {
4803 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
4806 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
4807 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
4810 if (c
->log_ratelimit_burst
> 0)
4811 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_ratelimit_burst
);
4813 if (c
->n_log_extra_fields
> 0) {
4816 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
4817 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
4818 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
4819 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
4825 if (c
->log_namespace
)
4826 fprintf(f
, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix
, c
->log_namespace
);
4828 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
4829 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4831 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
4833 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4836 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
4837 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4839 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
4841 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4844 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4845 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4847 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
4849 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4853 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
4855 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
4857 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
4859 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
4860 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
4861 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
4866 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
4868 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
4869 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
4870 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
4874 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
4875 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
4876 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
4880 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
4881 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
4882 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4886 if (c
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
4887 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
4888 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
4889 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
4890 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
4891 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
4892 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
4893 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
4895 if (c
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
4896 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
4897 TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
4899 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
4901 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
4902 strempty(t
->options
));
4907 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
4908 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
4910 if (c
->selinux_context
)
4912 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
4913 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
4915 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4917 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4918 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4920 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
4922 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
4923 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
4925 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
4927 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
4928 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
4931 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
4932 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
4934 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
4942 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
4945 if (!c
->syscall_allow_list
)
4949 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
4950 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
4951 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
4952 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
4959 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
4960 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
4963 errno_name
= errno_to_name(num
);
4965 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
4967 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
4975 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
4982 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
4986 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
4987 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
4992 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
4993 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
4995 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
4997 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
5001 if (c
->network_namespace_path
)
5003 "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n",
5004 prefix
, c
->network_namespace_path
);
5006 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
5007 const char *errno_name
;
5009 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
5011 errno_name
= errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
);
5013 fprintf(f
, "%s\n", errno_name
);
5015 fprintf(f
, "%d\n", c
->syscall_errno
);
5019 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5022 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
5023 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
5028 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
5034 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5042 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
5044 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
5049 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
5054 for (l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
5055 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
5056 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
5057 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
5060 void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext
*c
) {
5065 /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */
5066 exec_context_tty_reset(c
, NULL
);
5068 /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path
5069 * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed
5070 * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */
5072 if (exec_context_may_touch_tty(c
)) {
5075 path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
5077 r
= chmod_and_chown(path
, TTY_MODE
, 0, TTY_GID
);
5078 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
5079 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path
);
5084 int exec_context_get_clean_directories(
5090 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5091 ExecDirectoryType t
;
5098 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
5101 if (!FLAGS_SET(mask
, 1U << t
))
5107 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
5110 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], *i
);
5114 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5118 /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */
5119 if (t
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
5120 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
5124 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5135 int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext
*c
, ExecCleanMask
*ret
) {
5136 ExecCleanMask mask
= 0;
5141 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
5142 if (!strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
5149 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
5156 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
5159 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
5162 if (s
->pid
!= pid
) {
5168 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
5173 if (context
&& context
->utmp_id
)
5174 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
5177 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
5180 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
5183 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5184 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
5192 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5195 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
5198 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
5200 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
5201 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
5203 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
5205 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
5207 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
5208 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
5209 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
5213 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
5221 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
5229 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
5236 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
5247 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
5248 * spaces and ticks in them */
5253 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5254 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
5255 const char *prefix2
;
5260 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5261 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
5263 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
5265 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
5266 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror_safe(ENOMEM
));
5268 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
5271 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5274 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5276 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
5277 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
5280 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
5287 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
5288 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
5289 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
5294 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5302 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5314 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
5316 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
5319 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5320 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5328 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5334 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
5341 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
5342 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
5344 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
5348 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5355 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
5357 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
5359 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
5360 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5362 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
5364 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5369 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
5370 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5372 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5374 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5376 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5379 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
5380 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
5381 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5382 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
5386 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
5387 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
5390 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**ret
, const char *id
) {
5391 _cleanup_free_
char *id_copy
= NULL
;
5396 id_copy
= strdup(id
);
5400 n
= new(ExecRuntime
, 1);
5404 *n
= (ExecRuntime
) {
5405 .id
= TAKE_PTR(id_copy
),
5406 .netns_storage_socket
= { -1, -1 },
5413 static int exec_runtime_add(
5418 int netns_storage_socket
[2],
5419 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
5421 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
5427 /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */
5429 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
5433 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
, id
);
5437 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
5441 assert(!!rt
->tmp_dir
== !!rt
->var_tmp_dir
); /* We require both to be set together */
5442 rt
->tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir
);
5443 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir
);
5445 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
5446 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5447 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5454 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
5459 static int exec_runtime_make(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
5460 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp
) char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5461 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = { -1, -1 };
5468 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
5469 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
&& !c
->network_namespace_path
)
5472 if (c
->private_tmp
&&
5473 !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/tmp") &&
5474 (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var/tmp") ||
5475 prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var")))) {
5476 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
5481 if (c
->private_network
|| c
->network_namespace_path
) {
5482 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
5486 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
5493 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
5501 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
5503 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
5509 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
5510 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
5512 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
5516 /* increment reference counter. */
5522 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5526 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
5532 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
5535 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5543 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5544 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
5547 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5549 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
5550 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5552 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
5555 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5559 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
5562 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
5565 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5569 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
5578 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5579 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
5583 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
5584 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
5585 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
5586 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
5592 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
5593 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
5594 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
5595 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
5599 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
5601 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
5605 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
5607 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
, u
->id
);
5614 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
5617 copy
= strdup(value
);
5621 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
5623 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
5626 copy
= strdup(value
);
5630 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
5632 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
5635 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5636 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5640 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5641 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5643 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
5646 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5647 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5651 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5652 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5656 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
5658 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
5660 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
5664 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
5667 TAKE_PTR(rt_create
);
5673 int exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5674 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5676 int r
, fdpair
[] = {-1, -1};
5677 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
5684 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5685 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5690 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
5692 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5693 tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
5701 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
5703 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5704 var_tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
5712 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
5716 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5717 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5718 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[0]) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[0]))
5719 return log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5720 fdpair
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[0]);
5726 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
5730 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5731 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5732 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[1]) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[1]))
5733 return log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5734 fdpair
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[1]);
5738 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, fdpair
, NULL
);
5740 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
5744 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
5750 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
5752 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5756 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
5760 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
5764 strv_free(p
->environment
);
5767 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
5768 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5769 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5770 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
5771 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
5772 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5773 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5774 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
5775 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5778 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
5780 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
5781 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5782 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5783 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5784 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
5785 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
5786 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
5787 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
5788 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5789 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5790 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5791 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
5794 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
5796 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
5797 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
5798 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
5799 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
5802 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
5804 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
5805 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
5806 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
5807 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
5810 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
5812 /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */
5813 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5814 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
5815 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
5816 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
5817 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
5818 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
5821 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5823 /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This
5824 * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit
5825 * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */
5826 static const char* const exec_resource_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5827 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "runtime",
5828 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "state",
5829 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "cache",
5830 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "logs",
5831 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "configuration",
5834 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5836 /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to
5837 * the service payload in. */
5838 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5839 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
5840 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
5841 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
5842 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
5843 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
5846 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5848 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
5849 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5850 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
5851 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
5854 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);