2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
136 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
142 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
143 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
144 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
145 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
146 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
162 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
163 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
164 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
173 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
176 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
177 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
178 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
180 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
181 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
183 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered.
186 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
190 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
191 s
->packet_length
= 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
196 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
197 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
201 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
203 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
207 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
209 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len
= s
->packet_length
;
218 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) { /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+ left
);
226 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
229 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
235 /* ignore max parameter */
240 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
241 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
246 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
247 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
252 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
253 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
254 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
262 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
264 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
269 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
270 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
271 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
275 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
279 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
282 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
283 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
288 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
289 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
290 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
291 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
293 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
296 * Call this to get a new input record.
297 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
298 * or non-blocking IO.
299 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
300 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
304 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
305 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
307 int ssl_major
, ssl_minor
, al
;
308 int enc_err
, n
, i
, ret
= -1;
312 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
316 unsigned empty_record_count
= 0;
321 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
322 extra
= SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
325 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
) {
327 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
328 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
335 /* check if we have the header */
336 if ((s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
337 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
338 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
340 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking */
341 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
345 s
->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, p
, 5, s
,
346 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
348 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
352 version
= (ssl_major
<< 8) | ssl_minor
;
355 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
358 /* Lets check version */
359 if (!s
->first_packet
) {
360 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
362 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00)
363 && !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
365 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
367 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
368 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
373 if ((version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
) {
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
378 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
379 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
384 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
387 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
389 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
390 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
392 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, i
, i
, 1);
394 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
396 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
401 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
404 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
405 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
407 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
410 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
411 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
412 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
413 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
417 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
418 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
421 /* check is not needed I believe */
422 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
423 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
428 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
429 rr
->data
= rr
->input
;
430 rr
->orig_len
= rr
->length
;
432 * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
433 * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
435 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && s
->read_hash
) {
437 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
438 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
439 if (rr
->length
< mac_size
) {
440 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
444 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
445 mac
= rr
->data
+ rr
->length
;
446 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, md
, 0 /* not send */ );
447 if (i
< 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0) {
448 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
450 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
455 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 0);
458 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
459 * 1: if the padding is valid
460 * -1: if the padding is invalid
463 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
468 printf("dec %d\n", rr
->length
);
471 for (z
= 0; z
< rr
->length
; z
++)
472 printf("%02X%c", rr
->data
[z
], ((z
+ 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
477 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
478 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
479 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) &&
480 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s
)) {
481 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
482 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
483 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
484 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
485 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
488 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
489 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
490 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
491 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
493 if (rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
||
494 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
495 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
496 rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
+ 1)) {
497 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
502 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
504 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
505 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
506 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
507 * contents of the padding bytes.
510 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
);
511 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
514 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
515 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
518 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
519 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
522 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, md
, 0 /* not send */ );
523 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
524 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
526 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ extra
+ mac_size
)
532 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
533 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
534 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
535 * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
536 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
538 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
540 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
544 /* r->length is now just compressed */
545 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
) {
546 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
547 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
551 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
)) {
552 al
= SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
558 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
559 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
566 * So at this point the following is true
567 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
568 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
569 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
570 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
574 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
575 s
->packet_length
= 0;
577 /* just read a 0 length packet */
578 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
579 empty_record_count
++;
580 if (empty_record_count
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS
) {
581 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL
);
588 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
,
595 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
600 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
606 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
607 i
= COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
, rr
->comp
,
608 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, rr
->data
,
619 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
625 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
626 i
= COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
, wr
->data
,
627 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
628 wr
->input
, (int)wr
->length
);
634 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
640 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
641 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
643 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
645 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
648 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
649 unsigned int max_send_fragment
;
651 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
653 unsigned int u_len
= (unsigned int)len
;
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH
);
660 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
661 OPENSSL_assert(s
->s3
->wnum
<= INT_MAX
);
665 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
666 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
676 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
677 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
678 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
679 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
680 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
681 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
682 * report the error in a way the user will notice
685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
690 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
691 * will happen with non blocking IO
694 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->s3
->wpend_tot
);
696 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
700 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
702 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
704 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
705 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
706 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
707 * compromise is considered worthy.
709 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
710 u_len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
711 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
712 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
714 enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) &
715 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
716 unsigned char aad
[13];
717 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
720 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
721 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
722 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
724 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
725 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
727 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
728 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
729 max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
731 if (u_len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
736 wb
->buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
738 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
739 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
746 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
747 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
752 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
753 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
760 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
761 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
763 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
765 memcpy(aad
, s
->s3
->write_sequence
, 8);
767 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
768 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
775 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
776 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
777 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
779 if (packlen
<= 0 || packlen
> (int)wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
780 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
785 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
786 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
789 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
790 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
791 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
794 s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
795 if (s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
797 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->s3
->write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
803 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= nw
;
804 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
805 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
806 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= nw
;
808 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
);
811 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
818 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
827 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
828 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
829 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
836 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
837 nw
= s
->max_send_fragment
;
841 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
843 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
849 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
850 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
852 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
853 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
855 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
857 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
859 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
869 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
870 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
872 unsigned char *p
, *plen
;
873 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
878 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
882 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
883 * will happen with non blocking IO
886 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
));
888 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
889 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
890 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
893 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
897 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
900 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
906 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
907 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
908 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
910 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
916 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
921 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
922 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& s
->compress
== NULL
&&
923 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
925 enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) &
926 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
)
928 unsigned char aad
[13];
929 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
=
930 { NULL
, aad
, sizeof(aad
), 0 };
933 memcpy(aad
, s
->s3
->write_sequence
, 8);
935 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
936 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
937 aad
[11] = (unsigned char)(len
>> 8);
938 aad
[12] = (unsigned char)len
;
939 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
940 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
941 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
943 if (packlen
== 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
)
946 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
949 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
950 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
951 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
953 s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
954 if (s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
956 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->s3
->write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
963 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad
964 * write retries later
966 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= len
;
967 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= buf
;
968 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
969 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= len
;
971 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
972 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
977 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
979 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
981 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
982 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
985 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
987 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
988 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
989 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
992 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
997 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
999 /* insufficient space */
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1005 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
1008 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1009 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1011 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
1012 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
1013 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
1015 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1016 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
1018 p
= wb
->buf
+ align
;
1020 } else if (prefix_len
) {
1021 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
1023 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1024 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1025 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
1027 p
= wb
->buf
+ align
;
1031 /* write the header */
1033 *(p
++) = type
& 0xff;
1036 *(p
++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
1038 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
1039 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
1041 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1042 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
1045 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1047 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1050 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1051 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
1052 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1053 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
1054 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1058 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1059 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
1060 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
1066 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1067 wr
->data
= p
+ eivlen
;
1068 wr
->length
= (int)len
;
1069 wr
->input
= (unsigned char *)buf
;
1072 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1075 /* first we compress */
1076 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
1077 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
)) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1082 memcpy(wr
->data
, wr
->input
, wr
->length
);
1083 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
1087 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1088 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1092 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1093 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
1095 wr
->length
+= mac_size
;
1103 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1105 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
1108 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 1) < 1)
1111 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1112 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, p
+ wr
->length
, 1) < 0)
1114 wr
->length
+= mac_size
;
1117 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1118 s2n(wr
->length
, plen
);
1120 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1121 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
- 5, 5, s
,
1122 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1125 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1128 wr
->type
= type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1129 wr
->length
+= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1131 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1133 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1139 /* now let's set up wb */
1140 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1143 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1146 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= len
;
1147 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= buf
;
1148 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
1149 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= len
;
1151 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1152 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
1157 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1158 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
1162 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
1165 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
1166 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1167 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1168 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1175 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1176 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1177 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
1178 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
1179 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1184 if (i
== wb
->left
) {
1187 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1188 return (s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
1189 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1190 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
1192 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1193 * using a datagram service
1205 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1206 * 'type' is one of the following:
1208 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1209 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1210 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1212 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1213 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1215 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1216 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1217 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1218 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1219 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1220 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1221 * Change cipher spec protocol
1222 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1224 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1225 * Handshake protocol
1226 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1227 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1228 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1229 * Application data protocol
1230 * none of our business
1232 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
1237 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1239 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
1240 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1243 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1244 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1246 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1251 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1252 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1254 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1255 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1260 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1263 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1266 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1267 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1268 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1273 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1276 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1277 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1278 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1287 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1290 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1291 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1292 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1293 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1295 rr
= &(s
->s3
->rrec
);
1297 /* get new packet if necessary */
1298 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)) {
1299 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1304 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1306 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1307 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1308 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1309 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1315 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1318 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1320 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1324 if (type
== rr
->type
) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1325 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1327 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1328 * doing a handshake for the first time
1330 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1331 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1332 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1340 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1343 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1345 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1349 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
1350 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1352 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1353 && s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
1354 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1361 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1362 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1366 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1367 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1370 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1371 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1372 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1374 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1375 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1376 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1377 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1378 } else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1379 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1380 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1381 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1384 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
) {
1385 tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1387 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1389 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1390 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1391 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1396 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1397 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1399 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1401 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1403 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1407 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1408 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1413 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1414 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1415 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1418 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1420 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1421 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1422 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1423 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1425 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1426 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1427 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1428 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1433 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1434 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1435 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1436 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1438 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1439 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1440 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1441 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1442 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1443 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1448 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1452 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1453 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1456 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1457 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1458 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1459 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1461 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1462 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1463 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1464 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1471 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1472 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1477 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1478 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1479 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1482 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1483 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1484 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1485 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1486 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1487 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1488 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1490 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1493 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1496 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1497 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1498 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1500 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1502 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1503 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1504 s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1506 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1507 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1508 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1509 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1512 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1513 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1516 if (alert_level
== 1) { /* warning */
1517 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1518 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1519 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1523 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1524 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1525 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1526 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1527 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1528 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1530 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1531 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1535 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1536 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1539 } else if (alert_level
== 2) { /* fatal */
1542 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1543 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1545 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1546 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1547 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1548 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1551 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1559 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1561 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1566 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1568 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1569 * what the record payload has to look like
1571 if ((rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1572 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
1573 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1578 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1579 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
1580 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1585 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
)) {
1586 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1591 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1595 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1596 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1597 rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1599 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
1600 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1607 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1609 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
1610 if (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1611 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1612 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1613 * are not as expected (and because this is
1614 * not really needed for clients except for
1615 * detecting protocol violations): */
1616 s
->state
= SSL_ST_BEFORE
| (s
->server
)
1617 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1619 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1624 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1632 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1633 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1636 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1637 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1638 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1639 * problems in the blocking world
1641 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1642 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1643 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1644 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1655 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1656 * an unexpected message alert.
1658 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
) {
1663 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1666 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1668 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1670 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1671 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1672 * happen when type != rr->type
1674 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1677 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1679 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1680 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1681 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1682 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1683 * started), we will indulge it.
1685 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1686 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1687 (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1688 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1689 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1690 ) || ((s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1691 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1692 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1695 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1698 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1706 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1711 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1717 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1718 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1720 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1722 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
) {
1723 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0) {
1724 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1726 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1730 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1731 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
1735 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
, i
))
1739 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1740 * before we read the finished message
1742 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) {
1743 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1744 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1746 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1747 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1750 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1752 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1757 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1762 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1764 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1765 desc
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1766 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1767 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1768 * protocol_version alerts */
1771 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1772 if ((level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1773 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1775 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1776 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] = level
;
1777 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] = desc
;
1778 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1779 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1781 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1787 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1790 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1792 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 0;
1793 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1795 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1798 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1799 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1802 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1803 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1805 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1806 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
,
1807 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1809 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1810 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1811 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1812 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1815 j
= (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] << 8) | s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1816 cb(s
, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
, j
);