1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
10 #include <sys/capability.h>
11 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
13 #include <sys/personality.h>
14 #include <sys/prctl.h>
16 #include <sys/socket.h>
18 #include <sys/types.h>
24 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
28 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
36 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
39 #include "sd-messages.h"
42 #include "alloc-util.h"
44 #include "apparmor-util.h"
49 #include "capability-util.h"
50 #include "chown-recursive.h"
51 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
55 #include "errno-list.h"
57 #include "exit-status.h"
59 #include "format-util.h"
61 #include "glob-util.h"
70 #include "namespace.h"
71 #include "parse-util.h"
72 #include "path-util.h"
73 #include "process-util.h"
74 #include "rlimit-util.h"
77 #include "seccomp-util.h"
79 #include "securebits-util.h"
80 #include "selinux-util.h"
81 #include "signal-util.h"
82 #include "smack-util.h"
83 #include "socket-util.h"
85 #include "stat-util.h"
86 #include "string-table.h"
87 #include "string-util.h"
89 #include "syslog-util.h"
90 #include "terminal-util.h"
91 #include "umask-util.h"
93 #include "user-util.h"
95 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
97 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
98 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
100 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
101 #define TTY_MODE 0620
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
106 int start
, restart_from
;
111 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
121 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
124 /* Already at right index? */
128 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
135 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
136 * let's remember that and try again from here */
137 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
141 if (restart_from
< 0)
144 start
= restart_from
;
150 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
154 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
160 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
161 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
163 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
165 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
166 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
171 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
172 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
175 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
183 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
186 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
189 if (context
->tty_path
)
190 return context
->tty_path
;
192 return "/dev/console";
195 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
200 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
202 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
203 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
204 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
206 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
209 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
210 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
211 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
213 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
216 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
217 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
220 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
223 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
224 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
227 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
230 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
231 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool is_syslog_output(ExecOutput o
) {
238 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
);
241 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
244 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
247 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
250 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
252 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
255 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
258 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
261 return !!c
->tty_path
;
264 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
269 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
273 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
276 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
277 static const union sockaddr_union sa
= {
278 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
279 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
281 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
282 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
)) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
360 is_syslog_output(output
),
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
= {};
383 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
388 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
391 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
395 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
397 if (strlen(path
) >= sizeof(sa
.un
.sun_path
)) /* Too long, can't be a UNIX socket */
400 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
402 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
406 salen
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, salen
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 int named_iofds
[3]) {
468 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
469 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
472 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
473 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
474 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
475 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
481 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
485 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
486 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
489 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
493 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
494 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
496 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
501 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
504 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
505 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
507 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
509 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
510 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
512 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
513 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
515 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
518 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
522 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
525 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
529 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
531 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
532 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
534 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
538 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
542 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
546 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
547 const ExecContext
*context
,
553 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
556 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
561 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
562 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
564 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
))
565 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
570 static int setup_output(
572 const ExecContext
*context
,
573 const ExecParameters
*params
,
580 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
581 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
591 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
592 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
594 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
596 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
599 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
602 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
603 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
606 return STDERR_FILENO
;
609 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
610 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
612 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
614 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
616 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
618 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
619 * the way and are not on a tty */
620 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
621 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
623 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
627 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
628 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
629 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
633 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
634 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
635 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
636 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
638 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
639 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
640 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
642 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
646 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
647 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
652 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
653 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
655 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
656 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
657 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
659 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
660 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
662 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
667 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
668 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
670 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
671 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
675 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
676 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
677 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
679 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
680 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
682 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
683 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
684 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
685 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
690 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
691 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
693 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
695 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
696 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
698 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
699 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
: {
706 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
708 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
709 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
715 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
718 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
722 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
726 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
730 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
735 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
739 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
740 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
741 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
743 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
746 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
752 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
753 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
756 assert(_saved_stdin
);
757 assert(_saved_stdout
);
759 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
763 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
764 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
767 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
771 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
775 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
779 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
784 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
785 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
787 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
792 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
795 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
796 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
799 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
803 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
804 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
808 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
812 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
815 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
819 assert(saved_stdout
);
823 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
824 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
827 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
828 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
831 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
832 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
838 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
843 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
844 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
845 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
848 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
849 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
851 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
852 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
855 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
856 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
861 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
869 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
871 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
878 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
879 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
883 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
884 continue; /* ask again */
886 printf("Failing execution.\n");
887 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
890 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
891 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
892 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
894 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
895 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
896 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
897 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
898 continue; /* ask again */
900 printf(" Description: %s\n"
903 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
904 continue; /* ask again */
906 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
907 continue; /* ask again */
909 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
910 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
911 continue; /* ask again */
913 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
914 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
920 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
926 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
930 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
931 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
932 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
941 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
942 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
945 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
953 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
963 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
971 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
972 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
973 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
977 bool keep_groups
= false;
978 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
979 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
984 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
985 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
986 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
987 * groups of the caller.
989 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
990 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
991 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
997 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
1001 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1002 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1005 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1006 if (ngroups_max
<= 0) {
1010 return -EOPNOTSUPP
; /* For all other values */
1013 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1019 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1020 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1023 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1028 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1031 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1035 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1043 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1044 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1051 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1052 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1056 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1064 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1067 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1069 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1074 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1075 /* Then set our gids */
1076 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1083 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1086 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1089 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1090 * capabilities while doing so. */
1092 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1094 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1095 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1096 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1098 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
1100 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
1101 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
1106 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1107 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1110 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1111 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1112 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1113 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1120 static int null_conv(
1122 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1123 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1124 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1126 /* We don't support conversations */
1128 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1133 static int setup_pam(
1140 int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1144 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1149 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1150 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1152 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1153 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1154 bool close_session
= false;
1155 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1162 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1163 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1164 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1165 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1166 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1167 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1169 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1173 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1174 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1176 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1177 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1183 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1185 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1186 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1188 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1189 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1193 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1194 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1198 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1199 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1200 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1204 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1205 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1208 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1209 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1212 close_session
= true;
1214 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1216 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1220 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1223 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1225 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1227 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1231 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1233 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1235 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1237 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
1238 * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1239 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1241 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1242 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1243 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1244 * to fail to exit normally */
1246 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1248 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1249 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1250 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1251 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1252 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1254 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1256 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1257 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1258 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1259 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1260 * to do the rest for us. */
1261 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1264 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1265 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1266 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1268 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1269 * return failure here. */
1270 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1272 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1273 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1276 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1277 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1280 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1287 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1292 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1293 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1294 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1295 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1302 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1306 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1308 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1309 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1312 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1313 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1315 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1316 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1319 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1320 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1321 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1322 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1324 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1327 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1328 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1329 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1331 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1335 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1337 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1349 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1350 char process_name
[11];
1354 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1355 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1359 rename_process("(...)");
1365 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1366 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1372 process_name
[0] = '(';
1373 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1374 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1375 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1377 rename_process(process_name
);
1380 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1383 return c
->address_families_whitelist
||
1384 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1387 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1390 return c
->syscall_whitelist
||
1391 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1394 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1397 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1400 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1403 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1404 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1405 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1406 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1407 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1408 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1409 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1410 c
->private_devices
||
1411 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1412 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1413 c
->lock_personality
;
1418 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1420 if (is_seccomp_available())
1423 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1427 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1428 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1434 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1437 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1440 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1442 if (c
->syscall_whitelist
) {
1443 default_action
= negative_action
;
1444 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1446 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1447 action
= negative_action
;
1450 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1451 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_whitelist
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1456 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1459 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1463 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1466 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1469 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1472 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1476 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1479 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1482 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_whitelist
);
1485 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1489 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1492 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1495 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1498 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1502 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1505 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1508 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1511 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1515 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1516 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1518 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1521 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1524 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1527 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1531 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1533 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1536 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1539 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1542 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1546 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1548 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1551 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1554 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1557 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1561 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1564 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1567 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1570 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1571 unsigned long personality
;
1577 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1580 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1583 personality
= c
->personality
;
1585 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1586 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1588 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1593 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1598 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[4]) {
1601 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1602 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1604 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1607 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1609 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1612 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1613 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1615 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1616 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1619 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1623 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1626 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1628 static int build_environment(
1630 const ExecContext
*c
,
1631 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1634 const char *username
,
1636 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1637 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1640 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1641 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1650 our_env
= new0(char*, 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1655 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1657 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1659 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1661 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1663 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1665 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1669 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1672 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1675 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1676 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1678 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1680 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1682 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1685 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1686 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1687 * check the database directly. */
1688 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1689 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1692 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1696 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1699 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1703 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1706 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1708 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1711 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1715 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1718 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1721 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1722 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1725 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1728 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1729 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1731 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1733 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1734 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1735 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1737 if (path_equal(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1738 term
= getenv("TERM");
1740 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1742 x
= strappend("TERM=", term
);
1745 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1748 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1749 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1752 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1755 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1756 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1762 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1765 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1769 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1773 joined
= strv_join_prefix(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
);
1777 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1781 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1784 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1785 assert(n_env
<= 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1787 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1792 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1793 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1794 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1797 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1798 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1804 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1808 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1811 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1812 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1815 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1820 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1821 const ExecContext
*context
,
1822 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1823 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1828 if (context
->root_image
)
1831 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1832 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1833 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1836 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
1839 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
1842 if (context
->mount_flags
!= 0)
1845 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1848 if (context
->private_devices
||
1849 context
->private_mounts
||
1850 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1851 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
1852 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1853 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1854 context
->protect_control_groups
)
1857 if (context
->root_directory
) {
1858 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1860 if (context
->mount_apivfs
)
1863 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1864 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
1867 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1872 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
1873 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
1874 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
1875 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
1881 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1882 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1883 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1884 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1885 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1890 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1891 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1892 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1893 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1894 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1895 * continues execution normally. */
1897 if (uid
!= 0 && uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
1898 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
1899 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1900 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1905 uid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1910 if (gid
!= 0 && gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1911 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
1912 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1913 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1918 gid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1923 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1925 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
1926 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
1929 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1931 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
1934 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
1938 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
1942 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1943 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1946 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
1948 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1949 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
1954 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1955 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
1956 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1958 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
1963 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1965 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1970 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1973 /* First write the GID map */
1974 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
1975 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1980 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
1984 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1986 /* The write the UID map */
1987 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
1988 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1993 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
1998 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2001 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2002 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2005 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2007 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2010 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2011 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2014 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2015 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2018 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2023 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2026 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2030 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2036 static int setup_exec_directory(
2037 const ExecContext
*context
,
2038 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2041 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2044 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2045 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2046 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2047 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2048 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2049 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2056 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2057 assert(exit_status
);
2059 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2062 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2063 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2065 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2069 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2070 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2072 p
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[type
], "/", *rt
);
2078 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2082 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2083 !IN_SET(type
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)) {
2084 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2086 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that case we
2087 * want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by a dynamic user
2088 * whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same trick used by container
2089 * managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of the same UID in containers: we
2090 * place everything inside a directory that has an access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root,
2091 * so that it acts as security boundary for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing
2092 * to make this directory permeable for the service itself.
2094 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create a
2095 * directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place "foo" inside of
2096 * that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to "private/foo". This way,
2097 * privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but unprivileged host users can't look
2098 * into it. Inside of the namespaceof the container "private/" is replaced by a more liberally
2099 * accessible tmpfs, into which the host's "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus
2100 * disabling the access boundary for the service and making sure it only gets access to the
2101 * dirs it needs but no others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2103 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not to be
2104 * owned by the service itself.
2105 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used for sharing
2106 * files or sockets with other services. */
2108 private_root
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[type
], "/private");
2109 if (!private_root
) {
2114 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2115 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2119 pp
= strjoin(private_root
, "/", *rt
);
2125 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2126 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2130 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2131 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2133 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2134 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2135 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2137 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2142 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2144 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2145 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2149 /* And link it up from the original place */
2150 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2154 /* Lock down the access mode */
2155 if (chmod(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
) < 0) {
2160 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2161 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2163 if (r
== -EEXIST
&& !context
->dynamic_user
)
2167 /* Don't change the owner of the configuration directory, as in the common case it is not written to by
2168 * a service, and shall not be writable. */
2169 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2172 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary */
2173 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
);
2181 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2186 static int setup_smack(
2187 const ExecContext
*context
,
2188 const ExecCommand
*command
) {
2195 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2196 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2200 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2202 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2204 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2205 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2208 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2218 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2219 const ExecContext
*context
,
2220 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2221 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2222 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2223 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2225 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2226 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2228 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2233 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2234 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2235 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2237 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2238 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2239 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2242 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2246 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2247 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2248 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2252 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2256 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2257 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2260 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2266 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2273 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2276 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2277 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2278 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2282 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2285 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2288 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2291 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2292 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2293 !(context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
)) {
2296 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
2297 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
2298 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
2300 private_root
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private");
2301 if (!private_root
) {
2306 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
2311 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2314 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2315 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
))
2316 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *suffix
);
2318 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2324 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2325 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2326 (context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
))
2327 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
2328 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
2329 * on the 'non-private' place. */
2330 d
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2339 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2344 .ignore_enoent
= false,
2351 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
2352 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
2353 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
2358 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
2362 static int apply_mount_namespace(
2364 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2365 const ExecContext
*context
,
2366 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2367 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
2369 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2370 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
2371 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
2372 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
2373 bool needs_sandboxing
;
2374 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2375 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2380 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2381 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2382 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
2384 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2385 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2386 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2387 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
2388 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2391 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2392 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
2395 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
2398 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
2402 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
2403 if (needs_sandboxing
)
2404 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2405 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
2406 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
2407 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
2408 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
2409 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
2410 .mount_apivfs
= context
->mount_apivfs
,
2411 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
2413 else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
2415 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2416 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2417 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2419 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2420 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
2423 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
2425 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
,
2426 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
2427 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
2428 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
2432 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
2433 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
2436 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_home
: PROTECT_HOME_NO
,
2437 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_system
: PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
,
2438 context
->mount_flags
,
2439 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
);
2441 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
2443 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
2444 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceeed, but only if exclusively
2445 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
2446 * completely different execution environment. */
2448 if (n_bind_mounts
== 0 &&
2449 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
== 0 &&
2450 !root_dir
&& !root_image
&&
2451 !context
->dynamic_user
) {
2452 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
2456 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
2457 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
2458 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
2466 static int apply_working_directory(
2467 const ExecContext
*context
,
2468 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2470 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
2476 assert(exit_status
);
2478 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
2481 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2487 } else if (context
->working_directory
)
2488 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2492 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2493 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
2494 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
2495 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2501 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
2503 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2504 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2511 static int setup_keyring(
2513 const ExecContext
*context
,
2514 const ExecParameters
*p
,
2515 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2517 key_serial_t keyring
;
2526 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
2527 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
2528 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
2529 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
2530 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
2531 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
2533 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
2536 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
2537 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
2538 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
2539 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
2541 saved_uid
= getuid();
2542 saved_gid
= getgid();
2544 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2545 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
2546 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
2549 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2550 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
2551 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
2556 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2557 if (keyring
== -1) {
2558 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
2559 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
2560 else if (IN_SET(errno
, EACCES
, EPERM
))
2561 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
2562 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
2563 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
2565 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
2570 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
2571 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
2573 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
2574 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
2575 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
2576 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
2581 /* Restore uid/gid back */
2582 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2583 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
2584 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
2589 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2590 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
2591 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
2594 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
2595 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
2598 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
2600 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
2602 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
2603 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
2604 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
2605 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
2610 /* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */
2611 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
2612 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
2613 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
2615 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
2616 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
2621 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[2]) {
2629 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
2631 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
2634 static int close_remaining_fds(
2635 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2636 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2637 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2641 int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
2643 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
2644 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
2648 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
2649 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
2650 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
2651 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
2652 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
2653 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
2656 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
2658 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = exec_fd
;
2660 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
2661 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
2665 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2669 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
2671 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
2674 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
2675 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
2677 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
2680 static int send_user_lookup(
2688 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2689 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2692 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
2695 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
2698 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
2700 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
2701 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
2702 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
2708 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
2715 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
2720 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
2724 /* Hardcode /root as home directory for UID 0 */
2729 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
2737 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
2738 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
2739 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2746 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
2748 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
2749 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
2752 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2755 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2761 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2764 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
)
2765 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/", *i
);
2767 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *i
);
2771 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
2777 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
2782 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
2784 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
2785 bool using_subcgroup
;
2791 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
2794 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
2795 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
2796 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
2797 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
2798 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
2799 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
2800 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
2801 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
2803 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
2804 if (using_subcgroup
)
2805 p
= strjoin(params
->cgroup_path
, "/.control");
2807 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
2812 return using_subcgroup
;
2815 static int exec_child(
2817 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2818 const ExecContext
*context
,
2819 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2820 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2821 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2825 size_t n_socket_fds
,
2826 size_t n_storage_fds
,
2831 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **final_argv
= NULL
;
2832 int *fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
, r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
= -1;
2833 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
2834 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
2835 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
2836 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
2837 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
2838 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
2839 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
2840 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
2841 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
2842 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
2844 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
2845 bool use_selinux
= false;
2848 bool use_smack
= false;
2851 bool use_apparmor
= false;
2853 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
2854 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
2856 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
2863 assert(exit_status
);
2865 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
2867 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
2868 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
2869 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
2870 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
2871 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
2872 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
2873 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
2875 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
2876 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
2878 r
= reset_signal_mask();
2880 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
2881 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
2884 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
2885 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
2887 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
2888 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
2889 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
2890 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
2893 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
2895 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
2898 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
2899 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, params
->exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
2901 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2902 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
2905 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
2907 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
2908 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
2911 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
2913 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
2914 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
2915 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
2917 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
2919 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2923 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
2924 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
2925 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
2926 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
2929 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
2930 log_unit_error(unit
, "Execution cancelled by the user");
2935 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
2936 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
2937 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
2938 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
2939 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
2940 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
2941 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
2942 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2943 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2946 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
2947 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
2949 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
2950 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
2951 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
2952 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2953 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2956 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
2958 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2962 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
2964 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2966 log_unit_error(unit
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
2969 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
2972 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
2973 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2974 log_unit_error(unit
, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
2978 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
2979 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2980 log_unit_error(unit
, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
2985 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
2988 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
2990 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2991 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
2994 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
2996 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
2997 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3001 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3002 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3003 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3005 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3006 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3009 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3011 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3012 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3015 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3017 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3019 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3020 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3023 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3024 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3026 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3028 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3029 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3030 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3031 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3033 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3035 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3036 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3039 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3041 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3042 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3046 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3048 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3049 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3052 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3054 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3055 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3058 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3060 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3061 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3064 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3065 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3066 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3067 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3068 if (IN_SET(r
, -EPERM
, -EACCES
))
3069 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3071 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3072 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3076 if (context
->nice_set
)
3077 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
3078 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
3079 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3082 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3083 struct sched_param param
= {
3084 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3087 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3088 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3089 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3090 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3093 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3094 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3098 if (context
->cpuset
)
3099 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
3100 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3101 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3104 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3105 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3106 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3107 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3110 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3111 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3112 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3113 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3116 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
3117 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
3119 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
3120 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
3124 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3125 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
3127 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
3128 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
3132 if (context
->user
) {
3133 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
3135 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3136 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
3140 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
3141 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
3142 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
3143 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
3144 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
3145 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
3147 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3148 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
3152 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
3153 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
3155 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
3158 r
= build_environment(
3170 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3174 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
3176 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3180 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
3181 params
->environment
,
3184 context
->environment
,
3188 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3191 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
3193 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
3195 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
3197 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
3198 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
3201 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
3202 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3204 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
3205 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
3207 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
3208 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3209 needs_setuid
= false;
3211 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
3213 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3214 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
3215 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
3216 * impacting our own code paths. */
3219 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
3222 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
3225 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
3230 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
3231 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
3233 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
3234 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
3239 if (context
->private_network
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3240 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
3241 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3243 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3244 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
3247 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
3250 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
3251 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
3252 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
, context
, params
, runtime
);
3254 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3255 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing: %m");
3259 /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
3261 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, supplementary_gids
, ngids
);
3263 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3264 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
3268 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3270 if (use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
3271 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
3273 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3274 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
3279 if (context
->private_users
) {
3280 r
= setup_private_users(uid
, gid
);
3282 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3283 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
3288 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
3289 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
3290 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
3292 if (params
->exec_fd
>= 0) {
3293 exec_fd
= params
->exec_fd
;
3295 if (exec_fd
< 3 + (int) n_fds
) {
3298 /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
3299 * process we are about to execute. */
3301 moved_fd
= fcntl(exec_fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) n_fds
);
3303 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3304 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
3307 safe_close(exec_fd
);
3310 /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
3311 r
= fd_cloexec(exec_fd
, true);
3313 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3314 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3318 fds_with_exec_fd
= newa(int, n_fds
+ 1);
3319 memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3320 fds_with_exec_fd
[n_fds
] = exec_fd
;
3321 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
+ 1;
3323 fds_with_exec_fd
= fds
;
3324 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
;
3327 r
= close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
);
3329 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
3331 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
3333 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3334 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
3337 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
3338 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
3339 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
3342 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
3344 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3348 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
3350 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3351 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
3354 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. */
3355 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
3356 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
3357 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3358 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
3363 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
3364 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
3366 r
= setup_smack(context
, command
);
3368 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
3369 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
3374 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
3375 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
3376 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
3377 * instead of us doing that */
3378 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3379 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
3380 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
3381 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
3383 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
3384 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
3386 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3387 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
3391 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
3392 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
3393 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3394 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3395 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
3397 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3398 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
3404 if (context
->user
) {
3405 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
3407 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3408 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
3411 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3412 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3414 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
3415 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
3417 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3418 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
3421 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
3422 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
3423 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
3424 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
3425 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
3426 * drop the bit away next. */
3428 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
3433 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
3434 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
3435 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
3437 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
3439 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3440 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
3441 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
3442 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
3443 * are restricted. */
3447 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
3450 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
3452 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3453 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
3460 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
3461 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
3462 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
3463 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
3464 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
3469 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
3470 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
3471 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
3472 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
3473 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
3474 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
3477 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
3478 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
3479 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
3480 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
3484 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
3486 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
3487 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
3490 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
3492 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3493 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
3496 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
3498 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3499 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
3502 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
3504 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3505 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
3508 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
3510 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3511 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
3514 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
3516 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3517 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
3520 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
3522 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3523 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
3526 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
3528 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3529 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
3532 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
3534 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3535 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
3538 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
3539 * by the filter as little as possible. */
3540 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
3542 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3543 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
3548 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
3551 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
3553 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3557 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
3560 final_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
3562 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3566 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
3567 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
3569 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
3571 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3572 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3573 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
3575 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3581 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
3582 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
3584 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3585 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3586 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
3590 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
3596 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
3597 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
3599 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3600 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3601 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
3605 if (r
== -ENOENT
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
3606 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
3607 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3609 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3610 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
3612 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3616 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3617 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute command: %m");
3620 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
3621 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[3]);
3623 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
3624 ExecCommand
*command
,
3625 const ExecContext
*context
,
3626 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3627 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3628 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3631 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
3632 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
3633 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
3634 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
3635 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
3643 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
3645 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
3646 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
3647 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
3649 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1) {
3650 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
3654 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0) {
3655 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got no socket.");
3659 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
3663 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
3664 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
3667 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
3669 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
3671 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
3673 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
3675 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3679 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3680 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
3681 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3683 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3685 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3686 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
3688 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
3689 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
3690 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
3692 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
3698 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
3701 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3703 r
= exec_child(unit
,
3715 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
3719 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
3720 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3722 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3723 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
3724 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
3726 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3731 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
3733 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
3734 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
3735 * process will be killed too). */
3737 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
3739 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
3745 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
3746 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3751 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
3752 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
3753 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
3754 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
3755 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
3756 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
3757 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
3758 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3759 c
->directories
[i
].mode
= 0755;
3760 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
3761 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
3762 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
3763 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3766 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
3767 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3772 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
3773 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
3774 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
3775 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
3777 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
3779 for (l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
3780 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
3781 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
3784 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
3785 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
3786 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
3787 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
3788 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
3789 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
3790 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
3792 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
3794 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
3796 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
3797 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
3798 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3800 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
3801 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3802 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3803 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
3804 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
3805 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
3807 c
->cpuset
= cpu_set_mfree(c
->cpuset
);
3809 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
3810 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
3811 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
3812 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
3814 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
3815 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
3816 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
3818 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3819 c
->directories
[i
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[i
].paths
);
3821 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3823 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
3825 c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
= 0;
3826 c
->log_rate_limit_burst
= 0;
3828 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
3829 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
3832 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
3837 if (!runtime_prefix
)
3840 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
3841 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
3843 p
= strjoin(runtime_prefix
, "/", *i
);
3847 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the service
3849 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
3855 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3858 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
3859 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
3862 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3865 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3866 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
3869 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3873 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
3874 exec_command_done(i
);
3881 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3884 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3885 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
3888 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3891 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3892 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
3895 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3898 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
3901 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
3902 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
3906 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
3911 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
3912 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
3914 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
3917 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
3923 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3926 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
3929 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3932 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
3935 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3938 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
3945 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[3]) {
3947 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
3953 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
3954 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
3955 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
3957 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
3958 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
3960 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
3962 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
3963 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
3964 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
3965 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
3966 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
3968 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
3971 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
3972 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
3973 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
3974 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
3976 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
3979 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
3980 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
3981 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
3982 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
3984 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
3988 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
3991 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
3992 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
3997 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
4001 bool ignore
= false;
4003 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
4012 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
4020 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
4021 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
4030 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
4031 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
4033 for (n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
4034 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
4042 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
4044 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
4046 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
4049 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
4057 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
4073 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
4074 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
4079 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
4081 /* trivial identity? */
4082 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
4085 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
4086 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
4088 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
4089 return streq(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
4092 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4094 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
4096 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
4097 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
4098 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
4099 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
4100 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
4103 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
4109 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
4112 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
4113 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
4121 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4125 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
4126 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
4127 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
4128 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
4129 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
4130 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
4131 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
4132 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
4133 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
4134 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
4135 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
4136 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
4137 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
4138 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
4139 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
4140 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
4141 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n",
4143 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
4144 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
4145 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
4146 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
4147 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
4148 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
4149 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
4150 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
4151 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
4152 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
4153 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
4154 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
4155 prefix
, yes_no(c
->mount_apivfs
),
4156 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
4157 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
4158 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
4159 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
));
4162 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
4164 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
4165 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4167 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
4168 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4170 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
4171 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4173 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
4174 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4176 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
4178 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4179 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
4181 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
4182 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
4190 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
4192 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
4193 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
4195 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
4197 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4198 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
4199 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4200 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
4203 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
4204 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
4206 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
4208 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
4210 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
4213 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
4214 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
4216 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
4218 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
4221 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
4222 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
4223 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
4224 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
4228 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
4229 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
4230 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
4231 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
4235 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
4236 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
4239 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
4240 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
4241 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
4242 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
4243 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
4244 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
4246 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4247 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4248 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4249 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4250 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4251 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4253 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
4254 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4255 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4256 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4257 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4258 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4259 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4260 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4261 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4262 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4268 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
4269 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
4270 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
4271 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
4272 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
4273 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
4275 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
4278 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4279 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4280 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4281 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
4282 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
4285 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4286 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4287 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4288 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
4290 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
4292 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
4294 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
4296 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
4298 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
4301 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
4302 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
4304 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
4306 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
4309 if (c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
> 0) {
4310 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
4313 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
4314 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
4317 if (c
->log_rate_limit_burst
> 0)
4318 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_rate_limit_burst
);
4320 if (c
->n_log_extra_fields
> 0) {
4323 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
4324 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
4325 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
4326 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
4332 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
4333 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4335 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
4337 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4340 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
4341 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4343 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
4345 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4348 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4349 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4351 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
4353 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4357 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
4359 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
4361 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
4363 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
4364 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
4365 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
4370 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
4372 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
4373 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
4374 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
4378 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
4379 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
4380 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
4384 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
4385 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
4386 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4390 if (c
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
4391 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
4392 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
4393 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
4394 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
4395 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
4396 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
4397 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
4399 if (c
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
4400 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
4401 TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
4403 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
4405 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
4406 strempty(t
->options
));
4411 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
4412 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
4414 if (c
->selinux_context
)
4416 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
4417 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
4419 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4421 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4422 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4424 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
4426 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
4427 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
4429 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
4431 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
4432 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
4435 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
4436 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
4438 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
4446 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
4449 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
4453 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
4454 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
4455 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
4456 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
4463 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
4464 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
4467 errno_name
= errno_to_name(num
);
4469 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
4471 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
4479 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
4486 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
4490 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
4491 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
4496 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
4497 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
4499 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
4501 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
4505 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
4506 const char *errno_name
;
4508 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
4510 errno_name
= errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
);
4512 fprintf(f
, "%s\n", errno_name
);
4514 fprintf(f
, "%d\n", c
->syscall_errno
);
4517 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4519 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4520 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4523 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4526 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
4527 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
4532 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
4538 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4546 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
4548 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
4553 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
4558 for (l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
4559 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
4560 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
4561 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
4564 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
4571 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
4574 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
4577 if (s
->pid
!= pid
) {
4583 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
4589 if (context
->utmp_id
)
4590 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
4592 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
4596 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
4599 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
4602 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4603 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
4611 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4614 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
4617 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
4619 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
4620 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
4622 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
4624 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
4626 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
4627 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
4628 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
4632 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
4640 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
4648 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
4655 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
4666 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
4667 * spaces and ticks in them */
4672 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4673 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
4674 const char *prefix2
;
4679 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4680 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
4682 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
4684 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
4685 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
4687 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
4690 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4693 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4695 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
4696 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
4699 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
4706 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
4707 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
4708 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
4713 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4721 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4733 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
4735 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
4738 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4739 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
4747 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4753 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
4760 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
4761 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
4763 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
4767 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
4774 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
4776 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
4777 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
) {
4778 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4780 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
4782 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4789 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
4790 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4792 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4794 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4795 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4798 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4801 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
4802 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
4803 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4804 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
4808 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
4810 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
4813 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
4816 *rt
= new0(ExecRuntime
, 1);
4820 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
4824 static int exec_runtime_add(
4827 const char *tmp_dir
,
4828 const char *var_tmp_dir
,
4829 const int netns_storage_socket
[2],
4830 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4832 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
4838 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
4842 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
);
4846 rt
->id
= strdup(id
);
4851 rt
->tmp_dir
= strdup(tmp_dir
);
4855 /* When tmp_dir is set, then we require var_tmp_dir is also set. */
4856 assert(var_tmp_dir
);
4857 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= strdup(var_tmp_dir
);
4858 if (!rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
4862 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
4863 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = netns_storage_socket
[0];
4864 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = netns_storage_socket
[1];
4867 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
4876 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
4881 static int exec_runtime_make(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4882 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4883 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = {-1, -1};
4890 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4891 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
)
4894 if (c
->private_tmp
) {
4895 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
4900 if (c
->private_network
) {
4901 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
4905 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
4910 netns_storage_socket
[0] = -1;
4911 netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
4915 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4923 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
4925 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
4931 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
4932 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
4934 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4938 /* increment reference counter. */
4944 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
4948 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
4954 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
4957 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
4965 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
4966 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
4969 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4971 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
4972 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4974 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
4977 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
4981 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
4984 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
4987 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
4991 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
5000 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5001 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
5005 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
5006 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
5007 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
5008 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
5014 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
5015 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
5016 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
5017 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
5021 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
5023 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
5027 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
5029 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
);
5033 rt_create
->id
= strdup(u
->id
);
5040 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
5043 copy
= strdup(value
);
5047 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
5049 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
5052 copy
= strdup(value
);
5056 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
5058 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
5061 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5062 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5066 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5067 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5069 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
5072 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5073 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5077 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5078 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5082 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
5084 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
5086 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
5090 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
5099 void exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5100 char *id
= NULL
, *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5101 int r
, fd0
= -1, fd1
= -1;
5102 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
5109 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5110 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5115 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
5117 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5118 tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5124 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
5126 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5127 var_tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5133 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
5137 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5138 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5139 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd0
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd0
)) {
5140 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5143 fd0
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd0
);
5149 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
5153 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5154 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5155 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd1
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd1
)) {
5156 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5159 fd1
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd1
);
5164 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, (int[]) { fd0
, fd1
}, NULL
);
5166 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
5169 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
5175 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
5177 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5181 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
5185 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
5189 strv_free(p
->environment
);
5192 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
5193 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5194 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5195 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
5196 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
5197 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5198 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5199 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
5200 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5203 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
5205 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
5206 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5207 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5208 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5209 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
5210 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
5211 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
5212 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
5213 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
5214 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
5215 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5216 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5217 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5218 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
5221 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
5223 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
5224 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
5225 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
5226 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
5229 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
5231 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
5232 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
5233 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
5234 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
5237 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
5239 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5240 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
5241 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
5242 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
5243 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
5244 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
5247 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5249 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5250 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
5251 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
5252 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
5253 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
5254 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
5257 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5259 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
5260 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5261 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
5262 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
5265 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);