2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
18 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
20 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
21 #include <openssl/evp.h>
22 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
23 #include <openssl/x509.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
25 #include <openssl/objects.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include "internal/dane.h"
28 #include "crypto/x509.h"
29 #include "x509_local.h"
31 /* CRL score values */
33 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
34 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
35 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
37 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \
38 (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
39 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
40 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
41 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
42 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
44 static int x509_verify_x509(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
45 static int x509_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
46 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
47 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
48 static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
49 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
50 static int dane_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
51 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
52 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
53 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
54 static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
55 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
56 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
57 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
58 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
59 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
60 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
61 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
62 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
63 static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
64 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
65 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
66 static int check_curve(X509
*cert
);
68 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
69 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
70 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
71 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
72 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
73 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
74 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
75 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
77 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
78 unsigned int *preasons
);
79 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
80 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
81 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
82 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
84 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
86 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
92 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
93 * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested.
94 * It calls ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions()
95 * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
96 * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc.
98 int X509_self_signed(X509
*cert
, int verify_signature
)
102 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
)) == NULL
) { /* handles cert == NULL */
103 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
106 if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert
))
108 if ((cert
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) == 0)
110 if (!verify_signature
)
112 return X509_verify(cert
, pkey
);
116 * Given a certificate, try and find an exact match in the store.
117 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on not found, -1 on internal error.
119 static int lookup_cert_match(X509
**result
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
121 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
126 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
128 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
135 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
136 if (X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
) == 0)
142 if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp
))
147 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs
);
152 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
153 * The error code is set to |err| if |err| is not X509_V_OK, else
154 * |ctx->error| is left unchanged (under the assumption it is set elsewhere).
155 * The error depth is |depth| if >= 0, else it defaults to |ctx->error_depth|.
156 * The error cert is |x| if not NULL, else the cert in |ctx->chain| at |depth|.
158 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
160 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
163 depth
= ctx
->error_depth
;
165 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
166 ctx
->current_cert
= x
!= NULL
? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
167 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
169 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
172 #define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
173 if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
177 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
178 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
181 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
183 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
186 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
189 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
190 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
193 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
195 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
198 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
199 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
202 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
203 * check the security of issuer keys.
205 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 0 && !check_cert_key_level(ctx
, cert
),
206 ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
208 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
209 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
211 CB_FAIL_IF(i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
),
212 ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
218 * Returns -1 on internal error.
219 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
221 static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
223 /* Not much to verify on a RPK */
224 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
225 return ctx
->verify(ctx
);
227 return !!ctx
->verify_cb(ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
, ctx
);
232 * Returns -1 on internal error.
233 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
235 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
240 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) <= 0
241 || (ok
= check_extensions(ctx
)) <= 0
242 || (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) <= 0
243 || (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) <= 0
244 || (ok
= X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
) ? 1 : -1) <= 0
245 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) <= 0)
248 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
250 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
);
252 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
253 ok
= ctx
->verify
!= NULL
? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
257 if ((ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) <= 0)
260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
261 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
262 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) <= 0)
264 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) <= 0)
268 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
269 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
) != 0)
270 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
274 int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
280 if (ctx
->rpk
!= NULL
)
281 return x509_verify_rpk(ctx
);
282 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
) >= 1)
283 ctx
->cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, 0);
284 return x509_verify_x509(ctx
);
287 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
290 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
293 return (ctx
->rpk
!= NULL
) ? x509_verify_rpk(ctx
) : x509_verify_x509(ctx
);
297 * Returns -1 on internal error.
298 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
300 static int x509_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
304 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
305 if (!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->rpk
)
306 && verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
) == 0)
309 /* Barring any data to verify the RPK, simply report it as untrusted */
310 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_RPK_UNTRUSTED
;
312 ret
= DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx
->dane
) ? dane_verify_rpk(ctx
) : verify_rpk(ctx
);
315 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
316 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
317 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
319 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
320 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
325 * Returns -1 on internal error.
326 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
328 static int x509_verify_x509(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
332 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
333 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
334 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
338 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
340 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
341 * cannot do another one.
343 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
344 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
348 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
349 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
352 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
354 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
355 CB_FAIL_IF(!check_cert_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
),
356 ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
358 ret
= DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx
->dane
) ? dane_verify(ctx
) : verify_chain(ctx
);
361 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
362 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
363 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
365 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
366 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
370 static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*cert
)
372 int i
, n
= sk_X509_num(sk
);
374 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
375 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk
, i
), cert
) == 0)
381 * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|.
382 * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that
383 * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element.
384 * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one.
386 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
389 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
391 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
392 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
393 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)
394 && (((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
395 || !sk_X509_contains(ctx
->chain
, issuer
))) {
396 if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, issuer
, -1))
398 if (rv
== NULL
|| ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer
),
399 X509_get0_notAfter(rv
)) > 0)
406 /* Check that the given certificate |x| is issued by the certificate |issuer| */
407 static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
409 int err
= ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer
, x
);
411 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
414 * SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH just means 'x' is clearly not issued by 'issuer'.
415 * Every other error code likely indicates a real error.
421 * Alternative get_issuer method: look up from a STACK_OF(X509) in other_ctx.
422 * Returns -1 on internal error.
424 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
426 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
429 return X509_up_ref(*issuer
) ? 1 : -1;
433 * Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx.
434 * Returns NULL on internal/fatal error, empty stack if not found.
436 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const X509_NAME
*nm
)
438 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
444 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
445 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
446 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
447 if (!X509_add_cert(sk
, x
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
448 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk
);
449 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
458 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
459 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
460 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
462 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
465 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
468 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
469 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
471 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
472 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
473 * ctx->param->purpose!
475 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
476 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
477 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
478 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
479 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
481 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
482 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
485 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
486 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
489 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
491 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
493 default: /* can only be X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED */
494 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
500 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
506 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
510 * Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose.
511 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
513 static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
515 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
517 int ret
, proxy_path_length
= 0;
518 int purpose
, allow_proxy_certs
, num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
521 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
522 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
523 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
524 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
525 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
526 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
527 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
531 /* CRL path validation */
532 if (ctx
->parent
!= NULL
) {
533 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
534 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
537 (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
) != 0;
538 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
541 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
542 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
543 CB_FAIL_IF((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
) == 0
544 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) != 0,
545 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
);
546 CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0,
547 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
);
548 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
549 switch (must_be_ca
) {
551 CB_FAIL_IF((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
552 && ret
!= 1 && ret
!= 0,
553 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
);
556 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
!= 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
);
559 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
562 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0)
563 && ret
!= 1), ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
);
567 /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
568 ret
= check_curve(x
);
569 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
< 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
);
570 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
== 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
);
573 * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
574 * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
575 * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
577 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
580 * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
581 * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
583 /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
584 if (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1) {
585 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0,
586 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
);
587 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) == 0, ctx
,
588 x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
);
590 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
591 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) != 0
592 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL
) == 0,
593 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL
);
594 /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
595 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0) {
596 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) == 0,
597 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE
);
599 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) != 0, ctx
, x
, i
,
600 X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
);
602 /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
603 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x
)) == 0,
604 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY
);
605 /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
606 CB_FAIL_IF(((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
607 || (x
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) != 0
608 || x
->altname
== NULL
)
609 && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0,
610 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY
);
611 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0
612 && x
->altname
!= NULL
613 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL
) == 0,
614 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL
);
615 /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
616 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->altname
!= NULL
617 && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x
->altname
) <= 0,
618 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
);
619 /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
620 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x
->sig_alg
, &x
->cert_info
.signature
) != 0,
621 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY
);
622 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->akid
!= NULL
623 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL
) != 0,
624 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
);
625 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->skid
!= NULL
626 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL
) != 0,
627 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
);
628 if (X509_get_version(x
) >= X509_VERSION_3
) {
629 /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
630 CB_FAIL_IF(i
+ 1 < num
/*
631 * this means not last cert in chain,
632 * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
634 && (x
->akid
== NULL
|| x
->akid
->keyid
== NULL
), ctx
,
635 x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
);
636 /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
637 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0 && x
->skid
== NULL
,
638 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER
);
640 CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x
)) > 0,
641 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3
);
645 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
646 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
648 /* Check path length */
649 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 1 && x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1
650 && plen
> x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
,
651 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
);
652 /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
653 if (i
> 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0)
656 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
657 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
658 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
660 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
662 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
663 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
664 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
665 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
667 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
668 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
669 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
670 * increment proxy_path_length.
672 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
673 CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
,
674 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
);
675 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
686 static int has_san_id(X509
*x
, int gtype
)
690 GENERAL_NAMES
*gs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, NULL
, NULL
);
695 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs
); i
++) {
696 GENERAL_NAME
*g
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs
, i
);
698 if (g
->type
== gtype
) {
703 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs
);
708 * Returns -1 on internal error.
709 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
711 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
715 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
716 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
717 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
720 /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
721 if (i
!= 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) != 0)
725 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
726 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
728 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
730 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0) {
731 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
732 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
733 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
736 int last_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
738 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
740 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
741 goto proxy_name_done
;
745 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
746 * there is in issuer.
748 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
749 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
750 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
751 goto proxy_name_done
;
755 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
758 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
, last_loc
))
759 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
761 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
762 goto proxy_name_done
;
766 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
767 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
769 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
770 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
771 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
772 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
776 tmpentry
= X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_loc
);
777 last_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
779 if (last_nid
!= NID_commonName
780 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
781 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
784 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
785 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
788 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, x
, i
, err
);
792 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
793 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
794 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
797 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
798 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
801 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
804 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
805 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0
806 && (ctx
->param
->hostflags
807 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT
) == 0
808 && ((ctx
->param
->hostflags
809 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT
) != 0
810 || (ret
= has_san_id(x
, GEN_DNS
)) == 0))
811 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
818 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
821 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, x
, i
, rv
);
830 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
832 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
835 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
838 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
841 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
842 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
843 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
845 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
846 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
847 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
853 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
855 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
858 if (vpm
->hosts
!= NULL
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
859 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
862 if (vpm
->email
!= NULL
863 && X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
864 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
867 if (vpm
->ip
!= NULL
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
868 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
874 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
875 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
880 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
881 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
885 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
886 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
888 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
889 trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
);
890 if (trust
!= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
)
895 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
896 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
897 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
898 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
900 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
901 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
902 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
903 /* If explicitly trusted (so not neutral nor rejected) return trusted */
904 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
906 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
911 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
912 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
914 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
915 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) != 0)
917 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
920 if (num_untrusted
== num
921 && (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) != 0) {
923 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
924 * for a direct trust store match.
927 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
928 res
= lookup_cert_match(&mx
, ctx
, x
);
932 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
935 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
936 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
938 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
939 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
944 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
945 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
947 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
952 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
953 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
955 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
958 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
) == 0
959 ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED
: X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
962 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
963 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
965 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
966 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
967 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
968 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
969 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
972 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
973 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
975 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
977 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
) == 0)
979 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
) != 0) {
980 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
982 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
983 if (ctx
->parent
!= NULL
)
987 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
988 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
989 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
996 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
997 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
999 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1001 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1002 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
1004 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1005 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
1006 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
1007 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
1009 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0)
1012 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
1013 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1015 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1016 if (ctx
->get_crl
!= NULL
)
1017 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
1019 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
1020 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */
1022 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
1025 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
1026 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
1031 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
1034 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
1041 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1043 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
1049 X509_CRL_free(dcrl
);
1053 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
1056 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
1057 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
1063 X509_CRL_free(dcrl
);
1065 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1069 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1070 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
1075 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1076 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1077 else if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1082 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
1084 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1088 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1095 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1099 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
1100 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1105 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1108 /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
1109 if (i
< 0 && (ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
) == 0) {
1110 if (!notify
|| !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1116 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1121 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1122 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1123 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1125 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1126 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1127 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1128 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1129 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1131 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1132 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1133 reasons
= *preasons
;
1134 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1135 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
1137 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1138 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1141 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
1142 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
1145 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1148 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
1152 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1153 best_score
= crl_score
;
1154 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1157 if (best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1158 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1160 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1161 *pscore
= best_score
;
1162 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1163 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1164 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1166 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1169 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1176 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1177 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1179 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1181 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
= NULL
, *extb
= NULL
;
1182 int i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1185 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1186 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1188 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1191 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1193 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1195 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1198 if (exta
== NULL
&& extb
== NULL
)
1201 if (exta
== NULL
|| extb
== NULL
)
1204 return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
) == 0;
1207 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1208 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1210 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1211 if (delta
->base_crl_number
== NULL
)
1213 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1214 if (base
->crl_number
== NULL
)
1216 /* Issuer names must match */
1217 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
),
1218 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)) != 0)
1220 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1221 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1223 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1225 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1226 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1228 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1229 return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0;
1233 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1234 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1236 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1237 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1242 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
) == 0)
1244 if (((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
) == 0)
1246 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1247 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1248 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1249 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1250 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1251 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1260 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1261 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1262 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1263 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1264 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1266 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1267 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1270 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1272 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1274 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1275 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) != 0)
1277 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1278 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
) == 0) {
1279 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1281 } else if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) != 0) {
1282 /* If no new reasons reject */
1283 if ((crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
) == 0)
1286 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1287 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
!= NULL
)
1289 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1290 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
)) != 0) {
1291 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
) == 0)
1294 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1297 if ((crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) == 0)
1298 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1300 /* Check expiration */
1301 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1302 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1304 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1305 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1307 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1308 if ((crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
) == 0)
1311 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1312 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1313 /* If no new reasons reject */
1314 if ((crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
) == 0)
1316 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1317 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1320 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1326 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1327 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1329 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1330 const X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1331 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1334 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1337 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1339 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1340 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1341 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1342 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1347 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1348 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1349 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1351 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1352 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1353 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1358 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1359 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
) == 0)
1363 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1364 * untrusted certificates.
1366 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1367 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1368 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
) != 0)
1370 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1371 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1372 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1379 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1380 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1381 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1382 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1384 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1386 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
= {0};
1389 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1390 if (ctx
->parent
!= NULL
)
1392 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->store
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1395 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1396 /* Copy verify params across */
1397 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1399 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1400 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1402 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1403 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1407 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1408 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1410 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1415 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1416 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1417 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more
1418 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1419 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1422 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1423 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1424 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1426 X509
*cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1427 X509
*crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1429 return X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
) == 0;
1433 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1434 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1435 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1436 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1437 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1439 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1441 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1442 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1443 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1446 if (a
== NULL
|| b
== NULL
)
1449 if (a
->dpname
== NULL
)
1451 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1453 if (b
->dpname
== NULL
)
1455 return X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
) == 0;
1457 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1459 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1460 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1461 if (b
->dpname
== NULL
)
1463 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1464 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1468 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1470 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1471 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1472 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1474 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
) == 0)
1480 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1482 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1483 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1484 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1485 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1486 if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
) == 0)
1495 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1498 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1500 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1501 if (dp
->CRLissuer
== NULL
)
1502 return (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) != 0;
1503 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1504 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1506 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1508 if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
) == 0)
1514 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1515 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1516 unsigned int *preasons
)
1520 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
) != 0)
1522 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0) {
1523 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
) != 0)
1526 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
) != 0)
1529 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1530 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1531 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1533 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1534 if (crl
->idp
== NULL
1535 || idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1536 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1541 return (crl
->idp
== NULL
|| crl
->idp
->distpoint
== NULL
)
1542 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) != 0;
1546 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1547 * to find a delta CRL too
1549 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1550 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1553 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1555 unsigned int reasons
;
1556 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1557 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1558 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1560 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1561 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1562 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1566 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1567 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1569 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1570 if (skcrl
== NULL
&& crl
!= NULL
)
1573 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1575 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1578 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1580 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1581 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1582 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1590 /* Check CRL validity */
1591 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1593 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1594 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1595 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1596 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1598 /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1599 if (ctx
->current_issuer
!= NULL
) {
1600 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1602 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1603 * certificate in chain.
1605 } else if (cnum
< chnum
) {
1606 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1608 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1609 /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
1610 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1611 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1619 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1621 if (crl
->base_crl_number
== NULL
) {
1622 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1623 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) != 0 &&
1624 (issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) == 0 &&
1625 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1628 if ((ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) == 0 &&
1629 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1632 if ((ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) == 0 &&
1633 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1634 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1637 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) != 0 &&
1638 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1642 if ((ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) == 0 &&
1643 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1646 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1647 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1649 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1653 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1655 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1657 /* Verify CRL signature */
1658 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1659 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1665 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1666 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1671 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1672 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1673 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1674 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1676 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
) == 0
1677 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) != 0 &&
1678 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1681 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1682 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1684 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1685 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1687 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1694 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
1695 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1702 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1703 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1704 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1705 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1706 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1707 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1708 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1709 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1710 * X509_policy_check() call.
1712 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1713 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
1716 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1717 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1718 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1719 (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1721 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1722 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
1725 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1726 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1727 int i
, cbcalled
= 0;
1729 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1730 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1731 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1733 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
) != 0)
1735 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
) != 0,
1736 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
);
1739 /* Should not be able to get here */
1740 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1743 /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
1746 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1747 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1748 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1749 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1751 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1752 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1756 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) != 0) {
1757 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1759 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1760 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1761 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1762 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1764 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1771 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1776 * Check certificate validity times.
1777 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1778 * the validation status.
1780 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1781 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
1783 int ossl_x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1788 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1789 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1790 else if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1795 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1796 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1798 CB_FAIL_IF(i
== 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
);
1799 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
);
1801 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1802 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1804 CB_FAIL_IF(i
== 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
);
1805 CB_FAIL_IF(i
< 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
);
1810 * Verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain.
1811 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
1813 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1819 /* For RPK: just do the verify callback */
1820 if (ctx
->rpk
!= NULL
) {
1821 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
, ctx
))
1825 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1826 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1829 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1830 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1832 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures,
1833 * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps.
1834 * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key.
1837 } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi
, xi
) != X509_V_OK
1838 /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */
1839 && ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) == 0)) {
1842 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1843 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1845 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, xi
, 0,
1846 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1849 * The below code will certainly not do a
1850 * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued.
1855 * Do not clear error (by ctx->error = X509_V_OK), it must be "sticky",
1856 * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1860 * For each iteration of this loop:
1861 * n is the subject depth
1862 * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1863 * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures
1864 * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1865 * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1868 * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly
1869 * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1873 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
) != 0
1874 && (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) != 0))) {
1877 * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1878 * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1879 * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1881 int issuer_depth
= n
+ (xs
== xi
? 0 : 1);
1883 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1884 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1885 * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1886 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1887 * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of
1888 * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1889 * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1890 * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1891 * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1892 * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1893 * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1895 int ret
= xs
== xi
&& (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0
1896 ? X509_V_OK
: ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi
, xs
);
1898 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
, ret
);
1899 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1900 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
,
1901 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1903 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0,
1904 ctx
, xs
, n
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
);
1908 /* In addition to RFC 5280 requirements do also for trust anchor cert */
1909 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1910 if (!ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1914 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1917 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1918 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1919 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1920 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1925 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1931 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1933 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1936 /* returns 0 on error, otherwise 1 if ctm > cmp_time, else -1 */
1937 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1939 static const size_t utctime_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1940 static const size_t generalizedtime_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1941 ASN1_TIME
*asn1_cmp_time
= NULL
;
1942 int i
, day
, sec
, ret
= 0;
1943 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1944 const char upper_z
= 0x5A;
1946 const char upper_z
= 'Z';
1950 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1951 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1952 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1953 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1955 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1956 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1957 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1958 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1960 switch (ctm
->type
) {
1961 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME
:
1962 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(utctime_length
))
1965 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
:
1966 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(generalizedtime_length
))
1974 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1975 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1976 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1978 for (i
= 0; i
< ctm
->length
- 1; i
++) {
1979 if (!ossl_ascii_isdigit(ctm
->data
[i
]))
1982 if (ctm
->data
[ctm
->length
- 1] != upper_z
)
1986 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1987 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1988 * so we go through ASN.1
1990 asn1_cmp_time
= X509_time_adj(NULL
, 0, cmp_time
);
1991 if (asn1_cmp_time
== NULL
)
1993 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, ctm
, asn1_cmp_time
) == 0)
1997 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1998 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
2000 ret
= (day
>= 0 && sec
>= 0) ? -1 : 1;
2003 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time
);
2008 * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range,
2009 * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start
2011 int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
,
2012 const ASN1_TIME
*start
, const ASN1_TIME
*end
)
2015 time_t *time
= NULL
;
2016 unsigned long flags
= vpm
== NULL
? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm
);
2018 if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
2019 ref_time
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm
);
2021 } else if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
2022 return 0; /* this means ok */
2023 } /* else reference time is the current time */
2025 if (end
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(end
, time
) < 0)
2027 if (start
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(start
, time
) > 0)
2032 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
2034 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
2037 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
2039 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
2042 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
2043 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
2052 if (s
!= NULL
&& (s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
) == 0) {
2053 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
2054 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
2055 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
2056 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
2058 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
2061 /* Copy any missing public key parameters up the chain towards pkey */
2062 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2064 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
2067 if (pkey
!= NULL
&& !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
2070 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2071 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
2073 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
2076 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
2081 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
2085 /* first, populate the other certs */
2086 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
2087 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
2088 if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
))
2093 return EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
2098 * Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs.
2099 * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error.
2101 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
2102 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
2104 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
2106 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
2108 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2109 if (base
->base_crl_number
!= NULL
|| newer
->base_crl_number
!= NULL
) {
2110 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
2113 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2114 if (base
->crl_number
== NULL
|| newer
->crl_number
== NULL
) {
2115 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
2118 /* Issuer names must match */
2119 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
),
2120 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)) != 0) {
2121 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2124 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2125 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2126 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2129 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2130 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2133 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2134 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2135 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2138 /* CRLs must verify */
2139 if (skey
!= NULL
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2140 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2141 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2144 /* Create new CRL */
2145 crl
= X509_CRL_new_ex(base
->libctx
, base
->propq
);
2146 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, X509_CRL_VERSION_2
)) {
2147 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2150 /* Set issuer name */
2151 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
2152 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2156 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
))) {
2157 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2160 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
))) {
2161 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2165 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2166 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0)) {
2167 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2172 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2173 * number to correct value too.
2175 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2176 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2178 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1)) {
2179 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2184 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2185 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2187 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2188 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2190 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2192 * Add only if not also in base.
2193 * Need something cleverer here for some more complex CRLs covering
2196 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2197 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2198 if (rvtmp
== NULL
) {
2199 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2202 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2203 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2204 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2210 if (skey
!= NULL
&& md
!= NULL
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
)) {
2211 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
2222 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2224 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2227 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2229 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2232 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2237 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2242 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2244 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2247 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2249 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2252 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2254 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2257 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2259 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2262 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2267 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2269 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
)
2271 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2274 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2276 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2279 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2281 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2284 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2289 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2294 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, EVP_PKEY
*rpk
)
2299 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2304 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2307 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2308 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2309 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2311 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2314 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2317 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2318 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2320 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2324 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2325 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2326 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2327 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2328 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2329 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2330 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2333 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2334 int purpose
, int trust
)
2338 /* If purpose not set use default */
2340 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2342 * If purpose is set but we don't have a default then set the default to
2343 * the current purpose
2345 else if (def_purpose
== 0)
2346 def_purpose
= purpose
;
2347 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2351 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2353 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2356 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2357 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2358 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2360 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2363 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2365 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2367 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2370 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2372 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2377 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
== 0 && purpose
!= 0)
2378 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2379 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== 0 && trust
!= 0)
2380 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2384 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
, const char *propq
)
2386 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2391 ctx
->libctx
= libctx
;
2392 if (propq
!= NULL
) {
2393 ctx
->propq
= OPENSSL_strdup(propq
);
2394 if (ctx
->propq
== NULL
) {
2403 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2405 return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL
, NULL
);
2408 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2413 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2415 /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
2416 OPENSSL_free(ctx
->propq
);
2421 int X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, EVP_PKEY
*rpk
)
2423 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx
, store
, NULL
, NULL
))
2429 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2430 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2433 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
2436 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2440 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2442 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2443 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2446 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
2447 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2448 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2449 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2450 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2451 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2452 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2453 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2457 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2459 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2460 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2462 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2464 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2466 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2468 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_issued
!= NULL
)
2469 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2471 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2473 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->get_issuer
!= NULL
)
2474 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2476 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2478 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->verify_cb
!= NULL
)
2479 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2481 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2483 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->verify
!= NULL
)
2484 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2486 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2488 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_revocation
!= NULL
)
2489 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2491 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2493 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->get_crl
!= NULL
)
2494 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2496 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2498 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_crl
!= NULL
)
2499 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2501 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2503 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->cert_crl
!= NULL
)
2504 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2506 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2508 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_policy
!= NULL
)
2509 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2511 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2513 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->lookup_certs
!= NULL
)
2514 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2516 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2518 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->lookup_crls
!= NULL
)
2519 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2521 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2523 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2524 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2525 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2529 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
2531 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2532 else if (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
) == 0)
2535 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx
, "default"))
2539 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2540 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2542 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2543 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2544 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2547 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2550 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2553 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2557 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2558 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2560 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2565 * Set alternative get_issuer method: just from a STACK of trusted certificates.
2566 * This avoids the complexity of X509_STORE where it is not needed.
2568 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2570 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2571 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2572 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2575 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2578 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2579 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2580 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2581 * pointers below after they're freed!
2583 /* Seems to always be NULL in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2584 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2586 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2588 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2589 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2590 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2593 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2595 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx
->chain
);
2597 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2598 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2601 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2603 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2606 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2608 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2611 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2614 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2617 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2622 EVP_PKEY
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_rpk(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2627 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2629 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2632 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2634 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2637 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2639 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx
->chain
);
2643 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2644 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2646 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2649 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2651 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2654 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2655 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2657 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2660 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2665 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
2666 X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2668 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2671 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
2672 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2674 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2677 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
2678 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2680 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2683 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2685 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2688 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
2689 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2691 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2694 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
2695 X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2697 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2700 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
2701 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2703 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2706 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
2707 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2709 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2712 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
2713 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2715 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2718 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2720 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2723 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2728 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2730 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2733 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2735 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2738 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2740 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2742 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2743 if (param
== NULL
) {
2744 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
, "name=%s", name
);
2747 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2750 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2755 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2757 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2761 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2766 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509
*cert
, uint8_t selector
,
2767 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2769 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2773 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2776 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2777 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2779 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2780 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2783 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2787 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2788 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2792 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2796 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2798 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
2799 static int dane_match_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2801 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2802 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2803 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2804 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2805 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2806 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2807 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2808 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2809 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2810 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2814 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2817 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2819 /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */
2820 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2821 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2824 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2825 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2826 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2828 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2829 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2832 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2833 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2834 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2835 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2837 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2838 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2839 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2840 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2842 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2843 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2844 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2846 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2847 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2848 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2849 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2850 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2851 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2852 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2854 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2855 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2856 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2857 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2859 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2860 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2861 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2862 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2864 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2867 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2868 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2869 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2871 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2872 selector
= t
->selector
;
2874 /* Update per-selector state */
2875 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2876 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2880 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2881 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2882 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2883 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2887 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2889 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2890 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2891 * other than "Full".
2893 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2898 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2899 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2901 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2902 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2909 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2917 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2918 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2921 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2922 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2923 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2925 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2926 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2928 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2936 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2937 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2941 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
2942 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2944 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2948 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2949 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2952 * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2953 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2954 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2956 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2957 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match_cert(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2960 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2961 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2964 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2967 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2969 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2971 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2972 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2973 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2976 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2977 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2978 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2979 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2980 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2981 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2984 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2985 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2988 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2989 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2990 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2993 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2994 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2995 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2996 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2998 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
3001 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
3005 * Only DANE-EE and SPKI are supported
3006 * Returns -1 on internal error
3008 static int dane_match_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, EVP_PKEY
*rpk
)
3010 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
3011 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
3012 int mtype
= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
;
3013 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
3014 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
3015 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
3016 unsigned char *cmpbuf
;
3017 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
3019 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
3023 /* Calculate ASN.1 DER of RPK */
3024 if ((len
= i2d_PUBKEY(rpk
, &i2dbuf
)) <= 0)
3026 cmplen
= i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
3029 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; i
++) {
3030 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
3031 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE
|| t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
)
3034 /* Calculate hash - keep only one around */
3035 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
3036 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
3043 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
3049 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&& memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
3056 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
3060 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
3062 /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */
3063 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3070 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
3071 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3073 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
3075 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
3079 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
3080 static int dane_verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
3082 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
3088 * Look for a DANE record for RPK
3089 * If error, return -1
3090 * If found, call ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)
3091 * If not found call ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)
3093 matched
= dane_match_rpk(ctx
, ctx
->rpk
);
3094 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
3097 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3102 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
3104 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
;
3106 return verify_rpk(ctx
);
3109 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
3110 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
3112 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
3113 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
3120 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
3121 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
3122 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
3123 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor.
3124 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
3126 * + matched < 0, internal error.
3127 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
3128 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
3129 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
3131 matched
= dane_match_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
3132 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
3134 if (done
&& !X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
))
3138 /* Callback invoked as needed */
3139 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
3141 /* Callback invoked as needed */
3142 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
3145 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
3146 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
3147 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
3148 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
3152 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
3153 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
3154 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3159 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
3160 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
3162 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3166 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
3167 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
3169 return verify_chain(ctx
);
3173 * Get trusted issuer, without duplicate suppression
3174 * Returns -1 on internal error.
3176 static int get1_trusted_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3178 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
3182 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
3183 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
3189 * Returns -1 on internal error.
3190 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
3192 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
3194 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
3195 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3196 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk_untrusted
= NULL
;
3197 unsigned int search
;
3198 int may_trusted
= 0;
3199 int may_alternate
= 0;
3200 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
3201 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
3206 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
3207 if (!ossl_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
))
3210 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
3211 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
3212 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
3214 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled,
3215 * which is the default.
3216 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
3217 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
3218 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
3219 * if no luck with untrusted first.
3221 search
= ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
3222 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
3223 if (search
== 0 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) != 0)
3224 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3225 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
3230 /* Initialize empty untrusted stack. */
3231 if ((sk_untrusted
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3232 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3237 * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, *prepend* them
3238 * to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack.
3240 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
3241 && !X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted
, dane
->certs
, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT
)) {
3242 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
3247 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
3248 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so we can make
3249 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
3251 if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted
, ctx
->untrusted
, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT
)) {
3252 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
3257 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3258 * might be reasonable.
3260 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/ 2)
3261 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/ 2;
3264 * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3265 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3266 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3268 max_depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
3270 while (search
!= 0) {
3271 X509
*curr
, *issuer
= NULL
;
3273 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3274 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
3276 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3277 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
3278 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3279 * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3281 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3282 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3283 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3284 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3285 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
3286 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3287 * would be a-priori too long.
3289 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3291 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3293 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3294 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3295 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
3296 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
3297 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3298 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3299 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3300 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3301 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3302 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3304 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3305 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3309 curr
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
3311 /* Note: get1_trusted_issuer() must be used even if self-signed. */
3312 ok
= num
> max_depth
? 0 : get1_trusted_issuer(&issuer
, ctx
, curr
);
3316 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3321 int self_signed
= X509_self_signed(curr
, 0);
3323 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3328 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3329 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3330 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3331 * that despite the current trust store match we might still
3332 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which
3333 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3334 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3335 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3337 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3338 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3339 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3341 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3342 if (!ossl_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && !self_signed
)) {
3346 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3347 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3348 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3349 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3351 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3352 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3354 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3357 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3358 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3362 if (!self_signed
) { /* untrusted not self-signed certificate */
3363 /* Grow the chain by trusted issuer */
3364 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, issuer
)) {
3366 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3369 if ((self_signed
= X509_self_signed(issuer
, 0)) < 0)
3373 * We have a self-signed untrusted cert that has the same
3374 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3375 * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3376 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3378 if (X509_cmp(curr
, issuer
) != 0) {
3379 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3382 } else { /* curr "==" issuer */
3384 * Replace self-signed untrusted certificate
3385 * by its trusted matching issuer.
3388 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3389 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, issuer
);
3394 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check
3395 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3396 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3397 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3399 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3400 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3401 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3402 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3403 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3404 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3407 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
))
3409 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3410 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3411 if (trust
!= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
)
3419 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3420 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3421 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3422 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3424 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3425 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3426 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3428 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3429 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3430 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3432 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3433 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3434 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3439 * Try to extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificate
3441 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3442 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3443 if (!ossl_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
))
3445 curr
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
3446 issuer
= (X509_self_signed(curr
, 0) > 0 || num
> max_depth
) ?
3447 NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sk_untrusted
, curr
);
3448 if (issuer
== NULL
) {
3450 * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth
3451 * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking
3452 * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3454 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3456 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3460 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3461 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted
, issuer
);
3463 /* Grow the chain by untrusted issuer */
3464 if (!X509_add_cert(ctx
->chain
, issuer
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
))
3467 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3469 /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
3470 trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1);
3471 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
|| trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
3475 sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted
);
3477 if (trust
< 0) /* internal error */
3481 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3482 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3484 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3485 if (num
<= max_depth
) {
3486 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3487 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3488 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3489 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3493 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3495 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3496 /* Callback already issued */
3498 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3500 switch (ctx
->error
) {
3501 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
3502 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
3503 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
3504 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
3505 return 0; /* Callback already done by ossl_x509_check_cert_time() */
3506 default: /* A preliminary error has become final */
3507 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1, ctx
->error
);
3511 CB_FAIL_IF(num
> max_depth
,
3512 ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3513 CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
)
3514 && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0),
3515 ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3516 if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1), 0) > 0)
3517 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1,
3519 ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
3520 : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3521 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1,
3522 ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
3523 ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
3524 : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3528 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3529 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3530 sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted
);
3534 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3535 sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted
);
3539 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_build_chain(X509
*target
, STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
,
3540 X509_STORE
*store
, int with_self_signed
,
3541 OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
, const char *propq
)
3543 int finish_chain
= store
!= NULL
;
3544 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
3545 int flags
= X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
;
3546 STACK_OF(X509
) *result
= NULL
;
3548 if (target
== NULL
) {
3549 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
3553 if ((ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(libctx
, propq
)) == NULL
)
3555 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx
, store
, target
, finish_chain
? certs
: NULL
))
3558 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx
, certs
);
3559 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx
->chain
, target
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
3560 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3563 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
3565 if (!build_chain(ctx
) && finish_chain
)
3568 /* result list to store the up_ref'ed certificates */
3569 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) > 1 && !with_self_signed
)
3570 flags
|= X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS
;
3571 if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&result
, ctx
->chain
, flags
)) {
3572 sk_X509_free(result
);
3577 X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx
);
3582 * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table in ssl/ssl_cert.c
3583 * in ssl_get_security_level_bits that's used for selection of DH parameters
3585 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3586 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3589 * Check whether the given public key meets the security level of `ctx`.
3590 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3592 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3594 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3597 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3598 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3599 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3605 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3609 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3610 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3612 return EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3616 * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`.
3617 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3619 static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3621 return check_key_level(ctx
, X509_get0_pubkey(cert
));
3625 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
3626 * for an elliptic curve.
3628 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
3630 static int check_curve(X509
*cert
)
3632 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3635 /* Unsupported or malformed key */
3638 if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3642 EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey
,
3643 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
,
3645 return ret
< 0 ? ret
: !val
;
3649 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3650 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3651 * self-signed or otherwise).
3653 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3655 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3658 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3662 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3663 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3665 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert
, NULL
, NULL
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3668 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];