]> git.ipfire.org Git - people/pmueller/ipfire-2.x.git/blob - src/misc-progs/setuid.c
misc-progs: setuid: Return exit code from called process
[people/pmueller/ipfire-2.x.git] / src / misc-progs / setuid.c
1 /* This file is part of the IPCop Firewall.
2 *
3 * IPCop is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
4 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
5 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
6 * (at your option) any later version.
7 *
8 * IPCop is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
9 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
11 * GNU General Public License for more details.
12 *
13 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
14 * along with IPCop; if not, write to the Free Software
15 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
16 *
17 * Copyright (C) 2003-04-22 Robert Kerr <rkerr@go.to>
18 *
19 * $Id: setuid.c,v 1.2.2.1 2005/11/18 14:51:43 franck78 Exp $
20 *
21 */
22
23 #include <ctype.h>
24 #include <stdio.h>
25 #include <string.h>
26 #include <errno.h>
27 #include <unistd.h>
28 #include <stdlib.h>
29 #include <sys/types.h>
30 #include <limits.h>
31 #include <sys/time.h>
32 #include <sys/resource.h>
33 #include <sys/stat.h>
34 #include <fcntl.h>
35 #include <grp.h>
36 #include <signal.h>
37 #include <sys/wait.h>
38 #include <glob.h>
39 #include "setuid.h"
40
41 #ifndef OPEN_MAX
42 #define OPEN_MAX 256
43 #endif
44
45 #define MAX_ARGUMENTS 128
46
47 /* Trusted environment for executing commands */
48 char * trusted_env[4] = {
49 "PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin",
50 "SHELL=/bin/sh",
51 "TERM=dumb",
52 NULL
53 };
54
55 static int system_core(char* command, char** args, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error) {
56 int pid, status;
57
58 char* argv[MAX_ARGUMENTS + 1];
59 unsigned int argc = 0;
60
61 if(!command)
62 return 1;
63
64 // Add command as first element to argv
65 argv[argc++] = command;
66
67 // Add all other arguments
68 if (args) {
69 while (*args) {
70 argv[argc++] = *args++;
71
72 // Break when argv is full
73 if (argc >= MAX_ARGUMENTS) {
74 return 2;
75 }
76 }
77 }
78
79 // Make sure that argv is NULL-terminated
80 argv[argc] = NULL;
81
82 switch(pid = fork()) {
83 case -1:
84 return -1;
85
86 case 0: /* child */ {
87 if (gid && setgid(gid)) {
88 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
89 perror("Couldn't setgid");
90 exit(127);
91 }
92
93 if (uid && setuid(uid)) {
94 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
95 perror("Couldn't setuid");
96 exit(127);
97 }
98
99 execve(command, argv, trusted_env);
100
101 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
102 perror("execve failed");
103 exit(127);
104 }
105
106 default: /* parent */
107 // Wait until the child process has finished
108 waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
109
110 // The child was terminated by a signal
111 if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
112 return 128 + WTERMSIG(status);
113
114 // Return the exit code if available
115 if (WIFEXITED(status))
116 return WEXITSTATUS(status);
117
118 // Something unexpected happened, exiting with error
119 return EXIT_FAILURE;
120 }
121 }
122
123 int run(char* command, char** argv) {
124 return system_core(command, argv, 0, 0, "run");
125 }
126
127 /* Spawns a child process that uses /bin/sh to interpret a command.
128 * This is much the same in use and purpose as system(), yet as it uses execve
129 * to pass a trusted environment it's immune to attacks based upon changing
130 * IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV and other such variables.
131 * Note this does NOT guard against any other attacks, inparticular you MUST
132 * validate the command you are passing. If the command is formed from user
133 * input be sure to check this input is what you expect. Nasty things can
134 * happen if a user can inject ; or `` into your command for example */
135 int safe_system(char* command) {
136 char* argv[4] = {
137 "/bin/sh",
138 "-c",
139 command,
140 NULL,
141 };
142
143 return system_core(argv[0], argv + 1, 0, 0, "safe_system");
144 }
145
146 /* Much like safe_system but lets you specify a non-root uid and gid to run
147 * the command as */
148 int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
149 char* argv[4] = {
150 "/bin/sh",
151 "-c",
152 command,
153 NULL,
154 };
155
156 return system_core(argv[0], argv + 1, uid, gid, "unpriv_system");
157 }
158
159 /* General routine to initialise a setuid root program, and put the
160 * environment in a known state. Returns 1 on success, if initsetuid() returns
161 * 0 then you should exit(1) immediately, DON'T attempt to recover from the
162 * error */
163 int initsetuid(void) {
164 int fds, i;
165 struct stat st;
166 struct rlimit rlim;
167
168 /* Prevent signal tricks by ignoring all except SIGKILL and SIGCHILD */
169 for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) {
170 if (i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD)
171 signal(i, SIG_IGN);
172 }
173
174 /* dump all non-standard file descriptors (a full descriptor table could
175 * lead to DoS by preventing us opening files) */
176 if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1)
177 fds = OPEN_MAX;
178 for (i = 3; i < fds; i++)
179 close(i);
180
181 /* check stdin, stdout & stderr are open before going any further */
182 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
183 if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i))
184 return 0;
185
186 /* disable core dumps in case we're processing sensitive information */
187 rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
188 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim)) {
189 perror("Couldn't disable core dumps");
190 return 0;
191 }
192
193 /* drop any supplementary groups, set uid & gid to root */
194 if (setgroups(0, NULL)) {
195 perror("Couldn't clear group list");
196 return 0;
197 }
198
199 if (setgid(0)) {
200 perror("Couldn't setgid(0)");
201 return 0;
202 }
203
204 if (setuid(0)) {
205 perror("Couldn't setuid(0)");
206 return 0;
207 }
208
209 return 1;
210 }
211
212 /* Checks if a string only contains alphanumerical characters, dash or underscore */
213 int is_valid_argument_alnum(const char* arg) {
214 size_t l = strlen(arg);
215
216 for (unsigned int i = 0; i < l; i++) {
217 char c = arg[i];
218
219 // Dash or underscore
220 if (c == '-' || c == '_')
221 continue;
222
223 // Any alphanumerical character
224 if (isalnum(c))
225 continue;
226
227 // Invalid
228 return 0;
229 }
230
231 return 1;
232 }
233
234 int is_valid_argument_num(const char* arg) {
235 size_t l = strlen(arg);
236
237 for (unsigned int i = 0; i < l; i++) {
238 char c = arg[i];
239
240 // Any digit
241 if (isdigit(c))
242 continue;
243
244 // Invalid
245 return 0;
246 }
247
248 return 1;
249 }