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Reject invalid PSS parameters.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
0f113f3e 8 *
58964a49
RE		 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
0f113f3e 15 *
58964a49
RE		 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
0f113f3e 22 *
58964a49
RE		 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
0f113f3e 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
58964a49
RE		 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
0f113f3e 40 *
58964a49
RE		 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
0f113f3e 52 *
58964a49
RE		 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
0f113f3e 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
f1fd4544
BM		 67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e
MC		 119# include <openssl/dh.h>
120# include <openssl/bn.h>
09599b52 121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
0f113f3e 124const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
0f113f3e
MC		 128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
0f113f3e
MC		 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151};
152
153SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170};
171
172SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190};
58964a49 191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
0f113f3e
MC		 193{
194 /*
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
197 */
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
199}
58964a49 200
6b691a5c 201int tls1_new(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 202{
203 if (!ssl3_new(s))
204 return (0);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 return (1);
207}
58964a49 208
6b691a5c 209void tls1_free(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 210{
12bf56c0 211#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
214 }
215#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 ssl3_free(s);
217}
58964a49 218
6b691a5c 219void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 220{
221 ssl3_clear(s);
222 s->version = s->method->version;
223}
58964a49 224
525de5d3 225#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 226
0f113f3e
MC		 227typedef struct {
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231} tls_curve_info;
232
233# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235
236static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265};
266
267static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271};
272
273static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302};
303
304static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307};
2ea80354 308
525de5d3 309int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
0f113f3e
MC		 310{
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
314 return 0;
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
316}
525de5d3
DSH		 317
318int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 319{
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
321 switch (nid) {
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
323 return 1;
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 return 2;
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
327 return 3;
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
329 return 4;
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
331 return 5;
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
333 return 6;
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
335 return 7;
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
337 return 8;
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
339 return 9;
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
341 return 10;
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
343 return 11;
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
345 return 12;
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
347 return 13;
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
349 return 14;
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
351 return 15;
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
353 return 16;
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
355 return 17;
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
357 return 18;
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
359 return 19;
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
361 return 20;
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
363 return 21;
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
365 return 22;
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
367 return 23;
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
369 return 24;
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
371 return 25;
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
373 return 26;
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
375 return 27;
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
377 return 28;
378 default:
379 return 0;
380 }
381}
382
740580c2
EK		 383/*
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
385 * preferred list.
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
fd2b65ce 394 */
740580c2 395static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
0f113f3e
MC		 396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
397 size_t *num_curves)
398{
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
400 if (sess) {
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
403 } else {
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
409 break;
410
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 pcurveslen = 2;
414 break;
415
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 pcurveslen = 2;
419 break;
420 default:
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 }
424 if (!*pcurves) {
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
427 }
428 }
429
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 *num_curves = 0;
434 return 0;
435 } else {
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
437 return 1;
438 }
439}
b362ccab
DSH		 440
441/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 443{
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
445 if (curve[0])
446 return 1;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
449 return 0;
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
453 return 0;
454# endif
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
456}
b362ccab 457
d18b716d
DSH		 458/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
0f113f3e
MC		 460{
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
465 return 0;
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
467 if (suiteb_flags) {
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
469 if (p[1])
470 return 0;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
473 return 0;
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
476 return 0;
477 } else /* Should never happen */
478 return 0;
479 }
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
481 return 0;
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
485 }
486 return 0;
487}
d0595f17 488
1d97c843 489/*-
376e2ca3
EK		 490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
d0595f17 494 */
a4352630 495int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
0f113f3e
MC		 496{
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
499 int k;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
501 if (s->server == 0)
502 return -1;
503 if (nmatch == -2) {
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
505 /*
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
508 */
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
515 return NID_undef;
516 }
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
518 nmatch = 0;
519 }
520 /*
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
523 */
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
526 &num_supp))
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
531 &num_pref))
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
533 k = 0;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
539 continue;
540 if (nmatch == k) {
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
543 }
544 k++;
545 }
546 }
547 }
548 if (nmatch == -1)
549 return k;
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
551 return NID_undef;
552}
d0595f17
DSH		 553
554int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
0f113f3e
MC		 555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
556{
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
558 size_t i;
559 /*
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
561 * ids < 32
562 */
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
565 if (!clist)
566 return 0;
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
569 int id;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
571 idmask = 1L << id;
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
573 OPENSSL_free(clist);
574 return 0;
575 }
576 dup_list |= idmask;
577 s2n(id, p);
578 }
579 if (*pext)
580 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
581 *pext = clist;
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
583 return 1;
584}
585
586# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
587
588typedef struct {
589 size_t nidcnt;
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
591} nid_cb_st;
d0595f17
DSH		 592
593static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 594{
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
596 size_t i;
597 int nid;
598 char etmp[20];
2747d73c
KR		 599 if (elem == NULL)
600 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
602 return 0;
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
604 return 0;
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
606 etmp[len] = 0;
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
613 return 0;
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
616 return 0;
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
618 return 1;
619}
620
d0595f17 621/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
0f113f3e
MC		 622int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
623 const char *str)
624{
625 nid_cb_st ncb;
626 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
628 return 0;
629 if (pext == NULL)
630 return 1;
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
632}
633
fd2b65ce
DSH		 634/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
0f113f3e
MC		 636 EC_KEY *ec)
637{
638 int is_prime, id;
639 const EC_GROUP *grp;
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
641 if (!ec)
642 return 0;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
645 if (!grp)
646 return 0;
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
648 if (!meth)
649 return 0;
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
651 is_prime = 1;
652 else
653 is_prime = 0;
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
658 if (id) {
659 curve_id[0] = 0;
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
661 } else {
662 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
663 if (is_prime)
664 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
665 else
666 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
667 }
668 if (comp_id) {
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
670 return 0;
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
672 if (is_prime)
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
674 else
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
676 } else
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
678 }
679 return 1;
680}
681
fd2b65ce
DSH		 682/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
685{
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
688 int j;
689 /*
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
692 */
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
698 break;
699 }
700 if (i == num_formats)
701 return 0;
702 }
703 if (!curve_id)
704 return 1;
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
708 return 0;
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
711 break;
712 }
713 if (i == num_curves)
714 return 0;
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
716 if (!s->server)
717 break;
718 }
719 return 1;
720}
d61ff83b 721
5087afa1 722static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
0f113f3e
MC		 723 size_t *num_formats)
724{
725 /*
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
727 */
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
731 } else {
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
734 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
736 else
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
738 }
739}
740
741/*
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
d61ff83b 744 */
2ea80354 745static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 746{
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
748 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
749 int rv;
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
751 if (!pkey)
752 return 0;
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
755 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
756 return 1;
757 }
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
759 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
760 if (!rv)
761 return 0;
762 /*
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
764 * curves extension.
765 */
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
767 if (!rv)
768 return 0;
769 /*
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
772 */
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
774 int check_md;
775 size_t i;
776 CERT *c = s->cert;
777 if (curve_id[0])
778 return 0;
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
784 else
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
788 break;
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
790 return 0;
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
794 else
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
796 }
797 }
798 return rv;
799}
800
10bf4fc2 801# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
fd2b65ce 802/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 803int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
0f113f3e
MC		 804{
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
810 return 1;
811# endif
812 /*
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
814 * curves permitted.
815 */
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
822 else
823 return 0;
824 curve_id[0] = 0;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
827 return 0;
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
830 return 1;
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
832 else {
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
834 if (!ec)
835 return 0;
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
837 return 0;
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
839 return 1;
840 return 0;
841 }
842
843 }
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
847 return 1;
848 else
849 return 0;
850 }
851 if (!ec) {
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
853 return 1;
854 else
855 return 0;
856 }
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
858 return 0;
d18b716d 859/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
0f113f3e
MC		 860# if 0
861 return 1;
862# else
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
864# endif
865}
10bf4fc2 866# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d0595f17 867
14536c8c
DSH		 868#else
869
870static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 871{
872 return 1;
873}
14536c8c 874
0f113f3e 875#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 876
ed3883d2 877#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88 878
0f113f3e
MC		 879/*
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
fc101f88
DSH		 881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
882 */
883
0f113f3e
MC		 884# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
886# else
887# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
888# endif
889
890# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
892# else
893# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
894# endif
895
10bf4fc2
RS		 896# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
0f113f3e
MC		 898# else
899# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
900# endif
901
902# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
903 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
fc101f88 906
d97ed219 907static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 908 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
0f113f3e
MC		 910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
0f113f3e 912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
fc101f88 913};
0f113f3e 914
10bf4fc2 915# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d97ed219 916static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 917 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
2ea80354 919};
0f113f3e 920# endif
b7bfe69b 921size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
0f113f3e
MC		 922{
923 /*
924 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
925 * preferences.
926 */
927# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
928 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
929 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
930 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
931 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
932
933 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
934 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
935 return 2;
936
937 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
938 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
939 return 2;
940 }
941# endif
942 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
943 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
944 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
945 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
946 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
947 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
948 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
949 } else {
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
952 }
953}
954
955/*
956 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
ec4a50b3
DSH		 957 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
958 */
959int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 960 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
961{
962 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
963 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
964 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
965 /* Should never happen */
966 if (sigalg == -1)
967 return -1;
968 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
969 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
971 return 0;
972 }
973# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
974 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
978 return 0;
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
981 return 0;
982 }
983 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
984 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
985 if (curve_id[0])
986 return 0;
987 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
988 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
990 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
991 return 0;
992 }
993 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
994 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
996 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
997 return 0;
998 }
999 } else
1000 return 0;
1001 }
1002 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1003 return 0;
1004# endif
1005
1006 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1007 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1008 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1009 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1010 break;
1011 }
1012 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1013 if (i == sent_sigslen
1014 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1015 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1017 return 0;
1018 }
1019 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1020 if (*pmd == NULL) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1022 return 0;
1023 }
1024 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1025 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1026 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1027 (void *)sig)) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1029 return 0;
1030 }
1031 /*
1032 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1033 */
1034 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1035 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1036 return 1;
1037}
2ea80354 1038
0f113f3e
MC		 1039/*
1040 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1041 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1042 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1043 * settings.
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1044 */
1045void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1046{
1047 CERT *c = s->cert;
1048 c->mask_a = 0;
1049 c->mask_k = 0;
1050 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1051 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1052 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1053 else
1054 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1055 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1056 /*
1057 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1058 * algorithms.
1059 */
1060 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1061 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1062 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1063 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1064 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1066# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1067 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1070 }
1071# endif
1072# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1073 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1074 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1077 }
1078# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1080 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1083 }
1084# endif
1085 c->valid = 1;
1086}
fc101f88 1087
b362ccab 1088int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 1089{
1090 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1091 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1092 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1093 return 1;
1094 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1095}
b362ccab
DSH		 1096
1097static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1098{
1099 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1100 return 0;
1101 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1102}
ed3883d2 1103
0f113f3e
MC		 1104unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1105 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1106{
1107 int extdatalen = 0;
1108 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1109 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1110# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1111 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 int using_ecc = 0;
1113 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1114 int i;
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1117
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1119 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1120
1121 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1122 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1123 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1124 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1125 using_ecc = 1;
1126 break;
1127 }
1128 }
1129 }
1130# endif
ed3883d2 1131
0f113f3e 1132 ret += 2;
6434abbf 1133
0f113f3e
MC		 1134 if (ret >= limit)
1135 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
5a3d8eeb 1136
0f113f3e
MC		 1137 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1138 if (s->renegotiate) {
1139 int el;
5a3d8eeb 1140
0f113f3e
MC		 1141 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 return NULL;
1144 }
5a3d8eeb 1145
0f113f3e
MC		 1146 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1147 return NULL;
5a3d8eeb 1148
0f113f3e
MC		 1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1150 s2n(el, ret);
5a3d8eeb 1151
0f113f3e
MC		 1152 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 return NULL;
5a3d8eeb 1155 }
edc032b5 1156
0f113f3e
MC		 1157 ret += el;
1158 }
1159 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1160 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1161 goto done;
1162
1163 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1164 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1165 unsigned long size_str;
1166 long lenmax;
1167
50e735f9
MC		 1168 /*-
1169 * check for enough space.
1170 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1171 * 2 for servernamelist length
1172 * 1 for the hostname type
1173 * 2 for hostname length
1174 * + hostname length
1175 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1176
1177 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1178 || (size_str =
1179 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1180 return NULL;
1181
1182 /* extension type and length */
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1184 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1185
1186 /* length of servername list */
1187 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1188
1189 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1191 s2n(size_str, ret);
1192 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1193 ret += size_str;
1194 }
1195# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1196 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1197 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1198 * Client Hello message */
1199
1200 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1201 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 return NULL;
1204 }
761772d7 1205
50e735f9
MC		 1206 /*-
1207 * check for enough space.
1208 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1209 * 1 for the srp user identity
1210 * + srp user identity length
1211 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1212 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1213 return NULL;
1214
1215 /* fill in the extension */
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1217 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1218 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1219 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1220 ret += login_len;
1221 }
1222# endif
1223
1224# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1225 if (using_ecc) {
1226 /*
1227 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1228 */
1229 long lenmax;
1230 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1231 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1232 size_t i;
1233 unsigned char *etmp;
1234
1235 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1236
1237 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1238 return NULL;
1239 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1240 return NULL;
1241 if (num_formats > 255) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 return NULL;
1244 }
4817504d 1245
0f113f3e
MC		 1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1247 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1248 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1249 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1250 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1251 ret += num_formats;
1252
1253 /*
1254 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1255 */
1256 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1257 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1258 return NULL;
1259
1260 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1261 return NULL;
1262 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1263 return NULL;
1264 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return NULL;
1267 }
ee2ffc27 1268
0f113f3e
MC		 1269 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1270 etmp = ret + 4;
1271 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1272 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1273 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1274 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1276 }
1277 }
01f2f18f 1278
0f113f3e
MC		 1279 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1280
1281 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1282 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1283 ret += curves_list_len;
1284 }
1285# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1286
1287 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1288 int ticklen;
1289 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1291 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1292 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1293 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1294 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1295 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1296 return NULL;
1297 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1299 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1300 } else
1301 ticklen = 0;
1302 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1304 goto skip_ext;
1305 /*
1306 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1307 * ticket
1308 */
1309 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1310 return NULL;
1311 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1312 s2n(ticklen, ret);
1313 if (ticklen) {
1314 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1315 ret += ticklen;
1316 }
1317 }
1318 skip_ext:
1319
1320 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1321 size_t salglen;
1322 const unsigned char *salg;
1323 unsigned char *etmp;
1324 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1325 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1326 return NULL;
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1328 etmp = ret;
1329 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1330 ret += 4;
1331 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1332 /* Fill in lengths */
1333 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1334 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1335 ret += salglen;
1336 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1337
1338 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1339 int i;
1340 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1341 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1342
1343 idlen = 0;
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1345 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1346 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1347 if (itmp <= 0)
1348 return NULL;
1349 idlen += itmp + 2;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1350 }
1351
0f113f3e
MC		 1352 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1353 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1354 if (extlen < 0)
1355 return NULL;
1356 } else
1357 extlen = 0;
1358
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1360 return NULL;
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1362 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1363 return NULL;
1364 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1365 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1366 s2n(idlen, ret);
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1368 /* save position of id len */
1369 unsigned char *q = ret;
1370 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1371 /* skip over id len */
1372 ret += 2;
1373 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1374 /* write id len */
1375 s2n(itmp, q);
1376 }
1377 s2n(extlen, ret);
1378 if (extlen > 0)
1379 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1380 }
1381# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1384 return NULL;
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1386 s2n(1, ret);
50e735f9
MC		 1387 /*-
1388 * Set mode:
1389 * 1: peer may send requests
1390 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1391 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1392 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1394 else
1395 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1396# endif
1397
1398# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1399 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1400 /*
1401 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1402 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1403 */
1404 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1405 return NULL;
1406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1407 s2n(0, ret);
1408 }
1409# endif
1410
1411 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1412 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1413 return NULL;
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1415 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1416 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1418 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 }
1420# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1422 int el;
1423
1424 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425
1426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1427 return NULL;
1428
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1430 s2n(el, ret);
1431
1432 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 return NULL;
1435 }
1436 ret += el;
1437 }
1438# endif
1439 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1440 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1441 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1442 return NULL;
1443# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1445 s2n(0, ret);
1446# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1448 s2n(0, ret);
0f113f3e
MC		 1449
1450 /*
1451 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1452 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1453 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1454 * appear last.
1455 */
1456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1457 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1458 /*
1459 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1460 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1461 * does not.
1462 */
1463 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1464 hlen -= 5;
1465 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1466 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1467 if (hlen >= 4)
1468 hlen -= 4;
1469 else
1470 hlen = 0;
1471
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1473 s2n(hlen, ret);
1474 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1475 ret += hlen;
1476 }
1477 }
5a3d8eeb 1478
0f113f3e 1479 done:
5a3d8eeb 1480
0f113f3e
MC		 1481 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1482 return orig;
5a3d8eeb 1483
0f113f3e
MC		 1484 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1485 return ret;
1486}
333f926d 1487
0f113f3e
MC		 1488unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1489 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1490{
1491 int extdatalen = 0;
1492 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1493 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1494# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1495 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1496# endif
1497# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1499 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1500 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1501 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1502 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1503# endif
1504
1505 ret += 2;
1506 if (ret >= limit)
1507 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1508
1509 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1510 int el;
1511
1512 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1514 return NULL;
1515 }
333f926d 1516
0f113f3e
MC		 1517 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1518 return NULL;
333f926d 1519
0f113f3e
MC		 1520 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1521 s2n(el, ret);
333f926d 1522
0f113f3e
MC		 1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 return NULL;
1526 }
333f926d 1527
0f113f3e
MC		 1528 ret += el;
1529 }
1530
1531 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1532 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1533 goto done;
1534
1535 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1536 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1537 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1538 return NULL;
1539
1540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1541 s2n(0, ret);
1542 }
1543# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1544 if (using_ecc) {
1545 const unsigned char *plist;
1546 size_t plistlen;
1547 /*
1548 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1549 */
1550 long lenmax;
1551
1552 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1553
1554 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1555 return NULL;
1556 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1557 return NULL;
1558 if (plistlen > 255) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1560 return NULL;
1561 }
4817504d 1562
0f113f3e
MC		 1563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1564 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1565 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1566 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1567 ret += plistlen;
1568
1569 }
1570 /*
1571 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1572 * extension
1573 */
1574# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1575
1576 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1577 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1578 return NULL;
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1580 s2n(0, ret);
1581 }
1582
1583 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1584 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1585 return NULL;
1586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1587 s2n(0, ret);
1588 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1589
1590# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1591 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1592 int el;
1593
1594 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1595
1596 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1597 return NULL;
1598
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1600 s2n(el, ret);
1601
1602 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 return NULL;
1605 }
1606 ret += el;
1607 }
1608# endif
1609
1610 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1611 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1612 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1613 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1614 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1615 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1616 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1617 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1618 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1619 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1620 };
1621 if (limit - ret < 36)
1622 return NULL;
1623 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1624 ret += 36;
1625
1626 }
1627# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1628 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1629 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1630 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1631 return NULL;
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1633 s2n(1, ret);
50e735f9
MC		 1634 /*-
1635 * Set mode:
1636 * 1: peer may send requests
1637 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1638 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1640 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1641 else
1642 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1643
1644 }
1645# endif
1646
1647# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1648 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1649 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1650 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1651 const unsigned char *npa;
1652 unsigned int npalen;
1653 int r;
1654
1655 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1656 s->
1657 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1659 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1660 return NULL;
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1662 s2n(npalen, ret);
1663 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1664 ret += npalen;
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1666 }
1667 }
1668# endif
1669 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1670 return NULL;
1671# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1672 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1673 /*
1674 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1675 * for other cases too.
1676 */
1677 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1678 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1679 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1680 else {
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1682 s2n(0, ret);
1683 }
1684 }
1685# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 1686 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1688 s2n(0, ret);
1689 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1690
1691 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1692 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1693 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1694
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1696 return NULL;
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1698 s2n(3 + len, ret);
1699 s2n(1 + len, ret);
1700 *ret++ = len;
1701 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1702 ret += len;
1703 }
1704
1705 done:
1706
1707 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1708 return orig;
1709
1710 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1711 return ret;
1712}
a398f821 1713
0f113f3e
MC		 1714/*
1715 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1716 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1717 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1718 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1719 * success.
1720 */
6f017a8f 1721static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
0f113f3e
MC		 1722 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1723{
1724 unsigned i;
1725 unsigned proto_len;
1726 const unsigned char *selected;
1727 unsigned char selected_len;
1728 int r;
1729
1730 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1731 return 0;
1732
1733 if (data_len < 2)
1734 goto parse_error;
1735
1736 /*
1737 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1738 * length-prefixed strings.
1739 */
1740 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1741 data_len -= 2;
1742 data += 2;
1743 if (data_len != i)
1744 goto parse_error;
1745
1746 if (data_len < 2)
1747 goto parse_error;
1748
1749 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1750 proto_len = data[i];
1751 i++;
1752
1753 if (proto_len == 0)
1754 goto parse_error;
1755
1756 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1757 goto parse_error;
1758
1759 i += proto_len;
1760 }
1761
1762 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1763 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1764 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1765 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1768 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1770 return -1;
1771 }
1772 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1773 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1774 }
1775 return 0;
1776
1777 parse_error:
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1779 return -1;
1780}
6f017a8f 1781
0f113f3e 1782# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1d97c843
TH		 1783/*-
1784 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
dece3209
RS		 1785 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1786 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1787 * SNI,
1788 * elliptic_curves
1789 * ec_point_formats
1790 *
1791 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1792 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1793 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1794 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1795 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1796static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1797 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1798{
1799 unsigned short type, size;
1800 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1801 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1802 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1803 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1804 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1805 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1806 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1807
1808 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1809 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1810 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1811 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1812 };
1813
1814 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1815 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1816 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1817 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1818 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1819 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1820 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1821 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1822 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1823 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1824 };
1825
1826 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1827 return;
1828 data += 2;
1829
1830 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1831 return;
1832 n2s(data, type);
1833 n2s(data, size);
1834
1835 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1836 return;
1837
1838 if (data + size > d + n)
1839 return;
1840 data += size;
1841
1842 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1843 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1844 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1845
1846 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1847 return;
1848 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1849 return;
1850 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1851 return;
1852 } else {
1853 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1854
1855 if (data + len != d + n)
1856 return;
1857 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1858 return;
1859 }
1860
1861 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
dece3209 1862}
0f113f3e
MC		 1863# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1864
1865static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1866 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1867{
1868 unsigned short type;
1869 unsigned short size;
1870 unsigned short len;
1871 unsigned char *data = *p;
1872 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1873
1874 s->servername_done = 0;
1875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1876# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1878# endif
1879
1880 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1881 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1882 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1883 }
1884# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1887# endif
1888
1889# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1890 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1891 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1892# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1893
1894 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1895 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1897 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1898 }
1899# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1900 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1901# endif
1902
1903# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1905 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1906 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1907 }
1908# endif
1909
1910 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1911
1912 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1913 goto ri_check;
1914 n2s(data, len);
1915
1916 if (data > (d + n - len))
1917 goto ri_check;
1918
1919 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1920 n2s(data, type);
1921 n2s(data, size);
1922
1923 if (data + size > (d + n))
1924 goto ri_check;
0f113f3e
MC		 1925 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1926 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1927 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1928 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1929 return 0;
1930 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1931 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1932 }
1d97c843
TH		 1933/*-
1934 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1935 *
1936 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1937 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1938 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1939 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1940 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
0f113f3e
MC		 1941 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1942 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1943 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1d97c843
TH		 1944 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1945 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1946 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1947 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1948 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
0f113f3e 1949 * the value of the Host: field.
1d97c843 1950 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
0f113f3e
MC		 1951 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1952 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1953 * extension.
1954 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1d97c843 1955 *
0f113f3e 1956 */
ed3883d2 1957
0f113f3e
MC		 1958 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1959 unsigned char *sdata;
1960 int servname_type;
1961 int dsize;
1962
1963 if (size < 2) {
1964 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1965 return 0;
1966 }
1967 n2s(data, dsize);
1968 size -= 2;
1969 if (dsize > size) {
1970 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 return 0;
1972 }
1973
1974 sdata = data;
1975 while (dsize > 3) {
1976 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1977 n2s(sdata, len);
1978 dsize -= 3;
1979
1980 if (len > dsize) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 return 0;
1983 }
1984 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1985 switch (servname_type) {
1986 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1987 if (!s->hit) {
1988 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1994 return 0;
1995 }
1996 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1997 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1998 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 return 0;
2000 }
2001 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2002 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2003 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2004 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2005 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2007 return 0;
2008 }
2009 s->servername_done = 1;
761772d7 2010
0f113f3e
MC		 2011 } else
2012 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2013 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2014 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2015 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
b2284ed3 2016
0f113f3e 2017 break;
ee2ffc27 2018
0f113f3e
MC		 2019 default:
2020 break;
2021 }
6f31dd72 2022
0f113f3e
MC		 2023 dsize -= len;
2024 }
2025 if (dsize != 0) {
2026 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 return 0;
2028 }
6f017a8f 2029
0f113f3e
MC		 2030 }
2031# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2032 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2033 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 return 0;
2036 }
2037 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 return 0;
2040 }
2041 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2042 return -1;
2043 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2044 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2045
2046 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 return 0;
2049 }
2050 }
2051# endif
2052
2053# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2054 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2055 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2056 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2057
2058 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2059 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2061 return 0;
2062 }
2063 if (!s->hit) {
2064 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2065 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2067 }
2068 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2069 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2070 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 return 0;
2073 }
2074 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2075 ecpointformatlist_length;
2076 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2077 ecpointformatlist_length);
2078 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2079 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2080 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2083
2084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2086 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2087 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2088 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 return 0;
2090 }
2091 if (!s->hit) {
2092 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 return 0;
2095 }
2096 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2097 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2098 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2100 return 0;
2101 }
2102 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2103 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2105 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2106 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2107 }
2108# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 2109 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2110 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2111 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2112 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2113 {
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2115 return 0;
2116 }
2117 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2118 int dsize;
2119 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 return 0;
2122 }
2123 n2s(data, dsize);
2124 size -= 2;
2125 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2126 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2127 return 0;
2128 }
2129 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 return 0;
2132 }
2133 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2134
2135 if (size < 5) {
2136 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2137 return 0;
2138 }
2139
2140 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2141 size--;
2142 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2143 const unsigned char *sdata;
2144 int dsize;
2145 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2146 n2s(data, dsize);
2147 size -= 2;
2148 if (dsize > size) {
2149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 return 0;
2151 }
2152 while (dsize > 0) {
2153 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2154 int idsize;
2155 if (dsize < 4) {
2156 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 return 0;
2158 }
2159 n2s(data, idsize);
2160 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2161 size -= 2 + idsize;
2162 if (dsize < 0) {
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 return 0;
2165 }
2166 sdata = data;
2167 data += idsize;
2168 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2169 if (!id) {
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 return 0;
2172 }
2173 if (data != sdata) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 return 0;
2177 }
2178 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2179 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2180 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2181 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2182 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 return 0;
2184 }
2185 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2186 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2187 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2188 return 0;
2189 }
2190 }
4817504d 2191
0f113f3e
MC		 2192 /* Read in request_extensions */
2193 if (size < 2) {
2194 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 return 0;
2196 }
2197 n2s(data, dsize);
2198 size -= 2;
2199 if (dsize != size) {
2200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2201 return 0;
2202 }
2203 sdata = data;
2204 if (dsize > 0) {
2205 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2206 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2207 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2208 }
2209
2210 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2211 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2212 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 return 0;
2215 }
2216 }
2217 }
2218 /*
2219 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2220 */
2221 else
2222 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2223 }
2224# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2226 switch (data[0]) {
2227 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2228 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2229 break;
2230 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2231 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2232 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2233 break;
2234 default:
2235 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2236 return 0;
2237 }
2238 }
2239# endif
2240# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2241 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2242 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2243 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
50e735f9
MC		 2244 /*-
2245 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2246 * renegotiation.
2247 *
2248 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2249 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2250 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2251 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2252 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2253 * anything like that, but this might change).
2254 *
2255 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2256 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2257 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2258 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2259 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2260 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2261 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2262 }
2263# endif
2264
2265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2266 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2267 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2268 return 0;
2269# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2270 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2271 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2272# endif
2273 }
5e3ff62c 2274
0f113f3e
MC		 2275 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2276# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2277 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2278 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2279 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2280 return 0;
2281 }
2282# endif
2283# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2285 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2286# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 2287 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2288 if (!s->hit)
2289 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2290 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2291 /*
2292 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2293 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2294 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2295 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2296 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2297 */
2298 else if (!s->hit) {
2299 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2300 return 0;
2301 }
ed3883d2 2302
0f113f3e
MC		 2303 data += size;
2304 }
6f017a8f 2305
0f113f3e
MC		 2306 *p = data;
2307
2308 ri_check:
ed3883d2 2309
0f113f3e
MC		 2310 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2311
2312 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2314 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2316 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2317 return 0;
2318 }
2319
2320 return 1;
2321}
2322
2323int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2324 int n)
2325{
2326 int al = -1;
2327 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2328 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2329 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2330 return 0;
2331 }
2332
2333 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2335 return 0;
2336 }
2337 return 1;
2338}
2339
2340# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2341/*
2342 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2343 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2344 * fill the length of the block.
2345 */
2346static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2347{
2348 unsigned int off = 0;
2349
2350 while (off < len) {
2351 if (d[off] == 0)
2352 return 0;
2353 off += d[off];
2354 off++;
2355 }
2356
2357 return off == len;
2358}
2359# endif
2360
2361static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2362 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2363{
2364 unsigned short length;
2365 unsigned short type;
2366 unsigned short size;
2367 unsigned char *data = *p;
2368 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2369 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2370
2371# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2372 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2373# endif
2374 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2375
2376 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2377 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2378 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2379 }
2380# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2382 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2383# endif
2384
2385# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2387# endif
2388
2389 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2390 goto ri_check;
2391
2392 n2s(data, length);
2393 if (data + length != d + n) {
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2399 n2s(data, type);
2400 n2s(data, size);
2401
2402 if (data + size > (d + n))
2403 goto ri_check;
2404
2405 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2406 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2407
2408 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2409 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2410 return 0;
2411 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2413 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2414 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2416 return 0;
2417 }
2418 tlsext_servername = 1;
2419 }
2420# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2422 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2423 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2424
2425 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 return 0;
2428 }
2429 if (!s->hit) {
2430 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2431 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2432 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2433 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2434 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2436 return 0;
2437 }
2438 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2439 ecpointformatlist_length;
2440 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2441 ecpointformatlist_length);
2442 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2443 }
2444# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2445
2446 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2447 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2448 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2449 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2450 {
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2452 return 0;
2453 }
2454 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2456 return 0;
2457 }
2458 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2459 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2461 /*
2462 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2463 * request message.
2464 */
2465 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2467 return 0;
2468 }
2469 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2470 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2471 }
2472# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2474 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2475 unsigned char *selected;
2476 unsigned char selected_len;
2477
2478 /* We must have requested it. */
2479 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2481 return 0;
2482 }
2483 /* The data must be valid */
2484 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2485 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2486 return 0;
2487 }
2488 if (s->
2489 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2490 size,
2491 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2492 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2494 return 0;
2495 }
2496 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2497 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2499 return 0;
2500 }
2501 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2502 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2503 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2504 }
2505# endif
2506
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2508 unsigned len;
2509
2510 /* We must have requested it. */
2511 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2513 return 0;
2514 }
2515 if (size < 4) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2517 return 0;
2518 }
50e735f9
MC		 2519 /*-
2520 * The extension data consists of:
2521 * uint16 list_length
2522 * uint8 proto_length;
2523 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2524 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2525 len = data[0];
2526 len <<= 8;
2527 len |= data[1];
2528 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 return 0;
2531 }
2532 len = data[2];
2533 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2535 return 0;
2536 }
2537 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2540 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2541 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2542 return 0;
2543 }
2544 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2545 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2546 }
2547# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2548 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2549 switch (data[0]) {
2550 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2551 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2552 break;
2553 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2554 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2555 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2556 break;
2557 default:
2558 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2559 return 0;
2560 }
2561 }
2562# endif
2563# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2564 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2565 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2566 return 0;
2567 }
2568# endif
2569# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2571 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2572 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2573 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2574 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2575 }
2576# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 2577 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2578 if (!s->hit)
2579 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2580 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2581 /*
2582 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2583 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2584 */
2585 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2586 return 0;
2587
2588 data += size;
2589 }
2590
2591 if (data != d + n) {
2592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2593 return 0;
2594 }
2595
2596 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2597 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2598 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2599 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2600 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2601 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604 } else {
2605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2606 return 0;
2607 }
2608 }
2609 }
2610
2611 *p = data;
2612
2613 ri_check:
2614
2615 /*
2616 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2617 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2618 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2619 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2620 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2621 * initial connect only.
2622 */
2623 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2624 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2627 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2628 return 0;
2629 }
2630
2631 return 1;
2632}
b2172f4f 2633
36ca4ba6 2634int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2635{
2636
0f113f3e
MC		 2637 return 1;
2638}
36ca4ba6
BM		 2639
2640int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2641{
2642 return 1;
2643}
36ca4ba6 2644
2daceb03 2645static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2646{
2647 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2648 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2649
2650# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2651 /*
2652 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2653 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2654 */
2655 /*
2656 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2657 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2658 */
2659# endif
2660
2661 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2662 ret =
2663 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2664 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2665 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2666 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2667 ret =
2668 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2669 s->
2670 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2671
0f113f3e
MC		 2672 switch (ret) {
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2675 return -1;
2676
2677 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2678 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2679 return 1;
2680
2681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2682 s->servername_done = 0;
2683 default:
2684 return 1;
2685 }
2686}
f1fd4544 2687
e469af8d 2688int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2689{
2690 int al;
2691 size_t i;
2692 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2693 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2694 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2695 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2696 }
2697 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2698 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2699 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2700 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2701 }
2702
2703 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2704 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2705 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2707 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2708 goto err;
2709 }
2710 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2711 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2713 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2714 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2715 goto err;
2716 }
2717 } else
2718 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2719 return 1;
2720 err:
2721 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2722 return 0;
2723}
e469af8d 2724
2daceb03 2725int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2726{
2727 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2728 int al;
2729
2730 /*
2731 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2732 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2733 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2734 * influence which certificate is sent
2735 */
2736 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2737 int r;
2738 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2739 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2740 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2741 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2742 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2743 return 1;
2744 }
2745 /*
2746 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2747 * et al can pick it up.
2748 */
2749 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2750 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2751 switch (r) {
2752 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2753 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2754 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2755 break;
2756 /* status request response should be sent */
2757 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2758 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2760 else
2761 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2762 break;
2763 /* something bad happened */
2764 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2765 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2766 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2767 goto err;
2768 }
2769 } else
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2daceb03
BL		 2771
2772 err:
0f113f3e
MC		 2773 switch (ret) {
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2776 return -1;
2777
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2779 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2780 return 1;
2781
2782 default:
2783 return 1;
2784 }
2785}
2daceb03 2786
36ca4ba6 2787int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2788{
2789 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2790 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2791
2792# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2793 /*
2794 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2795 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2796 * must contain uncompressed.
2797 */
2798 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2799 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2800 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2801 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2802 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2803 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2804 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2805 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2806 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2807 size_t i;
2808 unsigned char *list;
2809 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2810 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2811 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2812 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2813 found_uncompressed = 1;
2814 break;
2815 }
2816 }
2817 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2819 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2820 return -1;
2821 }
2822 }
2823 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2824# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2825
2826 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2827 ret =
2828 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2829 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2830 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2831 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2832 ret =
2833 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2834 s->
2835 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2836
0f113f3e
MC		 2837 /*
2838 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2839 * callback
2840 */
2841 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2842 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2843 int r;
2844 /*
2845 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2846 * response.
2847 */
2848 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2849 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2850 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2851 }
2852 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2853 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2854 if (r == 0) {
2855 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2856 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2857 }
2858 if (r < 0) {
2859 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2860 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2861 }
2862 }
2863
2864 switch (ret) {
2865 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2866 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2867 return -1;
2868
2869 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2870 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2871 return 1;
2872
2873 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2874 s->servername_done = 0;
2875 default:
2876 return 1;
2877 }
2878}
761772d7 2879
0f113f3e
MC		 2880int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2881 int n)
2882{
2883 int al = -1;
2884 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2885 return 1;
2886 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2888 return 0;
2889 }
2890
2891 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2893 return 0;
2894 }
2895 return 1;
09e4e4b9
DSH		 2896}
2897
1d97c843
TH		 2898/*-
2899 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
c519e89f
BM		 2900 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2901 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2902 *
2903 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2904 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2905 * extension, if any.
2906 * len: the length of the session ID.
2907 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2908 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2909 * point to the resulting session.
2910 *
2911 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2912 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2913 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2914 *
2915 * Returns:
2916 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2917 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2918 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2919 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2920 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2921 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2922 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2923 *
2924 * Side effects:
2925 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2926 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2927 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2928 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2929 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2930 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 2931 */
6434abbf 2932int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
0f113f3e
MC		 2933 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2934{
2935 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2936 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2937 unsigned short i;
2938
2939 *ret = NULL;
2940 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2941
2942 /*
2943 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2944 * resumption.
2945 */
2946 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2947 return 0;
2948 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2949 return 0;
2950 if (p >= limit)
2951 return -1;
2952 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2953 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2954 i = *(p++);
2955 p += i;
2956 if (p >= limit)
2957 return -1;
2958 }
2959 /* Skip past cipher list */
2960 n2s(p, i);
2961 p += i;
2962 if (p >= limit)
2963 return -1;
2964 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2965 i = *(p++);
2966 p += i;
2967 if (p > limit)
2968 return -1;
2969 /* Now at start of extensions */
2970 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2971 return 0;
2972 n2s(p, i);
2973 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2974 unsigned short type, size;
2975 n2s(p, type);
2976 n2s(p, size);
2977 if (p + size > limit)
2978 return 0;
2979 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2980 int r;
2981 if (size == 0) {
2982 /*
2983 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2984 * one.
2985 */
2986 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2987 return 1;
2988 }
2989 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2990 /*
2991 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2992 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2993 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2994 * calculate the master secret later.
2995 */
2996 return 2;
2997 }
2998 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2999 switch (r) {
3000 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3001 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3002 return 2;
3003 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3004 return r;
3005 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3006 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3007 return 3;
3008 default: /* fatal error */
3009 return -1;
3010 }
3011 }
3012 p += size;
3013 }
3014 return 0;
3015}
6434abbf 3016
1d97c843
TH		 3017/*-
3018 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
c519e89f
BM		 3019 *
3020 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3021 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3022 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3023 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3024 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3025 * point to the resulting session.
3026 *
3027 * Returns:
3028 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3029 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3030 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3031 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3032 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3033static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3034 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3035 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3036{
3037 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3038 unsigned char *sdec;
3039 const unsigned char *p;
3040 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3041 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3042 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3043 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3044 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3045 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3046 if (eticklen < 48)
3047 return 2;
3048 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3049 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3050 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3051 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3052 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3053 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3054 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3055 if (rv < 0)
3056 return -1;
3057 if (rv == 0)
3058 return 2;
3059 if (rv == 2)
3060 renew_ticket = 1;
3061 } else {
3062 /* Check key name matches */
3063 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3064 return 2;
3065 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
474e469b 3066 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
0f113f3e
MC		 3067 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3068 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3069 }
3070 /*
3071 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3072 * checks on ticket.
3073 */
3074 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3075 if (mlen < 0) {
3076 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3077 return -1;
3078 }
3079 eticklen -= mlen;
3080 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3081 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3082 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3083 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3084 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3086 return 2;
3087 }
3088 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3089 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3090 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3091 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3092 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3093 if (!sdec) {
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3095 return -1;
3096 }
3097 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3098 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3100 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3101 return 2;
3102 }
3103 slen += mlen;
3104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3105 p = sdec;
3106
3107 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3108 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3109 if (sess) {
3110 /*
3111 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3112 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3113 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3114 * standard.
3115 */
3116 if (sesslen)
3117 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3118 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3119 *psess = sess;
3120 if (renew_ticket)
3121 return 4;
3122 else
3123 return 3;
3124 }
3125 ERR_clear_error();
3126 /*
3127 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3128 */
3129 return 2;
3130}
6434abbf 3131
6b7be581
DSH		 3132/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3133
0f113f3e
MC		 3134typedef struct {
3135 int nid;
3136 int id;
3137} tls12_lookup;
6b7be581 3138
d97ed219 3139static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3140 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3141 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3142 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3143 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3144 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3145 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3146};
3147
d97ed219 3148static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3149 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3150 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3151 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3152};
3153
d97ed219 3154static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3155{
3156 size_t i;
3157 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3158 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3159 return table[i].id;
3160 }
3161 return -1;
3162}
e7f8ff43 3163
d97ed219 3164static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3165{
3166 size_t i;
3167 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3168 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3169 return table[i].nid;
3170 }
3171 return NID_undef;
3172}
3173
3174int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3175 const EVP_MD *md)
3176{
3177 int sig_id, md_id;
3178 if (!md)
3179 return 0;
3180 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3181 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3182 if (md_id == -1)
3183 return 0;
3184 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3185 if (sig_id == -1)
3186 return 0;
3187 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3188 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3189 return 1;
3190}
6b7be581 3191
a2f9200f 3192int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
0f113f3e
MC		 3193{
3194 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3195 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3196}
3197
3198typedef struct {
3199 int nid;
3200 int secbits;
3201 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3202} tls12_hash_info;
b362ccab
DSH		 3203
3204static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3205# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3206 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3207# else
3208 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3209# endif
0f113f3e 3210 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
0f113f3e
MC		 3211 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3212 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
0f113f3e
MC		 3213 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3214 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
b362ccab 3215};
a2f9200f 3216
b362ccab 3217static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3218{
3219 if (hash_alg == 0)
3220 return NULL;
3221 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3222 return NULL;
3223 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3224}
a2f9200f 3225
b362ccab 3226const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3227{
3228 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3229 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3230 return NULL;
3231 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3232 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3233 return NULL;
3234 return inf->mfunc();
3235}
a2f9200f 3236
4453cd8c 3237static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3238{
3239 switch (sig_alg) {
3240# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3241 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3242 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3243# endif
3244# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3245 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3246 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3247# endif
10bf4fc2 3248# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3249 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3250 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3251# endif
3252 }
3253 return -1;
3254}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3255
3256/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3257static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
0f113f3e
MC		 3258 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3259{
3260 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3261 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3262 return;
3263 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3264 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3265 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3266 if (phash_nid)
3267 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3268 }
3269 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3270 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3271 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3272 if (psign_nid)
3273 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3274 }
3275 if (psignhash_nid) {
3276 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3277 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3278 else
3279 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3280 }
3281}
3282
b362ccab
DSH		 3283/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3284static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
0f113f3e
MC		 3285{
3286 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3287 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3288 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3289 return 0;
3290 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3291 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3292 return 0;
3293 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3294 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3295}
3296
3297/*
3298 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3299 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3300 * disabled.
b362ccab
DSH		 3301 */
3302
3303void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 3304{
3305 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3306 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3307 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3308 /*
3309 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3310 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3311 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3312 */
3313 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3314 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3315 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3316# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3317 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3318 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3319 have_rsa = 1;
3320 break;
3321# endif
3322# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3323 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3324 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3325 have_dsa = 1;
3326 break;
3327# endif
10bf4fc2 3328# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3329 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3330 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3331 have_ecdsa = 1;
3332 break;
3333# endif
3334 }
3335 }
3336 if (!have_rsa)
3337 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3338 if (!have_dsa)
3339 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3340 if (!have_ecdsa)
3341 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3342}
b362ccab
DSH		 3343
3344size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
0f113f3e
MC		 3345 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3346{
3347 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3348 size_t i;
3349 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3350 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3351 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3352 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3353 }
3354 }
3355 return tmpout - out;
3356}
b362ccab 3357
4453cd8c 3358/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3359static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
0f113f3e
MC		 3360 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3361 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3362{
3363 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3364 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3365 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3366 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3367 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3368 continue;
3369 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3370 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3371 nmatch++;
3372 if (shsig) {
3373 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3374 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3375 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3376 &shsig->sign_nid,
3377 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3378 shsig++;
3379 }
3380 break;
3381 }
3382 }
3383 }
3384 return nmatch;
3385}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3386
3387/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3388static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3389{
3390 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3391 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3392 size_t nmatch;
3393 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3394 CERT *c = s->cert;
3395 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3396 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3397 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3398 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3399 }
3400 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3401 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3402 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3403 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3404 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3405 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3406 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3407 } else
3408 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3410 pref = conf;
3411 preflen = conflen;
3412 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3413 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3414 } else {
3415 allow = conf;
3416 allowlen = conflen;
3417 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3418 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3419 }
3420 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3421 if (!nmatch)
3422 return 1;
3423 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3424 if (!salgs)
3425 return 0;
3426 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3427 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3428 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3429 return 1;
3430}
4453cd8c 3431
6b7be581
DSH		 3432/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3433
c800c27a 3434int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
0f113f3e
MC		 3435{
3436 CERT *c = s->cert;
3437 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3438 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3439 return 1;
3440 /* Should never happen */
3441 if (!c)
3442 return 0;
3443
3444 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3445 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3446 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3447 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3448 return 0;
3449 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3450 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3451 return 1;
3452}
6b7be581 3453
c800c27a 3454int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3455{
3456 int idx;
3457 size_t i;
3458 const EVP_MD *md;
3459 CERT *c = s->cert;
3460 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3461 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3462 return 0;
3463
3464# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3465 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3466 /*
3467 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3468 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3469 */
3470 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3471 if (s->server)
3472 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3473 else
3474 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3475 if (sigs) {
3476 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3477 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3478 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3479 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3480 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3481 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3482 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3484 }
3485 }
3486 }
3487# endif
3488
3489 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3490 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3491 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3492 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3493 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3494 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3495 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3496 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3497 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3498 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3499 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3500 }
3501 }
6b7be581 3502
0f113f3e
MC		 3503 }
3504 /*
3505 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3506 * the certificate for signing.
3507 */
3508 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3509 /*
3510 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3511 * supported it stays as NULL.
3512 */
3513# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3514 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3516# endif
3517# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3518 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3519 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3521 }
3522# endif
10bf4fc2 3523# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
0f113f3e
MC		 3524 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3525 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3526# endif
3527 }
3528 return 1;
3529}
4817504d 3530
e7f8ff43 3531int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3532 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3533 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3534{
3535 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3536 if (psig == NULL)
3537 return 0;
3538 if (idx >= 0) {
3539 idx <<= 1;
3540 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3541 return 0;
3542 psig += idx;
3543 if (rhash)
3544 *rhash = psig[0];
3545 if (rsig)
3546 *rsig = psig[1];
3547 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3548 }
3549 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3550}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3551
3552int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3553 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3554 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3555{
3556 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3557 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3558 return 0;
3559 shsigalgs += idx;
3560 if (phash)
3561 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3562 if (psign)
3563 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3564 if (psignhash)
3565 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3566 if (rsig)
3567 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3568 if (rhash)
3569 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3570 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3571}
3572
3573# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3574int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3575{
3576 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3577 unsigned short hbtype;
3578 unsigned int payload;
3579 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3580
3581 if (s->msg_callback)
3582 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3583 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3584 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3585
3586 /* Read type and payload length first */
3587 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3588 return 0; /* silently discard */
3589 hbtype = *p++;
3590 n2s(p, payload);
3591 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3592 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3593 pl = p;
3594
3595 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3596 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3597 int r;
3598
3599 /*
3600 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3601 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3602 */
3603 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3604 if (buffer == NULL) {
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3606 return -1;
3607 }
3608 bp = buffer;
3609
3610 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3611 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3612 s2n(payload, bp);
3613 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3614 bp += payload;
3615 /* Random padding */
3616 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3617
3618 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3619 3 + payload + padding);
3620
3621 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3622 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3623 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3624 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3625
3626 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3627
3628 if (r < 0)
3629 return r;
3630 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3631 unsigned int seq;
3632
3633 /*
3634 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3635 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3636 */
3637 n2s(pl, seq);
3638
3639 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3640 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3641 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3642 }
3643 }
3644
3645 return 0;
3646}
0f229cce 3647
0f113f3e
MC		 3648int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3649{
3650 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3651 int ret;
3652 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3653 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3654
3655 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3656 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3657 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3659 return -1;
3660 }
3661
3662 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3663 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3665 return -1;
3666 }
3667
3668 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3669 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3671 return -1;
3672 }
3673
3674 /*
3675 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3676 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3677 */
3678 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3679
50e735f9
MC		 3680 /*-
3681 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3682 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3683 * some random stuff.
3684 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3685 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3686 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3687 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3688 * - Padding
3689 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3690 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3691 if (buf == NULL) {
3692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3693 return -1;
3694 }
3695 p = buf;
3696 /* Message Type */
3697 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3698 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3699 s2n(payload, p);
3700 /* Sequence number */
3701 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3702 /* 16 random bytes */
3703 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3704 p += 16;
3705 /* Random padding */
3706 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3707
3708 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3709 if (ret >= 0) {
3710 if (s->msg_callback)
3711 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3712 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3713 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3714
3715 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3716 }
3717
3718 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3719
3720 return ret;
3721}
3722# endif
3723
3724# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce 3725
0f113f3e
MC		 3726typedef struct {
3727 size_t sigalgcnt;
3728 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3729} sig_cb_st;
0f229cce
DSH		 3730
3731static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3732{
3733 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3734 size_t i;
3735 char etmp[20], *p;
3736 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
2747d73c
KR		 3737 if (elem == NULL)
3738 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3739 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3740 return 0;
3741 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3742 return 0;
3743 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3744 etmp[len] = 0;
3745 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3746 if (!p)
3747 return 0;
3748 *p = 0;
3749 p++;
3750 if (!*p)
3751 return 0;
3752
3753 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3754 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3755 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3756 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3757 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3758 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3759 else
3760 return 0;
3761
3762 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3763 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3764 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3765 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3766 return 0;
3767
3768 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3769 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3770 return 0;
3771 }
3772 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3774 return 1;
3775}
3776
3777/*
3778 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3779 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3780 */
3dbc46df 3781int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f113f3e
MC		 3782{
3783 sig_cb_st sig;
3784 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3785 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3786 return 0;
3787 if (c == NULL)
3788 return 1;
3789 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3790}
3791
3792int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3793 int client)
3794{
3795 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3796 int rhash, rsign;
3797 size_t i;
3798 if (salglen & 1)
3799 return 0;
3800 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3801 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3802 return 0;
3803 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3804 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3805 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3806 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3807 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3808
3809 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3810 goto err;
3811 *sptr++ = rhash;
3812 *sptr++ = rsign;
3813 }
3814
3815 if (client) {
3816 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3817 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3818 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3819 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3820 } else {
3821 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3822 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3823 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3824 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3825 }
3826
3827 return 1;
3828
3829 err:
3830 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3831 return 0;
3832}
4453cd8c 3833
d61ff83b 3834static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 3835{
3836 int sig_nid;
3837 size_t i;
3838 if (default_nid == -1)
3839 return 1;
3840 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3841 if (default_nid)
3842 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3843 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3844 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3845 return 1;
3846 return 0;
3847}
3848
6dbb6219
DSH		 3849/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3850static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 3851{
3852 X509_NAME *nm;
3853 int i;
3854 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3855 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3856 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3857 return 1;
3858 }
3859 return 0;
3860}
3861
3862/*
3863 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3864 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3865 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3866 * attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 3867 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 3868
3869/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3870
0f113f3e
MC		 3871# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3872 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
6dbb6219 3873/* Strict mode flags */
0f113f3e
MC		 3874# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3875 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3876 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
6dbb6219 3877
d61ff83b 3878int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
0f113f3e
MC		 3879 int idx)
3880{
3881 int i;
3882 int rv = 0;
3883 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3884 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3885 CERT *c = s->cert;
3886 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3887 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3888 if (idx != -1) {
3889 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3890 if (idx == -2) {
3891 cpk = c->key;
3892 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3893 } else
3894 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3895 x = cpk->x509;
3896 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3897 chain = cpk->chain;
3898 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3899 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3900 if (!x || !pk)
3901 goto end;
3902# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3903 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3904 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3905 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3906 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3907 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3908 return rv;
3909 }
3910# endif
3911 } else {
3912 if (!x || !pk)
d813f9eb 3913 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3914 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3915 if (idx == -1)
d813f9eb 3916 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3917 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3918 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3919 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3920 else
3921 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3922 strict_mode = 1;
3923 }
3924
3925 if (suiteb_flags) {
3926 int ok;
3927 if (check_flags)
3928 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3929 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3930 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3932 else if (!check_flags)
3933 goto end;
3934 }
3935
3936 /*
3937 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3938 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3939 */
3940 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3941 int default_nid;
3942 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3943 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3944 default_nid = 0;
3945 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3946 else {
3947 switch (idx) {
3948 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3949 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3950 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3951 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3952 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3953 break;
3954
3955 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3956 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3957 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3958 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3959 break;
3960
3961 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
3962 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3963 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3964 break;
3965
3966 default:
3967 default_nid = -1;
3968 break;
3969 }
3970 }
3971 /*
3972 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3973 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3974 */
3975 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3976 size_t j;
3977 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3978 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3979 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3980 break;
3981 }
3982 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3983 if (check_flags)
3984 goto skip_sigs;
3985 else
3986 goto end;
3987 }
3988 }
3989 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3990 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3991 if (!check_flags)
3992 goto end;
3993 } else
3994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3996 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3997 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3998 if (check_flags) {
3999 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4000 break;
4001 } else
4002 goto end;
4003 }
4004 }
4005 }
4006 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4007 else if (check_flags)
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4009 skip_sigs:
4010 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4011 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4013 else if (!check_flags)
4014 goto end;
4015 if (!s->server)
4016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4017 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4018 else if (strict_mode) {
4019 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4020 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4021 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4022 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4023 if (check_flags) {
4024 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4025 break;
4026 } else
4027 goto end;
4028 }
4029 }
4030 }
4031 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4032 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4033 int check_type = 0;
4034 switch (pk->type) {
4035 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4036 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4037 break;
4038 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4039 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4040 break;
4041 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4042 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4043 break;
4044 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4045 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4046 {
4047 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4048 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4049 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4050 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4051 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4052 }
4053 }
4054 if (check_type) {
4055 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4056 int ctypelen;
4057 if (c->ctypes) {
4058 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4059 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4060 } else {
4061 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4062 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4063 }
4064 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4065 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4067 break;
4068 }
4069 }
4070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4071 goto end;
4072 } else
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4074
4075 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4076
4077 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4079
4080 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4081 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4083 }
4084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4086 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4087 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4089 break;
4090 }
4091 }
4092 }
4093 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4094 goto end;
4095 } else
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4097
4098 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4100
4101 end:
4102
4103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4104 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4106 else if (cpk->digest)
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4108 } else
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4110
4111 /*
4112 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4113 * chain is invalid.
4114 */
4115 if (!check_flags) {
4116 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4117 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4118 else {
4119 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4120 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4121 return 0;
4122 }
4123 }
4124 return rv;
4125}
d61ff83b
DSH		 4126
4127/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4128void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 4129{
4130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4136}
4137
18d71588
DSH		 4138/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4139int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
0f113f3e
MC		 4140{
4141 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4142}
d61ff83b 4143
4453cd8c 4144#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4145
4146#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4147DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 4148{
4149 int dh_secbits = 80;
4150 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4151 return DH_get_1024_160();
4152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4154 dh_secbits = 128;
4155 else
4156 dh_secbits = 80;
4157 } else {
4158 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4159 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4160 }
4161
4162 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4163 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4164 if (!dhp)
4165 return NULL;
4166 dhp->g = BN_new();
4167 if (dhp->g)
4168 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4169 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4170 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4171 else
4172 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4173 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4174 DH_free(dhp);
4175 return NULL;
4176 }
4177 return dhp;
4178 }
4179 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4180 return DH_get_2048_224();
4181 return DH_get_1024_160();
4182}
09599b52 4183#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4184
4185static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4186{
4187 int secbits;
4188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4189 if (pkey) {
4190 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4191 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4192 } else
4193 secbits = -1;
4194 if (s)
4195 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4196 else
4197 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4198}
b362ccab
DSH		 4199
4200static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4201{
4202 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4203 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4204 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4205 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4206 const EVP_MD *md;
4207 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4208 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4209 }
4210 if (s)
4211 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4212 else
4213 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4214}
b362ccab
DSH		 4215
4216int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
0f113f3e
MC		 4217{
4218 if (vfy)
4219 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4220 if (is_ee) {
4221 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4222 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4223 } else {
4224 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4225 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4226 }
4227 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4228 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4229 return 1;
4230}
4231
4232/*
4233 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4234 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4235 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
b362ccab
DSH		 4236 */
4237
4238int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
0f113f3e
MC		 4239{
4240 int rv, start_idx, i;
4241 if (x == NULL) {
4242 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4243 start_idx = 1;
4244 } else
4245 start_idx = 0;
4246
4247 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4248 if (rv != 1)
4249 return rv;
4250
4251 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4252 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4253 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4254 if (rv != 1)
4255 return rv;
4256 }
4257 return 1;
4258}
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