1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
184 ssl_undefined_function
,
185 ssl3_get_server_method
)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
190 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
191 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
194 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
200 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
202 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
203 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
228 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
231 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
233 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
238 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
240 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
242 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
263 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
271 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
272 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
279 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
287 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
288 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
289 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
290 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
305 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
306 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
309 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
315 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
316 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
320 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
321 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
323 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
327 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
339 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
340 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
342 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
343 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
346 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
348 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
353 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
360 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
367 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
382 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
396 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
402 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
|SSL_kEDH
))
403 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
404 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
405 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
413 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
414 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
419 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
430 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
444 /* no cert request */
446 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
447 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
451 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
452 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
453 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
457 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
458 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
466 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
467 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
468 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
469 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1
=BIO_ctrl(s
->wbio
,BIO_CTRL_INFO
,0,NULL
);
478 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
479 num1
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
480 if (num1
<= 0) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
481 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
484 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
494 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
496 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
498 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
499 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
502 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
508 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
518 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
526 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
529 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
530 * a client cert, it can be verified
531 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
532 * should be generalized. But it is next step
534 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
535 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
537 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
538 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
542 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
543 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
554 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
555 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
557 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
558 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
559 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
561 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
565 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
566 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
567 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
568 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
569 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
571 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
572 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
580 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
585 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
586 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
587 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
588 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
589 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
593 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
594 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
595 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
596 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
597 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
603 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
604 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
606 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
607 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
608 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
610 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
611 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
613 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
614 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
617 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
618 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
626 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
628 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
629 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
630 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
631 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
632 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
633 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
635 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
637 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
642 /* clean a few things up */
643 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
645 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
648 /* remove buffering on output */
649 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
653 if (s
->new_session
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
655 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
656 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
660 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
662 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
664 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
666 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
680 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
684 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
689 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
693 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
700 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
704 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
708 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
712 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
714 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
715 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
720 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
721 /* number of bytes to write */
726 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
727 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
730 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
735 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
736 * so permit appropriate message length */
737 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
743 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
744 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
745 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
747 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
748 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
749 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
750 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
752 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
754 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
755 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
763 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
765 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
766 unsigned int cookie_len
;
769 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
774 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
776 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
777 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
778 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
779 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
782 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
784 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
787 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
788 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
789 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
790 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
791 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
794 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
796 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
798 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
799 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
800 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
803 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
804 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
807 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
809 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
810 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
812 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
816 /* load the client random */
817 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
820 /* get the session-id */
824 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
825 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
826 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
827 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
828 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
829 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
830 * an earlier library version)
832 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
834 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
839 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
841 { /* previous session */
848 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
855 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
)
860 if ( (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
861 s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0)
863 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
864 if ( cookie_len
!= s
->d1
->cookie_len
)
866 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
873 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
874 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
875 * does not cause an overflow.
877 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
880 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
885 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
886 if ( (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
889 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
891 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
893 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
896 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
898 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
901 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
903 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
904 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
906 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
908 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
917 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
919 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
920 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
926 /* not enough data */
927 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
931 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
938 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
939 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
942 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
945 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
947 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
949 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
951 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
952 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
960 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
962 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
963 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
964 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
965 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
966 * enabled, though. */
967 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
968 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
970 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
976 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
977 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
978 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
988 /* not enough data */
989 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
996 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1003 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1010 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
1012 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
1014 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1019 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1024 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1025 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1026 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1027 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1031 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1032 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1034 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1036 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1041 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1043 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1045 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1046 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1047 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1050 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1051 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1055 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1056 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1057 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1059 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1064 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1067 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1069 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1070 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1072 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1073 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1078 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1079 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1080 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1081 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1083 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1084 { /* See if we have a match */
1085 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1087 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1088 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1090 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1103 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1109 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1114 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1115 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1117 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1119 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1120 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1121 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1122 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1124 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1129 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1130 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1134 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1138 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1142 /* Session-id reuse */
1143 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1144 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1145 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1146 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1148 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1150 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1151 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1153 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1154 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1156 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1160 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1161 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1162 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1164 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1168 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1171 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1174 /* we now have the following setup.
1176 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1177 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1178 * compression - basically ignored right now
1179 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1180 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1181 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1182 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1189 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1192 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1196 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1199 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1202 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1206 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1208 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1209 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1210 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1211 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1212 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1214 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1217 /* Do the message type and length last */
1220 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1221 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1224 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1225 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1227 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1228 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1229 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1230 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1231 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1232 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1233 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1235 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1236 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1237 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1238 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1239 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1242 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1244 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1246 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1247 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1253 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1256 /* put the cipher */
1257 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1260 /* put the compression method */
1261 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1264 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1267 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1270 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1275 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1284 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1287 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1288 /* number of bytes to write */
1293 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1294 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1297 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1301 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1303 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1306 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1311 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1312 /* number of bytes to write */
1317 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1318 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1321 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1327 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1334 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1335 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1338 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1341 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1351 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1352 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1354 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1359 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1362 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1365 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1367 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1368 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1369 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1372 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1381 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1387 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1392 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1395 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1396 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1397 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1398 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1401 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1406 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1413 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1420 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1421 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1422 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1424 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1433 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1434 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1435 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1436 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1449 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1451 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1453 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1454 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1456 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1457 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1458 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1462 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1467 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1469 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1474 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1480 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1487 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1488 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1489 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1490 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1492 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1499 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1500 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1501 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1507 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1508 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1514 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1515 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1516 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1519 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1526 /* Encode the public key.
1527 * First check the size of encoding and
1528 * allocate memory accordingly.
1530 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1531 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1532 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1535 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1536 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1537 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1538 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1545 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1546 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1547 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1548 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1550 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1556 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1558 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1559 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1560 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1561 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1566 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1567 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1575 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1577 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1579 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1580 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1583 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1585 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1589 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1591 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1595 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1596 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1598 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1601 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1604 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1612 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1617 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1620 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1628 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1630 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1631 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1632 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1633 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1634 * the actual encoded point itself
1636 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1644 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1645 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1647 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1653 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1655 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1656 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1657 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1658 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1665 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1666 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1668 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1672 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1674 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1675 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1676 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1677 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1678 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1679 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1680 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1684 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1685 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1695 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1696 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1699 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1700 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1701 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1702 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1703 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1704 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1714 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1715 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1717 /* let's do ECDSA */
1718 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1719 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1720 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1721 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1722 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1723 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1734 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1735 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1741 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1744 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1750 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1751 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1752 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1754 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1757 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1758 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1760 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1764 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1766 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1768 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1772 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1776 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1778 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1780 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1789 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1793 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1795 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1796 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1797 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1802 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1803 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1806 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1813 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1814 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1820 /* else no CA names */
1821 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1824 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1825 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1828 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1833 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1834 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1837 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1844 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1847 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1848 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1853 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1857 unsigned long alg_k
;
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1861 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1869 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1872 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1873 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1874 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1875 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1878 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1879 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1880 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1881 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1885 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
1886 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1888 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1891 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
1893 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1894 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
1896 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
1897 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1898 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1899 * be sent already */
1902 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
1910 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
1911 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
1912 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
1913 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
1915 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
1922 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1923 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
1928 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1940 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
1944 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1946 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1947 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1950 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
1952 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1953 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1954 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1955 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1956 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1958 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1959 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
1960 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
1962 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1963 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1965 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1966 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1967 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1968 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1969 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1970 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1971 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1977 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1978 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1979 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1981 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
1982 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
1983 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
1984 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1988 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1989 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1990 s
->session
->master_key
,
1992 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1997 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2002 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2014 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2016 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2022 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2024 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2029 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2032 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2039 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2047 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2052 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2053 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2054 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2055 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2060 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2062 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2063 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2064 krb5_data authenticator
;
2066 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2068 EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2069 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2070 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2071 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2073 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2074 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2076 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2078 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2081 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2083 if (n
< enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2086 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2090 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2091 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2094 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2096 if (n
< enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2099 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2103 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2104 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2108 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2111 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2114 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2117 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2121 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2122 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2125 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2129 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2133 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2134 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2136 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2137 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2143 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2144 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2146 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2147 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2150 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2151 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2153 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2154 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2160 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2167 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2168 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2170 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2174 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2176 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2179 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2182 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2183 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2186 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2189 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2192 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2195 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2198 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2202 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2205 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2208 if (!((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2210 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2211 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2212 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2213 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2214 * the protocol version.
2215 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2216 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2218 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2219 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2222 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2227 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2229 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2230 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2231 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2233 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2235 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2236 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2238 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2239 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2244 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2245 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2246 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2247 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2251 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2254 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2259 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2260 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2262 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2263 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2266 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2270 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2271 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2273 /* use the certificate */
2274 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2278 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2279 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2281 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2284 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2285 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2287 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2288 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2295 /* Let's get client's public key */
2296 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2299 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2305 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2307 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2309 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2313 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2315 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2317 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2318 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2319 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2320 * never executed. When that support is
2321 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2322 * received in the certificate is
2323 * authorized for key agreement.
2324 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2325 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2328 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2330 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2334 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2335 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2341 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2345 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2346 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2348 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2351 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2355 /* Get encoded point length */
2358 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2359 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2365 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2366 * currently, so set it to the start
2368 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2371 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2372 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2373 if (field_size
<= 0)
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2379 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2387 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2388 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2389 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2390 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2392 /* Compute the master secret */
2393 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2394 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2396 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2402 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2404 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2405 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2406 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2408 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2410 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2419 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2422 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2425 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2428 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2432 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2433 * string for the callback */
2434 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2435 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2436 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2437 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2438 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2440 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2446 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2448 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2450 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2451 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2455 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2456 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2458 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2460 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2464 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2465 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2466 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2467 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2470 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2474 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2475 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2476 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2477 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2478 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2481 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2485 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2486 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2487 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2490 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2496 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2498 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2499 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2502 /* Get our certificate privatec key*/
2503 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
,NULL
);
2504 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2505 /* Decrypt session key */
2506 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)) || p
[1]!=0x81 )
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2511 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,p
+3,p
[2]) <0)
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2517 /* Generate master secret */
2518 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2519 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2520 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2521 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2526 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2528 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2534 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2535 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2539 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2540 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2541 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2542 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2543 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2548 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2550 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2557 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2558 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2559 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2564 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2566 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2568 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2569 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2570 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2578 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2580 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2581 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2583 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2594 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2598 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2601 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2605 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2608 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2612 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2613 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2614 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2615 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2616 * signature without length field */
2617 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
2618 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2629 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2633 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2634 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2637 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2642 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2644 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2645 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2649 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2655 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2663 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2665 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2666 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2667 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2671 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2679 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2681 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2682 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2683 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2687 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2689 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2695 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
2696 { unsigned char signature
[64];
2698 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
2699 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
2701 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
2703 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
2704 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
2706 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
2707 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2710 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2712 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2719 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2728 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2731 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2735 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2737 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2739 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2740 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2742 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2744 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2751 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2753 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2755 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2756 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2759 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2762 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2763 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2766 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2769 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2773 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2775 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2779 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2781 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2790 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2794 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2797 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2799 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2805 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2813 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2817 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2826 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2828 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2829 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2831 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2835 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2836 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2837 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2840 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2846 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
2849 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
2855 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
2856 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2857 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2858 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2860 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2861 * when we arrive here. */
2862 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2864 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
2865 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2871 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
2872 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
2873 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
2874 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2875 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2886 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
2887 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
2891 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2896 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
2898 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
2901 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2902 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
2903 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2910 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
2911 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
2916 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2917 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2920 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2922 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
2924 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
2929 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2930 unsigned char key_name
[16];
2932 /* get session encoding length */
2933 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
2934 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2939 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2940 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2941 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2942 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2943 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2944 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2946 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
2947 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
2948 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
2950 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
2954 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
2956 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2958 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
2959 /* Skip message length for now */
2961 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
2962 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
2963 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2964 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2967 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
2969 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
2978 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
2979 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
2980 s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
2981 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
2982 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
2983 memcpy(key_name
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
2985 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
2986 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2988 /* Output key name */
2990 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
2993 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
2994 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
2995 /* Encrypt session data */
2996 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
2998 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3000 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3002 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3003 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3004 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3007 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3009 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3010 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3011 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3013 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3015 /* number of bytes to write */
3017 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3022 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3023 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3026 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3028 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3031 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3032 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3033 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3036 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3039 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3042 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3043 /* message length */
3044 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3046 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3047 /* length of OCSP response */
3048 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3049 /* actual response */
3050 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3051 /* number of bytes to write */
3052 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3053 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3057 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3058 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));