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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8c74b5e5 | 5 | * |
2c18d164 | 6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8c74b5e5 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
fc24f0bf | 13 | #include <time.h> |
dee0cc10 | 14 | #include <assert.h> |
8ba708e5 | 15 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 16 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
dbad1690 | 21 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 23 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
3c27208f | 24 | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
49b26f54 | 25 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
4ff1a526 | 26 | #include <internal/cryptlib.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 27 | |
597c51bc | 28 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); |
e46f2334 MC |
29 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); |
30 | ||
7ab09630 | 31 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); |
a455d0f6 | 32 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); |
d45ba43d | 33 | static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, |
ae2f7b37 | 34 | WPACKET *pkt); |
ea262260 | 35 | |
61ae935a MC |
36 | /* |
37 | * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? | |
38 | * | |
39 | * Return values are: | |
40 | * 1: Yes | |
41 | * 0: No | |
42 | */ | |
7ab09630 | 43 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
44 | { |
45 | /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 46 | if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION |
a230b26e EK |
47 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) |
48 | || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) | |
61ae935a MC |
49 | return 0; |
50 | ||
51 | return 1; | |
52 | } | |
53 | ||
54 | /* | |
a455d0f6 | 55 | * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? |
61ae935a MC |
56 | * |
57 | * Return values are: | |
58 | * 1: Yes | |
59 | * 0: No | |
60 | */ | |
a455d0f6 | 61 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
62 | { |
63 | long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
64 | ||
65 | /* | |
66 | * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral | |
a455d0f6 | 67 | * ciphersuite or for SRP |
61ae935a | 68 | */ |
a455d0f6 MC |
69 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK |
70 | | SSL_kSRP)) { | |
71 | return 1; | |
61ae935a MC |
72 | } |
73 | ||
a455d0f6 | 74 | return 0; |
61ae935a MC |
75 | } |
76 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
77 | /* |
78 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
79 | * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the | |
80 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
81 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
82 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
83 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
84 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
85 | */ |
86 | static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
87 | { | |
88 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
89 | ||
90 | /* | |
91 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't | |
92 | * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by | |
93 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() | |
94 | */ | |
95 | ||
96 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
97 | default: | |
98 | break; | |
99 | ||
3847d426 MC |
100 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
101 | /* | |
102 | * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only | |
103 | * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. | |
104 | */ | |
105 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
106 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
107 | return 1; | |
108 | } | |
109 | break; | |
110 | ||
0f1e51ea | 111 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
112 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { |
113 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
114 | return 1; | |
115 | } | |
116 | break; | |
117 | ||
118 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
0f1e51ea | 119 | if (s->hit) { |
92760c21 MC |
120 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
121 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
122 | return 1; |
123 | } | |
124 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
125 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
126 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
127 | return 1; | |
f5ca0b04 MC |
128 | } |
129 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
0f1e51ea MC |
130 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; |
131 | return 1; | |
132 | } | |
133 | } | |
134 | break; | |
135 | ||
92760c21 MC |
136 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
137 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
138 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
139 | return 1; | |
140 | } | |
141 | break; | |
142 | ||
0f1e51ea | 143 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
144 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { |
145 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; | |
146 | return 1; | |
147 | } | |
148 | break; | |
149 | ||
150 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
151 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
152 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
153 | return 1; | |
154 | } | |
155 | break; | |
cc2455bf MC |
156 | |
157 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
158 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { | |
159 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
160 | return 1; | |
161 | } | |
e1c3de44 MC |
162 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
163 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
164 | return 1; | |
165 | } | |
9d75dce3 | 166 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
5c587fb6 | 167 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
9d75dce3 TS |
168 | # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message. |
169 | #endif | |
170 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { | |
171 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; | |
172 | /* | |
173 | * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the | |
174 | * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding | |
175 | * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the | |
176 | * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? | |
177 | */ | |
178 | if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
179 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
180 | return 0; | |
181 | } | |
182 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
183 | return 1; | |
184 | } | |
185 | } | |
cc2455bf | 186 | break; |
0f1e51ea MC |
187 | } |
188 | ||
0f1e51ea | 189 | /* No valid transition found */ |
0f1e51ea MC |
190 | return 0; |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
61ae935a | 193 | /* |
8481f583 MC |
194 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
195 | * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the | |
196 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
197 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 198 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
199 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
200 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 201 | */ |
8481f583 | 202 | int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 203 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 204 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
a455d0f6 | 205 | int ske_expected; |
61ae935a | 206 | |
0f1e51ea | 207 | /* |
3847d426 MC |
208 | * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version |
209 | * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. | |
0f1e51ea | 210 | */ |
f5ca0b04 | 211 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
212 | if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
213 | goto err; | |
214 | return 1; | |
215 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 216 | |
a230b26e | 217 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
218 | default: |
219 | break; | |
220 | ||
61ae935a MC |
221 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
222 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
223 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
224 | return 1; | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
227 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
228 | if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
229 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
230 | return 1; | |
231 | } | |
232 | } | |
233 | break; | |
234 | ||
d7f8783f | 235 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
4004ce5f MC |
236 | /* |
237 | * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early | |
238 | * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a | |
239 | * HelloRetryRequest. | |
240 | */ | |
241 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
242 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
243 | return 1; | |
244 | } | |
4004ce5f MC |
245 | break; |
246 | ||
61ae935a MC |
247 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
248 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 249 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
61ae935a MC |
250 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { |
251 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
252 | return 1; | |
253 | } | |
254 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
255 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
256 | return 1; | |
257 | } | |
258 | } else { | |
259 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
260 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
261 | return 1; | |
ad3819c2 | 262 | } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION |
aff8c126 RS |
263 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL |
264 | && s->session->ext.tick != NULL | |
a230b26e | 265 | && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
ad3819c2 MC |
266 | /* |
267 | * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session | |
268 | * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on | |
269 | * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if | |
270 | * the server is resuming. | |
271 | */ | |
272 | s->hit = 1; | |
273 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
274 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 275 | } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth |
a230b26e | 276 | & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
61ae935a MC |
277 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
278 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
279 | return 1; | |
280 | } | |
281 | } else { | |
a455d0f6 | 282 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); |
a455d0f6 MC |
283 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ |
284 | if (ske_expected | |
a230b26e EK |
285 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) |
286 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
a455d0f6 MC |
287 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
288 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
289 | return 1; | |
290 | } | |
291 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST | |
a230b26e EK |
292 | && cert_req_allowed(s)) { |
293 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
294 | return 1; | |
a455d0f6 | 295 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { |
a230b26e EK |
296 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; |
297 | return 1; | |
61ae935a MC |
298 | } |
299 | } | |
300 | } | |
301 | break; | |
302 | ||
303 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
bb1aaab4 MC |
304 | /* |
305 | * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if | |
aff8c126 | 306 | * |ext.status_expected| is set |
bb1aaab4 | 307 | */ |
aff8c126 | 308 | if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { |
bb1aaab4 MC |
309 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; |
310 | return 1; | |
a455d0f6 MC |
311 | } |
312 | /* Fall through */ | |
313 | ||
314 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: | |
315 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); | |
a455d0f6 | 316 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ |
a230b26e EK |
317 | if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) |
318 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
319 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
320 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
321 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 322 | } |
672f3337 | 323 | goto err; |
61ae935a | 324 | } |
a455d0f6 | 325 | /* Fall through */ |
61ae935a | 326 | |
a455d0f6 MC |
327 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
328 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
329 | if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
330 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; |
331 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 332 | } |
672f3337 | 333 | goto err; |
61ae935a | 334 | } |
a455d0f6 | 335 | /* Fall through */ |
61ae935a MC |
336 | |
337 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
338 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { | |
339 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; | |
340 | return 1; | |
341 | } | |
342 | break; | |
343 | ||
344 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
aff8c126 | 345 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
c45d6b2b DB |
346 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { |
347 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
348 | return 1; | |
349 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
350 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
351 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
352 | return 1; | |
353 | } | |
354 | break; | |
355 | ||
356 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
357 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
358 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
359 | return 1; | |
360 | } | |
361 | break; | |
362 | ||
363 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
364 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
365 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
366 | return 1; | |
367 | } | |
368 | break; | |
c7f47786 MC |
369 | |
370 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
4004ce5f | 371 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { |
c7f47786 MC |
372 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; |
373 | return 1; | |
374 | } | |
375 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
376 | } |
377 | ||
672f3337 | 378 | err: |
61ae935a | 379 | /* No valid transition found */ |
f20404fc MC |
380 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
381 | BIO *rbio; | |
382 | ||
383 | /* | |
384 | * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably | |
385 | * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. | |
386 | */ | |
387 | s->init_num = 0; | |
388 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
389 | rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
390 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); | |
391 | BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); | |
392 | return 0; | |
393 | } | |
f63a17d6 MC |
394 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
395 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, | |
396 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
61ae935a MC |
397 | return 0; |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
400 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
401 | * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
402 | * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the | |
403 | * server. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
404 | */ |
405 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
406 | { | |
407 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
408 | ||
409 | /* | |
3847d426 MC |
410 | * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated |
411 | * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by | |
412 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). | |
0f1e51ea MC |
413 | */ |
414 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
e43e6b19 TS |
415 | default: |
416 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
417 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
418 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
419 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
420 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
421 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
422 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
423 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
424 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
425 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
426 | } | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
427 | /* |
428 | * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after | |
429 | * we already sent close_notify | |
430 | */ | |
431 | if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { | |
432 | /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ | |
433 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
434 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
435 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
436 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
437 | } | |
438 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
439 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
0f1e51ea | 440 | |
92760c21 | 441 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
ef6c191b MC |
442 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY |
443 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
d7f8783f | 444 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; |
4d02f870 | 445 | else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
fc7129dc | 446 | && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) |
4d02f870 | 447 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
564547e4 MC |
448 | else |
449 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT | |
450 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
451 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
452 | ||
d7f8783f | 453 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: |
ef6c191b MC |
454 | if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { |
455 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
456 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
457 | } | |
458 | /* Fall through */ | |
459 | ||
460 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
4d02f870 | 461 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
94ed2c67 | 462 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT |
92760c21 | 463 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
464 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
465 | ||
466 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: | |
467 | /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ | |
94ed2c67 | 468 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY |
92760c21 | 469 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
470 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
471 | ||
472 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
473 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
474 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
475 | ||
e1c3de44 | 476 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
477 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
478 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
479 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
480 | } | |
481 | /* Fall through */ | |
482 | ||
9412b3ad | 483 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: |
cc2455bf | 484 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 485 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
94ed2c67 | 486 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
94ed2c67 | 487 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
cc2455bf MC |
488 | |
489 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
9412b3ad MC |
490 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
491 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
492 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
493 | } | |
494 | ||
495 | /* Try to read from the server instead */ | |
cc2455bf | 496 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
497 | } |
498 | } | |
499 | ||
500 | /* | |
501 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to | |
502 | * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. | |
61ae935a | 503 | */ |
8481f583 | 504 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 505 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 506 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 507 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
508 | /* |
509 | * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what | |
510 | * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until | |
511 | * later | |
512 | */ | |
f5ca0b04 | 513 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
514 | return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); |
515 | ||
a230b26e | 516 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
517 | default: |
518 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
519 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
520 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
521 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
522 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
523 | ||
a230b26e | 524 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
c7f47786 MC |
525 | if (!s->renegotiate) { |
526 | /* | |
527 | * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have | |
528 | * received a message from the server. Better read it. | |
529 | */ | |
530 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
531 | } | |
018fcbec BE |
532 | /* Renegotiation */ |
533 | /* fall thru */ | |
a230b26e EK |
534 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
535 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
536 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 537 | |
a230b26e | 538 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
49e7fe12 MC |
539 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { |
540 | /* | |
541 | * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't | |
542 | * actually selected a version yet. | |
543 | */ | |
066904cc MC |
544 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) |
545 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
546 | else | |
547 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
49e7fe12 MC |
548 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
549 | } | |
a230b26e EK |
550 | /* |
551 | * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what | |
552 | * we will be sent | |
553 | */ | |
554 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 555 | |
597c51bc | 556 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
318d3c0e MC |
557 | /* |
558 | * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a | |
559 | * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one | |
560 | * because we did early data. | |
561 | */ | |
562 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 | |
563 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
564 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
565 | else | |
566 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
a2b97bdf MC |
567 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
568 | ||
d7f8783f | 569 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
4004ce5f MC |
570 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
571 | ||
a230b26e EK |
572 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
573 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
574 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 575 | |
a230b26e EK |
576 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
577 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) | |
578 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
579 | else | |
61ae935a | 580 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; |
a230b26e | 581 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 582 | |
a230b26e EK |
583 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
584 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; | |
585 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 586 | |
a230b26e EK |
587 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: |
588 | /* | |
589 | * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is | |
590 | * sent, but no verify packet is sent | |
591 | */ | |
592 | /* | |
593 | * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH | |
594 | * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We | |
595 | * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's | |
596 | * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. | |
597 | */ | |
598 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { | |
599 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; | |
600 | } else { | |
61ae935a | 601 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
a230b26e EK |
602 | } |
603 | if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { | |
604 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
605 | } | |
606 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 607 | |
a230b26e EK |
608 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: |
609 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
610 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
611 | ||
612 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
318d3c0e MC |
613 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
614 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
615 | } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { | |
066904cc MC |
616 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
617 | } else { | |
61ae935a | 618 | #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
a230b26e | 619 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
066904cc MC |
620 | #else |
621 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) | |
622 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; | |
623 | else | |
624 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 625 | #endif |
066904cc | 626 | } |
a230b26e | 627 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
628 | |
629 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
a230b26e EK |
630 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: |
631 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
632 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
633 | #endif |
634 | ||
a230b26e EK |
635 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
636 | if (s->hit) { | |
637 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
a230b26e EK |
638 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
639 | } else { | |
640 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
641 | } | |
61ae935a | 642 | |
a230b26e EK |
643 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
644 | if (s->hit) { | |
645 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
646 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
647 | } else { | |
648 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
a230b26e EK |
649 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
650 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
651 | |
652 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: | |
653 | /* | |
654 | * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more | |
655 | * convenient time. | |
656 | */ | |
657 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { | |
658 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 659 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
660 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
661 | } | |
662 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
663 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
664 | } | |
665 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
c7f47786 | 666 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
667 | } |
668 | } | |
669 | ||
670 | /* | |
671 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
672 | * the client to the server. | |
673 | */ | |
8481f583 | 674 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 675 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 676 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 677 | |
a230b26e | 678 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
679 | default: |
680 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
681 | break; | |
682 | ||
61ae935a MC |
683 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
684 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
685 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
686 | /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f | 687 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 688 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
689 | return WORK_ERROR; |
690 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
691 | } |
692 | break; | |
693 | ||
61ae935a MC |
694 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
695 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
696 | if (s->hit) { | |
697 | /* | |
698 | * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these | |
699 | * messages unless we need to. | |
700 | */ | |
701 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
702 | } | |
703 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a2c2e000 MC |
704 | if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
705 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
61ae935a | 706 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
a2c2e000 | 707 | } |
61ae935a MC |
708 | #endif |
709 | } | |
f3b3d7f0 | 710 | break; |
61ae935a | 711 | |
d7f8783f | 712 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: |
ef6c191b MC |
713 | /* |
714 | * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not | |
715 | * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press | |
716 | * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. | |
717 | */ | |
718 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING | |
719 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) | |
720 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
721 | /* Fall through */ | |
722 | ||
723 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: | |
2a8db717 MC |
724 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); |
725 | ||
61ae935a | 726 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
a2c2e000 | 727 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
2a8db717 | 728 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
729 | } |
730 | ||
731 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
732 | } | |
733 | ||
734 | /* | |
735 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
736 | * client to the server. | |
737 | */ | |
8481f583 | 738 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 739 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 740 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
741 | |
742 | s->init_num = 0; | |
743 | ||
a230b26e | 744 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
745 | default: |
746 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
747 | break; | |
748 | ||
61ae935a | 749 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
6cb42265 | 750 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
5cc807da | 751 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { |
6cb42265 MC |
752 | /* |
753 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
754 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
755 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
756 | */ | |
5cc807da | 757 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { |
5cc807da MC |
758 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, |
759 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
760 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
761 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
762 | } | |
a2c2e000 | 763 | } |
5cc807da MC |
764 | /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ |
765 | } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { | |
766 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
767 | } | |
768 | ||
769 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
770 | /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ | |
771 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
6cb42265 | 772 | } |
61ae935a MC |
773 | break; |
774 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
775 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
776 | /* | |
777 | * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing | |
778 | * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. | |
779 | */ | |
780 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
781 | s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; | |
782 | break; | |
783 | ||
61ae935a | 784 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: |
a2c2e000 MC |
785 | if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { |
786 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 787 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 788 | } |
61ae935a MC |
789 | break; |
790 | ||
791 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
318d3c0e | 792 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
4d02f870 | 793 | break; |
066904cc MC |
794 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
795 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { | |
796 | /* | |
797 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
798 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
799 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
800 | */ | |
801 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, | |
802 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) | |
803 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
804 | break; | |
805 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
806 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
807 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
808 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
809 | #else | |
810 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) | |
811 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
812 | else | |
813 | s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; | |
814 | #endif | |
a2c2e000 MC |
815 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { |
816 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 817 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 818 | } |
61ae935a MC |
819 | |
820 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a2c2e000 MC |
821 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
822 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 823 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 824 | } |
61ae935a MC |
825 | |
826 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
827 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
828 | if (s->hit) { | |
829 | /* | |
830 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
831 | * no SCTP used. | |
832 | */ | |
833 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
834 | 0, NULL); | |
835 | } | |
836 | #endif | |
837 | ||
838 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
839 | } | |
840 | break; | |
841 | ||
842 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
843 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
844 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { | |
845 | /* | |
846 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
847 | * no SCTP used. | |
848 | */ | |
849 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
850 | 0, NULL); | |
851 | } | |
852 | #endif | |
853 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
854 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
92760c21 MC |
855 | |
856 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
9d75dce3 | 857 | if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
858 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
859 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
860 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
861 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { |
862 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
863 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
865 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
866 | } | |
867 | } | |
92760c21 | 868 | } |
61ae935a | 869 | break; |
9412b3ad MC |
870 | |
871 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
872 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
873 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
a2c2e000 MC |
874 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
875 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 876 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 877 | } |
9412b3ad | 878 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
879 | } |
880 | ||
881 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
882 | } | |
883 | ||
884 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
885 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
886 | * client | |
61ae935a MC |
887 | * |
888 | * Valid return values are: | |
889 | * 1: Success | |
890 | * 0: Error | |
891 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 892 | int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 893 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 894 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 895 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 896 | |
4a01c59f MC |
897 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
898 | default: | |
899 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
900 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
901 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, | |
902 | SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); | |
4a01c59f MC |
903 | return 0; |
904 | ||
905 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 906 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 907 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 908 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
909 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
910 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f MC |
911 | break; |
912 | ||
913 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
6392fb8e MC |
914 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; |
915 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f MC |
916 | break; |
917 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
918 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
919 | *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; | |
920 | *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
921 | break; | |
922 | ||
923 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: | |
924 | *confunc = NULL; | |
925 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
926 | break; | |
927 | ||
4a01c59f | 928 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
929 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; |
930 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f MC |
931 | break; |
932 | ||
933 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: | |
6392fb8e MC |
934 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; |
935 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f MC |
936 | break; |
937 | ||
938 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d8bc1399 | 939 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; |
6392fb8e | 940 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; |
4a01c59f | 941 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
942 | |
943 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
4a01c59f | 944 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: |
6392fb8e MC |
945 | *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; |
946 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; | |
4a01c59f | 947 | break; |
61ae935a | 948 | #endif |
4a01c59f | 949 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
950 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
951 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 952 | break; |
9412b3ad MC |
953 | |
954 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
955 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
956 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
957 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 958 | } |
5923ad4b | 959 | |
5923ad4b | 960 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
961 | } |
962 | ||
963 | /* | |
964 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
965 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
966 | */ | |
eda75751 | 967 | size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 968 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 969 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 970 | |
a230b26e | 971 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
972 | default: |
973 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
974 | return 0; | |
975 | ||
a230b26e EK |
976 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
977 | return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 978 | |
a230b26e EK |
979 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
980 | return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 981 | |
a230b26e EK |
982 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
983 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
61ae935a | 984 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
985 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
986 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
987 | ||
a230b26e EK |
988 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: |
989 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 990 | |
a230b26e EK |
991 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
992 | return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 993 | |
a230b26e EK |
994 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
995 | /* | |
996 | * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In | |
997 | * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured | |
998 | * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs | |
999 | */ | |
1000 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
61ae935a | 1001 | |
a230b26e EK |
1002 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
1003 | return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1004 | |
a230b26e EK |
1005 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
1006 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
1007 | return 3; | |
1008 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1009 | |
a230b26e EK |
1010 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
1011 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1012 | |
a230b26e EK |
1013 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
1014 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
e46f2334 MC |
1015 | |
1016 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
1017 | return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
1018 | |
1019 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1020 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1021 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1022 | } |
1023 | ||
1024 | /* | |
1025 | * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. | |
1026 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1027 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1028 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1029 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1030 | |
a230b26e | 1031 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1032 | default: |
1033 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1034 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1035 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1036 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1037 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1038 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1039 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
1040 | return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1041 | |
a230b26e EK |
1042 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
1043 | return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1044 | |
a230b26e EK |
1045 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
1046 | return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1047 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1048 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
1049 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1050 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1051 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: |
1052 | return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1053 | |
a230b26e EK |
1054 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
1055 | return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1056 | |
a230b26e EK |
1057 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1058 | return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1059 | |
a230b26e EK |
1060 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
1061 | return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1062 | |
a230b26e EK |
1063 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
1064 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1065 | |
a230b26e EK |
1066 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
1067 | return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1068 | |
a230b26e EK |
1069 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
1070 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
e46f2334 | 1071 | |
c7f47786 MC |
1072 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: |
1073 | return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); | |
1074 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
1075 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
1076 | return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); | |
e1c3de44 MC |
1077 | |
1078 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1079 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1080 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1081 | } |
1082 | ||
1083 | /* | |
1084 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1085 | * from the server | |
1086 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1087 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1088 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1089 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1090 | |
a230b26e | 1091 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1092 | default: |
1093 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1094 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1095 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1096 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1097 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1098 | ||
e4562014 | 1099 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
05c4f1d5 MC |
1100 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1101 | return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1102 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1103 | } |
1104 | ||
7cea05dc | 1105 | int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1106 | { |
2c7b4dbc | 1107 | unsigned char *p; |
ec60ccc1 MC |
1108 | size_t sess_id_len; |
1109 | int i, protverr; | |
09b6c2ef | 1110 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1111 | SSL_COMP *comp; |
1112 | #endif | |
b9908bf9 | 1113 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
a5816a5a | 1114 | unsigned char *session_id; |
0f113f3e | 1115 | |
b9908bf9 | 1116 | /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1117 | protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); |
1118 | if (protverr != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1119 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1120 | protverr); | |
7cea05dc | 1121 | return 0; |
4fa52141 | 1122 | } |
0f113f3e | 1123 | |
e586eac8 | 1124 | if (sess == NULL |
4fd12788 | 1125 | || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) |
e586eac8 | 1126 | || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { |
fc7129dc MC |
1127 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE |
1128 | && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1129 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7cea05dc | 1130 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 1131 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1132 | } |
1133 | /* else use the pre-loaded session */ | |
0f113f3e | 1134 | |
b9908bf9 | 1135 | p = s->s3->client_random; |
0f113f3e | 1136 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1137 | /* |
1138 | * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are | |
1139 | * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify | |
1140 | */ | |
1141 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1142 | size_t idx; | |
1143 | i = 1; | |
1144 | for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { | |
1145 | if (p[idx]) { | |
1146 | i = 0; | |
1147 | break; | |
0f113f3e | 1148 | } |
0f113f3e | 1149 | } |
751b26b1 | 1150 | } else { |
fc7129dc | 1151 | i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); |
751b26b1 | 1152 | } |
0f113f3e | 1153 | |
f7f2a01d | 1154 | if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), |
f63a17d6 MC |
1155 | DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { |
1156 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1157 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1158 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 1159 | } |
b9908bf9 | 1160 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1161 | /*- |
1162 | * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from | |
1163 | * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version | |
1164 | * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also | |
1165 | * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can | |
1166 | * choke if we initially report a higher version then | |
1167 | * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This | |
1168 | * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it | |
1169 | * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports | |
1170 | * 1.0. | |
1171 | * | |
1172 | * Possible scenario with previous logic: | |
1173 | * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 | |
1174 | * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 | |
1175 | * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. | |
8483a003 | 1176 | * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. |
b9908bf9 MC |
1177 | * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. |
1178 | * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now | |
1179 | * know that is maximum server supports. | |
1180 | * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret | |
1181 | * containing version 1.0. | |
1182 | * | |
1183 | * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the | |
1184 | * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely | |
1185 | * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't | |
1186 | * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with | |
1187 | * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using | |
1188 | * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to | |
1189 | * the negotiated version. | |
cd998837 MC |
1190 | * |
1191 | * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the | |
16bce0e0 | 1192 | * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. |
b9908bf9 | 1193 | */ |
7acb8b64 | 1194 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) |
7cea05dc | 1195 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1196 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1197 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1198 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1199 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1200 | |
1201 | /* Session ID */ | |
a5816a5a MC |
1202 | session_id = s->session->session_id; |
1203 | if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
1204 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1205 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { | |
1206 | sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); | |
1207 | s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; | |
1208 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
fc7129dc | 1209 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE |
16cfc2c9 | 1210 | && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) { |
a5816a5a MC |
1211 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1212 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1213 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1214 | return 0; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | } else { | |
1217 | sess_id_len = 0; | |
1218 | } | |
1219 | } else { | |
dee0cc10 | 1220 | assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); |
ec60ccc1 | 1221 | sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; |
a5816a5a MC |
1222 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1223 | s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; | |
1224 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); | |
1225 | } | |
1226 | } | |
dee0cc10 | 1227 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
a5816a5a | 1228 | || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, |
ec60ccc1 | 1229 | sess_id_len)) |
7cea05dc | 1230 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1231 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1232 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1233 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1234 | } |
0f113f3e | 1235 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1236 | /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ |
1237 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
2c7b4dbc | 1238 | if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) |
7cea05dc | 1239 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
b2b3024e | 1240 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1241 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1242 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1243 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1244 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1245 | } |
1246 | ||
1247 | /* Ciphers supported */ | |
7cea05dc | 1248 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1249 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1250 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1251 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1252 | } |
635c8f77 | 1253 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1254 | if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { |
1255 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7cea05dc | 1256 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 1257 | } |
7cea05dc | 1258 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1259 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1260 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1261 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1262 | } |
0f113f3e | 1263 | |
b9908bf9 | 1264 | /* COMPRESSION */ |
7cea05dc | 1265 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1267 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1268 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1269 | } |
1270 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
c19602b5 MC |
1271 | if (ssl_allow_compression(s) |
1272 | && s->ctx->comp_methods | |
1273 | && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1274 | int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); |
1275 | for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { | |
1276 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); | |
7cea05dc | 1277 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1278 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1279 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1280 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1281 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1282 | } |
1283 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 1284 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1285 | #endif |
2c7b4dbc | 1286 | /* Add the NULL method */ |
7cea05dc | 1287 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1288 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1289 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1290 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1291 | } |
761772d7 | 1292 | |
b9908bf9 | 1293 | /* TLS extensions */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1294 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { |
1295 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7cea05dc | 1296 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1297 | } |
0f113f3e | 1298 | |
b9908bf9 | 1299 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1300 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1301 | |
be3583fa | 1302 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1303 | { |
cb150cbc | 1304 | size_t cookie_len; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1305 | PACKET cookiepkt; |
1306 | ||
1307 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) | |
a230b26e | 1308 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1309 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, |
1310 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1311 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1312 | } |
1313 | ||
1314 | cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); | |
1315 | if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1316 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, |
1317 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1318 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1319 | } |
1320 | ||
1321 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1322 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, |
1323 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1324 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1325 | } |
1326 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; | |
1327 | ||
1328 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1329 | } |
1330 | ||
11c67eea | 1331 | static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) |
b9908bf9 MC |
1332 | { |
1333 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
1334 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
11c67eea MC |
1335 | int i; |
1336 | ||
1337 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); | |
1338 | if (c == NULL) { | |
1339 | /* unknown cipher */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1340 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1341 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1342 | return 0; |
1343 | } | |
1344 | /* | |
1345 | * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, | |
1346 | * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. | |
1347 | */ | |
8af91fd9 | 1348 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1349 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1350 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1351 | return 0; |
1352 | } | |
1353 | ||
1354 | sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); | |
1355 | i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); | |
1356 | if (i < 0) { | |
1357 | /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1359 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1360 | return 0; |
1361 | } | |
1362 | ||
1363 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL | |
1364 | && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { | |
1365 | /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1366 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1367 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1368 | return 0; |
1369 | } | |
1370 | ||
1371 | /* | |
1372 | * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher | |
1373 | * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is | |
1374 | * set and use it for comparison. | |
1375 | */ | |
1376 | if (s->session->cipher != NULL) | |
1377 | s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
1378 | if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { | |
a055a881 MC |
1379 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1380 | /* | |
1381 | * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different | |
1382 | * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. | |
1383 | */ | |
1384 | if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) | |
1385 | != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1386 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1387 | SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1388 | SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); | |
a055a881 MC |
1389 | return 0; |
1390 | } | |
1391 | } else { | |
1392 | /* | |
1393 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same | |
1394 | * ciphersuite. | |
1395 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1396 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1397 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); | |
a055a881 MC |
1398 | return 0; |
1399 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
1400 | } |
1401 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; | |
1402 | ||
1403 | return 1; | |
1404 | } | |
1405 | ||
1406 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1407 | { | |
332eb390 | 1408 | PACKET session_id, extpkt; |
b9908bf9 | 1409 | size_t session_id_len; |
b6981744 | 1410 | const unsigned char *cipherchars; |
597c51bc | 1411 | int hrr = 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1412 | unsigned int compression; |
4fa52141 | 1413 | unsigned int sversion; |
3434f40b | 1414 | unsigned int context; |
332eb390 | 1415 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; |
b9908bf9 MC |
1416 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1417 | SSL_COMP *comp; | |
1418 | #endif | |
1419 | ||
4fa52141 | 1420 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1421 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1422 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1423 | goto err; | |
4fa52141 | 1424 | } |
50932c4a | 1425 | |
c3043dcd | 1426 | /* load the server random */ |
597c51bc MC |
1427 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION |
1428 | && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1429 | && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1430 | && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { | |
fc7129dc MC |
1431 | s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; |
1432 | hrr = 1; | |
597c51bc MC |
1433 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
1434 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1435 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1436 | goto err; | |
1437 | } | |
1438 | } else { | |
1439 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { | |
1440 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1441 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1442 | goto err; | |
1443 | } | |
c3043dcd MC |
1444 | } |
1445 | ||
88050dd1 MC |
1446 | /* Get the session-id. */ |
1447 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { | |
1448 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1449 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
f63a17d6 | 1450 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1451 | } |
88050dd1 MC |
1452 | session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); |
1453 | if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) | |
1454 | || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { | |
1455 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1456 | SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); | |
f63a17d6 | 1457 | goto err; |
524420d8 MC |
1458 | } |
1459 | ||
73999b62 | 1460 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1462 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1463 | goto err; | |
fc5ce51d EK |
1464 | } |
1465 | ||
88050dd1 MC |
1466 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
1467 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1468 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1469 | goto err; | |
4ff65f77 MC |
1470 | } |
1471 | ||
1472 | /* TLS extensions */ | |
597c51bc | 1473 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { |
4ff65f77 | 1474 | PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); |
26b9172a MC |
1475 | } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) |
1476 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1477 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1478 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1479 | goto err; | |
4ff65f77 MC |
1480 | } |
1481 | ||
597c51bc MC |
1482 | if (!hrr) { |
1483 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
1484 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1485 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1486 | &extensions, NULL, 1)) { | |
1487 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1488 | goto err; | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | ||
1491 | if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { | |
1492 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1493 | goto err; | |
1494 | } | |
88050dd1 MC |
1495 | } |
1496 | ||
597c51bc MC |
1497 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { |
1498 | if (compression != 0) { | |
1499 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1500 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1501 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1502 | goto err; | |
1503 | } | |
1504 | ||
1505 | if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len | |
1506 | || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, | |
1507 | session_id_len) != 0) { | |
1508 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1509 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); | |
1510 | goto err; | |
1511 | } | |
1512 | } | |
1513 | ||
1514 | if (hrr) { | |
1515 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { | |
1516 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1517 | goto err; | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | ||
1520 | return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); | |
88050dd1 MC |
1521 | } |
1522 | ||
1523 | /* | |
1524 | * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions | |
1525 | * are appropriate for this version. | |
1526 | */ | |
fe874d27 MC |
1527 | context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
1528 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; | |
88050dd1 MC |
1529 | if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { |
1530 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1531 | SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); | |
1532 | goto err; | |
1533 | } | |
1534 | ||
4ff65f77 MC |
1535 | s->hit = 0; |
1536 | ||
1537 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
a5816a5a MC |
1538 | /* |
1539 | * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of | |
1540 | * the message must be on a record boundary. | |
1541 | */ | |
1542 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
1543 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, | |
1544 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1545 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
1546 | goto err; | |
1547 | } | |
1548 | ||
4ff65f77 MC |
1549 | /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ |
1550 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, | |
fe874d27 | 1551 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, |
88050dd1 | 1552 | extensions, NULL, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1553 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1554 | goto err; | |
1555 | } | |
4ff65f77 | 1556 | } else { |
8c1a5343 | 1557 | /* |
4ff65f77 MC |
1558 | * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared |
1559 | * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. | |
1560 | * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. | |
1561 | * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) | |
1562 | * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application | |
1563 | * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether | |
1564 | * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session | |
1565 | * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we | |
1566 | * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake | |
1567 | * message to see if the server wants to resume. | |
8c1a5343 | 1568 | */ |
4ff65f77 MC |
1569 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION |
1570 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { | |
1571 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; | |
1572 | /* | |
1573 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1574 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1575 | */ | |
1576 | int master_key_length; | |
1577 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); | |
1578 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, | |
1579 | &master_key_length, | |
1580 | NULL, &pref_cipher, | |
1581 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) | |
1582 | && master_key_length > 0) { | |
1583 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
1584 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? | |
60d685d1 | 1585 | pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); |
4ff65f77 | 1586 | } else { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1587 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1588 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1589 | goto err; | |
4ff65f77 | 1590 | } |
0f113f3e | 1591 | } |
4ff65f77 MC |
1592 | |
1593 | if (session_id_len != 0 | |
1594 | && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length | |
1595 | && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, | |
1596 | session_id_len) == 0) | |
1597 | s->hit = 1; | |
50932c4a MC |
1598 | } |
1599 | ||
4ff65f77 | 1600 | if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1601 | if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length |
4ff65f77 | 1602 | || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { |
0f113f3e | 1603 | /* actually a client application bug */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1604 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1605 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1606 | SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | |
1607 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1608 | } |
6e3d0153 | 1609 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1610 | /* |
6e3d0153 | 1611 | * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server |
4ff65f77 | 1612 | * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. |
6e3d0153 EK |
1613 | * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, |
1614 | * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be | |
1615 | * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. | |
0f113f3e | 1616 | */ |
c96ce52c | 1617 | if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { |
9ef9088c | 1618 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); |
0f113f3e | 1619 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1620 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1621 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1622 | } |
1623 | } | |
50932c4a | 1624 | |
ccae4a15 | 1625 | s->session->ssl_version = s->version; |
a5816a5a MC |
1626 | /* |
1627 | * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can | |
1628 | * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an | |
1629 | * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be | |
1630 | * used for resumption. | |
1631 | */ | |
1632 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1633 | s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; | |
1634 | /* session_id_len could be 0 */ | |
1635 | if (session_id_len > 0) | |
1636 | memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), | |
1637 | session_id_len); | |
1638 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1639 | } |
fc5ce51d | 1640 | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1641 | /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ |
1642 | if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1643 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1644 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); | |
1645 | goto err; | |
ccae4a15 | 1646 | } |
0f113f3e | 1647 | /* |
3eb2aff4 KR |
1648 | * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed |
1649 | * version. | |
1650 | */ | |
1651 | s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; | |
1652 | s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; | |
0f113f3e | 1653 | |
11c67eea | 1654 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1655 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1656 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1657 | } |
1658 | ||
09b6c2ef | 1659 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
fc5ce51d | 1660 | if (compression != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1661 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1662 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1663 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1664 | } |
1665 | /* | |
1666 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1667 | * using compression. | |
1668 | */ | |
1669 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1670 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1671 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
1672 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1673 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1674 | #else |
fc5ce51d | 1675 | if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { |
f63a17d6 | 1676 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
dd5a4279 | 1677 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); |
f63a17d6 | 1678 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1679 | } |
fc5ce51d | 1680 | if (compression == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1681 | comp = NULL; |
1682 | else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1683 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1684 | SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); | |
1685 | goto err; | |
fc5ce51d EK |
1686 | } else { |
1687 | comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); | |
1688 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1689 | |
fc5ce51d | 1690 | if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1691 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1692 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1693 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1694 | } else { |
1695 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1696 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1697 | #endif |
761772d7 | 1698 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1699 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1700 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1701 | goto err; | |
1702 | } | |
332eb390 | 1703 | |
8723588e MC |
1704 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
1705 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
1706 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
1707 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 1708 | size_t labellen; |
8723588e MC |
1709 | |
1710 | /* | |
1711 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
1712 | * no SCTP used. | |
1713 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
1714 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
1715 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
8723588e | 1716 | |
09d62b33 MT |
1717 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
1718 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
1719 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
1720 | labellen += 1; | |
1721 | ||
8723588e | 1722 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e EK |
1723 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), |
1724 | labelbuffer, | |
09d62b33 | 1725 | labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1726 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1727 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1728 | goto err; | |
1729 | } | |
8723588e MC |
1730 | |
1731 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), | |
1732 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
1733 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
1734 | } | |
1735 | #endif | |
1736 | ||
92760c21 MC |
1737 | /* |
1738 | * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise | |
1739 | * we're done with this message | |
1740 | */ | |
1741 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1742 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
92760c21 MC |
1743 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
1744 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1745 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1746 | goto err; | |
92760c21 MC |
1747 | } |
1748 | ||
1b0286a3 | 1749 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
b9908bf9 | 1750 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 1751 | err: |
1b0286a3 | 1752 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
b9908bf9 | 1753 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 1754 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1755 | |
597c51bc MC |
1756 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, |
1757 | PACKET *extpkt) | |
3847d426 | 1758 | { |
3847d426 | 1759 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; |
3847d426 | 1760 | |
d4504fe5 MC |
1761 | /* |
1762 | * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and | |
1763 | * should not be used. | |
1764 | */ | |
1765 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
1766 | s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; | |
1767 | ||
597c51bc | 1768 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 | 1769 | &extensions, NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 1770 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1771 | extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1772 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1773 | goto err; | |
1774 | } | |
3847d426 MC |
1775 | |
1776 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
66d4bf6b MC |
1777 | extensions = NULL; |
1778 | ||
f5d270ca BK |
1779 | if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 |
1780 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) | |
1781 | && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL | |
1782 | #endif | |
1783 | ) { | |
66d4bf6b MC |
1784 | /* |
1785 | * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next | |
1786 | * ClientHello will not change | |
1787 | */ | |
f63a17d6 | 1788 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
597c51bc MC |
1789 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
1790 | SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); | |
f63a17d6 | 1791 | goto err; |
66d4bf6b | 1792 | } |
3847d426 | 1793 | |
11c67eea MC |
1794 | /* |
1795 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
1796 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
1797 | */ | |
43054d3d | 1798 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1799 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1800 | goto err; | |
11c67eea MC |
1801 | } |
1802 | ||
1803 | /* | |
1804 | * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done | |
1805 | * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the | |
1806 | * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now | |
1807 | * for HRR messages. | |
1808 | */ | |
1809 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1810 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1811 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1812 | goto err; | |
11c67eea MC |
1813 | } |
1814 | ||
3847d426 | 1815 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 1816 | err: |
3847d426 MC |
1817 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
1818 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | ||
be3583fa | 1821 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 1822 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1823 | int i; |
eb5fd03b | 1824 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
1825 | unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; |
1826 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
b6981744 | 1827 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
b9908bf9 MC |
1828 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
1829 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
7f6b466b | 1830 | size_t chainidx, certidx; |
e96e0f8e | 1831 | unsigned int context = 0; |
7f6b466b | 1832 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; |
0f113f3e MC |
1833 | |
1834 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1836 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
cc273a93 | 1837 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1838 | } |
1839 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
1840 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) |
1841 | || context != 0 | |
1842 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) | |
1a281aab MC |
1843 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len |
1844 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1845 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1846 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1847 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1848 | } |
d805a57b | 1849 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { |
73999b62 | 1850 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) |
a230b26e | 1851 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1852 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1853 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1854 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1855 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1856 | } |
1857 | ||
df758a85 MC |
1858 | certstart = certbytes; |
1859 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); | |
0f113f3e | 1860 | if (x == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1861 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, |
1862 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
1863 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1864 | } |
df758a85 | 1865 | if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1866 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1867 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1868 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1869 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1870 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1871 | |
1872 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1873 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
1874 | PACKET extensions; | |
1875 | ||
1876 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1877 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1878 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1879 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1880 | goto err; | |
e96e0f8e | 1881 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
1882 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
1883 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 1884 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 1885 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 1886 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 1887 | PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 1888 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1889 | /* SSLfatal already called */ |
1890 | goto err; | |
5ee289ea MC |
1891 | } |
1892 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1893 | } |
1894 | ||
0f113f3e | 1895 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1896 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1897 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1898 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
cc273a93 | 1899 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1900 | } |
1901 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1902 | } |
1903 | ||
1904 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
c8e2f98c MC |
1905 | /* |
1906 | * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order | |
1907 | * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. | |
1908 | * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set | |
1909 | * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes | |
1910 | * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was | |
1911 | * reverted because at least one application *only* set | |
1912 | * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused | |
1913 | * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did | |
1914 | * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags | |
1915 | * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the | |
1916 | * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is | |
1917 | * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. | |
1918 | */ | |
1919 | if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { | |
c6d38183 | 1920 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), |
f63a17d6 MC |
1921 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1922 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
1923 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1924 | } |
1925 | ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ | |
1926 | if (i > 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1927 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1928 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); | |
1929 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1930 | } |
1931 | ||
c34b0f99 | 1932 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; |
0f113f3e MC |
1933 | /* |
1934 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, | |
d4d78943 | 1935 | * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c |
0f113f3e MC |
1936 | */ |
1937 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
1938 | sk = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 1939 | |
8382fd3a | 1940 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e | 1941 | |
55a9a16f | 1942 | if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { |
0f113f3e | 1943 | x = NULL; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1944 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1945 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); | |
1946 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1947 | } |
1948 | ||
7f6b466b | 1949 | if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 1950 | x = NULL; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1951 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1952 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1953 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1954 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1955 | } |
05b8486e DSH |
1956 | /* |
1957 | * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 | |
1958 | * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate | |
1959 | * type. | |
1960 | */ | |
1961 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
7f6b466b | 1962 | if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { |
05b8486e | 1963 | x = NULL; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1964 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1965 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1966 | SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1967 | goto err; | |
05b8486e | 1968 | } |
0f113f3e | 1969 | } |
7f6b466b | 1970 | s->session->peer_type = certidx; |
55a9a16f MC |
1971 | |
1972 | X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
05f0fb9f | 1973 | X509_up_ref(x); |
55a9a16f | 1974 | s->session->peer = x; |
0f113f3e | 1975 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
0f113f3e | 1976 | x = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1977 | |
1978 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
1979 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1980 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
1981 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
1982 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1983 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
1984 | goto err; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1985 | } |
1986 | ||
b9908bf9 | 1987 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 | 1988 | |
cc273a93 | 1989 | err: |
0f113f3e MC |
1990 | X509_free(x); |
1991 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
b9908bf9 | 1992 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 1993 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1994 | |
a2c2e000 | 1995 | static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
02a74590 MC |
1996 | { |
1997 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
7dc1c647 | 1998 | PACKET psk_identity_hint; |
02a74590 | 1999 | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2000 | /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ |
2001 | ||
2002 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2003 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2004 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2005 | return 0; |
2006 | } | |
2007 | ||
2008 | /* | |
2009 | * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in | |
2010 | * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of | |
2011 | * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK | |
2012 | * identity. | |
2013 | */ | |
2014 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2015 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2016 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2017 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2018 | return 0; |
2019 | } | |
02a74590 | 2020 | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2021 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { |
2022 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); | |
2023 | s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
2024 | } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, | |
a230b26e | 2025 | &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2026 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2027 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2028 | return 0; |
2029 | } | |
2030 | ||
2031 | return 1; | |
2032 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2033 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2034 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7dc1c647 | 2035 | return 0; |
02a74590 MC |
2036 | #endif |
2037 | } | |
2038 | ||
a2c2e000 | 2039 | static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
25c6c10c MC |
2040 | { |
2041 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2042 | PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; | |
2043 | ||
2044 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) | |
2045 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
2046 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) | |
2047 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2048 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, |
2049 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
25c6c10c MC |
2050 | return 0; |
2051 | } | |
2052 | ||
348240c6 | 2053 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ |
25c6c10c MC |
2054 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N = |
2055 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), | |
348240c6 | 2056 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2057 | || (s->srp_ctx.g = |
2058 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), | |
348240c6 | 2059 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2060 | || (s->srp_ctx.s = |
2061 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), | |
348240c6 | 2062 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2063 | || (s->srp_ctx.B = |
2064 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), | |
348240c6 | 2065 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2066 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, |
2067 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
25c6c10c MC |
2068 | return 0; |
2069 | } | |
2070 | ||
a2c2e000 MC |
2071 | if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { |
2072 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
25c6c10c MC |
2073 | return 0; |
2074 | } | |
2075 | ||
2076 | /* We must check if there is a certificate */ | |
a230b26e | 2077 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) |
25c6c10c MC |
2078 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
2079 | ||
2080 | return 1; | |
2081 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2082 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, |
2083 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
25c6c10c MC |
2084 | return 0; |
2085 | #endif | |
2086 | } | |
2087 | ||
a2c2e000 | 2088 | static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
e01a610d MC |
2089 | { |
2090 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2091 | PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; | |
2092 | EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; | |
2093 | ||
2094 | DH *dh = NULL; | |
2095 | BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; | |
2096 | ||
26505153 RL |
2097 | int check_bits = 0; |
2098 | ||
e01a610d MC |
2099 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) |
2100 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
2101 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2102 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2103 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
e01a610d MC |
2104 | return 0; |
2105 | } | |
2106 | ||
2107 | peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2108 | dh = DH_new(); | |
2109 | ||
2110 | if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2111 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2112 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
e01a610d MC |
2113 | goto err; |
2114 | } | |
2115 | ||
348240c6 MC |
2116 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ |
2117 | p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); | |
2118 | g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), | |
2119 | NULL); | |
2120 | bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), | |
2121 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); | |
e01a610d | 2122 | if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2123 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2124 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2125 | goto err; |
2126 | } | |
2127 | ||
69687aa8 | 2128 | /* test non-zero pubkey */ |
26505153 | 2129 | if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2130 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2131 | SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
e01a610d MC |
2132 | goto err; |
2133 | } | |
2134 | ||
2135 | if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2136 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2137 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2138 | goto err; |
2139 | } | |
2140 | p = g = NULL; | |
2141 | ||
26505153 | 2142 | if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2143 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2144 | SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
26505153 RL |
2145 | goto err; |
2146 | } | |
2147 | ||
e01a610d | 2148 | if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2149 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2150 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2151 | goto err; |
2152 | } | |
2153 | bnpub_key = NULL; | |
2154 | ||
2155 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2156 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2157 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
e01a610d MC |
2158 | goto err; |
2159 | } | |
2160 | ||
2161 | if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2162 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2163 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2164 | goto err; |
2165 | } | |
2166 | ||
2167 | s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; | |
2168 | ||
2169 | /* | |
2170 | * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with | |
2171 | * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this | |
2172 | */ | |
a230b26e | 2173 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) |
e01a610d MC |
2174 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
2175 | /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ | |
2176 | ||
2177 | return 1; | |
2178 | ||
2179 | err: | |
2180 | BN_free(p); | |
2181 | BN_free(g); | |
2182 | BN_free(bnpub_key); | |
2183 | DH_free(dh); | |
2184 | EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); | |
2185 | ||
2186 | return 0; | |
2187 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2188 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2189 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e01a610d MC |
2190 | return 0; |
2191 | #endif | |
2192 | } | |
2193 | ||
a2c2e000 | 2194 | static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2195 | { |
2196 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2197 | PACKET encoded_pt; | |
6447e818 | 2198 | unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2199 | |
2200 | /* | |
2201 | * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH | |
6447e818 | 2202 | * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2203 | * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. |
2204 | */ | |
6447e818 | 2205 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2206 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2207 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2208 | return 0; |
2209 | } | |
2210 | /* | |
6447e818 DSH |
2211 | * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not |
2212 | * server has sent an invalid curve. | |
ff74aeb1 | 2213 | */ |
dcf8b01f MC |
2214 | if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE |
2215 | || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2216 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2217 | SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2218 | return 0; |
2219 | } | |
2220 | ||
6447e818 | 2221 | if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2222 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2223 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2224 | return 0; |
2225 | } | |
2226 | ||
ff74aeb1 | 2227 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2228 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2229 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2230 | return 0; |
2231 | } | |
2232 | ||
ec24630a DSH |
2233 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, |
2234 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
2235 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2236 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2237 | SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2238 | return 0; |
2239 | } | |
2240 | ||
2241 | /* | |
2242 | * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign | |
2243 | * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA | |
2244 | * and ECDSA. | |
2245 | */ | |
2246 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) | |
2247 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2248 | else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) | |
2249 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2250 | /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ | |
2251 | ||
2252 | return 1; | |
2253 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2254 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2255 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2256 | return 0; |
2257 | #endif | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | ||
be3583fa | 2260 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2261 | { |
e1e588ac | 2262 | long alg_k; |
b9908bf9 | 2263 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
fe3066ee MC |
2264 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; |
2265 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
73999b62 | 2266 | PACKET save_param_start, signature; |
b9908bf9 | 2267 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
2268 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
2269 | ||
73999b62 | 2270 | save_param_start = *pkt; |
8d92c1f8 | 2271 | |
3260adf1 | 2272 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) |
61dd9f7a DSH |
2273 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); |
2274 | s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; | |
3260adf1 | 2275 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 2276 | |
7689082b | 2277 | if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2278 | if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
2279 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7dc1c647 | 2280 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2281 | } |
7689082b DSH |
2282 | } |
2283 | ||
2284 | /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ | |
2285 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
25c6c10c | 2286 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2287 | if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2288 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 2289 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2290 | } |
e01a610d | 2291 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2292 | if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2293 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e01a610d | 2294 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2295 | } |
ff74aeb1 | 2296 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2297 | if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2298 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
ff74aeb1 | 2299 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2300 | } |
0f113f3e | 2301 | } else if (alg_k) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2303 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
e1e588ac | 2304 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2305 | } |
0f113f3e | 2306 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2307 | /* if it was signed, check the signature */ |
2308 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
32942870 | 2309 | PACKET params; |
be8dba2c MC |
2310 | int maxsig; |
2311 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2312 | unsigned char *tbs; |
2313 | size_t tbslen; | |
2314 | int rv; | |
e1e588ac | 2315 | |
32942870 EK |
2316 | /* |
2317 | * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference | |
2318 | * equals the length of the parameters. | |
2319 | */ | |
2320 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, | |
2321 | PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - | |
73999b62 | 2322 | PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2323 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2324 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e1e588ac | 2325 | goto err; |
32942870 EK |
2326 | } |
2327 | ||
0f113f3e | 2328 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
703bcee0 | 2329 | unsigned int sigalg; |
703bcee0 MC |
2330 | |
2331 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2332 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2333 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
e1e588ac | 2334 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2335 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
2336 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { |
2337 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 2338 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2339 | } |
f365a3e2 | 2340 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2341 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2342 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f365a3e2 | 2343 | goto err; |
32942870 | 2344 | } |
0f113f3e | 2345 | |
b2021556 | 2346 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2347 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2348 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b2021556 DSH |
2349 | goto err; |
2350 | } | |
44f23cd2 | 2351 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 RL |
2352 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
2353 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
f365a3e2 | 2354 | |
73999b62 MC |
2355 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) |
2356 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2357 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2358 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
e1e588ac | 2359 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2360 | } |
be8dba2c MC |
2361 | maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
2362 | if (maxsig < 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2363 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2364 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e1e588ac | 2365 | goto err; |
8098fc56 | 2366 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
2367 | |
2368 | /* | |
8098fc56 | 2369 | * Check signature length |
0f113f3e | 2370 | */ |
be8dba2c | 2371 | if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { |
0f113f3e | 2372 | /* wrong packet length */ |
a2c2e000 | 2373 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
a230b26e | 2374 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); |
e1e588ac MC |
2375 | goto err; |
2376 | } | |
2377 | ||
2378 | md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2379 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 | 2380 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
dd5a4279 | 2381 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
e1e588ac | 2382 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2383 | } |
e1e588ac | 2384 | |
fe3066ee | 2385 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2386 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2387 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
fe3066ee MC |
2388 | goto err; |
2389 | } | |
5554facb | 2390 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
fe3066ee | 2391 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
91410d40 | 2392 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
968ae5b3 | 2393 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2394 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2395 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
fe3066ee MC |
2396 | goto err; |
2397 | } | |
2398 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2399 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), |
2400 | PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); | |
2401 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2402 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e1e588ac | 2403 | goto err; |
192e4bbb | 2404 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2405 | |
2406 | rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), | |
2407 | PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); | |
2408 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
cfba0675 | 2409 | if (rv <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2410 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2411 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
e1e588ac | 2412 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2413 | } |
e1e588ac | 2414 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
fe3066ee | 2415 | md_ctx = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2416 | } else { |
7689082b | 2417 | /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ |
e1e588ac | 2418 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) |
a230b26e | 2419 | && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { |
0f113f3e | 2420 | /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ |
e1e588ac | 2421 | if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2422 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2423 | SSL_R_BAD_DATA); | |
e1e588ac | 2424 | } |
a2c2e000 | 2425 | /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2426 | goto err; |
2427 | } | |
2428 | /* still data left over */ | |
73999b62 | 2429 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2430 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2431 | SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); | |
e1e588ac | 2432 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2433 | } |
2434 | } | |
e1e588ac | 2435 | |
b9908bf9 | 2436 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2437 | err: |
fe3066ee | 2438 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
b9908bf9 | 2439 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2440 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2441 | |
be3583fa | 2442 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2443 | { |
32f66107 DSH |
2444 | size_t i; |
2445 | ||
2446 | /* Clear certificate validity flags */ | |
2447 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) | |
2448 | s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2449 | |
03f44b97 | 2450 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
32f66107 DSH |
2451 | PACKET reqctx, extensions; |
2452 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
03f44b97 | 2453 | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
2454 | if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { |
2455 | /* | |
2456 | * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 | |
2457 | * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so | |
2458 | * we just ignore it | |
2459 | */ | |
2460 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2461 | } | |
2462 | ||
03f44b97 DSH |
2463 | /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ |
2464 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); | |
2465 | s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; | |
2466 | s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2467 | OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); |
2468 | s->pha_context = NULL; | |
32f66107 | 2469 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2470 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || |
2471 | !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2473 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2474 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2475 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 | 2476 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2477 | |
2478 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2480 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2481 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
2482 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 DSH |
2483 | } |
2484 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, | |
fe874d27 | 2485 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 | 2486 | &rawexts, NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 2487 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2488 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
2489 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32f66107 | 2490 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 2491 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 DSH |
2492 | } |
2493 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
2494 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2495 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2496 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2497 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
2498 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 | 2499 | } |
03f44b97 DSH |
2500 | } else { |
2501 | PACKET ctypes; | |
75c13e78 | 2502 | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2503 | /* get the certificate types */ |
2504 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2505 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2506 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2507 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2508 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2509 | } |
2510 | ||
2511 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2512 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2513 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2514 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2515 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 | 2516 | } |
ac112332 | 2517 | |
32f66107 DSH |
2518 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
2519 | PACKET sigalgs; | |
703bcee0 | 2520 | |
32f66107 | 2521 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { |
848a950b | 2522 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2523 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2524 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2525 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 | 2526 | } |
ac112332 | 2527 | |
c589c34e BK |
2528 | /* |
2529 | * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility | |
2530 | * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. | |
2531 | */ | |
2532 | if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2533 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2534 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2535 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); | |
2536 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 DSH |
2537 | } |
2538 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2539 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2540 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2541 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2542 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 | 2543 | } |
0f113f3e | 2544 | } |
0f113f3e | 2545 | |
32f66107 | 2546 | /* get the CA RDNs */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2547 | if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { |
2548 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2549 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2550 | } | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2551 | } |
2552 | ||
2553 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
848a950b | 2554 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2555 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2556 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2557 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 | 2558 | } |
0f113f3e | 2559 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2560 | /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ |
2561 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2562 | |
e4562014 MC |
2563 | /* |
2564 | * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until | |
2565 | * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because | |
2566 | * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message | |
2567 | * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that | |
2568 | * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in | |
2569 | * client_cert_cb. | |
2570 | */ | |
2571 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
2572 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
2573 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2574 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e MC |
2575 | } |
2576 | ||
be3583fa | 2577 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2578 | { |
b9908bf9 | 2579 | unsigned int ticklen; |
9ac6244b | 2580 | unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; |
ec60ccc1 | 2581 | unsigned int sess_len; |
de1df7e9 | 2582 | RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; |
9b6a8254 | 2583 | PACKET nonce; |
b9908bf9 | 2584 | |
6cf2dbd9 MC |
2585 | PACKET_null_init(&nonce); |
2586 | ||
73999b62 | 2587 | if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) |
9b6a8254 MC |
2588 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2589 | && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) | |
6cf2dbd9 | 2590 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) |
a230b26e | 2591 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) |
10bda8f8 MC |
2592 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) |
2593 | : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2594 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2595 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2596 | goto err; | |
e711da71 EK |
2597 | } |
2598 | ||
de1df7e9 MC |
2599 | /* |
2600 | * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty | |
2601 | * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never | |
2602 | * be 0 here in that instance | |
2603 | */ | |
e711da71 | 2604 | if (ticklen == 0) |
c9de4a20 | 2605 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
e711da71 | 2606 | |
150840b9 MC |
2607 | /* |
2608 | * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise | |
2609 | * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, | |
2610 | * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every | |
2611 | * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive | |
2612 | * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session | |
2613 | * cache. | |
2614 | */ | |
2615 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { | |
98ece4ee | 2616 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess; |
1f156321 | 2617 | |
98ece4ee MC |
2618 | /* |
2619 | * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new | |
2620 | * one | |
2621 | */ | |
5d61491c | 2622 | if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2623 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2624 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2625 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2626 | goto err; | |
5d61491c MC |
2627 | } |
2628 | ||
1f156321 MC |
2629 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 |
2630 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2631 | /* | |
2632 | * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that | |
2633 | * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the | |
2634 | * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails | |
2635 | */ | |
2636 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
2637 | } | |
2638 | ||
98ece4ee MC |
2639 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
2640 | s->session = new_sess; | |
2641 | } | |
2642 | ||
fc24f0bf MC |
2643 | /* |
2644 | * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - | |
2645 | * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. | |
2646 | */ | |
2647 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); | |
2648 | ||
aff8c126 RS |
2649 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); |
2650 | s->session->ext.tick = NULL; | |
2651 | s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; | |
e711da71 | 2652 | |
aff8c126 RS |
2653 | s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
2654 | if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2655 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2656 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
0f113f3e MC |
2657 | goto err; |
2658 | } | |
aff8c126 | 2659 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2660 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2661 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2662 | goto err; | |
561e12bb | 2663 | } |
e711da71 | 2664 | |
aff8c126 | 2665 | s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; |
fc24f0bf | 2666 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; |
aff8c126 | 2667 | s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; |
de1df7e9 MC |
2668 | |
2669 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2670 | PACKET extpkt; | |
2671 | ||
2672 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) | |
1cde0259 MC |
2673 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
2674 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
2675 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2676 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2677 | goto err; | |
2678 | } | |
2679 | ||
2680 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
2681 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, | |
2682 | NULL, 1) | |
fe874d27 MC |
2683 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, |
2684 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2685 | exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
2686 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2687 | goto err; | |
de1df7e9 MC |
2688 | } |
2689 | } | |
2690 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2691 | /* |
2692 | * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set | |
2693 | * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in | |
2694 | * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work | |
2695 | * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The | |
2696 | * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is | |
2697 | * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. | |
2698 | * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions | |
2699 | * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is | |
2700 | * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. | |
2701 | */ | |
ec60ccc1 MC |
2702 | /* |
2703 | * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int | |
2704 | * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t | |
2705 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 2706 | if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, |
ec60ccc1 | 2707 | s->session->session_id, &sess_len, |
d166ed8c | 2708 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2709 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2710 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d166ed8c DSH |
2711 | goto err; |
2712 | } | |
ec60ccc1 | 2713 | s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; |
4cb00457 | 2714 | s->session->not_resumable = 0; |
de1df7e9 MC |
2715 | |
2716 | /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ | |
2717 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
4ff1a526 MC |
2718 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); |
2719 | int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); | |
2720 | size_t hashlen; | |
2721 | static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; | |
2722 | ||
2723 | /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ | |
2724 | if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { | |
2725 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2726 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2727 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2728 | goto err; | |
2729 | } | |
2730 | hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; | |
2731 | ||
2732 | if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, | |
2733 | nonce_label, | |
2734 | sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, | |
6cf2dbd9 MC |
2735 | PACKET_data(&nonce), |
2736 | PACKET_remaining(&nonce), | |
4ff1a526 | 2737 | s->session->master_key, |
0fb2815b | 2738 | hashlen, 1)) { |
4ff1a526 MC |
2739 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2740 | goto err; | |
2741 | } | |
2742 | s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; | |
2743 | ||
33d93417 | 2744 | OPENSSL_free(exts); |
de1df7e9 MC |
2745 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
2746 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2747 | } | |
2748 | ||
b9908bf9 | 2749 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2750 | err: |
33d93417 | 2751 | OPENSSL_free(exts); |
b9908bf9 | 2752 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2753 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 2754 | |
f63e4288 MC |
2755 | /* |
2756 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
f63a17d6 | 2757 | * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure |
f63e4288 | 2758 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2759 | int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2760 | { |
8b0e934a | 2761 | size_t resplen; |
b9908bf9 | 2762 | unsigned int type; |
b9908bf9 | 2763 | |
73999b62 | 2764 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) |
a230b26e | 2765 | || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2766 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2767 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); | |
f63e4288 | 2768 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2769 | } |
56a26ce3 MC |
2770 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) |
2771 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2772 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2773 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
f63e4288 | 2774 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2775 | } |
8cbfcc70 RS |
2776 | s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); |
2777 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2778 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2779 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f63e4288 | 2780 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2781 | } |
8cbfcc70 | 2782 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2783 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2784 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
f63e4288 | 2785 | return 0; |
ac63710a | 2786 | } |
8cbfcc70 | 2787 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; |
f63e4288 MC |
2788 | |
2789 | return 1; | |
2790 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 2791 | |
f63e4288 MC |
2792 | |
2793 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2794 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2795 | if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { |
2796 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63e4288 MC |
2797 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2798 | } | |
2799 | ||
b9908bf9 | 2800 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2801 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2802 | |
7776a36c MC |
2803 | /* |
2804 | * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the | |
2805 | * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. | |
6530c490 MC |
2806 | * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 |
2807 | * on failure. | |
7776a36c | 2808 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2809 | int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) |
b9908bf9 | 2810 | { |
a455d0f6 MC |
2811 | /* |
2812 | * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from | |
2813 | * the server | |
2814 | */ | |
2815 | if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2816 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7776a36c | 2817 | return 0; |
a455d0f6 MC |
2818 | } |
2819 | ||
bb1aaab4 | 2820 | /* |
aff8c126 RS |
2821 | * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and |
2822 | * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status | |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2823 | * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise |
2824 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
2825 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing |
2826 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
2827 | int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); | |
2828 | ||
bb1aaab4 | 2829 | if (ret == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2830 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, |
2831 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, | |
2832 | SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); | |
7776a36c | 2833 | return 0; |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2834 | } |
2835 | if (ret < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2836 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2837 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, | |
dd5a4279 | 2838 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
7776a36c | 2839 | return 0; |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2840 | } |
2841 | } | |
ed29e82a RP |
2842 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT |
2843 | if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { | |
43341433 VD |
2844 | /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ |
2845 | if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2846 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7776a36c | 2847 | return 0; |
ed29e82a RP |
2848 | } |
2849 | } | |
2850 | #endif | |
2851 | ||
7776a36c MC |
2852 | return 1; |
2853 | } | |
2854 | ||
2855 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2856 | { | |
7776a36c MC |
2857 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
2858 | /* should contain no data */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2859 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, |
2860 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2861 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
7776a36c MC |
2862 | } |
2863 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2864 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { | |
2865 | if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2866 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, |
2867 | SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); | |
2868 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
7776a36c MC |
2869 | } |
2870 | } | |
2871 | #endif | |
2872 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2873 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { |
2874 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2875 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2876 | } | |
7776a36c | 2877 | |
bd79bcb4 | 2878 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2879 | } |
176f31dd | 2880 | |
a2c2e000 | 2881 | static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2882 | { |
7689082b | 2883 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
13c0ec4a MC |
2884 | int ret = 0; |
2885 | /* | |
2886 | * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a | |
2887 | * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating | |
2888 | * strnlen. | |
2889 | */ | |
2890 | char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; | |
2891 | size_t identitylen = 0; | |
2892 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; | |
2893 | unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; | |
2894 | char *tmpidentity = NULL; | |
2895 | size_t psklen = 0; | |
2896 | ||
2897 | if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2898 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2899 | SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2900 | goto err; |
2901 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2902 | |
13c0ec4a | 2903 | memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
d02b48c6 | 2904 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2905 | psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, |
2906 | identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, | |
2907 | psk, sizeof(psk)); | |
7689082b | 2908 | |
13c0ec4a | 2909 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2910 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2911 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2912 | goto err; |
2913 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2914 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2915 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2916 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2917 | goto err; |
2918 | } | |
7689082b | 2919 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2920 | identitylen = strlen(identity); |
2921 | if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2922 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2923 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2924 | goto err; |
2925 | } | |
7689082b | 2926 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2927 | tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); |
2928 | tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); | |
2929 | if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2930 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2931 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2932 | goto err; |
2933 | } | |
7689082b | 2934 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2935 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2936 | s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; | |
2937 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2938 | tmppsk = NULL; | |
2939 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); | |
2940 | s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; | |
2941 | tmpidentity = NULL; | |
f1ec23c0 | 2942 | |
b2b3024e | 2943 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2944 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2945 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
2946 | goto err; |
2947 | } | |
7689082b | 2948 | |
13c0ec4a | 2949 | ret = 1; |
0bce0b02 | 2950 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2951 | err: |
2952 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
2953 | OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); | |
2954 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); | |
2955 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); | |
d02b48c6 | 2956 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2957 | return ret; |
2958 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2959 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2960 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a | 2961 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 2962 | #endif |
13c0ec4a | 2963 | } |
b9908bf9 | 2964 | |
a2c2e000 | 2965 | static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
13c0ec4a | 2966 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2967 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
f1ec23c0 | 2968 | unsigned char *encdata = NULL; |
13c0ec4a MC |
2969 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
2970 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
2971 | size_t enclen; | |
2972 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
2973 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
b9908bf9 | 2974 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2975 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { |
2976 | /* | |
2977 | * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. | |
2978 | */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2979 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
2980 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2981 | return 0; |
2982 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2983 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2984 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
2985 | if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2986 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
2987 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2988 | return 0; |
2989 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2990 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2991 | pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2992 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
2993 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2994 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
2995 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2996 | return 0; |
2997 | } | |
0bce0b02 | 2998 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2999 | pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; |
3000 | pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
348240c6 | 3001 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
16cfc2c9 | 3002 | if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3003 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3004 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3005 | goto err; |
3006 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3007 | |
13c0ec4a | 3008 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
f1ec23c0 | 3009 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3010 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3011 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3012 | goto err; |
3013 | } | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3014 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); |
3015 | if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
3016 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3017 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3018 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3019 | goto err; |
3020 | } | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3021 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) |
3022 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3023 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3024 | SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3025 | goto err; |
3026 | } | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3027 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
3028 | pctx = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 3029 | |
13c0ec4a | 3030 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
f1ec23c0 | 3031 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3032 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3033 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3034 | goto err; |
b9908bf9 | 3035 | } |
13c0ec4a | 3036 | |
2faa1b48 | 3037 | /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
a2c2e000 MC |
3038 | if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { |
3039 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2faa1b48 | 3040 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3041 | } |
2faa1b48 | 3042 | |
26fb4b03 RS |
3043 | s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; |
3044 | s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
3045 | ||
13c0ec4a MC |
3046 | return 1; |
3047 | err: | |
3048 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3049 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
3050 | ||
3051 | return 0; | |
3052 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3053 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3054 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a | 3055 | return 0; |
f9b3bff6 | 3056 | #endif |
13c0ec4a MC |
3057 | } |
3058 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3059 | static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
a8c1c704 MC |
3060 | { |
3061 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
3062 | DH *dh_clnt = NULL; | |
3063 | const BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
3064 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; | |
f1ec23c0 | 3065 | unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; |
a8c1c704 MC |
3066 | |
3067 | skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3068 | if (skey == NULL) { |
3069 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3070 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3071 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3072 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3073 | |
0a699a07 | 3074 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); |
a2c2e000 MC |
3075 | if (ckey == NULL) { |
3076 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3077 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b599ce3b | 3078 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3079 | } |
b599ce3b | 3080 | |
a8c1c704 MC |
3081 | dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); |
3082 | ||
a2c2e000 MC |
3083 | if (dh_clnt == NULL) { |
3084 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3085 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3086 | goto err; | |
3087 | } | |
3088 | ||
3089 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { | |
3090 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f1ec23c0 | 3091 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3092 | } |
a8c1c704 MC |
3093 | |
3094 | /* send off the data */ | |
3095 | DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3096 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), |
3097 | &keybytes)) { | |
3098 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3099 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3100 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3101 | } |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3102 | |
3103 | BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); | |
a8c1c704 MC |
3104 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
3105 | ||
3106 | return 1; | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3107 | err: |
3108 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
f9f674eb MC |
3109 | return 0; |
3110 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3111 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, |
3112 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
a8c1c704 | 3113 | return 0; |
f9f674eb | 3114 | #endif |
a8c1c704 MC |
3115 | } |
3116 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3117 | static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
67ad5aab MC |
3118 | { |
3119 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
3120 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; | |
348240c6 | 3121 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; |
67ad5aab | 3122 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; |
f1ec23c0 | 3123 | int ret = 0; |
67ad5aab MC |
3124 | |
3125 | skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; | |
ec24630a | 3126 | if (skey == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3127 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3128 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
67ad5aab MC |
3129 | return 0; |
3130 | } | |
3131 | ||
0a699a07 | 3132 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); |
b599ce3b | 3133 | if (ckey == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3134 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3135 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
b599ce3b MC |
3136 | goto err; |
3137 | } | |
67ad5aab | 3138 | |
0f1e51ea | 3139 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { |
a2c2e000 | 3140 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ad5aab MC |
3141 | goto err; |
3142 | } | |
3143 | ||
3144 | /* Generate encoding of client key */ | |
ec24630a | 3145 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); |
67ad5aab MC |
3146 | |
3147 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3148 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3149 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
67ad5aab MC |
3150 | goto err; |
3151 | } | |
3152 | ||
b2b3024e | 3153 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3154 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3155 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3156 | goto err; |
3157 | } | |
67ad5aab | 3158 | |
f1ec23c0 | 3159 | ret = 1; |
67ad5aab | 3160 | err: |
f1ec23c0 | 3161 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
67ad5aab | 3162 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
f1ec23c0 | 3163 | return ret; |
67ad5aab | 3164 | #else |
a2c2e000 MC |
3165 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3166 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
67ad5aab MC |
3167 | return 0; |
3168 | #endif | |
3169 | } | |
3170 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3171 | static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e00e0b3d MC |
3172 | { |
3173 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3174 | /* GOST key exchange message creation */ | |
3175 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; | |
3176 | X509 *peer_cert; | |
3177 | size_t msglen; | |
3178 | unsigned int md_len; | |
3179 | unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; | |
3180 | EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3181 | int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; | |
3182 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3183 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3184 | ||
3185 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) | |
3186 | dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; | |
3187 | ||
3188 | /* | |
1ee4b98e | 3189 | * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it |
e00e0b3d MC |
3190 | */ |
3191 | peer_cert = s->session->peer; | |
3192 | if (!peer_cert) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3193 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
e00e0b3d MC |
3194 | SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); |
3195 | return 0; | |
3196 | } | |
3197 | ||
3198 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); | |
3199 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3200 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3201 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3202 | return 0; |
3203 | } | |
3204 | /* | |
3205 | * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key | |
3206 | * parameters match those of server certificate, use | |
3207 | * certificate key for key exchange | |
3208 | */ | |
3209 | ||
3210 | /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ | |
3211 | pmslen = 32; | |
3212 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
3213 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3214 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3215 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2f3930bc | 3216 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d MC |
3217 | } |
3218 | ||
3219 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 | |
348240c6 MC |
3220 | /* Generate session key |
3221 | * TODO(size_t): Convert this function | |
3222 | */ | |
16cfc2c9 | 3223 | || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3224 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3225 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3226 | goto err; |
3227 | }; | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3228 | /* |
3229 | * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context | |
3230 | * data | |
3231 | */ | |
3232 | ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
3233 | if (ukm_hash == NULL | |
a230b26e EK |
3234 | || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 |
3235 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, | |
3236 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3237 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, | |
3238 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3239 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3240 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3241 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3242 | goto err; |
3243 | } | |
3244 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3245 | ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3246 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, | |
3247 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3248 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3249 | SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3250 | goto err; |
3251 | } | |
3252 | /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ | |
3253 | /* | |
3254 | * Encapsulate it into sequence | |
3255 | */ | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3256 | msglen = 255; |
3257 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3258 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3259 | SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3260 | goto err; |
3261 | } | |
f1ec23c0 | 3262 | |
08029dfa MC |
3263 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) |
3264 | || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) | |
b2b3024e | 3265 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3267 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3268 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d | 3269 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3270 | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3271 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); |
3272 | s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; | |
3273 | s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
3274 | ||
3275 | return 1; | |
3276 | err: | |
3277 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3278 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3279 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3280 | return 0; | |
3281 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3282 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3283 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3284 | return 0; |
3285 | #endif | |
3286 | } | |
3287 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3288 | static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
840a2bf8 | 3289 | { |
8b9546c7 | 3290 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3291 | unsigned char *abytes = NULL; |
3292 | ||
3293 | if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL | |
b2b3024e MC |
3294 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), |
3295 | &abytes)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3296 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, |
3297 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
840a2bf8 MC |
3298 | return 0; |
3299 | } | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3300 | BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); |
3301 | ||
840a2bf8 MC |
3302 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); |
3303 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3304 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3305 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, |
3306 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
840a2bf8 MC |
3307 | return 0; |
3308 | } | |
3309 | ||
3310 | return 1; | |
3311 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, |
3313 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
840a2bf8 MC |
3314 | return 0; |
3315 | #endif | |
3316 | } | |
3317 | ||
7cea05dc | 3318 | int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
13c0ec4a | 3319 | { |
13c0ec4a | 3320 | unsigned long alg_k; |
13c0ec4a | 3321 | |
f1ec23c0 | 3322 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
13c0ec4a | 3323 | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3324 | /* |
3325 | * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so | |
3326 | * no need to do so here. | |
3327 | */ | |
13c0ec4a | 3328 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) |
a2c2e000 | 3329 | && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) |
13c0ec4a MC |
3330 | goto err; |
3331 | ||
f1ec23c0 | 3332 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3333 | if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) |
13c0ec4a | 3334 | goto err; |
a8c1c704 | 3335 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3336 | if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) |
b9908bf9 | 3337 | goto err; |
67ad5aab | 3338 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3339 | if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) |
ce0c1f2b | 3340 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d | 3341 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
a2c2e000 | 3342 | if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) |
a71edf3b | 3343 | goto err; |
840a2bf8 | 3344 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
a2c2e000 | 3345 | if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) |
69f68237 | 3346 | goto err; |
4a424545 | 3347 | } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3348 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3349 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3350 | goto err; |
3351 | } | |
3352 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3353 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 3354 | err: |
0bce0b02 | 3355 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); |
76106e60 | 3356 | s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; |
7689082b DSH |
3357 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3358 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3359 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 3360 | #endif |
b9908bf9 MC |
3361 | return 0; |
3362 | } | |
3363 | ||
3364 | int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) | |
3365 | { | |
3366 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3367 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3368 | ||
6f137370 MC |
3369 | pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; |
3370 | pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; | |
3371 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3372 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
3373 | /* Check for SRP */ | |
3374 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { | |
3375 | if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3376 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
b9908bf9 MC |
3377 | goto err; |
3378 | } | |
3379 | return 1; | |
3380 | } | |
3381 | #endif | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3382 | |
3383 | if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3384 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3385 | SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3386 | goto err; |
3387 | } | |
3388 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3389 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6f137370 MC |
3390 | /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ |
3391 | pms = NULL; | |
3392 | pmslen = 0; | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3393 | goto err; |
3394 | } | |
6f137370 MC |
3395 | pms = NULL; |
3396 | pmslen = 0; | |
473483d4 MC |
3397 | |
3398 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3399 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3400 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3401 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 3402 | size_t labellen; |
473483d4 MC |
3403 | |
3404 | /* | |
3405 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3406 | * used. | |
3407 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3408 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3409 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
473483d4 | 3410 | |
09d62b33 MT |
3411 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
3412 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
3413 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
3414 | labellen += 1; | |
3415 | ||
473483d4 | 3416 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e | 3417 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
09d62b33 | 3418 | labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 | 3419 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
dd5a4279 MC |
3420 | SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, |
3421 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
473483d4 | 3422 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3423 | } |
473483d4 MC |
3424 | |
3425 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
3426 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
3427 | } | |
3428 | #endif | |
3429 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3430 | return 1; |
3431 | err: | |
3432 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3433 | s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; | |
3434 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3435 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3436 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3437 | /* |
3438 | * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check | |
3439 | * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client | |
3440 | * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. | |
0d609395 DSH |
3441 | */ |
3442 | static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 3443 | { |
0f113f3e | 3444 | /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ |
f63a17d6 | 3445 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
3446 | return 0; |
3447 | /* | |
3448 | * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also | |
3449 | * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. | |
3450 | */ | |
3451 | if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && | |
3452 | !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) | |
3453 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3454 | return 1; |
3455 | } | |
0d609395 | 3456 | |
be3583fa | 3457 | WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
0f113f3e MC |
3458 | { |
3459 | X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
3460 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
3461 | int i; | |
3462 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3463 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3464 | /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ |
3465 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
3466 | i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
3467 | if (i < 0) { | |
3468 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3469 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
0f113f3e MC |
3470 | } |
3471 | if (i == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3473 | SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3474 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
eb5fd03b | 3475 | return WORK_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
3476 | } |
3477 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3478 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
3479 | if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { |
3480 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
3481 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
3482 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 3483 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
9d75dce3 | 3484 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
3485 | |
3486 | /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ | |
3487 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3488 | } |
3489 | ||
3490 | /* We need to get a client cert */ | |
b9908bf9 | 3491 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3492 | /* |
3493 | * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
3494 | * return(-1); We then get retied later | |
3495 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
3496 | i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); |
3497 | if (i < 0) { | |
3498 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3499 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
0f113f3e MC |
3500 | } |
3501 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3502 | if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
3503 | if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) |
3504 | i = 0; | |
3505 | } else if (i == 1) { | |
3506 | i = 0; | |
b9908bf9 | 3507 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3508 | SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); |
3509 | } | |
3510 | ||
222561fe | 3511 | X509_free(x509); |
25aaa98a | 3512 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
0f113f3e MC |
3513 | if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) |
3514 | i = 0; | |
3515 | if (i == 0) { | |
3516 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3517 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
3518 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); | |
b9908bf9 | 3519 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e MC |
3520 | } else { |
3521 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; | |
124037fd | 3522 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 3523 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
eb5fd03b | 3524 | return WORK_ERROR; |
dab18ab5 | 3525 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3526 | } |
3527 | } | |
3528 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3529 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
3530 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3531 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e MC |
3532 | } |
3533 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3534 | /* Shouldn't ever get here */ |
a2c2e000 MC |
3535 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
3536 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3537 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3538 | } | |
3539 | ||
7cea05dc | 3540 | int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 3541 | { |
9d75dce3 TS |
3542 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3543 | if (s->pha_context == NULL) { | |
3544 | /* no context available, add 0-length context */ | |
3545 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
3546 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3547 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3548 | return 0; | |
3549 | } | |
3550 | } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { | |
3551 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3552 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3553 | return 0; | |
3554 | } | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3555 | } |
3556 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, | |
3557 | (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL | |
3558 | : s->cert->key)) { | |
3559 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3560 | return 0; | |
f7e393be MC |
3561 | } |
3562 | ||
3563 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3564 | && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) | |
3565 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3566 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
c31ad0bb | 3567 | /* |
a2c2e000 | 3568 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent |
f63a17d6 | 3569 | * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. |
c31ad0bb | 3570 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 3571 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
dd5a4279 | 3572 | SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
c31ad0bb | 3573 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3574 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
3575 | |
3576 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3577 | } |
3578 | ||
36d16f8e | 3579 | int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e | 3580 | { |
dd24857b DSH |
3581 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; |
3582 | size_t idx; | |
0f113f3e | 3583 | long alg_k, alg_a; |
d02b48c6 | 3584 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3585 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
3586 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
d02b48c6 | 3587 | |
0f113f3e | 3588 | /* we don't have a certificate */ |
dd24857b DSH |
3589 | if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) |
3590 | return 1; | |
d02b48c6 | 3591 | |
0f113f3e | 3592 | /* This is the passed certificate */ |
dd24857b | 3593 | clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); |
d02b48c6 | 3594 | |
dd24857b DSH |
3595 | /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ |
3596 | if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3597 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3598 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3599 | SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); | |
3600 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3601 | } |
0f113f3e | 3602 | |
dd24857b DSH |
3603 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
3604 | if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
3605 | if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) | |
3606 | return 1; | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3607 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3608 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
3609 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3610 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3611 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 3612 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
dd24857b | 3613 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3614 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3615 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3616 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); | |
3617 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3618 | } |
79df9d62 | 3619 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 3620 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
fb79abe3 | 3621 | if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3622 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, |
3623 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3624 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3625 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
3626 | #endif |
3627 | ||
dd24857b | 3628 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
3629 | } |
3630 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3631 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
7cea05dc | 3632 | int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 3633 | { |
15e6be6c MC |
3634 | size_t len, padding_len; |
3635 | unsigned char *padding = NULL; | |
15e6be6c | 3636 | |
aff8c126 | 3637 | len = s->ext.npn_len; |
b9908bf9 | 3638 | padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); |
15e6be6c | 3639 | |
aff8c126 | 3640 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) |
7cea05dc | 3641 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3642 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, |
3643 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3644 | return 0; | |
15e6be6c MC |
3645 | } |
3646 | ||
3647 | memset(padding, 0, padding_len); | |
3648 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3649 | return 1; |
3650 | } | |
6434abbf | 3651 | #endif |
368888bc | 3652 | |
c7f47786 MC |
3653 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3654 | { | |
3655 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
3656 | /* should contain no data */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3657 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, |
3658 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
c7f47786 MC |
3659 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3660 | } | |
3661 | ||
db0f35dd TS |
3662 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
3663 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
3664 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3665 | } | |
3666 | ||
c7f47786 | 3667 | /* |
1f04f23e MC |
3668 | * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for |
3669 | * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will | |
3670 | * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a | |
3671 | * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable | |
3672 | * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. | |
c7f47786 MC |
3673 | */ |
3674 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
3675 | SSL_renegotiate(s); | |
3676 | else | |
3677 | SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); | |
3678 | ||
3679 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3680 | } | |
3681 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
3682 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3683 | { | |
e46f2334 | 3684 | PACKET extensions; |
3434f40b | 3685 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; |
e46f2334 | 3686 | |
26b9172a MC |
3687 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) |
3688 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3689 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
3690 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
e46f2334 MC |
3691 | goto err; |
3692 | } | |
3693 | ||
fe874d27 MC |
3694 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3695 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 3696 | NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 3697 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3698 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
3699 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3434f40b | 3700 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3701 | } |
3434f40b | 3702 | |
1b0286a3 | 3703 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e46f2334 MC |
3704 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
3705 | ||
3706 | err: | |
1b0286a3 | 3707 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e46f2334 MC |
3708 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3709 | } | |
3710 | ||
368888bc | 3711 | int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) |
0f113f3e MC |
3712 | { |
3713 | int i = 0; | |
368888bc | 3714 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
0f113f3e MC |
3715 | if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { |
3716 | i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, | |
3717 | SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), | |
3718 | px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
3719 | if (i != 0) | |
3720 | return i; | |
3721 | } | |
3722 | #endif | |
3723 | if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) | |
3724 | i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); | |
3725 | return i; | |
3726 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3727 | |
ae2f7b37 | 3728 | int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) |
d45ba43d | 3729 | { |
2c7b4dbc | 3730 | int i; |
aafec89c | 3731 | size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; |
d45ba43d | 3732 | int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; |
1d0c08b4 | 3733 | |
d45ba43d | 3734 | /* Set disabled masks for this session */ |
1d0c08b4 MC |
3735 | if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { |
3736 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3737 | SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); | |
3738 | return 0; | |
3739 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3740 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3741 | if (sk == NULL) { |
3742 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3743 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
26a7d938 | 3744 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 3745 | } |
d45ba43d | 3746 | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3747 | #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH |
3748 | # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 | |
3749 | # error Max cipher length too short | |
3750 | # endif | |
3751 | /* | |
3752 | * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround | |
3753 | * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we | |
3754 | * use TLS v1.2 | |
3755 | */ | |
3756 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
3757 | maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; | |
3758 | else | |
3759 | #endif | |
3760 | /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ | |
3761 | maxlen = 0xfffe; | |
3762 | ||
3763 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) | |
3764 | maxlen -= 2; | |
3765 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) | |
3766 | maxlen -= 2; | |
3767 | ||
3768 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { | |
3769 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
3770 | ||
d45ba43d MC |
3771 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); |
3772 | /* Skip disabled ciphers */ | |
8af91fd9 | 3773 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) |
d45ba43d | 3774 | continue; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3775 | |
3776 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3777 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, |
3778 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3779 | return 0; |
3780 | } | |
3781 | ||
aafec89c MC |
3782 | /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ |
3783 | if (!maxverok) { | |
3784 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3785 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
3786 | && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) | |
3787 | maxverok = 1; | |
3788 | } else { | |
3789 | if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver | |
3790 | && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
3791 | maxverok = 1; | |
3792 | } | |
3793 | } | |
3794 | ||
2c7b4dbc | 3795 | totlen += len; |
d45ba43d | 3796 | } |
2c7b4dbc | 3797 | |
aafec89c | 3798 | if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3799 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, |
3800 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
aafec89c MC |
3801 | |
3802 | if (!maxverok) | |
3803 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
3804 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
3805 | ||
2c7b4dbc MC |
3806 | return 0; |
3807 | } | |
3808 | ||
3809 | if (totlen != 0) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3810 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { |
3811 | static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { | |
bbb4ceb8 | 3812 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
d45ba43d | 3813 | }; |
2c7b4dbc | 3814 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3815 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3816 | SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3817 | return 0; |
3818 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3819 | } |
3820 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { | |
3821 | static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { | |
bbb4ceb8 | 3822 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
d45ba43d | 3823 | }; |
2c7b4dbc | 3824 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3825 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3826 | SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3827 | return 0; |
3828 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3829 | } |
3830 | } | |
3831 | ||
2c7b4dbc | 3832 | return 1; |
d45ba43d | 3833 | } |
ef6c191b MC |
3834 | |
3835 | int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3836 | { | |
3837 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY | |
3838 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { | |
635c8f77 MC |
3839 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3840 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3841 | ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
ef6c191b MC |
3842 | return 0; |
3843 | } | |
3844 | ||
3845 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; | |
3846 | return 1; | |
3847 | } |