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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
b6461792 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8c74b5e5 | 5 | * |
2c18d164 | 6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8c74b5e5 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
fc24f0bf | 13 | #include <time.h> |
dee0cc10 | 14 | #include <assert.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
15 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
16 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
ec577822 BM |
17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
dbad1690 | 21 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d7e498ac | 23 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
d095b68d | 24 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
3c27208f | 25 | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
49b26f54 | 26 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
1ee22dc2 MC |
27 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
28 | #include <openssl/param_build.h> | |
449bdf37 | 29 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
f9b3bff6 | 30 | |
38b051a1 TM |
31 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
32 | PACKET *pkt); | |
33 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, | |
34 | PACKET *pkt); | |
35 | ||
36 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s); | |
37 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s); | |
38 | static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, | |
ae2f7b37 | 39 | WPACKET *pkt); |
ea262260 | 40 | |
3c95ef22 TS |
41 | static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) |
42 | { | |
43 | return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL; | |
44 | } | |
45 | ||
61ae935a MC |
46 | /* |
47 | * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? | |
48 | * | |
49 | * Return values are: | |
50 | * 1: Yes | |
51 | * 0: No | |
52 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 53 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
61ae935a MC |
54 | { |
55 | /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 56 | if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION |
555cbb32 TS |
57 | && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) |
58 | || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) | |
61ae935a MC |
59 | return 0; |
60 | ||
61 | return 1; | |
62 | } | |
63 | ||
64 | /* | |
a455d0f6 | 65 | * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? |
61ae935a MC |
66 | * |
67 | * Return values are: | |
68 | * 1: Yes | |
69 | * 0: No | |
70 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 71 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
61ae935a | 72 | { |
555cbb32 | 73 | long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
61ae935a MC |
74 | |
75 | /* | |
76 | * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral | |
a455d0f6 | 77 | * ciphersuite or for SRP |
61ae935a | 78 | */ |
a455d0f6 MC |
79 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK |
80 | | SSL_kSRP)) { | |
81 | return 1; | |
61ae935a MC |
82 | } |
83 | ||
a455d0f6 | 84 | return 0; |
61ae935a MC |
85 | } |
86 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
87 | /* |
88 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
89 | * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the | |
90 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
91 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
92 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
93 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
94 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea | 95 | */ |
38b051a1 | 96 | static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt) |
0f1e51ea MC |
97 | { |
98 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
99 | ||
100 | /* | |
101 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't | |
102 | * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by | |
103 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() | |
104 | */ | |
105 | ||
106 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
107 | default: | |
108 | break; | |
109 | ||
3847d426 MC |
110 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
111 | /* | |
112 | * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only | |
113 | * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. | |
114 | */ | |
115 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
116 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
117 | return 1; | |
118 | } | |
119 | break; | |
120 | ||
0f1e51ea | 121 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
122 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { |
123 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
124 | return 1; | |
125 | } | |
126 | break; | |
127 | ||
128 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
0f1e51ea | 129 | if (s->hit) { |
92760c21 MC |
130 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
131 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
132 | return 1; |
133 | } | |
134 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
135 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
136 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
137 | return 1; | |
f5ca0b04 MC |
138 | } |
139 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
0f1e51ea MC |
140 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; |
141 | return 1; | |
142 | } | |
b67cb09f TS |
143 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG |
144 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE | |
145 | && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) { | |
146 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT; | |
147 | return 1; | |
148 | } | |
149 | #endif | |
0f1e51ea MC |
150 | } |
151 | break; | |
152 | ||
92760c21 MC |
153 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
154 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
155 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
156 | return 1; | |
157 | } | |
b67cb09f TS |
158 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG |
159 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE | |
160 | && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) { | |
161 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT; | |
162 | return 1; | |
163 | } | |
164 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
165 | break; |
166 | ||
0f1e51ea | 167 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
b67cb09f | 168 | case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
169 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { |
170 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; | |
171 | return 1; | |
172 | } | |
173 | break; | |
174 | ||
175 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
176 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
177 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
178 | return 1; | |
179 | } | |
180 | break; | |
cc2455bf MC |
181 | |
182 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
183 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { | |
184 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
185 | return 1; | |
186 | } | |
50a0af2e | 187 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
e1c3de44 MC |
188 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; |
189 | return 1; | |
190 | } | |
9d75dce3 | 191 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
5c587fb6 | 192 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
407820c0 P |
193 | /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/ |
194 | # error Internal DTLS version error | |
9d75dce3 | 195 | #endif |
38b051a1 TM |
196 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
197 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
198 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; |
199 | /* | |
200 | * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the | |
201 | * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding | |
202 | * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the | |
203 | * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? | |
204 | */ | |
205 | if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
206 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
207 | return 0; | |
208 | } | |
209 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
210 | return 1; | |
211 | } | |
212 | } | |
cc2455bf | 213 | break; |
0f1e51ea MC |
214 | } |
215 | ||
0f1e51ea | 216 | /* No valid transition found */ |
0f1e51ea MC |
217 | return 0; |
218 | } | |
219 | ||
61ae935a | 220 | /* |
8481f583 MC |
221 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
222 | * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the | |
223 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
224 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 225 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
226 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
227 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 228 | */ |
38b051a1 | 229 | int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 230 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 231 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
a455d0f6 | 232 | int ske_expected; |
61ae935a | 233 | |
0f1e51ea | 234 | /* |
3847d426 MC |
235 | * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version |
236 | * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. | |
0f1e51ea | 237 | */ |
38b051a1 | 238 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
239 | if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
240 | goto err; | |
241 | return 1; | |
242 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 243 | |
a230b26e | 244 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
245 | default: |
246 | break; | |
247 | ||
61ae935a MC |
248 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
249 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
250 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
251 | return 1; | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
38b051a1 | 254 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
61ae935a MC |
255 | if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { |
256 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
257 | return 1; | |
258 | } | |
259 | } | |
260 | break; | |
261 | ||
d7f8783f | 262 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
4004ce5f MC |
263 | /* |
264 | * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early | |
265 | * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a | |
266 | * HelloRetryRequest. | |
267 | */ | |
268 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
269 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
270 | return 1; | |
271 | } | |
4004ce5f MC |
272 | break; |
273 | ||
61ae935a MC |
274 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
275 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 276 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
61ae935a MC |
277 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { |
278 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
279 | return 1; | |
280 | } | |
281 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
282 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
283 | return 1; | |
284 | } | |
285 | } else { | |
38b051a1 TM |
286 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
287 | && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
61ae935a MC |
288 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
289 | return 1; | |
ad3819c2 | 290 | } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION |
aff8c126 RS |
291 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL |
292 | && s->session->ext.tick != NULL | |
a230b26e | 293 | && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
ad3819c2 MC |
294 | /* |
295 | * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session | |
296 | * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on | |
297 | * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if | |
298 | * the server is resuming. | |
299 | */ | |
300 | s->hit = 1; | |
301 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
302 | return 1; | |
555cbb32 | 303 | } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth |
a230b26e | 304 | & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
61ae935a MC |
305 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
306 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
307 | return 1; | |
308 | } | |
309 | } else { | |
a455d0f6 | 310 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); |
a455d0f6 MC |
311 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ |
312 | if (ske_expected | |
555cbb32 | 313 | || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) |
a230b26e | 314 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { |
a455d0f6 MC |
315 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
316 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
317 | return 1; | |
318 | } | |
319 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST | |
a230b26e EK |
320 | && cert_req_allowed(s)) { |
321 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
322 | return 1; | |
a455d0f6 | 323 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { |
a230b26e EK |
324 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; |
325 | return 1; | |
61ae935a MC |
326 | } |
327 | } | |
328 | } | |
329 | break; | |
330 | ||
331 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
b67cb09f | 332 | case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: |
bb1aaab4 MC |
333 | /* |
334 | * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if | |
aff8c126 | 335 | * |ext.status_expected| is set |
bb1aaab4 | 336 | */ |
aff8c126 | 337 | if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { |
bb1aaab4 MC |
338 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; |
339 | return 1; | |
a455d0f6 MC |
340 | } |
341 | /* Fall through */ | |
342 | ||
343 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: | |
344 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); | |
a455d0f6 | 345 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ |
555cbb32 | 346 | if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) |
a230b26e | 347 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { |
61ae935a MC |
348 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
349 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
350 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 351 | } |
672f3337 | 352 | goto err; |
61ae935a | 353 | } |
a455d0f6 | 354 | /* Fall through */ |
61ae935a | 355 | |
a455d0f6 MC |
356 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
357 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
358 | if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
359 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; |
360 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 361 | } |
672f3337 | 362 | goto err; |
61ae935a | 363 | } |
a455d0f6 | 364 | /* Fall through */ |
61ae935a MC |
365 | |
366 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
367 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { | |
368 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; | |
369 | return 1; | |
370 | } | |
371 | break; | |
372 | ||
373 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
aff8c126 | 374 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
c45d6b2b DB |
375 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { |
376 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
377 | return 1; | |
378 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
379 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
380 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
381 | return 1; | |
382 | } | |
383 | break; | |
384 | ||
385 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
386 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
387 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
388 | return 1; | |
389 | } | |
390 | break; | |
391 | ||
392 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
393 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
394 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
395 | return 1; | |
396 | } | |
397 | break; | |
c7f47786 MC |
398 | |
399 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
4004ce5f | 400 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { |
c7f47786 MC |
401 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; |
402 | return 1; | |
403 | } | |
404 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
405 | } |
406 | ||
672f3337 | 407 | err: |
61ae935a | 408 | /* No valid transition found */ |
38b051a1 | 409 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
f20404fc MC |
410 | BIO *rbio; |
411 | ||
412 | /* | |
413 | * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably | |
414 | * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. | |
415 | */ | |
416 | s->init_num = 0; | |
417 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
38b051a1 | 418 | rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)); |
f20404fc MC |
419 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); |
420 | BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); | |
421 | return 0; | |
422 | } | |
c48ffbcc | 423 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
424 | return 0; |
425 | } | |
426 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
427 | static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) |
428 | { | |
429 | /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */ | |
430 | return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509 | |
431 | && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; | |
432 | } | |
433 | ||
61ae935a | 434 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
435 | * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
436 | * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the | |
437 | * server. | |
0f1e51ea | 438 | */ |
38b051a1 | 439 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f1e51ea MC |
440 | { |
441 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
442 | ||
443 | /* | |
3847d426 MC |
444 | * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated |
445 | * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by | |
446 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). | |
0f1e51ea MC |
447 | */ |
448 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
e43e6b19 TS |
449 | default: |
450 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 451 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e43e6b19 TS |
452 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
453 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
454 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
455 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
3c95ef22 | 456 | if (do_compressed_cert(s)) |
b67cb09f TS |
457 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT; |
458 | else | |
459 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
460 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
461 | } | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
462 | /* |
463 | * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after | |
464 | * we already sent close_notify | |
465 | */ | |
466 | if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { | |
467 | /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ | |
c48ffbcc | 468 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1bf4cb0f MC |
469 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
470 | } | |
471 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
472 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
0f1e51ea | 473 | |
92760c21 | 474 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
ef6c191b MC |
475 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY |
476 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
d7f8783f | 477 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; |
4d02f870 | 478 | else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
fc7129dc | 479 | && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) |
4d02f870 | 480 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
b67cb09f TS |
481 | else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0) |
482 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
3c95ef22 | 483 | else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) |
b67cb09f | 484 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT; |
564547e4 | 485 | else |
b67cb09f | 486 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; |
cee0628e JC |
487 | |
488 | s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now(); | |
564547e4 MC |
489 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
490 | ||
d7f8783f | 491 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: |
ef6c191b MC |
492 | if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { |
493 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
494 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
495 | } | |
496 | /* Fall through */ | |
497 | ||
498 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
4d02f870 | 499 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
b67cb09f TS |
500 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0) |
501 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
3c95ef22 | 502 | else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) |
b67cb09f TS |
503 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT; |
504 | else | |
505 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
506 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
507 | ||
b67cb09f | 508 | case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT: |
0f1e51ea MC |
509 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
510 | /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ | |
555cbb32 | 511 | st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY |
92760c21 | 512 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
513 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
514 | ||
515 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
516 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
517 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
518 | ||
e1c3de44 | 519 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: |
9412b3ad | 520 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: |
cc2455bf | 521 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 522 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
94ed2c67 | 523 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
94ed2c67 | 524 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
cc2455bf MC |
525 | |
526 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
9412b3ad MC |
527 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
528 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
529 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
530 | } | |
531 | ||
532 | /* Try to read from the server instead */ | |
cc2455bf | 533 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
534 | } |
535 | } | |
536 | ||
537 | /* | |
538 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to | |
539 | * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. | |
61ae935a | 540 | */ |
38b051a1 | 541 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
61ae935a | 542 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 543 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 544 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
545 | /* |
546 | * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what | |
547 | * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until | |
548 | * later | |
549 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 550 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
551 | return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); |
552 | ||
a230b26e | 553 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
554 | default: |
555 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 556 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
557 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
558 | ||
a230b26e | 559 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
c7f47786 MC |
560 | if (!s->renegotiate) { |
561 | /* | |
562 | * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have | |
563 | * received a message from the server. Better read it. | |
564 | */ | |
565 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
566 | } | |
018fcbec BE |
567 | /* Renegotiation */ |
568 | /* fall thru */ | |
a230b26e EK |
569 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
570 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
571 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 572 | |
a230b26e | 573 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
49e7fe12 MC |
574 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { |
575 | /* | |
576 | * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't | |
577 | * actually selected a version yet. | |
578 | */ | |
066904cc MC |
579 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) |
580 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
581 | else | |
582 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
49e7fe12 MC |
583 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
584 | } | |
a230b26e EK |
585 | /* |
586 | * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what | |
587 | * we will be sent | |
588 | */ | |
cee0628e | 589 | s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now(); |
a230b26e | 590 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 591 | |
597c51bc | 592 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
318d3c0e MC |
593 | /* |
594 | * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a | |
595 | * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one | |
596 | * because we did early data. | |
597 | */ | |
598 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 | |
599 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
600 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
601 | else | |
602 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
a2b97bdf MC |
603 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
604 | ||
d7f8783f | 605 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
cee0628e | 606 | s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now(); |
4004ce5f MC |
607 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
608 | ||
a230b26e EK |
609 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
610 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
611 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 612 | |
a230b26e | 613 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
cee0628e | 614 | s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now(); |
555cbb32 | 615 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req) |
a230b26e EK |
616 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; |
617 | else | |
61ae935a | 618 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; |
a230b26e | 619 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 620 | |
a230b26e EK |
621 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
622 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; | |
623 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 624 | |
a230b26e EK |
625 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: |
626 | /* | |
627 | * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is | |
628 | * sent, but no verify packet is sent | |
629 | */ | |
630 | /* | |
631 | * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH | |
632 | * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We | |
633 | * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's | |
634 | * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. | |
635 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 636 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) { |
a230b26e EK |
637 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; |
638 | } else { | |
61ae935a | 639 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
a230b26e | 640 | } |
555cbb32 | 641 | if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { |
a230b26e EK |
642 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
643 | } | |
644 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 645 | |
a230b26e EK |
646 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: |
647 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
648 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
649 | ||
650 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
318d3c0e MC |
651 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
652 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
653 | } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { | |
066904cc MC |
654 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
655 | } else { | |
61ae935a | 656 | #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
a230b26e | 657 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
066904cc | 658 | #else |
38b051a1 | 659 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen) |
066904cc MC |
660 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; |
661 | else | |
662 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 663 | #endif |
066904cc | 664 | } |
a230b26e | 665 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
666 | |
667 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
a230b26e EK |
668 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: |
669 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
670 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
671 | #endif |
672 | ||
a230b26e EK |
673 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
674 | if (s->hit) { | |
675 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
a230b26e EK |
676 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
677 | } else { | |
678 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
679 | } | |
61ae935a | 680 | |
a230b26e EK |
681 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
682 | if (s->hit) { | |
683 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
684 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
685 | } else { | |
686 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
a230b26e EK |
687 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
688 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
689 | |
690 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: | |
691 | /* | |
692 | * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more | |
693 | * convenient time. | |
694 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 695 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) { |
c7f47786 | 696 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 697 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
698 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
699 | } | |
700 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
701 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
702 | } | |
703 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
c7f47786 | 704 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
705 | } |
706 | } | |
707 | ||
708 | /* | |
709 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
710 | * the client to the server. | |
711 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 712 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 713 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 714 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 715 | |
a230b26e | 716 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
717 | default: |
718 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
719 | break; | |
720 | ||
61ae935a MC |
721 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
722 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
38b051a1 | 723 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
61ae935a | 724 | /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ |
2c4a056f | 725 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 726 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
727 | return WORK_ERROR; |
728 | } | |
2c50d7fb MC |
729 | } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) { |
730 | /* | |
731 | * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an | |
732 | * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were | |
733 | * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the | |
734 | * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again. | |
735 | */ | |
736 | if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, | |
737 | TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
738 | OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE, | |
739 | OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, | |
3f9175c7 MC |
740 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, |
741 | NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, | |
742 | NULL)) { | |
2c50d7fb MC |
743 | /* SSLfatal already called */ |
744 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
745 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
746 | } |
747 | break; | |
748 | ||
61ae935a | 749 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
38b051a1 | 750 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
61ae935a MC |
751 | if (s->hit) { |
752 | /* | |
753 | * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these | |
754 | * messages unless we need to. | |
755 | */ | |
756 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
757 | } | |
758 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
38b051a1 | 759 | if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) { |
a2c2e000 | 760 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
61ae935a | 761 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
a2c2e000 | 762 | } |
61ae935a MC |
763 | #endif |
764 | } | |
f3b3d7f0 | 765 | break; |
61ae935a | 766 | |
d7f8783f | 767 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: |
ef6c191b MC |
768 | /* |
769 | * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not | |
770 | * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press | |
771 | * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. | |
772 | */ | |
773 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING | |
774 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) | |
775 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
776 | /* Fall through */ | |
777 | ||
778 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: | |
2a8db717 MC |
779 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); |
780 | ||
61ae935a | 781 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
a2c2e000 | 782 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
2a8db717 | 783 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
784 | } |
785 | ||
786 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
787 | } | |
788 | ||
789 | /* | |
790 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
791 | * client to the server. | |
792 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 793 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 794 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 795 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
38b051a1 | 796 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
61ae935a MC |
797 | |
798 | s->init_num = 0; | |
799 | ||
a230b26e | 800 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
801 | default: |
802 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
803 | break; | |
804 | ||
61ae935a | 805 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
6cb42265 | 806 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
5cc807da | 807 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { |
6cb42265 MC |
808 | /* |
809 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
810 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
811 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
812 | */ | |
5cc807da | 813 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { |
5cc807da MC |
814 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, |
815 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
816 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
817 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
818 | } | |
a2c2e000 | 819 | } |
5cc807da MC |
820 | /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ |
821 | } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { | |
822 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
823 | } | |
824 | ||
38b051a1 | 825 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
5cc807da MC |
826 | /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ |
827 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
6cb42265 | 828 | } |
61ae935a MC |
829 | break; |
830 | ||
831 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: | |
a2c2e000 MC |
832 | if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { |
833 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 834 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 835 | } |
61ae935a MC |
836 | break; |
837 | ||
838 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
38b051a1 TM |
839 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
840 | || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) | |
4d02f870 | 841 | break; |
066904cc MC |
842 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
843 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { | |
844 | /* | |
845 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
846 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
847 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
848 | */ | |
849 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, | |
850 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) | |
851 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
852 | break; | |
853 | } | |
555cbb32 | 854 | s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; |
61ae935a MC |
855 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
856 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
857 | #else | |
555cbb32 | 858 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
61ae935a MC |
859 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
860 | else | |
555cbb32 | 861 | s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; |
61ae935a | 862 | #endif |
38b051a1 | 863 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { |
a2c2e000 | 864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a | 865 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 866 | } |
61ae935a | 867 | |
38b051a1 | 868 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
a2c2e000 MC |
869 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
870 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 871 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 872 | } |
61ae935a | 873 | |
61ae935a | 874 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
4897bd20 FWH |
875 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { |
876 | /* | |
877 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
878 | * no SCTP used. | |
879 | */ | |
880 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
881 | 0, NULL); | |
61ae935a | 882 | } |
4897bd20 | 883 | #endif |
61ae935a MC |
884 | break; |
885 | ||
886 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
887 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
38b051a1 | 888 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { |
61ae935a MC |
889 | /* |
890 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
891 | * no SCTP used. | |
892 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 893 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, |
61ae935a MC |
894 | 0, NULL); |
895 | } | |
896 | #endif | |
897 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
898 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
92760c21 | 899 | |
38b051a1 | 900 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
9d75dce3 | 901 | if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
902 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
903 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
904 | } | |
9d75dce3 | 905 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { |
38b051a1 | 906 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
9d75dce3 TS |
907 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
908 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
909 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
910 | } | |
911 | } | |
92760c21 | 912 | } |
61ae935a | 913 | break; |
9412b3ad MC |
914 | |
915 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
916 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
917 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
a2c2e000 MC |
918 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
919 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 920 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 921 | } |
9412b3ad | 922 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
923 | } |
924 | ||
925 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
926 | } | |
927 | ||
928 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
929 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
930 | * client | |
61ae935a MC |
931 | * |
932 | * Valid return values are: | |
933 | * 1: Success | |
934 | * 0: Error | |
935 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 936 | int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
a15c953f | 937 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 938 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 939 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 940 | |
4a01c59f MC |
941 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
942 | default: | |
943 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 944 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); |
4a01c59f MC |
945 | return 0; |
946 | ||
947 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
38b051a1 | 948 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 949 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 950 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
951 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
952 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f MC |
953 | break; |
954 | ||
955 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
6392fb8e MC |
956 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; |
957 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f MC |
958 | break; |
959 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
960 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
961 | *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; | |
962 | *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
963 | break; | |
964 | ||
965 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: | |
966 | *confunc = NULL; | |
967 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
968 | break; | |
969 | ||
4a01c59f | 970 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
971 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; |
972 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f MC |
973 | break; |
974 | ||
b67cb09f TS |
975 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG |
976 | case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT: | |
977 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate; | |
978 | *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE; | |
979 | break; | |
980 | #endif | |
981 | ||
4a01c59f | 982 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
983 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; |
984 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f MC |
985 | break; |
986 | ||
987 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d8bc1399 | 988 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; |
6392fb8e | 989 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; |
4a01c59f | 990 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
991 | |
992 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
4a01c59f | 993 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: |
6392fb8e MC |
994 | *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; |
995 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; | |
4a01c59f | 996 | break; |
61ae935a | 997 | #endif |
4a01c59f | 998 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
999 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
1000 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 1001 | break; |
9412b3ad MC |
1002 | |
1003 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1004 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
1005 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
1006 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 1007 | } |
5923ad4b | 1008 | |
5923ad4b | 1009 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
1010 | } |
1011 | ||
1012 | /* | |
1013 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
1014 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
1015 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1016 | size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
61ae935a | 1017 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1018 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1019 | |
a230b26e | 1020 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1021 | default: |
1022 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1023 | return 0; | |
1024 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1025 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
1026 | return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1027 | |
a230b26e EK |
1028 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
1029 | return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1030 | |
b67cb09f | 1031 | case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: |
a230b26e EK |
1032 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
1033 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
61ae935a | 1034 | |
2c5dfdc3 | 1035 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
c6d14bfd | 1036 | return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH; |
2c5dfdc3 | 1037 | |
a230b26e EK |
1038 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: |
1039 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1040 | |
a230b26e EK |
1041 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
1042 | return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1043 | |
a230b26e EK |
1044 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1045 | /* | |
1046 | * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In | |
1047 | * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured | |
1048 | * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs | |
1049 | */ | |
1050 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
61ae935a | 1051 | |
a230b26e EK |
1052 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
1053 | return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1054 | |
a230b26e EK |
1055 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
1056 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
1057 | return 3; | |
1058 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1059 | |
a230b26e | 1060 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
38b051a1 TM |
1061 | return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13 |
1062 | : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12; | |
61ae935a | 1063 | |
a230b26e EK |
1064 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
1065 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
e46f2334 MC |
1066 | |
1067 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
1068 | return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
1069 | |
1070 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1071 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1072 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1073 | } |
1074 | ||
1075 | /* | |
0c3eb279 | 1076 | * Process a message that the client has received from the server. |
61ae935a | 1077 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1078 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
1079 | PACKET *pkt) | |
61ae935a | 1080 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1081 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1082 | |
a230b26e | 1083 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1084 | default: |
1085 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1086 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1087 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1088 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1089 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
1090 | return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1091 | |
a230b26e EK |
1092 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
1093 | return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1094 | |
a230b26e EK |
1095 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
1096 | return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1097 | |
b67cb09f TS |
1098 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG |
1099 | case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: | |
1100 | return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1101 | #endif | |
1102 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1103 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
1104 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1105 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1106 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: |
1107 | return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1108 | |
a230b26e EK |
1109 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
1110 | return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1111 | |
a230b26e EK |
1112 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1113 | return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1114 | |
a230b26e EK |
1115 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
1116 | return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1117 | |
a230b26e EK |
1118 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
1119 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1120 | |
a230b26e EK |
1121 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
1122 | return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1123 | |
a230b26e EK |
1124 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
1125 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
e46f2334 | 1126 | |
c7f47786 MC |
1127 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: |
1128 | return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); | |
1129 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
1130 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
1131 | return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); | |
e1c3de44 MC |
1132 | |
1133 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1134 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1135 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1136 | } |
1137 | ||
1138 | /* | |
1139 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1140 | * from the server | |
1141 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1142 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
1143 | WORK_STATE wst) | |
61ae935a | 1144 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1145 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1146 | |
a230b26e | 1147 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1148 | default: |
1149 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1150 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1151 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1152 | ||
0c3eb279 | 1153 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
b67cb09f | 1154 | case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT: |
0c3eb279 DDO |
1155 | return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst); |
1156 | ||
e4562014 | 1157 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
05c4f1d5 MC |
1158 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1159 | return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1160 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1161 | } |
1162 | ||
67ec6d2b | 1163 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1164 | { |
2c7b4dbc | 1165 | unsigned char *p; |
ec60ccc1 MC |
1166 | size_t sess_id_len; |
1167 | int i, protverr; | |
09b6c2ef | 1168 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1169 | SSL_COMP *comp; |
1170 | #endif | |
b9908bf9 | 1171 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
a5816a5a | 1172 | unsigned char *session_id; |
38b051a1 | 1173 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
0f113f3e | 1174 | |
b9908bf9 | 1175 | /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1176 | protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); |
1177 | if (protverr != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1178 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr); |
67ec6d2b | 1179 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4fa52141 | 1180 | } |
0f113f3e | 1181 | |
e586eac8 | 1182 | if (sess == NULL |
4fd12788 | 1183 | || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) |
e586eac8 | 1184 | || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { |
fc7129dc MC |
1185 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE |
1186 | && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1187 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 1188 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f63a17d6 | 1189 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1190 | } |
1191 | /* else use the pre-loaded session */ | |
0f113f3e | 1192 | |
555cbb32 | 1193 | p = s->s3.client_random; |
0f113f3e | 1194 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1195 | /* |
1196 | * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are | |
1197 | * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify | |
1198 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1199 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
b9908bf9 MC |
1200 | size_t idx; |
1201 | i = 1; | |
555cbb32 | 1202 | for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) { |
b9908bf9 MC |
1203 | if (p[idx]) { |
1204 | i = 0; | |
1205 | break; | |
0f113f3e | 1206 | } |
0f113f3e | 1207 | } |
751b26b1 | 1208 | } else { |
fc7129dc | 1209 | i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); |
751b26b1 | 1210 | } |
0f113f3e | 1211 | |
555cbb32 | 1212 | if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random), |
f63a17d6 | 1213 | DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1214 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1215 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f63a17d6 | 1216 | } |
b9908bf9 | 1217 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1218 | /*- |
1219 | * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from | |
1220 | * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version | |
1221 | * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also | |
1222 | * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can | |
1223 | * choke if we initially report a higher version then | |
1224 | * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This | |
1225 | * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it | |
1226 | * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports | |
1227 | * 1.0. | |
1228 | * | |
1229 | * Possible scenario with previous logic: | |
1230 | * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 | |
1231 | * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 | |
1232 | * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. | |
8483a003 | 1233 | * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. |
b9908bf9 MC |
1234 | * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. |
1235 | * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now | |
1236 | * know that is maximum server supports. | |
1237 | * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret | |
1238 | * containing version 1.0. | |
1239 | * | |
1240 | * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the | |
1241 | * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely | |
1242 | * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't | |
1243 | * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with | |
1244 | * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using | |
1245 | * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to | |
1246 | * the negotiated version. | |
cd998837 MC |
1247 | * |
1248 | * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the | |
16bce0e0 | 1249 | * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. |
b9908bf9 | 1250 | */ |
7acb8b64 | 1251 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) |
555cbb32 | 1252 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1253 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1254 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
2c7b4dbc | 1255 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1256 | |
1257 | /* Session ID */ | |
a5816a5a MC |
1258 | session_id = s->session->session_id; |
1259 | if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
1260 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1261 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { | |
1262 | sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); | |
1263 | s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; | |
1264 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
fc7129dc | 1265 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE |
38b051a1 | 1266 | && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id, |
0f8815aa | 1267 | sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1269 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
a5816a5a MC |
1270 | } |
1271 | } else { | |
1272 | sess_id_len = 0; | |
1273 | } | |
1274 | } else { | |
dee0cc10 | 1275 | assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); |
ec60ccc1 | 1276 | sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; |
a5816a5a MC |
1277 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1278 | s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; | |
1279 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); | |
1280 | } | |
1281 | } | |
dee0cc10 | 1282 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
a5816a5a | 1283 | || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, |
ec60ccc1 | 1284 | sess_id_len)) |
7cea05dc | 1285 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1286 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1287 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 1288 | } |
0f113f3e | 1289 | |
b9908bf9 | 1290 | /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ |
38b051a1 | 1291 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
2c7b4dbc | 1292 | if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) |
7cea05dc | 1293 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
b2b3024e | 1294 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1295 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1296 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 1297 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1298 | } |
1299 | ||
1300 | /* Ciphers supported */ | |
7cea05dc | 1301 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1303 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
2c7b4dbc | 1304 | } |
635c8f77 | 1305 | |
38b051a1 TM |
1306 | if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), |
1307 | pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1308 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 1309 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f63a17d6 | 1310 | } |
7cea05dc | 1311 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1313 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 1314 | } |
0f113f3e | 1315 | |
b9908bf9 | 1316 | /* COMPRESSION */ |
7cea05dc | 1317 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1318 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1319 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1320 | } |
1321 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
c19602b5 | 1322 | if (ssl_allow_compression(s) |
38b051a1 TM |
1323 | && sctx->comp_methods |
1324 | && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1325 | || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1326 | int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); | |
2c7b4dbc | 1327 | for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { |
38b051a1 | 1328 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i); |
7cea05dc | 1329 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1330 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1331 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1332 | } |
1333 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 1334 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1335 | #endif |
2c7b4dbc | 1336 | /* Add the NULL method */ |
7cea05dc | 1337 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1338 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 1339 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
2c7b4dbc | 1340 | } |
761772d7 | 1341 | |
b9908bf9 | 1342 | /* TLS extensions */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1343 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { |
1344 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
67ec6d2b | 1345 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 1346 | } |
0f113f3e | 1347 | |
67ec6d2b | 1348 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
0f113f3e | 1349 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1350 | |
38b051a1 | 1351 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1352 | { |
cb150cbc | 1353 | size_t cookie_len; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1354 | PACKET cookiepkt; |
1355 | ||
1356 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) | |
a230b26e | 1357 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1359 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1360 | } |
1361 | ||
1362 | cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); | |
1363 | if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1364 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
f63a17d6 | 1365 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1366 | } |
1367 | ||
1368 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1369 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1370 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1371 | } |
1372 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; | |
1373 | ||
1374 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1375 | } |
1376 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
1377 | static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
1378 | const unsigned char *cipherchars) | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1379 | { |
1380 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
1381 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
11c67eea | 1382 | int i; |
38b051a1 | 1383 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
11c67eea MC |
1384 | |
1385 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); | |
1386 | if (c == NULL) { | |
1387 | /* unknown cipher */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1388 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
11c67eea MC |
1389 | return 0; |
1390 | } | |
1391 | /* | |
1392 | * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, | |
1393 | * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. | |
1394 | */ | |
8af91fd9 | 1395 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1396 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
11c67eea MC |
1397 | return 0; |
1398 | } | |
1399 | ||
1400 | sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); | |
1401 | i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); | |
1402 | if (i < 0) { | |
1403 | /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1404 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
11c67eea MC |
1405 | return 0; |
1406 | } | |
1407 | ||
38b051a1 | 1408 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL |
555cbb32 | 1409 | && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { |
11c67eea | 1410 | /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ |
c48ffbcc | 1411 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
11c67eea MC |
1412 | return 0; |
1413 | } | |
1414 | ||
1415 | /* | |
1416 | * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher | |
1417 | * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is | |
1418 | * set and use it for comparison. | |
1419 | */ | |
1420 | if (s->session->cipher != NULL) | |
1421 | s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
1422 | if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { | |
38b051a1 TM |
1423 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1424 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2); | |
b740012f | 1425 | |
9890cc42 AF |
1426 | if (!ossl_assert(s->session->cipher != NULL)) { |
1427 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1428 | return 0; | |
1429 | } | |
a055a881 MC |
1430 | /* |
1431 | * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different | |
1432 | * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. | |
1433 | */ | |
b740012f | 1434 | if (md == NULL |
38b051a1 | 1435 | || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1436 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1437 | SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); |
a055a881 MC |
1438 | return 0; |
1439 | } | |
1440 | } else { | |
1441 | /* | |
1442 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same | |
1443 | * ciphersuite. | |
1444 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1445 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 | 1446 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); |
a055a881 MC |
1447 | return 0; |
1448 | } | |
11c67eea | 1449 | } |
555cbb32 | 1450 | s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c; |
11c67eea MC |
1451 | |
1452 | return 1; | |
1453 | } | |
1454 | ||
38b051a1 | 1455 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
11c67eea | 1456 | { |
332eb390 | 1457 | PACKET session_id, extpkt; |
b9908bf9 | 1458 | size_t session_id_len; |
b6981744 | 1459 | const unsigned char *cipherchars; |
597c51bc | 1460 | int hrr = 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1461 | unsigned int compression; |
4fa52141 | 1462 | unsigned int sversion; |
3434f40b | 1463 | unsigned int context; |
332eb390 | 1464 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 1465 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
b9908bf9 MC |
1466 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1467 | SSL_COMP *comp; | |
1468 | #endif | |
1469 | ||
4fa52141 | 1470 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1471 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1472 | goto err; |
4fa52141 | 1473 | } |
50932c4a | 1474 | |
c3043dcd | 1475 | /* load the server random */ |
597c51bc MC |
1476 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION |
1477 | && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1478 | && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1479 | && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { | |
d204a50b TM |
1480 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
1481 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1482 | goto err; | |
1483 | } | |
fc7129dc | 1484 | s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; |
9cd9e097 | 1485 | /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */ |
1d367677 MC |
1486 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { |
1487 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1488 | goto err; | |
1489 | } | |
fc7129dc | 1490 | hrr = 1; |
597c51bc | 1491 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1492 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
597c51bc MC |
1493 | goto err; |
1494 | } | |
1495 | } else { | |
555cbb32 | 1496 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1497 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
597c51bc MC |
1498 | goto err; |
1499 | } | |
c3043dcd MC |
1500 | } |
1501 | ||
88050dd1 MC |
1502 | /* Get the session-id. */ |
1503 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1504 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1505 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1506 | } |
88050dd1 MC |
1507 | session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); |
1508 | if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) | |
1509 | || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1510 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); |
f63a17d6 | 1511 | goto err; |
524420d8 MC |
1512 | } |
1513 | ||
73999b62 | 1514 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1515 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1516 | goto err; |
fc5ce51d EK |
1517 | } |
1518 | ||
88050dd1 | 1519 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1520 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
88050dd1 | 1521 | goto err; |
4ff65f77 MC |
1522 | } |
1523 | ||
1524 | /* TLS extensions */ | |
597c51bc | 1525 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { |
4ff65f77 | 1526 | PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); |
26b9172a MC |
1527 | } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) |
1528 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1529 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 1530 | goto err; |
4ff65f77 MC |
1531 | } |
1532 | ||
597c51bc MC |
1533 | if (!hrr) { |
1534 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
1535 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1536 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1537 | &extensions, NULL, 1)) { | |
1538 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1539 | goto err; | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
1542 | if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { | |
1543 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1544 | goto err; | |
1545 | } | |
88050dd1 MC |
1546 | } |
1547 | ||
38b051a1 | 1548 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { |
597c51bc MC |
1549 | if (compression != 0) { |
1550 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
597c51bc MC |
1551 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1552 | goto err; | |
1553 | } | |
1554 | ||
1555 | if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len | |
1556 | || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, | |
1557 | session_id_len) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1558 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); |
597c51bc MC |
1559 | goto err; |
1560 | } | |
1561 | } | |
1562 | ||
1563 | if (hrr) { | |
1564 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { | |
1565 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1566 | goto err; | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | ||
1569 | return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); | |
88050dd1 MC |
1570 | } |
1571 | ||
1572 | /* | |
1573 | * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions | |
1574 | * are appropriate for this version. | |
1575 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1576 | context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
1577 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; | |
88050dd1 | 1578 | if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1579 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
88050dd1 MC |
1580 | goto err; |
1581 | } | |
1582 | ||
4ff65f77 MC |
1583 | s->hit = 0; |
1584 | ||
38b051a1 | 1585 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
a5816a5a MC |
1586 | /* |
1587 | * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of | |
1588 | * the message must be on a record boundary. | |
1589 | */ | |
1590 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
1591 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, | |
a5816a5a MC |
1592 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
1593 | goto err; | |
1594 | } | |
1595 | ||
4ff65f77 MC |
1596 | /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ |
1597 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, | |
fe874d27 | 1598 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, |
88050dd1 | 1599 | extensions, NULL, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1600 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1601 | goto err; | |
1602 | } | |
4ff65f77 | 1603 | } else { |
8c1a5343 | 1604 | /* |
4ff65f77 MC |
1605 | * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared |
1606 | * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. | |
1607 | * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. | |
1608 | * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) | |
1609 | * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application | |
1610 | * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether | |
1611 | * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session | |
1612 | * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we | |
1613 | * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake | |
1614 | * message to see if the server wants to resume. | |
8c1a5343 | 1615 | */ |
4ff65f77 MC |
1616 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION |
1617 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { | |
1618 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; | |
1619 | /* | |
1620 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1621 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1622 | */ | |
1623 | int master_key_length; | |
38b051a1 | 1624 | |
4ff65f77 | 1625 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
38b051a1 | 1626 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key, |
4ff65f77 MC |
1627 | &master_key_length, |
1628 | NULL, &pref_cipher, | |
1629 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) | |
1630 | && master_key_length > 0) { | |
1631 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
1632 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? | |
60d685d1 | 1633 | pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); |
4ff65f77 | 1634 | } else { |
c48ffbcc | 1635 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 1636 | goto err; |
4ff65f77 | 1637 | } |
0f113f3e | 1638 | } |
4ff65f77 MC |
1639 | |
1640 | if (session_id_len != 0 | |
1641 | && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length | |
1642 | && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, | |
1643 | session_id_len) == 0) | |
1644 | s->hit = 1; | |
50932c4a MC |
1645 | } |
1646 | ||
4ff65f77 | 1647 | if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1648 | if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length |
4ff65f77 | 1649 | || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { |
0f113f3e | 1650 | /* actually a client application bug */ |
f63a17d6 | 1651 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1652 | SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); |
1653 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1654 | } |
6e3d0153 | 1655 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1656 | /* |
6e3d0153 | 1657 | * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server |
4ff65f77 | 1658 | * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. |
6e3d0153 EK |
1659 | * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, |
1660 | * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be | |
1661 | * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. | |
0f113f3e | 1662 | */ |
c96ce52c | 1663 | if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { |
acce0557 | 1664 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); |
0f113f3e | 1665 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1666 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1667 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1668 | } |
1669 | } | |
50932c4a | 1670 | |
ccae4a15 | 1671 | s->session->ssl_version = s->version; |
a5816a5a MC |
1672 | /* |
1673 | * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can | |
1674 | * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an | |
1675 | * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be | |
1676 | * used for resumption. | |
1677 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1678 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
a5816a5a MC |
1679 | s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; |
1680 | /* session_id_len could be 0 */ | |
1681 | if (session_id_len > 0) | |
1682 | memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), | |
1683 | session_id_len); | |
1684 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1685 | } |
fc5ce51d | 1686 | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1687 | /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ |
1688 | if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1689 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1690 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); |
1691 | goto err; | |
ccae4a15 | 1692 | } |
0f113f3e | 1693 | /* |
3eb2aff4 KR |
1694 | * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed |
1695 | * version. | |
1696 | */ | |
555cbb32 TS |
1697 | s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version; |
1698 | s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version; | |
0f113f3e | 1699 | |
11c67eea | 1700 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1701 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1702 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1703 | } |
1704 | ||
09b6c2ef | 1705 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
fc5ce51d | 1706 | if (compression != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1707 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1708 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1709 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1710 | } |
1711 | /* | |
1712 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1713 | * using compression. | |
1714 | */ | |
1715 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1716 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
f63a17d6 | 1717 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1718 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1719 | #else |
fc5ce51d | 1720 | if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { |
c48ffbcc | 1721 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
dd5a4279 | 1722 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); |
f63a17d6 | 1723 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1724 | } |
fc5ce51d | 1725 | if (compression == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1726 | comp = NULL; |
1727 | else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1728 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); |
f63a17d6 | 1729 | goto err; |
fc5ce51d | 1730 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
1731 | comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods, |
1732 | compression); | |
fc5ce51d | 1733 | } |
0f113f3e | 1734 | |
fc5ce51d | 1735 | if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 1736 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1737 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1738 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1739 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 1740 | s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp; |
0f113f3e | 1741 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1742 | #endif |
761772d7 | 1743 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1744 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1745 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1746 | goto err; | |
1747 | } | |
332eb390 | 1748 | |
8723588e | 1749 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
38b051a1 | 1750 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { |
8723588e MC |
1751 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; |
1752 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 1753 | size_t labellen; |
8723588e MC |
1754 | |
1755 | /* | |
1756 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
1757 | * no SCTP used. | |
1758 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
1759 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
1760 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
8723588e | 1761 | |
09d62b33 MT |
1762 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
1763 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
1764 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
1765 | labellen += 1; | |
1766 | ||
38b051a1 | 1767 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e EK |
1768 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), |
1769 | labelbuffer, | |
09d62b33 | 1770 | labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 1771 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1772 | goto err; |
1773 | } | |
8723588e | 1774 | |
38b051a1 | 1775 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), |
8723588e MC |
1776 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
1777 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
1778 | } | |
1779 | #endif | |
1780 | ||
92760c21 MC |
1781 | /* |
1782 | * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise | |
1783 | * we're done with this message | |
1784 | */ | |
84a14925 MC |
1785 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1786 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
38b051a1 | 1787 | || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
84a14925 MC |
1788 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { |
1789 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1790 | goto err; | |
1791 | } | |
1792 | /* | |
1793 | * If we're not doing early-data and we're not going to send a dummy CCS | |
1794 | * (i.e. no middlebox compat mode) then we can change the write keys | |
1795 | * immediately. Otherwise we have to defer this until after all possible | |
23def9d3 | 1796 | * early data is written. We could just always defer until the last |
84a14925 MC |
1797 | * moment except QUIC needs it done at the same time as the read keys |
1798 | * are changed. Since QUIC doesn't do TLS early data or need middlebox | |
1799 | * compat this doesn't cause a problem. | |
1800 | */ | |
1801 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE | |
1802 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 | |
1803 | && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
1804 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
1805 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1806 | goto err; | |
1807 | } | |
92760c21 MC |
1808 | } |
1809 | ||
1b0286a3 | 1810 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
b9908bf9 | 1811 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 1812 | err: |
1b0286a3 | 1813 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
b9908bf9 | 1814 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 1815 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1816 | |
38b051a1 | 1817 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
597c51bc | 1818 | PACKET *extpkt) |
3847d426 | 1819 | { |
3847d426 | 1820 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; |
3847d426 | 1821 | |
d4504fe5 | 1822 | /* |
f471f60a MC |
1823 | * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using |
1824 | * the old wrlmethod. | |
d4504fe5 | 1825 | */ |
f471f60a MC |
1826 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING |
1827 | && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, | |
1828 | TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1829 | OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE, | |
1830 | OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, | |
3f9175c7 MC |
1831 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, |
1832 | NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { | |
f471f60a MC |
1833 | /* SSLfatal already called */ |
1834 | goto err; | |
1835 | } | |
1836 | /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */ | |
1837 | s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION); | |
d4504fe5 | 1838 | |
597c51bc | 1839 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 | 1840 | &extensions, NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 1841 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1842 | extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1843 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1844 | goto err; | |
1845 | } | |
3847d426 MC |
1846 | |
1847 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
66d4bf6b MC |
1848 | extensions = NULL; |
1849 | ||
5b64ce89 | 1850 | if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
66d4bf6b MC |
1851 | /* |
1852 | * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next | |
1853 | * ClientHello will not change | |
1854 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 1855 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); |
f63a17d6 | 1856 | goto err; |
66d4bf6b | 1857 | } |
3847d426 | 1858 | |
11c67eea MC |
1859 | /* |
1860 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
1861 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
1862 | */ | |
43054d3d | 1863 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1865 | goto err; | |
11c67eea MC |
1866 | } |
1867 | ||
1868 | /* | |
1869 | * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done | |
1870 | * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the | |
1871 | * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now | |
1872 | * for HRR messages. | |
1873 | */ | |
1874 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1875 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1876 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1877 | goto err; | |
11c67eea MC |
1878 | } |
1879 | ||
3847d426 | 1880 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 1881 | err: |
3847d426 MC |
1882 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
1883 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1884 | } | |
1885 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
1886 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt) |
1887 | { | |
1888 | EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk; | |
1889 | ||
1890 | if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) { | |
1891 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1892 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1893 | } | |
1894 | ||
1895 | if (peer_rpk == NULL) { | |
1896 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE); | |
1897 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1898 | } | |
1899 | ||
1900 | EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk); | |
1901 | sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk; | |
1902 | ||
1903 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
1904 | } | |
1905 | ||
1906 | static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
1907 | WORK_STATE wst) | |
1908 | { | |
1909 | size_t certidx; | |
1910 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; | |
1911 | ||
1912 | if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) { | |
1913 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1914 | SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1915 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1916 | } | |
1917 | ||
1918 | if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) | |
1919 | sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1920 | if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0 | |
1921 | && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) | |
1922 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1923 | ||
1924 | if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx, | |
1925 | SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) { | |
1926 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1927 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1928 | } | |
1929 | ||
1930 | /* | |
1931 | * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 | |
1932 | * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate | |
1933 | * type. | |
1934 | */ | |
1935 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
1936 | if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { | |
1937 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE); | |
1938 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1939 | } | |
1940 | } | |
1941 | ||
1942 | /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */ | |
1943 | X509_free(sc->session->peer); | |
1944 | sc->session->peer = NULL; | |
1945 | sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free); | |
1946 | sc->session->peer_chain = NULL; | |
1947 | sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result; | |
1948 | ||
1949 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
1950 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc) | |
1951 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash, | |
1952 | sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash), | |
1953 | &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
1954 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1955 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1956 | } | |
1957 | ||
1958 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1959 | } | |
1960 | ||
3201abeb | 1961 | /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1962 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
1963 | PACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 1964 | { |
b9908bf9 MC |
1965 | unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; |
1966 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
b6981744 | 1967 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
0c3eb279 | 1968 | size_t chainidx; |
e96e0f8e | 1969 | unsigned int context = 0; |
38b051a1 | 1970 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
0f113f3e | 1971 | |
3c95ef22 TS |
1972 | if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk) |
1973 | return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt); | |
1974 | if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) { | |
1975 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, | |
1976 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1977 | goto err; | |
1978 | } | |
1979 | ||
0c3eb279 | 1980 | if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
e077455e | 1981 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
cc273a93 | 1982 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1983 | } |
1984 | ||
38b051a1 | 1985 | if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) |
e96e0f8e MC |
1986 | || context != 0 |
1987 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) | |
1a281aab MC |
1988 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len |
1989 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1990 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1991 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1992 | } |
d805a57b | 1993 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { |
73999b62 | 1994 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) |
a230b26e | 1995 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1996 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 1997 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1998 | } |
1999 | ||
df758a85 | 2000 | certstart = certbytes; |
38b051a1 | 2001 | x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq); |
0f113f3e | 2002 | if (x == NULL) { |
e077455e | 2003 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
6725682d SL |
2004 | goto err; |
2005 | } | |
2006 | if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, | |
2007 | cert_len) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2008 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2009 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2010 | } |
6725682d | 2011 | |
df758a85 | 2012 | if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2013 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2014 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2015 | } |
e96e0f8e | 2016 | |
38b051a1 | 2017 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
2018 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; |
2019 | PACKET extensions; | |
2020 | ||
2021 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 2023 | goto err; |
e96e0f8e | 2024 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
2025 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
2026 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 2027 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 2028 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 2029 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 2030 | PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 2031 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 MC |
2032 | /* SSLfatal already called */ |
2033 | goto err; | |
5ee289ea MC |
2034 | } |
2035 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
2036 | } |
2037 | ||
0c3eb279 | 2038 | if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) { |
e077455e | 2039 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
cc273a93 | 2040 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2041 | } |
2042 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2043 | } |
0c3eb279 DDO |
2044 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
2045 | ||
2046 | err: | |
2047 | X509_free(x); | |
79b2a2f2 | 2048 | OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain); |
0c3eb279 DDO |
2049 | s->session->peer_chain = NULL; |
2050 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2051 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2052 | |
0c3eb279 DDO |
2053 | /* |
2054 | * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type. | |
2055 | * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result. | |
2056 | * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry. | |
2057 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2058 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
2059 | WORK_STATE wst) | |
0c3eb279 DDO |
2060 | { |
2061 | X509 *x; | |
2062 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
2063 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; | |
2064 | size_t certidx; | |
2065 | int i; | |
2066 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
2067 | if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk) |
2068 | return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst); | |
2069 | ||
dfb39f73 TM |
2070 | if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) |
2071 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0c3eb279 | 2072 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain); |
dfb39f73 | 2073 | if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) { |
0c3eb279 DDO |
2074 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
2075 | } | |
c8e2f98c MC |
2076 | /* |
2077 | * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order | |
2078 | * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. | |
2079 | * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set | |
2080 | * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes | |
2081 | * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was | |
2082 | * reverted because at least one application *only* set | |
2083 | * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused | |
2084 | * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did | |
2085 | * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags | |
2086 | * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the | |
2087 | * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is | |
2088 | * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. | |
2089 | */ | |
dfb39f73 | 2090 | if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { |
c6d38183 | 2091 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), |
f63a17d6 | 2092 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
0c3eb279 | 2093 | return WORK_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
2094 | } |
2095 | ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ | |
0f113f3e | 2096 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2097 | /* |
2098 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, | |
d4d78943 | 2099 | * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c |
0f113f3e | 2100 | */ |
0c3eb279 | 2101 | x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0); |
0f113f3e | 2102 | |
8382fd3a | 2103 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e | 2104 | |
55a9a16f | 2105 | if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2106 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 | 2107 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); |
0c3eb279 | 2108 | return WORK_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
2109 | } |
2110 | ||
ee58915c MB |
2111 | if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx, |
2112 | SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2113 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
0c3eb279 | 2114 | return WORK_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2115 | } |
05b8486e DSH |
2116 | /* |
2117 | * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 | |
2118 | * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate | |
2119 | * type. | |
2120 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2121 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
555cbb32 | 2122 | if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2123 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
0c3eb279 | 2124 | return WORK_ERROR; |
05b8486e | 2125 | } |
0f113f3e | 2126 | } |
55a9a16f MC |
2127 | |
2128 | X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
05f0fb9f | 2129 | X509_up_ref(x); |
55a9a16f | 2130 | s->session->peer = x; |
0f113f3e | 2131 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
3c95ef22 TS |
2132 | /* Ensure there is no RPK */ |
2133 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk); | |
2134 | s->session->peer_rpk = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
2135 | |
2136 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
38b051a1 | 2137 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
2138 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, |
2139 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
2140 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2141 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
0c3eb279 | 2142 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2c5dfdc3 | 2143 | } |
0c3eb279 | 2144 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e | 2145 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2146 | |
b67cb09f TS |
2147 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG |
2148 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt) | |
2149 | { | |
2150 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2151 | PACKET tmppkt; | |
2152 | BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new(); | |
2153 | ||
2154 | if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR) | |
2155 | ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt); | |
2156 | ||
2157 | BUF_MEM_free(buf); | |
2158 | return ret; | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | #endif | |
2161 | ||
38b051a1 | 2162 | static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
02a74590 MC |
2163 | { |
2164 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
7dc1c647 | 2165 | PACKET psk_identity_hint; |
02a74590 | 2166 | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2167 | /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ |
2168 | ||
2169 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2170 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
7dc1c647 MC |
2171 | return 0; |
2172 | } | |
2173 | ||
2174 | /* | |
2175 | * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in | |
2176 | * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of | |
2177 | * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK | |
2178 | * identity. | |
2179 | */ | |
2180 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2181 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
7dc1c647 MC |
2182 | return 0; |
2183 | } | |
02a74590 | 2184 | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2185 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { |
2186 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); | |
2187 | s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
2188 | } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, | |
a230b26e | 2189 | &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2190 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7dc1c647 MC |
2191 | return 0; |
2192 | } | |
2193 | ||
2194 | return 1; | |
2195 | #else | |
c48ffbcc | 2196 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7dc1c647 | 2197 | return 0; |
02a74590 MC |
2198 | #endif |
2199 | } | |
2200 | ||
38b051a1 | 2201 | static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
25c6c10c MC |
2202 | { |
2203 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2204 | PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; | |
2205 | ||
2206 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) | |
2207 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
2208 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) | |
2209 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2210 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
25c6c10c MC |
2211 | return 0; |
2212 | } | |
2213 | ||
2214 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N = | |
2215 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), | |
348240c6 | 2216 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2217 | || (s->srp_ctx.g = |
2218 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), | |
348240c6 | 2219 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2220 | || (s->srp_ctx.s = |
2221 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), | |
348240c6 | 2222 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2223 | || (s->srp_ctx.B = |
2224 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), | |
348240c6 | 2225 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2226 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
25c6c10c MC |
2227 | return 0; |
2228 | } | |
2229 | ||
a2c2e000 MC |
2230 | if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { |
2231 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
25c6c10c MC |
2232 | return 0; |
2233 | } | |
2234 | ||
2235 | /* We must check if there is a certificate */ | |
555cbb32 | 2236 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) |
3c95ef22 | 2237 | *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); |
25c6c10c MC |
2238 | |
2239 | return 1; | |
2240 | #else | |
c48ffbcc | 2241 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25c6c10c MC |
2242 | return 0; |
2243 | #endif | |
2244 | } | |
2245 | ||
38b051a1 | 2246 | static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
e01a610d | 2247 | { |
e01a610d MC |
2248 | PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; |
2249 | EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; | |
e01a610d | 2250 | BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; |
1ee22dc2 MC |
2251 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
2252 | OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; | |
2253 | OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL; | |
38b051a1 | 2254 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
1ee22dc2 | 2255 | int ret = 0; |
26505153 | 2256 | |
e01a610d MC |
2257 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) |
2258 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
2259 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2260 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
e01a610d MC |
2261 | return 0; |
2262 | } | |
2263 | ||
348240c6 MC |
2264 | p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); |
2265 | g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), | |
2266 | NULL); | |
2267 | bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), | |
2268 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); | |
e01a610d | 2269 | if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2270 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
e01a610d MC |
2271 | goto err; |
2272 | } | |
2273 | ||
1ee22dc2 MC |
2274 | tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new(); |
2275 | if (tmpl == NULL | |
2276 | || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) | |
2277 | || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) | |
2278 | || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, | |
2279 | bnpub_key) | |
2280 | || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) { | |
2281 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e01a610d MC |
2282 | goto err; |
2283 | } | |
e01a610d | 2284 | |
38b051a1 | 2285 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq); |
1ee22dc2 MC |
2286 | if (pctx == NULL) { |
2287 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
26505153 RL |
2288 | goto err; |
2289 | } | |
2db985b7 SL |
2290 | if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0 |
2291 | || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) { | |
1ee22dc2 | 2292 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); |
e01a610d MC |
2293 | goto err; |
2294 | } | |
e01a610d | 2295 | |
1ee22dc2 | 2296 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
38b051a1 | 2297 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq); |
1ee22dc2 | 2298 | if (pctx == NULL |
899e2564 MC |
2299 | /* |
2300 | * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using | |
2301 | * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH, | |
2302 | * we're ok with it not being a safe prime. | |
2303 | * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check. | |
2304 | */ | |
2305 | || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1 | |
1ee22dc2 MC |
2306 | || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) { |
2307 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
e01a610d MC |
2308 | goto err; |
2309 | } | |
2310 | ||
ed576acd TM |
2311 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, |
2312 | EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp), | |
47e81a1b | 2313 | 0, peer_tmp)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2314 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
ada66e78 P |
2315 | goto err; |
2316 | } | |
2317 | ||
555cbb32 | 2318 | s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp; |
1ee22dc2 | 2319 | peer_tmp = NULL; |
e01a610d MC |
2320 | |
2321 | /* | |
2322 | * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with | |
2323 | * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this | |
2324 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 2325 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) |
3c95ef22 | 2326 | *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); |
e01a610d MC |
2327 | /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ |
2328 | ||
1ee22dc2 | 2329 | ret = 1; |
e01a610d MC |
2330 | |
2331 | err: | |
1ee22dc2 | 2332 | OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl); |
3f883c7c | 2333 | OSSL_PARAM_free(params); |
1ee22dc2 MC |
2334 | EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); |
2335 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
e01a610d MC |
2336 | BN_free(p); |
2337 | BN_free(g); | |
2338 | BN_free(bnpub_key); | |
e01a610d | 2339 | |
1ee22dc2 | 2340 | return ret; |
e01a610d MC |
2341 | } |
2342 | ||
38b051a1 | 2343 | static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
ff74aeb1 | 2344 | { |
ff74aeb1 | 2345 | PACKET encoded_pt; |
6447e818 | 2346 | unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2347 | |
2348 | /* | |
2349 | * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH | |
6447e818 | 2350 | * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2351 | * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. |
2352 | */ | |
6447e818 | 2353 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2355 | return 0; |
2356 | } | |
2357 | /* | |
6447e818 DSH |
2358 | * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not |
2359 | * server has sent an invalid curve. | |
ff74aeb1 | 2360 | */ |
dcf8b01f MC |
2361 | if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE |
2362 | || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2363 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2364 | return 0; |
2365 | } | |
2366 | ||
ada66e78 | 2367 | if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 2368 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
a2c2e000 | 2369 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2370 | return 0; |
2371 | } | |
2372 | ||
ff74aeb1 | 2373 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2374 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2375 | return 0; |
2376 | } | |
2377 | ||
5ac8fb58 MC |
2378 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp, |
2379 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
2380 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2382 | return 0; |
2383 | } | |
2384 | ||
2385 | /* | |
2386 | * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign | |
2387 | * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA | |
2388 | * and ECDSA. | |
2389 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 2390 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) |
3c95ef22 | 2391 | *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); |
555cbb32 | 2392 | else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) |
3c95ef22 | 2393 | *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2394 | /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ |
2395 | ||
aa6bd216 BK |
2396 | /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */ |
2397 | s->session->kex_group = curve_id; | |
ff74aeb1 | 2398 | return 1; |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2399 | } |
2400 | ||
38b051a1 | 2401 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2402 | { |
e1e588ac | 2403 | long alg_k; |
b9908bf9 | 2404 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
fe3066ee MC |
2405 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; |
2406 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
73999b62 | 2407 | PACKET save_param_start, signature; |
38b051a1 | 2408 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
b9908bf9 | 2409 | |
555cbb32 | 2410 | alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
b9908bf9 | 2411 | |
73999b62 | 2412 | save_param_start = *pkt; |
8d92c1f8 | 2413 | |
555cbb32 TS |
2414 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp); |
2415 | s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL; | |
d02b48c6 | 2416 | |
7689082b | 2417 | if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2418 | if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
2419 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7dc1c647 | 2420 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2421 | } |
7689082b DSH |
2422 | } |
2423 | ||
2424 | /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ | |
2425 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
25c6c10c | 2426 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2427 | if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2428 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 2429 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2430 | } |
e01a610d | 2431 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2432 | if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2433 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e01a610d | 2434 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2435 | } |
ff74aeb1 | 2436 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2437 | if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2438 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
ff74aeb1 | 2439 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2440 | } |
0f113f3e | 2441 | } else if (alg_k) { |
c48ffbcc | 2442 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
e1e588ac | 2443 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2444 | } |
0f113f3e | 2445 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2446 | /* if it was signed, check the signature */ |
2447 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
32942870 | 2448 | PACKET params; |
be8dba2c | 2449 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2450 | unsigned char *tbs; |
2451 | size_t tbslen; | |
2452 | int rv; | |
e1e588ac | 2453 | |
32942870 EK |
2454 | /* |
2455 | * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference | |
2456 | * equals the length of the parameters. | |
2457 | */ | |
2458 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, | |
2459 | PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - | |
73999b62 | 2460 | PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { |
c48ffbcc | 2461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e1e588ac | 2462 | goto err; |
32942870 EK |
2463 | } |
2464 | ||
0f113f3e | 2465 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
703bcee0 | 2466 | unsigned int sigalg; |
703bcee0 MC |
2467 | |
2468 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2469 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
e1e588ac | 2470 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2471 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
2472 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { |
2473 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 2474 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2475 | } |
f365a3e2 | 2476 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
97b8db1a TM |
2477 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2478 | SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); | |
f365a3e2 | 2479 | goto err; |
32942870 | 2480 | } |
0f113f3e | 2481 | |
38b051a1 | 2482 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2483 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
7cd1420b | 2484 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); |
b2021556 DSH |
2485 | goto err; |
2486 | } | |
44f23cd2 | 2487 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 | 2488 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
ed576acd | 2489 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
f365a3e2 | 2490 | |
73999b62 MC |
2491 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) |
2492 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2493 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
e1e588ac | 2494 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2495 | } |
e1e588ac MC |
2496 | |
2497 | md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2498 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 2499 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
e1e588ac | 2500 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2501 | } |
e1e588ac | 2502 | |
d8652be0 | 2503 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, |
ed576acd | 2504 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
38b051a1 | 2505 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 2506 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2507 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
fe3066ee MC |
2508 | goto err; |
2509 | } | |
5554facb | 2510 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
fe3066ee | 2511 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
91410d40 | 2512 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
968ae5b3 | 2513 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2514 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
fe3066ee MC |
2515 | goto err; |
2516 | } | |
2517 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2518 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), |
2519 | PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); | |
2520 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2521 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e1e588ac | 2522 | goto err; |
192e4bbb | 2523 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2524 | |
2525 | rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), | |
2526 | PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); | |
2527 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
cfba0675 | 2528 | if (rv <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2529 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
e1e588ac | 2530 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2531 | } |
e1e588ac | 2532 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
fe3066ee | 2533 | md_ctx = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2534 | } else { |
7689082b | 2535 | /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ |
555cbb32 | 2536 | if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) |
a230b26e | 2537 | && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { |
0f113f3e | 2538 | /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ |
e1e588ac | 2539 | if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2540 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA); |
e1e588ac | 2541 | } |
a2c2e000 | 2542 | /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2543 | goto err; |
2544 | } | |
2545 | /* still data left over */ | |
73999b62 | 2546 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2547 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); |
e1e588ac | 2548 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2549 | } |
2550 | } | |
e1e588ac | 2551 | |
b9908bf9 | 2552 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2553 | err: |
fe3066ee | 2554 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
b9908bf9 | 2555 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2556 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2557 | |
38b051a1 TM |
2558 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
2559 | PACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 2560 | { |
32f66107 | 2561 | /* Clear certificate validity flags */ |
ee58915c MB |
2562 | if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL) |
2563 | memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t)); | |
2564 | else | |
2565 | s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t)); | |
2566 | ||
2567 | /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */ | |
2568 | if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL) | |
2569 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2570 | |
38b051a1 | 2571 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
32f66107 DSH |
2572 | PACKET reqctx, extensions; |
2573 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
03f44b97 | 2574 | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
2575 | if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { |
2576 | /* | |
2577 | * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 | |
2578 | * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so | |
2579 | * we just ignore it | |
2580 | */ | |
2581 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2582 | } | |
2583 | ||
03f44b97 | 2584 | /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ |
555cbb32 TS |
2585 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype); |
2586 | s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL; | |
2587 | s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2588 | OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); |
2589 | s->pha_context = NULL; | |
39a14059 | 2590 | s->pha_context_len = 0; |
32f66107 | 2591 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2592 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || |
2593 | !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2594 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2595 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
03f44b97 | 2596 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2597 | |
2598 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2599 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 2600 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 DSH |
2601 | } |
2602 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, | |
fe874d27 | 2603 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 | 2604 | &rawexts, NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 2605 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2606 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
2607 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32f66107 | 2608 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 2609 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 DSH |
2610 | } |
2611 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
2612 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2613 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 2614 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 | 2615 | } |
03f44b97 DSH |
2616 | } else { |
2617 | PACKET ctypes; | |
75c13e78 | 2618 | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2619 | /* get the certificate types */ |
2620 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2621 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2622 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
03f44b97 DSH |
2623 | } |
2624 | ||
555cbb32 | 2625 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2626 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 2627 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
03f44b97 | 2628 | } |
ac112332 | 2629 | |
32f66107 DSH |
2630 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
2631 | PACKET sigalgs; | |
703bcee0 | 2632 | |
32f66107 | 2633 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2634 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2635 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 | 2636 | } |
ac112332 | 2637 | |
c589c34e BK |
2638 | /* |
2639 | * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility | |
2640 | * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. | |
2641 | */ | |
2642 | if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2643 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2644 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); |
2645 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 DSH |
2646 | } |
2647 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
e077455e | 2648 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2649 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 | 2650 | } |
0f113f3e | 2651 | } |
0f113f3e | 2652 | |
32f66107 | 2653 | /* get the CA RDNs */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2654 | if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { |
2655 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2656 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2657 | } | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2658 | } |
2659 | ||
2660 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2661 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2662 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
03f44b97 | 2663 | } |
0f113f3e | 2664 | |
0f113f3e | 2665 | /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ |
555cbb32 | 2666 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1; |
0f113f3e | 2667 | |
e4562014 MC |
2668 | /* |
2669 | * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until | |
2670 | * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because | |
2671 | * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message | |
2672 | * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that | |
8c2bfd25 | 2673 | * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in |
e4562014 MC |
2674 | * client_cert_cb. |
2675 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2676 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
2677 | && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
e4562014 MC |
2678 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
2679 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2680 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e MC |
2681 | } |
2682 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
2683 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
2684 | PACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 2685 | { |
b9908bf9 | 2686 | unsigned int ticklen; |
9ac6244b | 2687 | unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; |
ec60ccc1 | 2688 | unsigned int sess_len; |
de1df7e9 | 2689 | RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; |
9b6a8254 | 2690 | PACKET nonce; |
abd86cec | 2691 | EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 2692 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
b9908bf9 | 2693 | |
6cf2dbd9 MC |
2694 | PACKET_null_init(&nonce); |
2695 | ||
73999b62 | 2696 | if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) |
38b051a1 | 2697 | || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
9b6a8254 | 2698 | && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) |
6cf2dbd9 | 2699 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) |
a230b26e | 2700 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) |
38b051a1 TM |
2701 | || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 |
2702 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) | |
2703 | : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2704 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2705 | goto err; |
e711da71 EK |
2706 | } |
2707 | ||
de1df7e9 MC |
2708 | /* |
2709 | * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty | |
2710 | * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never | |
2711 | * be 0 here in that instance | |
2712 | */ | |
e711da71 | 2713 | if (ticklen == 0) |
c9de4a20 | 2714 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
e711da71 | 2715 | |
150840b9 MC |
2716 | /* |
2717 | * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise | |
2718 | * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, | |
2719 | * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every | |
2720 | * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive | |
2721 | * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session | |
2722 | * cache. | |
2723 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2724 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { |
98ece4ee | 2725 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess; |
1f156321 | 2726 | |
98ece4ee MC |
2727 | /* |
2728 | * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new | |
2729 | * one | |
2730 | */ | |
5d61491c | 2731 | if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { |
e077455e | 2732 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2733 | goto err; |
5d61491c MC |
2734 | } |
2735 | ||
1f156321 | 2736 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 |
38b051a1 | 2737 | && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1f156321 MC |
2738 | /* |
2739 | * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that | |
2740 | * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the | |
2741 | * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails | |
2742 | */ | |
2743 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
2744 | } | |
2745 | ||
98ece4ee MC |
2746 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
2747 | s->session = new_sess; | |
2748 | } | |
2749 | ||
f0131dc0 | 2750 | s->session->time = ossl_time_now(); |
25959e04 | 2751 | ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session); |
fc24f0bf | 2752 | |
aff8c126 RS |
2753 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); |
2754 | s->session->ext.tick = NULL; | |
2755 | s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; | |
e711da71 | 2756 | |
aff8c126 RS |
2757 | s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
2758 | if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 2759 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
0f113f3e MC |
2760 | goto err; |
2761 | } | |
aff8c126 | 2762 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2763 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2764 | goto err; |
561e12bb | 2765 | } |
e711da71 | 2766 | |
aff8c126 | 2767 | s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; |
fc24f0bf | 2768 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; |
aff8c126 | 2769 | s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; |
de1df7e9 | 2770 | |
38b051a1 | 2771 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
de1df7e9 MC |
2772 | PACKET extpkt; |
2773 | ||
2774 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) | |
1cde0259 | 2775 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2776 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
1cde0259 MC |
2777 | goto err; |
2778 | } | |
2779 | ||
2780 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
2781 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, | |
2782 | NULL, 1) | |
fe874d27 MC |
2783 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, |
2784 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2785 | exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
2786 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2787 | goto err; | |
de1df7e9 MC |
2788 | } |
2789 | } | |
2790 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2791 | /* |
2792 | * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set | |
2793 | * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in | |
2794 | * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work | |
2795 | * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The | |
2796 | * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is | |
2797 | * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. | |
2798 | * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions | |
abd86cec MC |
2799 | * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the |
2800 | * ticket. | |
0f113f3e | 2801 | */ |
38b051a1 | 2802 | sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq); |
abd86cec | 2803 | if (sha256 == NULL) { |
5a2d0ef3 RL |
2804 | /* Error is already recorded */ |
2805 | SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
abd86cec MC |
2806 | goto err; |
2807 | } | |
ec60ccc1 | 2808 | /* |
407820c0 | 2809 | * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int |
ec60ccc1 MC |
2810 | * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t |
2811 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 2812 | if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, |
ec60ccc1 | 2813 | s->session->session_id, &sess_len, |
abd86cec | 2814 | sha256, NULL)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2815 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d166ed8c DSH |
2816 | goto err; |
2817 | } | |
abd86cec MC |
2818 | EVP_MD_free(sha256); |
2819 | sha256 = NULL; | |
ec60ccc1 | 2820 | s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; |
4cb00457 | 2821 | s->session->not_resumable = 0; |
de1df7e9 MC |
2822 | |
2823 | /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ | |
38b051a1 | 2824 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
4ff1a526 | 2825 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); |
ed576acd | 2826 | int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); |
4ff1a526 MC |
2827 | size_t hashlen; |
2828 | static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; | |
2829 | ||
2830 | /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ | |
2831 | if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2832 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
4ff1a526 MC |
2833 | goto err; |
2834 | } | |
2835 | hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; | |
2836 | ||
2837 | if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, | |
2838 | nonce_label, | |
2839 | sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, | |
6cf2dbd9 MC |
2840 | PACKET_data(&nonce), |
2841 | PACKET_remaining(&nonce), | |
4ff1a526 | 2842 | s->session->master_key, |
0fb2815b | 2843 | hashlen, 1)) { |
4ff1a526 MC |
2844 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2845 | goto err; | |
2846 | } | |
2847 | s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; | |
2848 | ||
33d93417 | 2849 | OPENSSL_free(exts); |
de1df7e9 MC |
2850 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
2851 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2852 | } | |
2853 | ||
b9908bf9 | 2854 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2855 | err: |
abd86cec | 2856 | EVP_MD_free(sha256); |
33d93417 | 2857 | OPENSSL_free(exts); |
b9908bf9 | 2858 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2859 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 2860 | |
f63e4288 MC |
2861 | /* |
2862 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
f63a17d6 | 2863 | * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure |
f63e4288 | 2864 | */ |
38b051a1 | 2865 | int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2866 | { |
8b0e934a | 2867 | size_t resplen; |
b9908bf9 | 2868 | unsigned int type; |
b9908bf9 | 2869 | |
73999b62 | 2870 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) |
a230b26e | 2871 | || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
c48ffbcc | 2872 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); |
f63e4288 | 2873 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2874 | } |
56a26ce3 MC |
2875 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) |
2876 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2877 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63e4288 | 2878 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2879 | } |
8cbfcc70 RS |
2880 | s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); |
2881 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { | |
39a14059 | 2882 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; |
e077455e | 2883 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
f63e4288 | 2884 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2885 | } |
39a14059 | 2886 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; |
8cbfcc70 | 2887 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2888 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63e4288 | 2889 | return 0; |
ac63710a | 2890 | } |
f63e4288 MC |
2891 | |
2892 | return 1; | |
2893 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 2894 | |
f63e4288 | 2895 | |
38b051a1 | 2896 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
f63e4288 | 2897 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2898 | if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { |
2899 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63e4288 MC |
2900 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2901 | } | |
2902 | ||
b9908bf9 | 2903 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2904 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2905 | |
7776a36c MC |
2906 | /* |
2907 | * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the | |
2908 | * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. | |
6530c490 MC |
2909 | * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 |
2910 | * on failure. | |
7776a36c | 2911 | */ |
38b051a1 | 2912 | int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
b9908bf9 | 2913 | { |
38b051a1 TM |
2914 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
2915 | ||
a455d0f6 MC |
2916 | /* |
2917 | * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from | |
2918 | * the server | |
2919 | */ | |
2920 | if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2921 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7776a36c | 2922 | return 0; |
a455d0f6 MC |
2923 | } |
2924 | ||
bb1aaab4 | 2925 | /* |
aff8c126 RS |
2926 | * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and |
2927 | * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status | |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2928 | * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise |
2929 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 2930 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing |
38b051a1 TM |
2931 | && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { |
2932 | int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), | |
2933 | sctx->ext.status_arg); | |
aff8c126 | 2934 | |
bb1aaab4 | 2935 | if (ret == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 2936 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, |
f63a17d6 | 2937 | SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); |
7776a36c | 2938 | return 0; |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2939 | } |
2940 | if (ret < 0) { | |
c0f4400c DB |
2941 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2942 | SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE); | |
7776a36c | 2943 | return 0; |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2944 | } |
2945 | } | |
ed29e82a RP |
2946 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT |
2947 | if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { | |
43341433 VD |
2948 | /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ |
2949 | if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2950 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7776a36c | 2951 | return 0; |
ed29e82a RP |
2952 | } |
2953 | } | |
2954 | #endif | |
2955 | ||
7776a36c MC |
2956 | return 1; |
2957 | } | |
2958 | ||
38b051a1 | 2959 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
7776a36c | 2960 | { |
7776a36c MC |
2961 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
2962 | /* should contain no data */ | |
c48ffbcc | 2963 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2964 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
7776a36c MC |
2965 | } |
2966 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
555cbb32 | 2967 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { |
76cb077f | 2968 | if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 2969 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); |
f63a17d6 | 2970 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
7776a36c MC |
2971 | } |
2972 | } | |
2973 | #endif | |
2974 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2975 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { |
2976 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2977 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2978 | } | |
7776a36c | 2979 | |
bd79bcb4 | 2980 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2981 | } |
176f31dd | 2982 | |
38b051a1 | 2983 | static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2984 | { |
7689082b | 2985 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
13c0ec4a MC |
2986 | int ret = 0; |
2987 | /* | |
2988 | * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a | |
2989 | * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating | |
2990 | * strnlen. | |
2991 | */ | |
2992 | char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; | |
2993 | size_t identitylen = 0; | |
2994 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; | |
2995 | unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; | |
2996 | char *tmpidentity = NULL; | |
2997 | size_t psklen = 0; | |
2998 | ||
2999 | if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3000 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3001 | goto err; |
3002 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 3003 | |
13c0ec4a | 3004 | memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
d02b48c6 | 3005 | |
38b051a1 TM |
3006 | psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), |
3007 | s->session->psk_identity_hint, | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3008 | identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, |
3009 | psk, sizeof(psk)); | |
7689082b | 3010 | |
13c0ec4a | 3011 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
c48ffbcc | 3012 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3de7f014 | 3013 | psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */ |
13c0ec4a MC |
3014 | goto err; |
3015 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3016 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3017 | goto err; |
3018 | } | |
7689082b | 3019 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3020 | identitylen = strlen(identity); |
3021 | if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3023 | goto err; |
3024 | } | |
7689082b | 3025 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3026 | tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); |
3027 | tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); | |
3028 | if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 3029 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3030 | goto err; |
3031 | } | |
7689082b | 3032 | |
555cbb32 TS |
3033 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk); |
3034 | s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk; | |
3035 | s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3036 | tmppsk = NULL; |
3037 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); | |
3038 | s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; | |
3039 | tmpidentity = NULL; | |
f1ec23c0 | 3040 | |
b2b3024e | 3041 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3042 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3043 | goto err; |
3044 | } | |
7689082b | 3045 | |
13c0ec4a | 3046 | ret = 1; |
0bce0b02 | 3047 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3048 | err: |
3049 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
3050 | OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); | |
3051 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); | |
3052 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); | |
d02b48c6 | 3053 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3054 | return ret; |
3055 | #else | |
c48ffbcc | 3056 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
13c0ec4a | 3057 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 3058 | #endif |
13c0ec4a | 3059 | } |
b9908bf9 | 3060 | |
38b051a1 | 3061 | static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
13c0ec4a | 3062 | { |
f1ec23c0 | 3063 | unsigned char *encdata = NULL; |
13c0ec4a MC |
3064 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
3065 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
3066 | size_t enclen; | |
3067 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3068 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
38b051a1 | 3069 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
b9908bf9 | 3070 | |
3c95ef22 | 3071 | if (!received_server_cert(s)) { |
13c0ec4a MC |
3072 | /* |
3073 | * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. | |
3074 | */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3075 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3076 | return 0; |
3077 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3078 | |
3c95ef22 TS |
3079 | if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) { |
3080 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3081 | return 0; | |
3082 | } | |
3083 | ||
d7e498ac | 3084 | if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) { |
c48ffbcc | 3085 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3086 | return 0; |
3087 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3088 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3089 | pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
3090 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
3091 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 3092 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3093 | return 0; |
3094 | } | |
0bce0b02 | 3095 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3096 | pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; |
3097 | pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
38b051a1 | 3098 | if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) { |
e077455e | 3099 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3100 | goto err; |
3101 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3102 | |
13c0ec4a | 3103 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
f1ec23c0 | 3104 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3105 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3106 | goto err; |
3107 | } | |
3aceb9ec | 3108 | |
38b051a1 | 3109 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3110 | if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 |
3111 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3112 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3113 | goto err; |
3114 | } | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3115 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) |
3116 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3117 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); |
13c0ec4a MC |
3118 | goto err; |
3119 | } | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3120 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
3121 | pctx = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 3122 | |
13c0ec4a | 3123 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
f1ec23c0 | 3124 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3125 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 | 3126 | goto err; |
b9908bf9 | 3127 | } |
13c0ec4a | 3128 | |
2faa1b48 | 3129 | /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
a2c2e000 MC |
3130 | if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { |
3131 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2faa1b48 | 3132 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3133 | } |
2faa1b48 | 3134 | |
555cbb32 TS |
3135 | s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; |
3136 | s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
26fb4b03 | 3137 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3138 | return 1; |
3139 | err: | |
3140 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3141 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
3142 | ||
3143 | return 0; | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3144 | } |
3145 | ||
38b051a1 | 3146 | static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
a8c1c704 | 3147 | { |
a8c1c704 | 3148 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; |
f1ec23c0 | 3149 | unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; |
807b0a1d | 3150 | int prime_len; |
cb5a427a MC |
3151 | unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL; |
3152 | size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len; | |
3153 | int ret = 0; | |
a8c1c704 | 3154 | |
555cbb32 | 3155 | skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; |
a2c2e000 | 3156 | if (skey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3157 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 | 3158 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3159 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3160 | |
0f00ed77 | 3161 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); |
a2c2e000 | 3162 | if (ckey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3163 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b599ce3b | 3164 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3165 | } |
b599ce3b | 3166 | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3167 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { |
3168 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f1ec23c0 | 3169 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3170 | } |
a8c1c704 MC |
3171 | |
3172 | /* send off the data */ | |
cb5a427a MC |
3173 | |
3174 | /* Generate encoding of server key */ | |
3175 | encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub); | |
3176 | if (encoded_pub_len == 0) { | |
3177 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
10481d33 | 3178 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
cb5a427a MC |
3179 | return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
3180 | } | |
3181 | ||
807b0a1d FM |
3182 | /* |
3183 | * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS | |
3184 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
cb5a427a | 3185 | * as the prime. |
807b0a1d | 3186 | */ |
ed576acd | 3187 | prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey); |
cb5a427a MC |
3188 | pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len; |
3189 | if (pad_len > 0) { | |
3190 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) { | |
3191 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3192 | goto err; | |
3193 | } | |
3194 | memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len); | |
3195 | } | |
3196 | ||
3197 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3198 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 | 3199 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3200 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3201 | |
cb5a427a | 3202 | ret = 1; |
f1ec23c0 | 3203 | err: |
cb5a427a | 3204 | OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub); |
f1ec23c0 | 3205 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
cb5a427a | 3206 | return ret; |
a8c1c704 MC |
3207 | } |
3208 | ||
38b051a1 | 3209 | static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
67ad5aab | 3210 | { |
67ad5aab | 3211 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 3212 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; |
67ad5aab | 3213 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; |
f1ec23c0 | 3214 | int ret = 0; |
67ad5aab | 3215 | |
555cbb32 | 3216 | skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; |
ec24630a | 3217 | if (skey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 3218 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ad5aab MC |
3219 | return 0; |
3220 | } | |
3221 | ||
0f00ed77 | 3222 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); |
b599ce3b | 3223 | if (ckey == NULL) { |
e077455e | 3224 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); |
b599ce3b MC |
3225 | goto err; |
3226 | } | |
67ad5aab | 3227 | |
0f1e51ea | 3228 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { |
a2c2e000 | 3229 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ad5aab MC |
3230 | goto err; |
3231 | } | |
3232 | ||
3233 | /* Generate encoding of client key */ | |
5ac8fb58 | 3234 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint); |
67ad5aab MC |
3235 | |
3236 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3237 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
67ad5aab MC |
3238 | goto err; |
3239 | } | |
3240 | ||
b2b3024e | 3241 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3242 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3243 | goto err; |
3244 | } | |
67ad5aab | 3245 | |
f1ec23c0 | 3246 | ret = 1; |
67ad5aab | 3247 | err: |
f1ec23c0 | 3248 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
67ad5aab | 3249 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
f1ec23c0 | 3250 | return ret; |
67ad5aab MC |
3251 | } |
3252 | ||
38b051a1 | 3253 | static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e00e0b3d MC |
3254 | { |
3255 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3256 | /* GOST key exchange message creation */ | |
3257 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; | |
3c95ef22 | 3258 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
e00e0b3d MC |
3259 | size_t msglen; |
3260 | unsigned int md_len; | |
3261 | unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; | |
3262 | EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3263 | int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; | |
3264 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3265 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
38b051a1 | 3266 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
e00e0b3d | 3267 | |
555cbb32 | 3268 | if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) |
e00e0b3d MC |
3269 | dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; |
3270 | ||
3271 | /* | |
1ee4b98e | 3272 | * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it |
e00e0b3d | 3273 | */ |
3c95ef22 | 3274 | if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc RL |
3275 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3276 | SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3277 | return 0; |
3278 | } | |
3279 | ||
38b051a1 | 3280 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, |
3c95ef22 | 3281 | pkey, |
38b051a1 | 3282 | sctx->propq); |
e00e0b3d | 3283 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { |
e077455e | 3284 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
e00e0b3d MC |
3285 | return 0; |
3286 | } | |
3287 | /* | |
3288 | * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key | |
3289 | * parameters match those of server certificate, use | |
3290 | * certificate key for key exchange | |
3291 | */ | |
3292 | ||
3293 | /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ | |
3294 | pmslen = 32; | |
3295 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
3296 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 3297 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
2f3930bc | 3298 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d MC |
3299 | } |
3300 | ||
3301 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 | |
348240c6 | 3302 | /* Generate session key |
348240c6 | 3303 | */ |
38b051a1 | 3304 | || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3305 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e00e0b3d MC |
3306 | goto err; |
3307 | }; | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3308 | /* |
3309 | * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context | |
3310 | * data | |
3311 | */ | |
3312 | ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
3313 | if (ukm_hash == NULL | |
a230b26e | 3314 | || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 |
555cbb32 | 3315 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random, |
a230b26e | 3316 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 |
555cbb32 | 3317 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random, |
a230b26e EK |
3318 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 |
3319 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3320 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e00e0b3d MC |
3321 | goto err; |
3322 | } | |
3323 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3324 | ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3325 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, | |
7b1264ba | 3326 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3327 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
e00e0b3d MC |
3328 | goto err; |
3329 | } | |
3330 | /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ | |
3331 | /* | |
3332 | * Encapsulate it into sequence | |
3333 | */ | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3334 | msglen = 255; |
3335 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3336 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
e00e0b3d MC |
3337 | goto err; |
3338 | } | |
f1ec23c0 | 3339 | |
08029dfa MC |
3340 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) |
3341 | || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) | |
b2b3024e | 3342 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3343 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f1ec23c0 | 3344 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d | 3345 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3346 | |
e00e0b3d | 3347 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); |
555cbb32 TS |
3348 | s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; |
3349 | s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3350 | |
3351 | return 1; | |
3352 | err: | |
3353 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3354 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3355 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3356 | return 0; | |
3357 | #else | |
c48ffbcc | 3358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e00e0b3d MC |
3359 | return 0; |
3360 | #endif | |
3361 | } | |
3362 | ||
5a5530a2 | 3363 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
38b051a1 | 3364 | int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
5a5530a2 DB |
3365 | { |
3366 | if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0) | |
3367 | return NID_magma_ctr; | |
3368 | else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0) | |
3369 | return NID_kuznyechik_ctr; | |
3370 | ||
3371 | return NID_undef; | |
3372 | } | |
3373 | ||
38b051a1 | 3374 | int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf) |
5a5530a2 | 3375 | { |
bbaeadb0 | 3376 | EVP_MD_CTX *hash = NULL; |
5a5530a2 | 3377 | unsigned int md_len; |
38b051a1 TM |
3378 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
3379 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, | |
3380 | sctx->propq); | |
5a5530a2 DB |
3381 | |
3382 | if (md == NULL) | |
3383 | return 0; | |
3384 | ||
3385 | if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL | |
3386 | || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0 | |
3387 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3388 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3389 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) { | |
3390 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash); | |
3391 | ssl_evp_md_free(md); | |
3392 | return 0; | |
3393 | } | |
3394 | ||
3395 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash); | |
3396 | ssl_evp_md_free(md); | |
3397 | return 1; | |
3398 | } | |
3399 | #endif | |
3400 | ||
38b051a1 | 3401 | static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
5a5530a2 DB |
3402 | { |
3403 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3404 | /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */ | |
2b5e8999 DB |
3405 | unsigned char rnd_dgst[32]; |
3406 | unsigned char *encdata = NULL; | |
5a5530a2 | 3407 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; |
3c95ef22 | 3408 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
5a5530a2 DB |
3409 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; |
3410 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3411 | size_t msglen; | |
6dd4b77a | 3412 | int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s); |
38b051a1 | 3413 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3414 | |
3415 | if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3416 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3417 | return 0; |
3418 | } | |
3419 | ||
6dd4b77a | 3420 | if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3421 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3422 | goto err; |
3423 | } | |
3424 | ||
3425 | /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */ | |
3426 | pmslen = 32; | |
3427 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
3428 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 3429 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3430 | goto err; |
3431 | } | |
3432 | ||
38b051a1 | 3433 | if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3434 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3435 | goto err; |
3436 | } | |
3437 | ||
3438 | /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ | |
3c95ef22 | 3439 | if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc RL |
3440 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3441 | SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); | |
1b87116a | 3442 | goto err; |
5a5530a2 DB |
3443 | } |
3444 | ||
38b051a1 | 3445 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, |
3c95ef22 | 3446 | pkey, |
38b051a1 | 3447 | sctx->propq); |
5a5530a2 | 3448 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { |
e077455e | 3449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
1b87116a | 3450 | goto err; |
5a5530a2 DB |
3451 | } |
3452 | ||
1287dabd | 3453 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3454 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3455 | goto err; |
3456 | }; | |
3457 | ||
3458 | /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */ | |
3459 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, | |
7b1264ba | 3460 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3462 | goto err; |
3463 | } | |
3464 | ||
3465 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, | |
7b1264ba | 3466 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3467 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3468 | goto err; |
3469 | } | |
3470 | ||
2b5e8999 DB |
3471 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { |
3472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5a5530a2 DB |
3473 | goto err; |
3474 | } | |
3475 | ||
2b5e8999 DB |
3476 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata) |
3477 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
3478 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5a5530a2 DB |
3479 | goto err; |
3480 | } | |
3481 | ||
3482 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
2b5e8999 | 3483 | pkey_ctx = NULL; |
5a5530a2 DB |
3484 | s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; |
3485 | s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
3486 | ||
3487 | return 1; | |
3488 | err: | |
3489 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3490 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3491 | return 0; | |
3492 | #else | |
c48ffbcc | 3493 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5a5530a2 DB |
3494 | return 0; |
3495 | #endif | |
3496 | } | |
3497 | ||
38b051a1 | 3498 | static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
840a2bf8 | 3499 | { |
8b9546c7 | 3500 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3501 | unsigned char *abytes = NULL; |
3502 | ||
3503 | if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL | |
b2b3024e MC |
3504 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), |
3505 | &abytes)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3506 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
840a2bf8 MC |
3507 | return 0; |
3508 | } | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3509 | BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); |
3510 | ||
840a2bf8 MC |
3511 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); |
3512 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3513 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 3514 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
840a2bf8 MC |
3515 | return 0; |
3516 | } | |
3517 | ||
3518 | return 1; | |
3519 | #else | |
c48ffbcc | 3520 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
840a2bf8 MC |
3521 | return 0; |
3522 | #endif | |
3523 | } | |
3524 | ||
67ec6d2b MC |
3525 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
3526 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
13c0ec4a | 3527 | { |
13c0ec4a | 3528 | unsigned long alg_k; |
13c0ec4a | 3529 | |
555cbb32 | 3530 | alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
13c0ec4a | 3531 | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3532 | /* |
3533 | * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so | |
3534 | * no need to do so here. | |
3535 | */ | |
13c0ec4a | 3536 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) |
a2c2e000 | 3537 | && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) |
13c0ec4a MC |
3538 | goto err; |
3539 | ||
f1ec23c0 | 3540 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3541 | if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) |
13c0ec4a | 3542 | goto err; |
a8c1c704 | 3543 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3544 | if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) |
b9908bf9 | 3545 | goto err; |
67ad5aab | 3546 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3547 | if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) |
ce0c1f2b | 3548 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d | 3549 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
a2c2e000 | 3550 | if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) |
a71edf3b | 3551 | goto err; |
5a5530a2 DB |
3552 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) { |
3553 | if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) | |
3554 | goto err; | |
840a2bf8 | 3555 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
a2c2e000 | 3556 | if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) |
69f68237 | 3557 | goto err; |
4a424545 | 3558 | } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3559 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b9908bf9 MC |
3560 | goto err; |
3561 | } | |
3562 | ||
67ec6d2b | 3563 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
0f113f3e | 3564 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
3565 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen); |
3566 | s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; | |
39a14059 | 3567 | s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; |
7689082b | 3568 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
555cbb32 TS |
3569 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen); |
3570 | s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL; | |
39a14059 | 3571 | s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 3572 | #endif |
67ec6d2b | 3573 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
3574 | } |
3575 | ||
38b051a1 | 3576 | int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
b9908bf9 MC |
3577 | { |
3578 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3579 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3580 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
3581 | pms = s->s3.tmp.pms; |
3582 | pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen; | |
6f137370 | 3583 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3584 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
3585 | /* Check for SRP */ | |
555cbb32 | 3586 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { |
b9908bf9 | 3587 | if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3588 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
b9908bf9 MC |
3589 | goto err; |
3590 | } | |
3591 | return 1; | |
3592 | } | |
3593 | #endif | |
b9908bf9 | 3594 | |
555cbb32 | 3595 | if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { |
e077455e | 3596 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); |
b9908bf9 MC |
3597 | goto err; |
3598 | } | |
3599 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3600 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6f137370 MC |
3601 | /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ |
3602 | pms = NULL; | |
3603 | pmslen = 0; | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3604 | goto err; |
3605 | } | |
6f137370 MC |
3606 | pms = NULL; |
3607 | pmslen = 0; | |
473483d4 MC |
3608 | |
3609 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
38b051a1 | 3610 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
473483d4 MC |
3611 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; |
3612 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
09d62b33 | 3613 | size_t labellen; |
38b051a1 | 3614 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
473483d4 MC |
3615 | |
3616 | /* | |
3617 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3618 | * used. | |
3619 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3620 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3621 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
473483d4 | 3622 | |
09d62b33 MT |
3623 | /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ |
3624 | labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; | |
3625 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) | |
3626 | labellen += 1; | |
3627 | ||
38b051a1 | 3628 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey, |
a230b26e | 3629 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
09d62b33 | 3630 | labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 3631 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
473483d4 | 3632 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3633 | } |
473483d4 | 3634 | |
38b051a1 | 3635 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
473483d4 MC |
3636 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); |
3637 | } | |
3638 | #endif | |
3639 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3640 | return 1; |
3641 | err: | |
3642 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
555cbb32 | 3643 | s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; |
39a14059 | 3644 | s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; |
b9908bf9 | 3645 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3646 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3647 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3648 | /* |
3649 | * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check | |
3650 | * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client | |
3651 | * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. | |
0d609395 | 3652 | */ |
38b051a1 | 3653 | static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e | 3654 | { |
0f113f3e | 3655 | /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ |
555cbb32 | 3656 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
3657 | return 0; |
3658 | /* | |
3659 | * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also | |
3660 | * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. | |
3661 | */ | |
3662 | if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && | |
3663 | !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) | |
3664 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3665 | return 1; |
3666 | } | |
0d609395 | 3667 | |
38b051a1 | 3668 | WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
0f113f3e MC |
3669 | { |
3670 | X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
3671 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
3672 | int i; | |
38b051a1 | 3673 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
0f113f3e | 3674 | |
b9908bf9 | 3675 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3676 | /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ |
3677 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
38b051a1 | 3678 | i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
0f113f3e MC |
3679 | if (i < 0) { |
3680 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3681 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
0f113f3e MC |
3682 | } |
3683 | if (i == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3684 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
eb5fd03b | 3685 | return WORK_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
3686 | } |
3687 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3688 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
3689 | if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { |
3690 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
3691 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
3692 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 3693 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
9d75dce3 | 3694 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
3695 | |
3696 | /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ | |
3697 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3698 | } |
3699 | ||
3700 | /* We need to get a client cert */ | |
b9908bf9 | 3701 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3702 | /* |
3703 | * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
3704 | * return(-1); We then get retied later | |
3705 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
3706 | i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); |
3707 | if (i < 0) { | |
3708 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3709 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
0f113f3e MC |
3710 | } |
3711 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3712 | if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { | |
38b051a1 TM |
3713 | if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) |
3714 | || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
3715 | i = 0; |
3716 | } else if (i == 1) { | |
3717 | i = 0; | |
6849b73c | 3718 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); |
0f113f3e MC |
3719 | } |
3720 | ||
222561fe | 3721 | X509_free(x509); |
25aaa98a | 3722 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
0f113f3e MC |
3723 | if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) |
3724 | i = 0; | |
3725 | if (i == 0) { | |
3726 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
555cbb32 | 3727 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
0f113f3e | 3728 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
b9908bf9 | 3729 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e | 3730 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 3731 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2; |
b67cb09f | 3732 | s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; |
124037fd | 3733 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 3734 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
eb5fd03b | 3735 | return WORK_ERROR; |
dab18ab5 | 3736 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3737 | } |
3738 | } | |
3739 | ||
b67cb09f TS |
3740 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
3741 | || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0) | |
3742 | s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; | |
3743 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3744 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
3745 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3746 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e MC |
3747 | } |
3748 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3749 | /* Shouldn't ever get here */ |
c48ffbcc | 3750 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b9908bf9 MC |
3751 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3752 | } | |
3753 | ||
67ec6d2b MC |
3754 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
3755 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 3756 | { |
3c95ef22 | 3757 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; |
38b051a1 TM |
3758 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
3759 | ||
3760 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
3761 | if (s->pha_context == NULL) { |
3762 | /* no context available, add 0-length context */ | |
3763 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3764 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 3765 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
9d75dce3 TS |
3766 | } |
3767 | } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3768 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 3769 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
9d75dce3 | 3770 | } |
f63a17d6 | 3771 | } |
3c95ef22 TS |
3772 | if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2) |
3773 | cpk = s->cert->key; | |
3774 | switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) { | |
3775 | case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk: | |
3776 | if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) { | |
3777 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3778 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; | |
3779 | } | |
3780 | break; | |
3781 | case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509: | |
3782 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) { | |
3783 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3784 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; | |
3785 | } | |
3786 | break; | |
3787 | default: | |
3788 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
67ec6d2b | 3789 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f7e393be MC |
3790 | } |
3791 | ||
84a14925 MC |
3792 | /* |
3793 | * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode | |
3794 | * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible | |
3795 | * moment. We need to do it now. | |
3796 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 3797 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
f7e393be | 3798 | && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) |
84a14925 MC |
3799 | && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE |
3800 | || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) | |
38b051a1 | 3801 | && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
f7e393be | 3802 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { |
c31ad0bb | 3803 | /* |
a2c2e000 | 3804 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent |
f63a17d6 | 3805 | * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. |
c31ad0bb | 3806 | */ |
c48ffbcc | 3807 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
67ec6d2b | 3808 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3809 | } |
b9908bf9 | 3810 | |
67ec6d2b | 3811 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
0f113f3e MC |
3812 | } |
3813 | ||
b67cb09f TS |
3814 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG |
3815 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
3816 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
3817 | { | |
3818 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc); | |
3819 | WPACKET tmppkt; | |
3820 | BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; | |
3821 | size_t length; | |
3822 | size_t max_length; | |
3823 | COMP_METHOD *method; | |
3824 | COMP_CTX *comp = NULL; | |
3825 | int comp_len; | |
3826 | int ret = 0; | |
3827 | int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0]; | |
3828 | ||
3829 | /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */ | |
3830 | ||
3831 | if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf)) | |
3832 | goto err; | |
3833 | ||
3834 | /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */ | |
3835 | if (sc->pha_context == NULL) { | |
3836 | /* no context available, add 0-length context */ | |
3837 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0)) | |
3838 | goto err; | |
3839 | } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) | |
3840 | goto err; | |
3841 | ||
72620ac7 | 3842 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) { |
b67cb09f TS |
3843 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3844 | goto out; | |
3845 | } | |
3846 | ||
3847 | /* continue with the real |pkt| */ | |
3848 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg) | |
3849 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length) | |
3850 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length)) | |
3851 | goto err; | |
3852 | ||
3853 | switch (alg) { | |
3854 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib: | |
3840271e | 3855 | method = COMP_zlib_oneshot(); |
b67cb09f TS |
3856 | break; |
3857 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli: | |
3858 | method = COMP_brotli_oneshot(); | |
3859 | break; | |
3860 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd: | |
3861 | method = COMP_zstd_oneshot(); | |
3862 | break; | |
3863 | default: | |
3864 | goto err; | |
3865 | } | |
3866 | max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length); | |
3867 | ||
7e3cacac TS |
3868 | if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL |
3869 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) | |
3870 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL)) | |
b67cb09f TS |
3871 | goto err; |
3872 | ||
3873 | comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length, | |
3874 | (unsigned char *)buf->data, length); | |
3875 | if (comp_len <= 0) | |
3876 | goto err; | |
3877 | ||
3878 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL) | |
3879 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) | |
3880 | goto err; | |
3881 | ||
84a14925 MC |
3882 | /* |
3883 | * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode | |
3884 | * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible | |
3885 | * moment. We need to do it now. | |
3886 | */ | |
b67cb09f | 3887 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc) |
84a14925 MC |
3888 | && (sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE |
3889 | || (sc->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) | |
b67cb09f TS |
3890 | && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc, |
3891 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
3892 | /* | |
3893 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an | |
3894 | * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. | |
3895 | */ | |
3896 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
3897 | goto out; | |
3898 | } | |
3899 | ret = 1; | |
3900 | goto out; | |
3901 | ||
3902 | err: | |
3903 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3904 | out: | |
d06d5d6b TS |
3905 | if (buf != NULL) { |
3906 | /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */ | |
3907 | WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt); | |
3908 | } | |
b67cb09f TS |
3909 | BUF_MEM_free(buf); |
3910 | COMP_CTX_free(comp); | |
3911 | return ret; | |
3912 | } | |
3913 | #endif | |
3914 | ||
38b051a1 | 3915 | int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e | 3916 | { |
dd24857b DSH |
3917 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; |
3918 | size_t idx; | |
0f113f3e | 3919 | long alg_k, alg_a; |
3c95ef22 | 3920 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
d02b48c6 | 3921 | |
555cbb32 TS |
3922 | alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
3923 | alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
d02b48c6 | 3924 | |
0f113f3e | 3925 | /* we don't have a certificate */ |
dd24857b DSH |
3926 | if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) |
3927 | return 1; | |
d02b48c6 | 3928 | |
0f113f3e | 3929 | /* This is the passed certificate */ |
3c95ef22 TS |
3930 | pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); |
3931 | clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)); | |
d02b48c6 | 3932 | |
dd24857b DSH |
3933 | /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ |
3934 | if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 3935 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); |
f63a17d6 | 3936 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3937 | } |
0f113f3e | 3938 | |
dd24857b | 3939 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { |
f63a17d6 | 3940 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3941 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); |
3942 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3943 | } |
5b64ce89 | 3944 | |
555cbb32 | 3945 | if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3946 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 3947 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3948 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3949 | |
3c95ef22 TS |
3950 | /* Early out to skip the checks below */ |
3951 | if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL) | |
3952 | return 1; | |
3953 | ||
3954 | if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
3955 | if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) | |
3956 | return 1; | |
3957 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
3958 | return 0; | |
3959 | } | |
3960 | ||
dd24857b | 3961 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
3962 | } |
3963 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3964 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
67ec6d2b | 3965 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 3966 | { |
15e6be6c MC |
3967 | size_t len, padding_len; |
3968 | unsigned char *padding = NULL; | |
15e6be6c | 3969 | |
aff8c126 | 3970 | len = s->ext.npn_len; |
b9908bf9 | 3971 | padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); |
15e6be6c | 3972 | |
aff8c126 | 3973 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) |
7cea05dc | 3974 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { |
c48ffbcc | 3975 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 3976 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
15e6be6c MC |
3977 | } |
3978 | ||
3979 | memset(padding, 0, padding_len); | |
3980 | ||
67ec6d2b | 3981 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
b9908bf9 | 3982 | } |
6434abbf | 3983 | #endif |
368888bc | 3984 | |
38b051a1 | 3985 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c7f47786 | 3986 | { |
38b051a1 TM |
3987 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
3988 | ||
c7f47786 MC |
3989 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
3990 | /* should contain no data */ | |
c48ffbcc | 3991 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c7f47786 MC |
3992 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3993 | } | |
3994 | ||
db0f35dd TS |
3995 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
3996 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
3997 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3998 | } | |
3999 | ||
c7f47786 | 4000 | /* |
1f04f23e MC |
4001 | * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for |
4002 | * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will | |
4003 | * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a | |
4004 | * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable | |
4005 | * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. | |
c7f47786 | 4006 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
4007 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) |
4008 | SSL_renegotiate(ssl); | |
c7f47786 | 4009 | else |
38b051a1 | 4010 | SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl); |
c7f47786 MC |
4011 | |
4012 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
4013 | } | |
4014 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
4015 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
4016 | PACKET *pkt) | |
e46f2334 | 4017 | { |
e46f2334 | 4018 | PACKET extensions; |
3434f40b | 4019 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; |
e46f2334 | 4020 | |
26b9172a MC |
4021 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) |
4022 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4023 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
e46f2334 MC |
4024 | goto err; |
4025 | } | |
4026 | ||
fe874d27 MC |
4027 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
4028 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 4029 | NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 4030 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
4031 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
4032 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3434f40b | 4033 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 4034 | } |
3434f40b | 4035 | |
1b0286a3 | 4036 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e46f2334 MC |
4037 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
4038 | ||
4039 | err: | |
1b0286a3 | 4040 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e46f2334 MC |
4041 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
4042 | } | |
4043 | ||
38b051a1 | 4044 | int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) |
0f113f3e MC |
4045 | { |
4046 | int i = 0; | |
38b051a1 TM |
4047 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
4048 | ||
368888bc | 4049 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
38b051a1 | 4050 | if (sctx->client_cert_engine) { |
301fcb28 | 4051 | i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey); |
0f113f3e MC |
4052 | if (i != 0) |
4053 | return i; | |
4054 | } | |
4055 | #endif | |
38b051a1 TM |
4056 | if (sctx->client_cert_cb) |
4057 | i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey); | |
0f113f3e MC |
4058 | return i; |
4059 | } | |
d45ba43d | 4060 | |
38b051a1 TM |
4061 | int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, |
4062 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
d45ba43d | 4063 | { |
2c7b4dbc | 4064 | int i; |
aafec89c | 4065 | size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; |
1eef26bd | 4066 | int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate |
972ee925 TP |
4067 | && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
4068 | && ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, TLS1_VERSION, NULL) | |
4069 | && s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION; | |
38b051a1 | 4070 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1d0c08b4 | 4071 | |
d45ba43d | 4072 | /* Set disabled masks for this session */ |
1d0c08b4 | 4073 | if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 4074 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); |
1d0c08b4 MC |
4075 | return 0; |
4076 | } | |
d45ba43d | 4077 | |
f63a17d6 | 4078 | if (sk == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 4079 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
26a7d938 | 4080 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 4081 | } |
d45ba43d | 4082 | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
4083 | #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH |
4084 | # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 | |
4085 | # error Max cipher length too short | |
4086 | # endif | |
4087 | /* | |
4088 | * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround | |
4089 | * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we | |
4090 | * use TLS v1.2 | |
4091 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 4092 | if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
4093 | maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; |
4094 | else | |
4095 | #endif | |
4096 | /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ | |
4097 | maxlen = 0xfffe; | |
4098 | ||
4099 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) | |
4100 | maxlen -= 2; | |
4101 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) | |
4102 | maxlen -= 2; | |
4103 | ||
4104 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { | |
4105 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
4106 | ||
d45ba43d MC |
4107 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); |
4108 | /* Skip disabled ciphers */ | |
8af91fd9 | 4109 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) |
d45ba43d | 4110 | continue; |
2c7b4dbc | 4111 | |
38b051a1 | 4112 | if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 4113 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c7b4dbc MC |
4114 | return 0; |
4115 | } | |
4116 | ||
aafec89c MC |
4117 | /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ |
4118 | if (!maxverok) { | |
6fd37948 FWH |
4119 | int minproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls; |
4120 | int maxproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls; | |
4121 | ||
4122 | if (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) >= 0 | |
4123 | && ssl_version_cmp(s, minproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) <= 0) | |
4124 | maxverok = 1; | |
aafec89c MC |
4125 | } |
4126 | ||
2c7b4dbc | 4127 | totlen += len; |
d45ba43d | 4128 | } |
2c7b4dbc | 4129 | |
aafec89c | 4130 | if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { |
c48ffbcc RL |
4131 | const char *maxvertext = |
4132 | !maxverok | |
4133 | ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version" | |
4134 | : NULL; | |
aafec89c | 4135 | |
c48ffbcc RL |
4136 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, |
4137 | maxvertext); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
4138 | return 0; |
4139 | } | |
4140 | ||
4141 | if (totlen != 0) { | |
d45ba43d | 4142 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { |
c30aee71 | 4143 | static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = { |
bbb4ceb8 | 4144 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
d45ba43d | 4145 | }; |
38b051a1 | 4146 | if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 4147 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c7b4dbc MC |
4148 | return 0; |
4149 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
4150 | } |
4151 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { | |
c30aee71 | 4152 | static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = { |
bbb4ceb8 | 4153 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
d45ba43d | 4154 | }; |
38b051a1 | 4155 | if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 4156 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c7b4dbc MC |
4157 | return 0; |
4158 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
4159 | } |
4160 | } | |
4161 | ||
2c7b4dbc | 4162 | return 1; |
d45ba43d | 4163 | } |
ef6c191b | 4164 | |
67ec6d2b | 4165 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
ef6c191b MC |
4166 | { |
4167 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY | |
4168 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { | |
c48ffbcc | 4169 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
67ec6d2b | 4170 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
ef6c191b MC |
4171 | } |
4172 | ||
4173 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; | |
67ec6d2b | 4174 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
ef6c191b | 4175 | } |