2 * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new(void)
27 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL
, NULL
);
31 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX
*ctx
)
33 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx
, NULL
);
36 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OPENSSL_CTX
*ctx
, int nid
)
38 EC_KEY
*ret
= EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx
);
41 ret
->group
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx
, nid
);
42 if (ret
->group
== NULL
) {
46 if (ret
->meth
->set_group
!= NULL
47 && ret
->meth
->set_group(ret
, ret
->group
) == 0) {
55 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid
)
57 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL
, nid
);
61 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY
*r
)
68 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r
->references
, &i
, r
->lock
);
69 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r
);
72 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i
< 0);
74 if (r
->meth
!= NULL
&& r
->meth
->finish
!= NULL
)
77 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
78 ENGINE_finish(r
->engine
);
81 if (r
->group
&& r
->group
->meth
->keyfinish
)
82 r
->group
->meth
->keyfinish(r
);
85 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY
, r
, &r
->ex_data
);
87 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r
->lock
);
88 EC_GROUP_free(r
->group
);
89 EC_POINT_free(r
->pub_key
);
90 BN_clear_free(r
->priv_key
);
92 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r
, sizeof(EC_KEY
));
95 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY
*dest
, const EC_KEY
*src
)
97 if (dest
== NULL
|| src
== NULL
) {
98 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
101 if (src
->meth
!= dest
->meth
) {
102 if (dest
->meth
->finish
!= NULL
)
103 dest
->meth
->finish(dest
);
104 if (dest
->group
&& dest
->group
->meth
->keyfinish
)
105 dest
->group
->meth
->keyfinish(dest
);
106 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
107 if (ENGINE_finish(dest
->engine
) == 0)
112 dest
->libctx
= src
->libctx
;
113 /* copy the parameters */
114 if (src
->group
!= NULL
) {
115 const EC_METHOD
*meth
= EC_GROUP_method_of(src
->group
);
116 /* clear the old group */
117 EC_GROUP_free(dest
->group
);
118 dest
->group
= EC_GROUP_new_ex(src
->libctx
, meth
);
119 if (dest
->group
== NULL
)
121 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest
->group
, src
->group
))
124 /* copy the public key */
125 if (src
->pub_key
!= NULL
) {
126 EC_POINT_free(dest
->pub_key
);
127 dest
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(src
->group
);
128 if (dest
->pub_key
== NULL
)
130 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest
->pub_key
, src
->pub_key
))
133 /* copy the private key */
134 if (src
->priv_key
!= NULL
) {
135 if (dest
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
136 dest
->priv_key
= BN_new();
137 if (dest
->priv_key
== NULL
)
140 if (!BN_copy(dest
->priv_key
, src
->priv_key
))
142 if (src
->group
->meth
->keycopy
143 && src
->group
->meth
->keycopy(dest
, src
) == 0)
150 dest
->enc_flag
= src
->enc_flag
;
151 dest
->conv_form
= src
->conv_form
;
152 dest
->version
= src
->version
;
153 dest
->flags
= src
->flags
;
155 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY
,
156 &dest
->ex_data
, &src
->ex_data
))
160 if (src
->meth
!= dest
->meth
) {
161 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
162 if (src
->engine
!= NULL
&& ENGINE_init(src
->engine
) == 0)
164 dest
->engine
= src
->engine
;
166 dest
->meth
= src
->meth
;
169 if (src
->meth
->copy
!= NULL
&& src
->meth
->copy(dest
, src
) == 0)
175 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY
*ec_key
)
177 EC_KEY
*ret
= ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key
->libctx
, ec_key
->engine
);
182 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret
, ec_key
) == NULL
) {
189 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY
*r
)
193 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r
->references
, &i
, r
->lock
) <= 0)
196 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r
);
197 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i
< 2);
198 return ((i
> 1) ? 1 : 0);
201 ENGINE
*EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
203 return eckey
->engine
;
206 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
208 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
) {
209 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
212 if (eckey
->meth
->keygen
!= NULL
)
213 return eckey
->meth
->keygen(eckey
);
214 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY
, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
218 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
220 return eckey
->group
->meth
->keygen(eckey
);
224 * ECC Key generation.
225 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
228 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
229 * is stored in this object.
230 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
232 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
235 BIGNUM
*priv_key
= NULL
;
236 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
237 EC_POINT
*pub_key
= NULL
;
238 const EC_GROUP
*group
= eckey
->group
;
239 BN_CTX
*ctx
= BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey
->libctx
);
244 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
245 priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
246 if (priv_key
== NULL
)
249 priv_key
= eckey
->priv_key
;
252 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
253 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
254 * stated in the security policy.
257 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(group
);
262 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
263 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
264 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
265 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
266 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
267 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
270 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key
, order
, ctx
))
272 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key
)) ;
274 if (eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
275 pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(group
);
279 pub_key
= eckey
->pub_key
;
281 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
282 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group
, pub_key
, priv_key
, NULL
, NULL
, ctx
))
285 eckey
->priv_key
= priv_key
;
286 eckey
->pub_key
= pub_key
;
293 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
295 BN_clear(eckey
->priv_key
);
296 if (eckey
->pub_key
!= NULL
)
297 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group
, eckey
->pub_key
);
300 EC_POINT_free(pub_key
);
301 BN_clear_free(priv_key
);
306 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
309 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
310 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
312 return EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
, eckey
->priv_key
, NULL
,
316 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
318 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
319 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
323 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->keycheck
== NULL
) {
324 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
328 return eckey
->group
->meth
->keycheck(eckey
);
332 * Check the range of the EC public key.
333 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
335 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
336 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
337 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
338 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
340 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX
*ctx
, const EC_KEY
*key
)
351 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, x
, y
, ctx
))
354 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key
->group
->meth
) == NID_X9_62_prime_field
) {
355 if (BN_is_negative(x
)
356 || BN_cmp(x
, key
->group
->field
) >= 0
358 || BN_cmp(y
, key
->group
->field
) >= 0) {
362 int m
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(key
->group
);
363 if (BN_num_bits(x
) > m
|| BN_num_bits(y
) > m
) {
374 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
375 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
376 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
377 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
379 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
380 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
381 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
383 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
387 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
388 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
390 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
391 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
395 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
396 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
)) {
397 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY
);
401 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey
->libctx
)) == NULL
)
404 if ((point
= EC_POINT_new(eckey
->group
)) == NULL
)
407 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
408 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx
, eckey
)) {
409 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE
);
413 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
414 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
, ctx
) <= 0) {
415 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE
);
419 order
= eckey
->group
->order
;
420 if (BN_is_zero(order
)) {
421 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER
);
424 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
425 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, point
, NULL
, eckey
->pub_key
, order
, ctx
)) {
426 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
429 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey
->group
, point
)) {
430 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER
);
434 if (eckey
->priv_key
!= NULL
) {
436 * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
437 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
439 if (BN_cmp(eckey
->priv_key
, BN_value_one()) < 0
440 || BN_cmp(eckey
->priv_key
, order
) >= 0) {
441 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER
);
445 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
446 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
448 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, point
, eckey
->priv_key
,
450 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
453 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey
->group
, point
, eckey
->pub_key
, ctx
) != 0) {
454 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY
);
461 EC_POINT_free(point
);
465 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY
*key
, BIGNUM
*x
,
470 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
473 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
|| x
== NULL
|| y
== NULL
) {
474 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES
,
475 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
478 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(key
->libctx
);
483 point
= EC_POINT_new(key
->group
);
488 tx
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
489 ty
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
493 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, point
, x
, y
, ctx
))
495 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, point
, tx
, ty
, ctx
))
499 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
500 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
502 if (BN_cmp(x
, tx
) || BN_cmp(y
, ty
)) {
503 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES
,
504 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE
);
508 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key
, point
))
511 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key
) == 0)
519 EC_POINT_free(point
);
524 const EC_GROUP
*EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY
*key
)
529 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY
*key
, const EC_GROUP
*group
)
531 if (key
->meth
->set_group
!= NULL
&& key
->meth
->set_group(key
, group
) == 0)
533 EC_GROUP_free(key
->group
);
534 key
->group
= EC_GROUP_dup(group
);
535 return (key
->group
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
538 const BIGNUM
*EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY
*key
)
540 return key
->priv_key
;
543 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY
*key
, const BIGNUM
*priv_key
)
545 if (key
->group
== NULL
|| key
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
547 if (key
->group
->meth
->set_private
!= NULL
548 && key
->group
->meth
->set_private(key
, priv_key
) == 0)
550 if (key
->meth
->set_private
!= NULL
551 && key
->meth
->set_private(key
, priv_key
) == 0)
553 BN_clear_free(key
->priv_key
);
554 key
->priv_key
= BN_dup(priv_key
);
555 return (key
->priv_key
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
558 const EC_POINT
*EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY
*key
)
563 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY
*key
, const EC_POINT
*pub_key
)
565 if (key
->meth
->set_public
!= NULL
566 && key
->meth
->set_public(key
, pub_key
) == 0)
568 EC_POINT_free(key
->pub_key
);
569 key
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_dup(pub_key
, key
->group
);
570 return (key
->pub_key
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
573 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY
*key
)
575 return key
->enc_flag
;
578 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, unsigned int flags
)
580 key
->enc_flag
= flags
;
583 point_conversion_form_t
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY
*key
)
585 return key
->conv_form
;
588 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY
*key
, point_conversion_form_t cform
)
590 key
->conv_form
= cform
;
591 if (key
->group
!= NULL
)
592 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key
->group
, cform
);
595 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY
*key
, int flag
)
597 if (key
->group
!= NULL
)
598 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key
->group
, flag
);
601 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY
*key
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
603 if (key
->group
== NULL
)
605 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key
->group
, ctx
);
608 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY
*key
)
613 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, int flags
)
618 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, int flags
)
620 key
->flags
&= ~flags
;
623 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY
*key
, point_conversion_form_t form
,
624 unsigned char **pbuf
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
626 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->pub_key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
)
628 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, form
, pbuf
, ctx
);
631 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY
*key
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
634 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
)
636 if (key
->pub_key
== NULL
)
637 key
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(key
->group
);
638 if (key
->pub_key
== NULL
)
640 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, buf
, len
, ctx
) == 0)
643 * Save the point conversion form.
644 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
645 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
646 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
647 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
649 if ((key
->group
->meth
->flags
& EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE
) == 0)
650 key
->conv_form
= (point_conversion_form_t
)(buf
[0] & ~0x01);
654 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY
*eckey
,
655 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
657 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
659 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->priv2oct
== NULL
) {
660 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
664 return eckey
->group
->meth
->priv2oct(eckey
, buf
, len
);
667 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY
*eckey
,
668 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
672 buf_len
= (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey
->group
) + 7) / 8;
673 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
)
677 else if (len
< buf_len
)
680 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
682 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey
->priv_key
, buf
, buf_len
) == -1) {
683 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT
, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
);
690 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY
*eckey
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
692 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
694 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->oct2priv
== NULL
) {
695 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
698 return eckey
->group
->meth
->oct2priv(eckey
, buf
, len
);
701 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY
*eckey
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
703 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
)
704 eckey
->priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
705 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
706 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
709 eckey
->priv_key
= BN_bin2bn(buf
, len
, eckey
->priv_key
);
710 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
711 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
717 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY
*eckey
, unsigned char **pbuf
)
722 len
= EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey
, NULL
, 0);
725 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
726 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
729 len
= EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey
, buf
, len
);
738 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
740 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
741 || (eckey
->group
->meth
->flags
& EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN
))