2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
38 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
49 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
50 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
72 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
86 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
87 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
89 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
92 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
97 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
103 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
108 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
115 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
118 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
122 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
130 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
140 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
188 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
198 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
211 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
224 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
225 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
230 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
236 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
237 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
238 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
247 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
249 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
272 * Ktls always reads full records.
273 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
275 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s
->rbio
) && !s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
276 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
277 /* ignore max parameter */
282 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
283 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
291 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
292 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
297 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
298 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
299 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
300 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
304 && !BIO_should_retry(s
->rbio
)
305 && BIO_eof(s
->rbio
)) {
306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
307 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
);
310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
311 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
317 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
319 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
324 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
325 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
326 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
328 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
330 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
334 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
337 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
338 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
344 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
345 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
347 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
350 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
352 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
353 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
356 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
360 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
361 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
363 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
364 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
365 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
366 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
367 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
368 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
369 * report the error in a way the user will notice
371 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
372 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
378 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
379 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
387 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we
388 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first.
390 if (wb
->left
== 0 && s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
)
391 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
394 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
395 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
398 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
399 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
400 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
401 /* SSLfatal() already called */
410 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
411 * will happen with non blocking IO
414 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
415 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
418 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
419 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
422 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
424 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
426 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
427 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
428 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
429 * compromise is considered worthy.
431 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
432 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)) &&
433 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
434 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
435 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) == 0) &&
436 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
437 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
438 unsigned char aad
[13];
439 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
443 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
444 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
445 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
447 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
448 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
450 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
451 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
452 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
454 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
459 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
460 /* SSLfatal() already called */
463 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
464 /* free jumbo buffer */
465 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
472 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
473 /* free jumbo buffer */
474 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
478 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
479 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
481 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
482 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
487 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
488 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
490 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
492 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
494 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
495 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
502 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
503 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
504 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
505 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
506 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
507 /* free jumbo buffer */
508 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
512 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
513 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
516 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
517 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
518 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
521 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
522 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
524 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
530 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
531 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
532 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
533 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
535 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
537 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
538 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
539 /* free jumbo buffer */
540 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
542 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
546 /* free jumbo buffer */
547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
548 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
555 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
556 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
557 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
558 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
566 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
567 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
569 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
570 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
571 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
574 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
575 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
577 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
581 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
585 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
586 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
587 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
588 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
590 if (max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
== 0
591 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
593 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
594 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
597 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
602 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
608 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
609 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
612 if (n
/ numpipes
>= max_send_fragment
) {
614 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
617 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
618 pipelens
[j
] = max_send_fragment
;
621 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
622 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
623 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
624 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
625 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
631 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
634 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
635 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
636 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
641 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
642 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
644 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
645 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
647 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 0;
650 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
) != 0
652 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
654 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
663 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
664 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
665 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
667 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
668 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
671 unsigned char *recordstart
;
672 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
673 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
678 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
681 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
682 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
684 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
685 * will happen with non blocking IO
687 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
688 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
689 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
692 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
693 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
694 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
696 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
699 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
702 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
) {
703 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0)) {
704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
709 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
714 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
715 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
716 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
719 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
720 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
723 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
729 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
731 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
) {
733 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
734 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
737 if (s
->s3
.need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
739 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
740 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
741 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
744 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
747 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
749 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
754 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
755 /* insufficient space */
756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
762 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 1;
765 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
767 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
768 * discard the const qualifier.
769 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
772 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], (unsigned char *)buf
);
773 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], 0);
774 goto wpacket_init_complete
;
777 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
778 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
779 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
781 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
782 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
783 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
785 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
786 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
788 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
789 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
790 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
791 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
797 } else if (prefix_len
) {
798 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
799 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
800 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
801 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
802 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
803 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
810 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
813 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
814 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
815 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
816 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
818 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
819 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
820 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
821 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
830 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
831 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
832 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
833 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
834 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
835 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
838 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
839 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
840 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
841 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
842 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
846 wpacket_init_complete
:
849 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
850 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof(wr
));
851 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
852 unsigned int version
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
854 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
856 unsigned int rectype
;
862 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
865 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
866 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
867 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
868 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
869 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
872 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, rectype
);
875 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
876 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
878 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
880 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
881 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
882 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
883 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr
, version
);
885 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
886 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
887 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
890 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
891 * Otherwise write the header now
893 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
894 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
895 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
896 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
898 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
900 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
902 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
903 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
907 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
908 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
909 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
910 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
911 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
914 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
918 /* first we compress */
919 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
920 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
921 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
923 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
927 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
928 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr
[j
]);
930 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
931 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
932 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
935 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
939 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
940 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
941 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
942 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
943 size_t rlen
, max_send_fragment
;
945 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
950 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
952 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
953 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
954 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
955 if (rlen
< max_send_fragment
) {
957 size_t max_padding
= max_send_fragment
- rlen
;
958 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
959 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
960 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
961 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
964 /* optimize for power of 2 */
965 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
966 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
968 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
969 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
973 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
976 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
977 if (padding
> max_padding
)
978 padding
= max_padding
;
979 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
984 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
990 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
991 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
995 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
998 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
999 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1000 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1001 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1007 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
1008 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
1009 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
1011 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1012 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
,
1013 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
1016 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1019 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
1020 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1025 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1026 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
1027 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
1028 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
1029 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
1033 if (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
== ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
) {
1035 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1036 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1038 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1) {
1039 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1040 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1041 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1046 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1047 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1) {
1048 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1049 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1057 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
1063 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
))
1066 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1067 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
1068 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1069 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
1070 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
1071 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
1072 thiswr
->length
- origlen
,
1074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1078 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1081 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
1082 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1083 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1087 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
1090 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
1091 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
1092 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1097 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
1098 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
1099 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1100 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
1101 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1102 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1104 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
1105 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1107 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1108 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1112 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1113 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1114 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1118 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1119 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1121 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1123 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1127 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1132 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1138 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1139 * is thiswr->length long
1141 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1144 /* now let's set up wb */
1145 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1146 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1150 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1153 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1154 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1155 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1156 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1158 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1159 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1161 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1162 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1166 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1168 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1170 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1174 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1178 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1179 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
1180 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
1181 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1183 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1188 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1189 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1190 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1195 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1196 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1199 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1200 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1202 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1203 i
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1208 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
1209 && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1210 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s
->wbio
, type
);
1212 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1213 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1214 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1215 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1216 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1220 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1224 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1225 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1226 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1227 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1229 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1230 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1232 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1235 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1236 * using a datagram service
1238 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1242 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1243 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1248 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1249 * 'type' is one of the following:
1251 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1252 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1253 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1255 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1256 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1258 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1259 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1260 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1261 * argument is non NULL.
1262 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1263 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1264 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1265 * Change cipher spec protocol
1266 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1268 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1269 * Handshake protocol
1270 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1271 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1272 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1273 * Application data protocol
1274 * none of our business
1276 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1277 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1280 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1283 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1284 int is_tls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
);
1286 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1288 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1289 /* Not initialized yet */
1290 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
1291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1296 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1297 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1299 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1301 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1305 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1306 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1308 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1309 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1314 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1317 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1320 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1321 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1322 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1324 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1325 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1332 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1335 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1336 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1337 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1338 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1345 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1348 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1349 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1350 * rr[i].data, - data
1351 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1352 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1354 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1355 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1358 /* get new records if necessary */
1359 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1360 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1362 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1365 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1366 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1367 /* Shouldn't happen */
1368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1373 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1375 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1377 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1378 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1382 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1385 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
1386 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1387 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1389 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
1394 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1395 * record that isn't an alert.
1397 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1398 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1399 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1401 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1403 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1404 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1405 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1406 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1407 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1412 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1415 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1416 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1417 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1421 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1422 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1423 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1426 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1427 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1428 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1431 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1432 * doing a handshake for the first time
1434 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1435 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1437 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1441 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1442 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1443 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1444 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1445 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1449 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1450 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1454 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1455 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1456 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1458 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1459 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1465 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1466 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1468 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1470 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1473 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1474 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1475 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1477 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1478 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1479 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1480 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1481 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1482 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1485 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1486 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1491 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1492 && totalbytes
< len
);
1493 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1494 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1497 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1498 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1499 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1500 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1501 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1506 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1507 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1508 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1512 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1514 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1516 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1517 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1518 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1519 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1526 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1527 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1529 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1530 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1531 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1532 * if we are a server.
1534 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1536 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1541 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1542 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1545 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1546 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1547 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1548 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1551 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1552 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1553 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1554 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1555 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1556 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1560 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1561 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1562 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1564 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1565 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1566 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1567 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1570 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1571 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1574 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
1575 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
1576 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1577 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1579 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1580 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1581 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1582 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1588 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1589 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1591 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1593 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1594 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
1595 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1597 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
1600 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1601 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1602 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1603 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1604 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1605 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1606 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1607 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1608 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1610 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1612 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1613 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1614 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1615 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1616 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1617 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1620 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1622 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1623 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1627 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1628 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1632 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
1633 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1637 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1638 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1639 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1640 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1641 * sent close_notify.
1643 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1644 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1645 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1647 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
1650 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1651 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1652 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
1653 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
1658 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1659 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1660 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1662 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1664 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1665 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1666 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1667 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
1673 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1674 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1675 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1676 * that we're just going to discard.
1678 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1679 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
1680 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1681 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1683 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1684 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1685 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1687 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1688 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1689 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1690 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1691 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1693 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1694 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1696 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1697 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1700 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1701 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1702 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1707 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1708 * protocol violation)
1710 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1711 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1712 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1714 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1715 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1717 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1718 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1726 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1727 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1728 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1733 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1734 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1735 /* no read-ahead left? */
1738 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1739 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1740 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1741 * problems in the blocking world
1743 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1744 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1745 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1746 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1753 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1756 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1757 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1758 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1759 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1760 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1763 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1765 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1767 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1769 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1770 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1771 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1776 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1778 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1779 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1780 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1781 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1782 * started), we will indulge it.
1784 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1785 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1787 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1789 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1790 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1791 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1792 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1793 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1794 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1797 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1798 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1806 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1812 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1816 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1824 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1825 * format and false otherwise.
1827 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1829 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1833 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1835 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1837 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);