2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
16 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
26 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
28 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE
,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
36 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
37 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
40 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.hostname
,
51 strlen(s
->ext
.hostname
))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
54 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME
,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
64 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
67 if (s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
== TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length
)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
80 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
90 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
103 strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP
,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116 static int use_ecc(SSL
*s
)
119 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= NULL
;
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
126 cipher_stack
= SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s
);
127 end
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
);
128 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
131 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
132 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
133 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
))
134 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
135 || c
->min_tls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
141 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack
);
145 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
146 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
149 const unsigned char *pformats
;
153 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
155 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
156 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
159 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
160 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
161 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, pformats
, num_formats
)
162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
163 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
164 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
168 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
171 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
172 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
175 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
176 size_t num_groups
= 0, i
;
179 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
182 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
184 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
185 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
187 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups
)
188 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
189 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
190 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
192 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
194 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
196 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
197 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
198 uint16_t ctmp
= pgroups
[i
];
200 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, ctmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
201 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, ctmp
)) {
202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
203 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
205 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
209 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
211 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS
,
212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
213 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
216 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
220 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
221 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
226 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
))
227 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
229 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
!= NULL
230 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
231 && s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
232 ticklen
= s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
;
233 } else if (s
->session
&& s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
234 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
!= NULL
) {
235 ticklen
= s
->ext
.session_ticket
->length
;
236 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
237 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
238 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
239 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
,
240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
241 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
243 memcpy(s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
244 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
245 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
250 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
&&
251 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
252 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
254 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
255 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
256 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
257 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
258 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
261 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
264 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
265 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
269 const uint16_t *salg
;
271 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
272 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
274 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &salg
);
275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
)
276 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
277 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
278 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
279 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
280 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, salg
, salglen
)
281 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
282 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
283 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS
,
284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
285 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
288 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
292 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
293 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
298 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
302 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
303 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
305 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
306 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
308 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
309 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
312 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
313 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
315 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
); i
++) {
316 unsigned char *idbytes
;
317 OCSP_RESPID
*id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, i
);
318 int idlen
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
321 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
322 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, idlen
, &idbytes
)
323 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &idbytes
) != idlen
) {
324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
325 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
327 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
330 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
331 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
332 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
333 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
334 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
336 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
) {
337 unsigned char *extbytes
;
338 int extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, NULL
);
341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
342 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
346 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, extlen
, &extbytes
)
347 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, &extbytes
)
349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
350 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
,
351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
352 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
355 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
356 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
357 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
358 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
361 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
366 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
367 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
369 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
370 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
373 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
374 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
377 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN
,
379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
380 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
383 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
387 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
388 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
390 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 0;
392 if (s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
393 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
396 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
397 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
398 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
399 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)
400 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN
,
402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
403 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
405 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 1;
407 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
412 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
413 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
416 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
420 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
422 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
423 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
424 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
425 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
426 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
429 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
432 end
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
);
433 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
434 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
=
435 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
437 if (prof
== NULL
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, prof
->id
)) {
438 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
439 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
440 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
443 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
444 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
445 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
446 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
447 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP
,
448 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
449 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
452 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
456 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
457 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
459 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
460 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
462 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
463 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM
,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
466 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
469 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
473 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
474 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
476 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
== NULL
)
477 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
479 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
481 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
)
484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT
,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
487 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
490 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
494 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
495 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
497 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
)
498 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
500 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
501 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
502 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS
,
503 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
504 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
507 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
510 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
511 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
514 int currv
, min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
516 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
518 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
519 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
, reason
);
520 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
524 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
525 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
527 if (max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
528 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
530 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
531 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
532 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
533 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
534 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
535 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
536 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
539 for (currv
= max_version
; currv
>= min_version
; currv
--) {
540 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, currv
)) {
541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
544 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
547 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
548 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
551 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
554 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
558 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
560 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
561 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
565 int nodhe
= s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX
;
567 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes
)
568 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
569 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
570 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE
)
571 || (nodhe
&& !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
))
572 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
573 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
575 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
576 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
579 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
;
581 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
|= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
;
584 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
588 static int add_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int curve_id
)
590 unsigned char *encoded_point
= NULL
;
591 EVP_PKEY
*key_share_key
= NULL
;
594 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
595 if (!ossl_assert(s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)) {
596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
,
597 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
601 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
603 key_share_key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
605 key_share_key
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
606 if (key_share_key
== NULL
) {
607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
612 /* Encode the public key. */
613 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key
,
615 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
616 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
620 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
621 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curve_id
)
622 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_point
, encodedlen
)) {
623 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE
,
624 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
629 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
630 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
631 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
633 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= key_share_key
;
634 s
->s3
->group_id
= curve_id
;
635 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
639 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
)
640 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key
);
641 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
646 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
647 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
651 size_t i
, num_groups
= 0;
652 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
653 uint16_t curve_id
= 0;
655 /* key_share extension */
656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
657 /* Extension data sub-packet */
658 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
659 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
660 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
661 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
663 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
666 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
669 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
672 if (s
->s3
->group_id
!= 0) {
673 curve_id
= s
->s3
->group_id
;
675 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
677 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pgroups
[i
], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
680 curve_id
= pgroups
[i
];
686 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
687 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
688 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
691 if (!add_key_share(s
, pkt
, curve_id
)) {
692 /* SSLfatal() already called */
693 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
696 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
697 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE
,
698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
699 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
701 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
703 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
707 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
708 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
710 EXT_RETURN ret
= EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
712 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
713 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0)
714 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
716 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
717 /* Extension data sub-packet */
718 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
719 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
720 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)
721 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE
,
723 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
727 ret
= EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
729 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
);
730 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
= NULL
;
731 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
= 0;
736 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
737 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
741 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
742 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
743 const unsigned char *id
= NULL
;
745 SSL_SESSION
*psksess
= NULL
;
746 SSL_SESSION
*edsess
= NULL
;
747 const EVP_MD
*handmd
= NULL
;
749 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
750 handmd
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
752 if (s
->psk_use_session_cb
!= NULL
753 && (!s
->psk_use_session_cb(s
, handmd
, &id
, &idlen
, &psksess
)
755 && psksess
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
756 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess
);
757 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
759 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
763 if (psksess
== NULL
&& s
->psk_client_callback
!= NULL
) {
764 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
767 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
768 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, NULL
, identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
771 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
772 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
773 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
774 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
775 } else if (psklen
> 0) {
776 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
777 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
779 idlen
= strlen(identity
);
780 if (idlen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
782 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
783 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
784 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
786 id
= (unsigned char *)identity
;
789 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
790 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
792 cipher
= SSL_CIPHER_find(s
, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
);
793 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
795 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
796 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
797 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
800 psksess
= SSL_SESSION_new();
802 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess
, psk
, psklen
)
803 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess
, cipher
)
804 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
806 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
808 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
809 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
811 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
814 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
816 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->psksession
);
817 s
->psksession
= psksess
;
818 if (psksess
!= NULL
) {
819 OPENSSL_free(s
->psksession_id
);
820 s
->psksession_id
= OPENSSL_memdup(id
, idlen
);
821 if (s
->psksession_id
== NULL
) {
822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
823 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
824 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
826 s
->psksession_id_len
= idlen
;
829 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
830 || (s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0
831 && (psksess
== NULL
|| psksess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0))) {
832 s
->max_early_data
= 0;
833 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
835 edsess
= s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
!= 0 ? s
->session
: psksess
;
836 s
->max_early_data
= edsess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
838 if (edsess
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
839 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
840 || (s
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
841 && strcmp(s
->ext
.hostname
, edsess
->ext
.hostname
) != 0)) {
842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
843 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
844 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI
);
845 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
849 if ((s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
&& edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
)) {
850 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
851 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN
);
852 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
856 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
859 if (edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
860 PACKET prots
, alpnpkt
;
863 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)) {
864 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
865 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
866 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
868 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots
, &alpnpkt
)) {
869 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt
, edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
870 edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
)) {
876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
877 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
878 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN
);
879 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
883 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
884 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
885 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA
,
887 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
888 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
892 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
893 * extension, we set it to accepted.
895 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
;
896 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 1;
898 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
901 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
902 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
905 * PSK pre binder overhead =
906 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
907 * 2 bytes for extension length
908 * 2 bytes for identities list length
909 * 2 bytes for identity length
910 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
911 * 2 bytes for binder list length
912 * 1 byte for binder length
913 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
914 * subsequent binder bytes
916 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
918 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
919 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
922 unsigned char *padbytes
;
925 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) == 0)
926 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
929 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
930 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
931 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
932 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
934 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &hlen
)) {
935 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
,
936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
937 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
941 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
942 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
944 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
945 && s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0
946 && s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) {
947 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
951 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
954 hlen
+= PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD
+ s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
959 if (hlen
> F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN
&& hlen
< F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
) {
960 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
961 hlen
= F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
- hlen
;
964 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
965 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
966 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
967 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
974 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
)
975 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, hlen
, &padbytes
)) {
976 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING
,
977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
978 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
980 memset(padbytes
, 0, hlen
);
983 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
987 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
989 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
990 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
993 uint32_t now
, agesec
, agems
= 0;
994 size_t reshashsize
= 0, pskhashsize
= 0, binderoffset
, msglen
;
995 unsigned char *resbinder
= NULL
, *pskbinder
= NULL
, *msgstart
= NULL
;
996 const EVP_MD
*handmd
= NULL
, *mdres
= NULL
, *mdpsk
= NULL
;
999 s
->ext
.tick_identity
= 0;
1002 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1003 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1004 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1008 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1009 * so don't add this extension.
1011 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1012 || (s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
== 0 && s
->psksession
== NULL
))
1013 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1015 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
1016 handmd
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
1018 if (s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0) {
1019 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1020 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
1021 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1023 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1025 mdres
= ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1026 if (mdres
== NULL
) {
1028 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1034 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& mdres
!= handmd
) {
1036 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1037 * so we can't use it.
1043 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1044 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1045 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1046 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1047 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1050 now
= (uint32_t)time(NULL
);
1051 agesec
= now
- (uint32_t)s
->session
->time
;
1053 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1054 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1055 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1056 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1057 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1063 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
< agesec
) {
1064 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1069 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1072 agems
= agesec
* (uint32_t)1000;
1074 if (agesec
!= 0 && agems
/ (uint32_t)1000 != agesec
) {
1076 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1077 * If so we just ignore it.
1083 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1086 agems
+= s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
;
1088 reshashsize
= EVP_MD_size(mdres
);
1089 s
->ext
.tick_identity
++;
1094 if (!dores
&& s
->psksession
== NULL
)
1095 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1097 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
) {
1098 mdpsk
= ssl_md(s
->psksession
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1099 if (mdpsk
== NULL
) {
1101 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1102 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1104 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1106 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1109 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& mdpsk
!= handmd
) {
1111 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1112 * session. This is an application bug.
1114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1116 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1119 pskhashsize
= EVP_MD_size(mdpsk
);
1122 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
)
1124 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1126 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1127 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1128 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1132 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
1133 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
)
1134 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, agems
)) {
1135 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1136 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1137 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1141 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
) {
1142 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->psksession_id
,
1143 s
->psksession_id_len
)
1144 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)) {
1145 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1146 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1147 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1149 s
->ext
.tick_identity
++;
1152 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1153 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &binderoffset
)
1154 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1156 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, reshashsize
, &resbinder
))
1157 || (s
->psksession
!= NULL
1158 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, pskhashsize
, &pskbinder
))
1159 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1160 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1161 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &msglen
)
1163 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1164 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1166 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt
)) {
1167 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK
,
1168 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1169 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1172 msgstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
) - msglen
;
1175 && tls_psk_do_binder(s
, mdres
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
,
1176 resbinder
, s
->session
, 1, 0) != 1) {
1177 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1178 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1181 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
1182 && tls_psk_do_binder(s
, mdpsk
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
,
1183 pskbinder
, s
->psksession
, 1, 1) != 1) {
1184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1185 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1188 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1190 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1194 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1195 unsigned int context
,
1196 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1199 if (!s
->pha_enabled
)
1200 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1202 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1203 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth
)
1204 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1205 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1207 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
,
1208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1209 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1212 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1214 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1216 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1222 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1224 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1225 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1227 size_t expected_len
= s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
1228 + s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
;
1230 const unsigned char *data
;
1232 /* Check for logic errors */
1233 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len
== 0
1234 || s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
!= 0)
1235 || !ossl_assert(expected_len
== 0
1236 || s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
!= 0)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1242 /* Parse the length byte */
1243 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &ilen
)) {
1244 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1245 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
1249 /* Consistency check */
1250 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ilen
) {
1251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1252 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
1256 /* Check that the extension matches */
1257 if (ilen
!= expected_len
) {
1258 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1259 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1263 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
1264 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
1265 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
) != 0) {
1266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1267 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1271 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
)
1272 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
,
1273 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
) != 0) {
1274 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE
,
1275 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1278 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1283 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1284 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1285 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1289 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &value
)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
1291 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1295 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1296 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value
)) {
1297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1298 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
1299 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
1303 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1305 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1306 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1307 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1309 if (value
!= s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
) {
1310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1311 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN
,
1312 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
1317 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1318 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1320 s
->session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= value
;
1325 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1326 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1328 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
1329 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1330 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1334 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1336 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1341 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
1342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1346 s
->session
->ext
.hostname
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->ext
.hostname
);
1347 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
1348 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME
,
1349 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1358 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1359 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1361 size_t ecpointformats_len
;
1362 PACKET ecptformatlist
;
1364 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ecptformatlist
)) {
1365 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
,
1366 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1370 ecpointformats_len
= PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist
);
1371 if (ecpointformats_len
== 0) {
1372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1373 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1377 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
= 0;
1378 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
);
1379 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
= OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len
);
1380 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
) {
1381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1382 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1386 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
= ecpointformats_len
;
1388 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist
,
1389 s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
,
1390 ecpointformats_len
)) {
1391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1392 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1401 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1402 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1404 if (s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
1405 !s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb(s
, PACKET_data(pkt
),
1406 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1407 s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb_arg
)) {
1408 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1409 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1413 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1414 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
,
1415 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1418 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1420 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1424 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1430 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1431 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1433 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
1434 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1435 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1440 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1441 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1443 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1444 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
,
1445 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1448 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1450 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1454 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1455 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1456 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1461 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1462 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
);
1465 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1466 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1474 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1477 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
1478 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1479 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1484 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1485 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1486 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1488 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1489 size_t size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1491 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1492 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.scts
);
1495 s
->ext
.scts_len
= (uint16_t)size
;
1497 s
->ext
.scts
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
);
1498 if (s
->ext
.scts
== NULL
1499 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.scts
, size
)) {
1500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT
,
1501 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1506 ENDPOINT role
= (context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
) != 0
1507 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT
: ENDPOINT_BOTH
;
1510 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1511 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1513 if (custom_ext_find(&s
->cert
->custext
, role
,
1514 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1516 SSLfatal(s
, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT
,
1517 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1521 if (!custom_ext_parse(s
, context
,
1522 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1523 PACKET_data(pkt
), PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1525 /* SSLfatal already called */
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1537 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1538 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1539 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1541 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1543 PACKET tmp_protocol
;
1545 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1546 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &tmp_protocol
)
1547 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol
) == 0) {
1548 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE
,
1549 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1557 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1560 unsigned char *selected
;
1561 unsigned char selected_len
;
1564 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1565 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1568 /* We must have requested it. */
1569 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
) {
1570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN
,
1571 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1575 /* The data must be valid */
1577 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s
, &tmppkt
)) {
1578 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1581 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
1583 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1584 s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb_arg
) !=
1585 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1586 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN
,
1587 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1592 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1593 * a single Serverhello
1595 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.npn
);
1596 s
->ext
.npn
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1597 if (s
->ext
.npn
== NULL
) {
1598 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN
,
1599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1603 memcpy(s
->ext
.npn
, selected
, selected_len
);
1604 s
->ext
.npn_len
= selected_len
;
1605 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 1;
1611 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1616 /* We must have requested it. */
1617 if (!s
->s3
->alpn_sent
) {
1618 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1619 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1623 * The extension data consists of:
1624 * uint16 list_length
1625 * uint8 proto_length;
1626 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1628 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt
, &len
)
1629 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
|| !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &len
)
1630 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
) {
1631 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1632 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1635 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1636 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
1637 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1642 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)) {
1643 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1644 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1647 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= len
;
1649 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
1650 || s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
!= len
1651 || memcmp(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)
1653 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1654 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
1658 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1659 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1661 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
1662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1666 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
1667 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
1668 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1669 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN
,
1670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1673 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1680 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1683 unsigned int id
, ct
, mki
;
1685 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
;
1686 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
;
1688 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ct
) || ct
!= 2
1689 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &id
)
1690 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mki
)
1691 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1692 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1693 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1698 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1700 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
);
1704 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1705 clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
1707 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1708 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES
);
1713 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1714 * presumably offered)
1716 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
); i
++) {
1717 prof
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
1719 if (prof
->id
== id
) {
1720 s
->srtp_profile
= prof
;
1725 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP
,
1726 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1731 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1734 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1735 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
1736 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
1737 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
1743 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1746 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
)
1748 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
1750 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
1755 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1756 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1758 unsigned int version
;
1760 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)
1761 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1763 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
1764 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1769 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1770 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1772 if (version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1774 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
,
1775 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1779 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1780 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
)
1783 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1784 s
->version
= version
;
1789 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1793 unsigned int group_id
;
1795 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
, *skey
= NULL
;
1798 if (ckey
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1804 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &group_id
)) {
1805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1806 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1810 if ((context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) != 0) {
1811 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
1812 size_t i
, num_groups
;
1814 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1816 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1821 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1822 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1824 if (group_id
== s
->s3
->group_id
) {
1825 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1826 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1830 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1831 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
1832 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
1833 if (group_id
== pgroups
[i
])
1837 || !tls_curve_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1839 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1843 s
->s3
->group_id
= group_id
;
1844 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1845 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
1849 if (group_id
!= s
->s3
->group_id
) {
1851 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1854 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1855 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1859 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)
1860 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
) == 0) {
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1862 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1866 skey
= ssl_generate_pkey(ckey
);
1868 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1869 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1872 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey
, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1873 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE
,
1876 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1880 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 1) == 0) {
1881 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1882 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1885 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= skey
;
1891 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1896 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cookie
)
1897 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie
, &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
1898 &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)) {
1899 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE
,
1900 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1907 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1908 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1910 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
) {
1911 unsigned long max_early_data
;
1913 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &max_early_data
)
1914 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1916 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA
);
1920 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= max_early_data
;
1925 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1926 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1927 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1931 if (!s
->ext
.early_data_ok
1934 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1935 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1936 * server should not be accepting it.
1938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA
,
1939 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1943 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
;
1948 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1952 unsigned int identity
;
1954 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &identity
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
,
1956 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1960 if (identity
>= (unsigned int)s
->ext
.tick_identity
) {
1961 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
,
1962 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY
);
1967 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1968 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1969 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1971 if (identity
== 0 && (s
->psksession
== NULL
|| s
->ext
.tick_identity
== 2)) {
1973 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->psksession
);
1974 s
->psksession
= NULL
;
1978 if (s
->psksession
== NULL
) {
1979 /* Should never happen */
1980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK
,
1981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1986 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1987 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1988 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1990 if ((s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1991 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
1992 || s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0
1993 || s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0)
1994 memcpy(s
->early_secret
, s
->psksession
->early_secret
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
1996 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1997 s
->session
= s
->psksession
;
1998 s
->psksession
= NULL
;
2000 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2002 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;